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This study has highlighted the changes in Bangladesh 
foreign policy during the Mu jib and Zia regimes. It has 
uncovered the fact that the foreign policy of the Sheikh 
Mujib regime was shaped by the principles of the national 
liberation war of Bangladesh (secularism and socialism) 
although the post-liberation reality demanded the supremacy 
of the national interest in the foreign policy formulation 
of the new nation. Because of Mujib's central priority on 
the principles of the national liberation war, his foreign 
policy was tilted towards India and the Soviet Union, as the 
two key international actors of Bangladesh's national 
liberation war. Due to their skeptical role in the 
liberation war the United States, China, and the Muslim 
world were kept away from the preferential treatment. As the 
Indo-Soviet allies failed to meet the emerging needs and 
growing economic crisis, Mujib's foreign policy failed to 
achieve the national interest and it proved dysfunctional. 
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On the other hand, following the eclipse of the Mu jib 
regime and at the beginning of the Zia era, a thaw began in 
the foreign policy decision-making process of Bangladesh. 
Ziaur Rahman considered the national interest as a vantage 
point and put top priority on it (self preservation, 
economic advancement, safe-guarding as well as augmenting 
national power and upholding national ideology). In order to 
achieve the national interest Zia very promptly transformed 
Bangladesh's foreign policy from the Indo-Soviet orbit, got 
rid of the socialist yoke, and aligned with the United 
States, China, and the Muslim world triangle. Zia's 
redesigned foreign policy has successfully explored 
sufficient external resources to meet the mounting economic 
crisis and to a great extent contributed to the economic 
development of Bangladesh. Although the Indo-Soviet threat 
was posed to the state under Zia, the new alliance of the 
United States, China, and the Muslim world effectively 
forestalled the threat and the national interest was served 
better than during the Mujib regime. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Foreign policy of a nation encompasses more than its 
behavior in the world.1 Actually, the foreign policy that a 
nation pursues is a means to an end. Foreign policy is 
important to any new state, for it helps the state to 
reaffirm its independence and articulate its identity.2 The 
main goal behind foreign policy pursuance is to attain the 
objectives that the country sets before itself. These 
objectives necessarily vary from country to country. 
Generally, foreign policy objectives may be determined by 
geo-politics, historical urges, national interests, people's 
aspiration, ethnicity, elite perception, economic 
compulsion, religious feelings, value system, domestic 
politics, domestic policy and external environment. In fact, 
shaping the foreign policy of a country is a complex and 
complicated political decision, particularly for the small 
states in the Third World. Difficulties for the analysis of 
1James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, Foreign Policy Making and 
the American Political System (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 
1983), 1. 
2Robert L. Rothstein, The Weak in the World of the Strong: The 
Developing Countries in the International System (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), 105. 
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foreign policy are also more acutely evident in the Third 
World countries. Korany perceives the Third World's foreign 
policy as the underdeveloped area of study of the 
underdeveloped countries.3 
In the words of Korany: 
Basic handicaps in the analysis of Third World 
foreign policy, especially of the decision making 
process, are the lack of data and the cult of 
secrecy practiced by many state authorities. In 
many Third World countries, the press is both 
technically less developed and more "guided" than 
that in the West. Moreover, the inadequacy of 
documentary and archival facilities makes the 
analysis of decisions very hazardous.4 
Statement of the Problem 
Since its emergence in 1971, Bangladesh has been 
pursuing foreign policies in order to achieve its national 
interest. Because of its lack of adequate economic 
strength and military power, the foreign policy of 
Bangladesh seeks to balance and harmonize the domestic and 
external environments. The success of its foreign policy can 
be observed in the bilateral and multilateral context, where 
it has taken various measures in order to influence the 
international environment. 
This study seeks to examine the changing patterns of 
the Bangladesh foreign policy in the context of domestic 
3Bahgat Korany, "The Take-off of Third World Studies: The Case 
of Foreign Policy," World Politics 35, no 3 (April 1983): 465. 
4Bahgat Korany, How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in the 
Third World: A Comparative Analysis (Boulder and London: Westview 
Press, 1989), 91. 
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political changes. Changes in the foreign policy decision 
making of Bangladesh will be examined by comparing the 
foreign policy decisions of Sheik Mujibur Rahman (1971-1975) 
and Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981) regimes.5 
In the aftermath of independence, Sheik Mujibur 
Rahman's regime formulated a foreign policy in the light of 
the Liberation War of Bangladesh, which was guided by his 
own political philosophy, "Mujibism," based on the 
principles of nationalism, socialism, secularism, and 
democracy. These were also adopted as the state principles 
of Bangladesh by the Mu jib government. Because of their 
supportive role in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, and the 
secular and socialist state policies, naturally Bangladesh's 
foreign policy during the Mujib regime became aligned with 
the Indo-Soviet axis. After the coup d'état of August, 
1975, with the end of the Mujib regime and with the advent 
of Ziaur Rahman as a strongman in Bangladesh politics, both 
the domestic and foreign policy of Bangladesh have changed. 
Zia brought some major changes in the domestic 
policy. He replaced the state principles of secularism and 
socialism with "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah 
(God) and economic and social justice."6 Moreover, Zia 
5Mujib regime started from December,1971 and ended in August 
1975 and Zia regime started in August 1975 and ended in May 1981. 
Sheikh Mujibur-Rahman and Ziaur Rahman were popularly known as Mujib 
and Zia. 
6The Bangladesh Observer (Dhaka: April 22, 1977) . 
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introduced a free market economy at the domestic level. At 
the international level, Zia reversed course and established 
close linkage with Pakistan, China, the USA, and the Muslim 
world. Zia's foreign policy was shaped by Western 
liberalism, principles of Islamic solidarity and the 
principles of friendship to all and malice to none. 
However, the purpose of this study is to examine the 
changes in Bangladesh foreign policy, by comparing the 
foreign policy decisions of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur 
Rahman. In order to focus on the process of changes, the 
author will analyze Bangladesh's relations with India, 
Pakistan, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and the 
Muslim world during the Mujib and Zia regimes. 
The main purpose of this research is to detail and 
explain the changes in foreign relations of the Bangladesh 
with each state during the Mujib and Zia regimes (1971— 
1981) . 
Definition of Key Concepts 
Foreign Policy 
By its nature, foreign policy is a problematic study 
and complex phenomenon. For its study, one has to go deep 
into the motivation of a nation. Because of its complex 
nature experts on international politics suggested treating 
foreign policy as a separate discipline. Generally, it is 
believed that foreign policy is a wheel through which the 
process of international politics operates. Conceptually, 
5 
foreign policy is that part of the national policy of a 
state which relates to the external environment.7 
According to K.J. Holsti, "the action of a state 
towards international environment and the conditions, 
usually domestic, under which - these actions are formulated 
concerned essentially with foreign policy."8 Prince Otto Von 
Bishmark defined foreign policy as, "the extension of 
domestic policy."9 Henry Kissinger has given a simplistic 
definition. He stated, "foreign policy begins where 
domestic policy ends."10 Modelski has defined foreign policy 
as "the process whereby a state adjusts its actions to those 
of other states so as to minimize adverse actions and 
maximize the favorable actions of foreign states."u 
For an operational definition of foreign policy we can 
say that, it consists of the course of actions which a state 
usually undertakes in its efforts to carry out its national 
objectives beyond the limits of its own jurisdiction. 
7Md. Halim, "Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: Framework of 
Analysis" in Ahamed Emajuddin (Ed.), Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A 
Small States Imperatives. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1989), 7. 
8
K.J. Holsti, international Politics; h Framework of Analysis, 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1967), 21. 
9Md. Halim, 80. 
10 Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" in 
George S. Masalinat and Gilbert Abcarian (Eds.), International 
Politics: Introductory Readings".(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1970), 155. 




Defining small states is indeed problematic. There is 
no consensus on it and the studies on small states as 
separate entities are misleading. In fact, in an extreme 
case, Behar has been quite critical about the strength of 
the concept of small states as an analytical tool and 
suggested abandoning smallness as a focus for research.12 
Others are not however, that rigid in their attitude towards 
this concept. Maniruzzaman thinks that the definition of 
small states depends upon its use.13 Initially, the small 
states were identified as so because of their small 
geographical size.14 However, now-a-days size alone does not 
define a small state. Size is now taken only as one of many 
criteria's. With the changing conditions of the world the 
definition and indication of small states have also been 
changing. It is argued by some scholars that the small 
states are very much dependent on larger countries. This is 
a contributory factor for their underdevelopment. Due to the 
existence of these dependency relationships, the small 
states are the underdogs, while the larger ones benefit out 
12R. Behar, "Small States: A Tool for Analysis" in World Folitics 
27, no. 3 (1975), 456-457. 
13Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Security of Small States in the 
Third World (Canbera: Australian National University, 1982), 15. 
14Percy Selwyn, "Introduction: Room for Maneuver" in Development 
Policy in Small Countries (London: Grooms Helms in Association with 
the Institute of Defense Studies, Sussex, 1975), 8. 
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of this dependence. According to Percy Selwyn there are 
five major areas where small states are dependent.15 
1. Eolitical Status 
2. Monetary Policies 
3. Trade 
4. Aid 
5. Operation of Multinational Corporations (MN££) 
1. Political Status. Politically, the small states are 
the client states of rich larger countries and in practice 
have no truly sovereign political existence. They can not 
determine what decision is to be taken, how to be taken, and 
for whom to be taken. All these are determined by the 
patron countries. 
2. Trade . The heavy dependence of small states on 
external trade is very much evident. Moreover, they hold no 
influence on the market. This dependence can be compounded 
by extreme export specialization. 
3. Monetary Policies. Small states are also dependent 
in respect of monetary policies. This is an area where there 
is more opportunity for maneuver. Many countries tie the 
value of their currencies to some of the international 
currencies such as the dollar, franc, or sterling and the 
world monetary crisis has forced small states to share some 
of these adverse effects. 
15 Ibid., 20. 
8 
4. Aid. The aid relationship between donor countries 
and small recipient countries is well known as dominance of 
dependency between the donor countries and the small aid 
recipient countries. The donor countries dictate political 
and economic strategies in the recipient countries. 
5. Operation of Multinational Corporations (MNCS) . The 
Multinational Corporations invest their capitals in small 
states and expropriate the economic surplus from these 
countries. Selwyn has further shown the following features 
of small states from the economic point of view:16 
1. Small poor states cannot afford equally 
protective tariff structure and may indeed have 
few industries to protect. 
2. The small states are not self-contained in 
terms of factors of production. 
3. Small states are generally more specialized in 
single commodity production and their internal 
economies are very weakly integrated. 
Maniruzzaman is in favor of constructing a composite 
scores of war capability for each nation from the two 
quantitative criteria - GNP and military budget in order to 
identify the small states.17 After careful examination of the 
above definitions, we would like to go for a weighted 
composite index to identify small states. We would thus call 
all those states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as 
16Percy Selwyn, "Industrial Development in Peripheral Small 
Countries" in Development Policy in Samll Countries (Groom Helm, 
London: in Association with the Institute of Development Studies, 
Sussex, 1975), 77-78. 
17 Maniruzzaman, 15. 
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small, which are characterized by: (1) small size, (2) low 
per capita income compared to industrialized countries, 
(3) high dependence on foreign capital, (4) weak defense 
capability, and (5) massive poverty. 
Capability 
The elements of national power of a country constitute 
the capability of the nation to pursue foreign policy. 
Foreign policy formulation itself is concerned with striking 
an even balance between capability available to and 
objectives desired by that nation. When both capability and 
policy goals are in an even balance, we speak of national 
policy. But, when they are not, which is often the case, 
either capability or policy objectives is to be modified. 
Robinson has aptly pointed out: 
Foreign policy goals must not range beyond the 
power available, for although national desires for 
good and for evil are infinite, the resources for 
obtaining them are strictly limited.18 
Domestic Policy 
Generally, domestic policy of a nation consists of its 
governmental policy towards the political system, domestic 
economic policy and it social policy. Domestic policy and 
foreign policy together form the national policy of a state. 
Foreign policy is usually based on the requirements of the 
domestic policy. As Padelford, Lincoln and Olvey say: 
18Quoted in Md. Abdul Halim, 10. 
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Foreign and domestic policy must be mutually 
supporting, if national policy aspiration is to be 
achieved in an atmosphere of political 
stability.19 
Perhaps, this dictum is more appropriate for Bangladesh 
where almost 60 percent of the annual budget and 80% of the 
development budget is financed by external assistance. In 
Bangladesh, foreign policy really begins at home. Each year 
the domestic policy makers appraise the foreign policy 
makers of the amount of foreign aid which would be needed 
for that year and the latter formulate foreign policy 
accordingly. 
Domestic Politics 
The domestic politics of a democratic country has 
important role on its foreign policy. The domestic politics 
consists of domestic political situations, psychology of the 
people, hopes and aspirations of the people, ethnic interest 
groups and special interest groups' attitudes, etc. 
Regarding domestic politics, Alan C. Isaak has pointedly 
argued: "To change any nations foreign policy its internal 
structure must change."20 
The policy makers must try to understand the domestic 
politics. If they ignore it, they may not remain in power. 
19Norman J. Padelford, George A. Lincoln, and Lee D. Olvey, "The 
Dynamics of International Politics (New York: Macmillian Pulishing Co. 
Inc., 1976), 201. 
20Alan C. Isaak, Scope .and Method of Political Science (Chicago, 
Dorsay, 1977) . 
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This is true in the case of both democracy and totalitarian 
systems. Professor Northedge has rightly pointed out: 
The formation of foreign policy... represents on 
domestic side, a continuous series of compromises 
and adjustments between the different elements of 
government and social structure.21 
The International Environment 
The international environment refers to the attributes 
of the international system and to the characteristics and 
behaviors of the actors comprising it. It includes all 
aspects of external environment of a country or any action 
occurring abroad that conditions or otherwise influences the 
choices made by its officials.22 Another way of defining 
international environment is to say that the international 
environment refers broadly to the impact of the state of the 
world on the particular state. The international environment 
exerts an important influence on the foreign policy of a 
country. The configuration of the international system on 
the distribution of power worldwide, may favor a country to 
pursue certain courses of action and the same condition may 
set limits to the maneuverability of another state. 
21F.S. Northedge, "The Nature of Foreign Policy" in F.S. 
Northedge (Ed.), The Foreign Policy of the Powers (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1968), 27. 
22Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign 
Policy: Pattern and Process (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 17- 
18. 
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The Muslim World 
The Muslim World consists of both of those states which 
are ruled by Islamic laws and those which are not ruled by 
the Islamic laws. But the rulers and majority of the 
population of these countries are Muslim. The Islamic world 
is comprised of those Muslim states which are exclusively 
ruled by the strict principles of Quran and Sunnah. Though 
very often both the terms of the Muslim world and Islamic 
world are used interchangeably, the two terms are different 
in real sense. 
Geo-politics 
Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish geographer first used the 
term geo-politics to describe the geo-political base of 
national power. In the Inter-War Period, the followers of 
Kjellen used geo-politics to develop a framework for German 
National Expansion. According to Karl Haushofer, geo¬ 
politics represented the relationship of political phenomena 
to geography.23 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, 
Jr. argues that geo-political analysis is based upon a 
scientific knowledge of geography and its relationship to 
technology, resources and population.24 
23Quoted in James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 
Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1990), 64-65. 
24 Ibid., 65. 
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State Actors 
It implies that nation states play the role of key 
actors in framing the foreign policy of a nation. Bangladesh 
is no exception of this pattern. In the foreign policy 
decision-making process of Bangladesh, the impact of the 
state of the world plays a very crucial role both at 
political and economic levels. The behavior of other states 
directed towards Bangladesh influences the foreign policy 
makers of the country. 
Non. State Actors 
The "non state actors" are also very important 
variables in the foreign policy formulation of Bangladesh. 
It includes international intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs), non governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
multinational corporations (MNCs). Non state actors have 
provided both forums for international contact and the glue 
of interdependence. 
Methodology 
The methodological approach used in this study is an 
exploratory approach. This approach is used because it 
provides an opportunity for the researcher to undertake a 
comprehensive explanation and analysis of many components 
for the subject matter. While the hypothetical method, which 
is based on pre-conceived ideas or beliefs, which tend to 
confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis, it sometimes may lead 
14 
the researcher towards a biased study. Moreover, as I am 
not pre-occupied with any belief or hypothesis, regarding 
the foreign policy of Bangladesh I have chosen the method of 
exploratory study for conducting this research. By using 
this method an attempt will be made to collect and examine 
data on the foreign relations of Bangladesh in order to 
focus upon the changing patterns of Bangladesh foreign 
policy during the Mujib and Zia regimes (1971-1981). 
For this study, data will be collected from both 
primary and secondary sources, viz: Government documents, 
independent reports, scholarly and journalistic articles, 
newspaper reports, and from published text and unpublished 
theses and dissertations. More specifically, primary 
sources include: 
Documents 
Bangladesh Documents/ Congressional Records Department 
of State Bulletin, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States: Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and 
Ronald Reagan; Presidential Papers of Jimmy Carter: (White 
House Central Files [WHCF], Executive File, Name File and 
General File); The Anderson Papers. The Carnegie Papers, The 
American Universities Field Staff Report, Documents of the 
Bangladesh Government, viz; The S.R.D. Brief, The Flow of 
External Resources into Bangladesh, White Papers on the 
Ganges water Dispute, The Amnesty International fieport, 
Stockholm. International Peace Research Institute (SIPFI3 
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fear Book/ The Military Balance (London) . The IMF, Direction 
of-Xrade Statistics- Statistical Year Book Q£ Bangladesh. 
The Speeches and Statements 
Jawharlal Nehru, M.A. Jinnah, Liakat Ali-Khan, H.S. 
Suhrawardi, Indira Gandhi, Z.A. Bhutto, Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, Ziaur-Rahman, and Maulana Bashani. 
Political Auto-Biographies 
A.K. Azad, India Wins Freedom. 
Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence. 
Ayub Khan, Friends Not Master. 
Benazir, Bhutto, The Daughter of the East. 
Secondary Sources Include 
1. a. Articles in Professional Journals, viz, Foreign 
Affairs Eoxeign Policy . World Politics . The National 
Interest. Current History. QRBIS. Pacific Affairs. Asian 
Snr.v.ey ■ Asdan Studies ■ Aalan Affairs . The Journal of. 
Developing Areas . South Asian Review. World Affairs ■ 
Economic and. Political Weekly, World View. International 
Affairs . BUSS Journal. Regional Studies ■ Journal o_f 
Comparative Politics . Pakistan Horizon . Indian Political 
Science Review, Problems of Communism, Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press . The American-Asian Review . The Australian 
Journal of Politics and History. Journal of Asdan and 
African Studies. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern 
Studies• 
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b. Moscow Review. USSR and The Third World. Reprint 
from The Soviet Press, etc. 
2. Books . Books related to Bangladesh politics and 
foreign policy. 
3. Newspapers. The Bangladesh Observer. The Bangladesh 
Times. The Daily Itteqaq. New York Time. Washington,East. 
Baltimore Sun. The Time (London) . The Observer (London) . Jhs. 
Guardian (London). The Pravda (from the current digest of 
the Soviet Press). The Statesman. The Hindustan Times. The 
Patriot. 
4. News Magazines. Time.. Newsweek. u.s. News and World 
Repart . The Economist . Far Eastern Economic Review.. The 
Enk.ing__.Review. The Bichittra, The Robbar, The Dhaka Courier. 
5. Unpublished Works. 
6. Thesis and Dissertations. 
Research Nature and Research Questions 
The nature of this research is an exploratory study. 
In order to carry out the exploration, the following 
research questions will be addressed in this study: 
1. What were the underlying reasons behind the Indo- 
Soviet support in the Liberation War of Bangladesh? and Why 
did the USA, China and the Muslim World oppose it? 
2. Why and how did the Mu jib regime follow a "tilt" 
policy towards the Indo-Soviet axis? 
3. Why did Bangladesh-Pakistan relations remain 
stagnant during the Mujib regime? 
17 
4. Why did the Mu jib regime fail to develop a friendly 
and cooperative relationship with the US, China, and the 
Muslim world? 
5. Why and how did Ziaur Rahman transform Bangladesh 
foreign policy from an Indo-Soviet orbit to a Western, 
Chinese and Muslim world triangle? 
6. Why and how did Ziaur Rahman shift Bangladesh- 
Pakistan relations from confrontation to co-operation? 
7. What kind of impact did the Western, Chinese, and 
Muslim world have on Ziaur Rahman's foreign policy? 
8. What kind of impact did the Indo-Soviet alliance 
have on Ziaur Rahman's government? 
9. What were the major foreign policy changes of Zia as 
compared to Mujib? 
Theoretical Framework 
A sound and well defined theoretical framework is an 
essential prerequisite for a scientific inquiry in social 
science research. Since no single theoretical framework is 
sufficient to explain a total picture of social reality, it 
is difficult to establish a theoretical framework in order 
to analyze the political reality in international relations. 
Because of the ever changing nature and fluid and dynamic 
character of the field, where multiple actors, issues and 
events interact with multi-dimensional goals and objectives, 
it is not so easy to analyze international relations, 
especially foreign policy in a rigid theoretical framework. 
18 
However, this study will be based on the theory of "national 
interest." 
The modern concept of "national interest" in the study 
of international relations/politics originated after the 
emergence of nation-states. It has started to be used in 
international relations with the emergence of European- 
nation states in the 16th and the 17th centuries. The date 
usually given is that of the Westphalian state system that 
was established in 1648.25 The concept of "national interest" 
evolved hand in hand with the evolution of national state 
system, the increase in influence of political control and 
the great expansion of economic relations.26 National 
interest refers to matters important enough to a nation¬ 
state to become a goal of national policies.2"7 There are 
different types of national interest; political, economic, 
ideological, military-security and socio-cultural. National 
interests are reflected both in domestic and external 
policies. Shifts and changes in the domestic coalitions and 
international relations may require a re-definition of 
25The Westphalian state system recognized equal sovereignity of 
European states, i.e., territorial integrity, neutrality as well as 
the right to preserve and promote their national interests. See, Lynn 
H. Miller, Global Order: Values and Power in International Policies 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 17-34. 
26Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1966), 21. 
27Golam Mostafa, "National Interest and Foreign Policy: A Case 
Study of Bangladesh's Relations with the Former Soviet Union, 1980- 
1990"; Department of Political Science, Carleton Univ., Ottawa, 
Canada; An Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 117. 
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national interest by a nation-state. Political, economic and 
technological changes also redistribute power, both at 
domestic and international levels, which may likewise compel 
nation-states to redefine their national interests.28 
Although the term "national interest" has become widely 
used in the post-World War II period, particularly in 
defining and executing U.S. foreign policy, the concern 
among analysts, leaders and policy planners, for what comes 
to be seen as national interest started long ago. For 
example, in the late 19th century, Alfred Mahan defined 
national interest as the prime consideration of diplomacy 
and held: 
Self interest is not only a legitimate, but a 
fundamental cause for national policy; one which 
need no cloak of hypocrisy... it is vain to expect 
governments to act continuously on any other 
ground than national interest. They have no right 
to do so, being agents and not principals.29 
Although during the inter-war period, the idealist-utopian 
views dominated the international relations theory, the 
national interest was considered as the guiding force for 
U.S. foreign policy. U.S. Secretary of the State Charles 
Hughes stated in 1924: 
Foreign policies are not built upon abstractions. 
They are the results of national interest arising 
28Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13. 
29Alfred T. Mahan, The Interest in America in Sea Power - Present 
and Future (Boston: Little and Brown, 1895); quoted in Golam Mastafa, 
20. 
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from some immediate exigency or standing out 
vividly in historical perspective.30 
While Charles A. Beard described national interest: 
...as a pivot of diplomacy is now universally 
employed in international relations. Indeed it 
may be said that national interest -- its 
maintenance, advancement and defense by the 
various means and instrumentalities of political 
power -- is the prime consideration of 
diplomacy.31 
Some scholars argue that national interest may be pursued 
for both offensive and defensive purposes and thus may be 
defined in an expansionist as well as in defensive matrix. 
It has been used to justify expansion and promotion of 
political, economic and ideological objectives globally as 
well as to secure the minimalist objectives of survival and 
the protection and preservation of a nation-state's 
sovereignty.32 
In international relations, actually the concept of 
"national interest" is debatable and controversial. The term 
has been widely used by analysts, political leaders, 
diplomats and bureaucrats, but it has never been properly 
conceptualized. Different criteria have been used to define 
national interest. Stephen Krasner, for example, considered 
material objectives and ambitious ideological goals as 
30Charles Hughes, International Conciliation 194 (January 1924): 
3. 
31Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1966) 21. 
32 Golam Mostafa, 23. 
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national interests.33 While Donald Nuechterlein used four 
aspects of national interest: 
1. Defense interest; the protection of the nation¬ 
state and its citizens from the threat of 
physical violence by another country. 
2. Economic interest; the enhancement of the 
nation-state's economic well-being in relations 
with other states. 
3. World-order interest: the maintenance of an 
international political and economic system in 
which the nation-state can feel secure. 
4. Geological interest: the protection and 
furtherance of a set of values which the 
citizens of a nation share and believe to be 
universally good.34 
Neuchterlein's analysis provided a useful general framework 
for understanding the concept of "national interest" in its 
objective aspects. But, it ignored the subjective aspects 
that can be crucial because national interest is often 
defined and influenced by intangible factors such as 
attitudes, perceptions and priorities of given regimes, 
leaders or societies. Moreover, "national interest" is a 
very relative term. It also varies from time to time. Since 
nation-states are the products of historical experience, 
national interests also shaped by history. It changes, 
reshapes, and modifies by history. During the Cold War, for 
33Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw 
Materials, Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 10. 
34Donald Nuechterlein, "The Concept of National Interest: A Time 
for New Approach," Qrbis (Spring 1979): 85. 
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example, national interest became almost synonymous with 
national security. But, now that security perceptions are 
changing, many nations have become more concerned with their 
social, economic and environmental interests. 
In the absence of universal definition of national 
interest, there are doubts among two groups of scholars. The 
first group of realists, define national interest solely in 
terms of material--military, political and economic. Others, 
on the other hand, insist that national interest should be 
defined more broadly. James Billington, for example, argues 
that national interest should be understood both in terms of 
material and non-material aspects.35 
The realists' view of national interest is mainly 
derived from the notion of "raison d'etat" or state 
interest. For them, national interest is an objective 
category which is universally valid and is unaffected by the 
circumstances of time and place.36 Classical realists 
consider national interest as a "perennial standard" or a 
"motive force" by which political actions of states should 
be guided: 
According to Hans J. Morgentrau: 
35James H. Billington, "Reflections on the Non-Material Aspects 
of National Interests" in Professor Gifford (Ed.), The National 
Interest of the United States (Washington, D. C., Woodwrod Wilson 
Center for Scholars; University Press of America, 1981), 180-183. 
36Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 4. 
23 
It is not only a political necessity but also 
moral duty for a nation to follow in its dealings 
with other nations but one guiding star, one 
standard for thought, one rule of action; the 
national interest.37 
The realists define national interests in terms of high 
politics (politics, military and security), not "low 
politics" (trade, finance, and monetary-exchange). 
The realists' view of national interest seriously 
influenced U.S. foreign policy planning and execution in the 
post-World War II era. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew 
Brezezinsky were two of the realists who held high office in 
U.S. administrations, and brought new meaning and 
understanding to the concept of national interest in terms 
of security and finance. 
Henry Kissinger's main preoccupation was to maintain 
international order, security and legitimacy. According to 
him, stability comes from legitimacy and legitimate order 
limits the scope for conflicts and guarantees the interest 
of all states by maintaining equilibrium.38 
While Brezezinski defined national interest in terms of 
power and security, but involved wider considerations of 
political state craft, economic strength, technological 
innovation and ideological vitality.39 
37Hans J. Morgenthau, 10. 
38Henry Kissinger, World Restored (New York: Library Grosset and 
Dunlop, 1964) . 
39Zbigzniew Brezezinski, Between Two Ages: American Role in the 
Technetronic Era (New York: The Viking Press, 1970). Also see Zbigniew 
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While defining national interest, Irving Kristol has 
presented a series of definitions: 
1. It is our national interest that no other super 
power emerge whose political and social values 
are profoundly hostile to our own. 
2. It follows that it is our national interest 
that those nations which largely share our 
political principles and social values should 
be protected from those that do not. 
3. Our relations with the other nations of the 
world will be decided candidly on a case by 
case basis. To the degree that any...nation has 
a foreign policy friendly towards us, we will 
surly be disposed to be friendly to it. To the 
degree that it displays hostility, we will 
reciprocate. Similarly to the degree that any 
country adapts its socio-economic-political 
arrangements to correspond to this prevailing 
in the west, we will find it easier to be more 
intimate in our friendship. To the degree that 
it does not, our relations will be at best cool 
and correct. 
4. But what about the moral dimension of American 
foreign policy? It has always been there and 
since we are a traditional nation founded on a 
liberal creed, it always will be there.40 
On the other hand Samuel P. Huntington, in his "Advice 
for a Democratic President," has equated national interest 
with economic renewal. According to him, the first priority 
of American foreign policy is economic renewal of the United 
States. Huntington said: 
It is a long term imperative which requires 
fundamental changes in the major elements of 
American life and culture. Yet it is essential 
both to future American prosperity and to the 
Brezezinski, In Quest of National Security (Boulder & London: Westview 
Press, 1988) . 
40Irving Kristol, "Defining Our National Interest," The National 
Interest (Fall 1990): 16. 
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future American role to the world. The need for 
economic renewal is written in clear, familiar and 
dismal facts of the American economic performances 
and of the forces that shape economic performance 
include G.N.P. growth, productivity growth, 
technological innovations, saving rates, 
investment levels, educational quality, production 
of scientists and engineers and resources 
committed to research and development.41 
While arguing for economic renewal Huntington further 
said, in the new world environment economic power is what 
counts.42 Finally in his concluding argument he said: 
The United States can only be involved and 
exercise leadership in the world, if it is 
economically dynamic, productive, and strong. To 
stay abroad, America must come home. And it must 
come home not to indulge or isolate itself, but to 
know itself.43 
Since there is no universal definition of national 
interest, no matter whatever debates and differences are 
existing between the realists and the others, the definition 
of national interest depends on its use, and the fact 
remains that national interest plays a key role in shaping 
the foreign policy of a country. 
According to Sondermann: 
National interest is an effort to describe the 
underlying rationale for the behavior of states 
and statesman in a threatening international 
environment.44 
41Samuel Huntington, "Advice for a Democratic President: The 
Economic Renewal of America," The National Interest (Spring 1992): 14. 
42Huntington, Ibid., 17 
43Ibid., 18. 
44Fred A. Sondermann, The Theory and Practice of International 
Relations, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), 35. 
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In the foreign policy decision making process of a 
country, national interests are the ultimate determinants 
that the decision makers of a state ought to follow in 
formulating their foreign policy. National interests are 
typically seen as general conceptions of those essential 
elements that make up a state's most vital needs. 
Invariably, these include self-preservation, independence, 
territorial integrity, military, security, and economic well 
being.45 
Regarding national interest, Mohammed Ali, Pakistan's 
ex-foreign minister has argued: 
In international relations, there can be no 
eternal friends, nor can there be eternal enemies. 
The only thing eternal is the national interest. 
History teaches us that England and France have 
been fighting for a hundred years, and today, they 
are friends. We also know that during the last 
war, America and Russia fought together side by 
side, but today, they are at logger heads. So 
there is no eternal friendship in international 
relations and there is no eternal enmity.46 
Ideally, national leaders and policy makers are charged with 
the responsibility of equally promoting and defending 
national interests. But sometimes such a task becomes 
almost an impossible one to accomplish. Hans J. Morgenthau 
45Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), 1-2. 
46Md. Ahsen Chaudhury, "Foundation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy" 
in Latif Admed Sherwani, et al., (Ed.), The Foreign Policy of 
Pakistan: An Analysis" (Karachi: Allies Book Corporation, 1964), 26. 
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clearly elucidated the importance of the national interest 
in international politics as follows: 
...while the concern of politics with interest is 
perennial, the connection between interest and the 
national state is a product of history. The 
national state itself is obviously a product of 
history and as such is destined to yield in time 
to different modes of political organization. As 
long as the world is politically organized into 
nations, the national interest is indeed the last 
word in international politics.47 
Although national interests may stand above particular 
interest and may be the last word in international politics, 
they also raise serious controversies, such as: a) What 
exactly the national interests of a nation are in any given 
situation: b) Whether or not they are being seriously 
threatened by external forces, and c) How best to promote 
and/or defend them.48 Despite the controversies, nation 
states in the contemporary state system interact with one 
another and they promote and defend their national 
interests. Differences in national interests of states may 
lead to actual conflict, but such a clash "has never 
precluded reconciliation or even cooperation among nations 
in other areas.49 According to Duchacek, "when the interests 
of several nations seriously clash, it does not mean that 
these nations are in national opposition at all times in all 
47Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1958), 67-68. 




respects."50 Nation states sometime have harmonious 
interests, when they do, they often work together to solve 
mutual problems. 
The theory of national interest is being used as the 
main theoretical framework for analyzing Bangladesh foreign 
policy. However, this study will not be guided by only one 
theoretical framework, because of its disadvantages of 
limiting us from exploring other competing and relevant 
theories that will be significant to the study. For 
example, David Easton has provided a rationale behind the 
limitations of paradigms. He has remarked: 
Each type of theoretical orientation brings to 
surface a different set of problems, provides 
unique insight and emphasis and thereby makes it 
possible for an alternative and even competing 
theories to be equally and simultaneously useful 
though often for quite different purposes.51 
State of Existing Literature 
It is quite evident that apart from primary sources, 
review of some of the existing literature on the area, 
constitutes and gives focus to the present study. In this 
regard, the literature review covers the literature dealing 
with the Bangladesh politics and Bangladesh foreign policy 
in general and Bangladesh's relation with its neighbors and 
50lbid. 
51David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967), 23. 
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great powers in particular, which will greatly facilitate 
the study by focusing on the tasks of this inquiry. 
The relevant and useful literature on the subject can 
be classified to the following categories: 
In the first place some studies unfolded the role of 
the great powers in the liberation war of Bangladesh.52 
G.W. Chaudhury's work has shown the role of India, the 
Soviet Union, China and the USA in the Bangladesh crisis. 
His analysis reveals that it was India, which exploited the 
internal situation of the hostile neighbor Pakistan and 
enhanced the independence of Bangladesh. Among many 
reasons, he has uncovered that India cherished those values, 
which Sheik Mujibur Rahman (The Architect of Bangladesh 
Movement) had.53 He also has maintained that Indian 
interaction in Bangladesh was against the UN charter and the 
bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan. 
About the role of the Soviet Union in the Bangladesh 
crisis, Chaudhury has claimed that the Soviet Union 
supported the Bangladesh crisis in order to protect its own 
strategic interest in the subcontinent. 
52For example, G. W. Chaudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan 
(Bloomington: Indiana Unviersity Press, 1979); Mizanur Rahman Shelly, 
Emergence of a New Nation in a Multi-Polar World: Bangladesh (Dhaka: 
University Press Limited, 1979). 
53G.W. Chaudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1974), 210. 
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Chaudhury's comments regarding the role of the Soviet 
Union is quite valid and acceptable, but it requires the 
explanation of Soviet strategic interest. 
Regarding the role of China in the Liberation War of 
Bangladesh, Chaudhury argued that ideologically the 
Bangladesh movement was not a true national liberation war, 
because the movement had started with the help of India and 
the Soviet Union under a bourgeois party. From the 
standpoint of Peking, it was a conflict between two 
bourgeois elites - one in East Pakistan and the other in 
West Pakistan. So obviously, China supported the Pakistan 
government which had supported China faithfully in the Sino- 
Soviet rivalry in the area. 
About the role of the US in the Liberation War of 
Bangladesh, the author clearly pointed out that the Nixon 
Administration wanted to have a political settlement of the 
Bangladesh crisis within the federal structure of Pakistan. 
In his conclusion, Chaudhury has pointed out that 
India's military success in the third Indo-Pakistan War was 
almost a foregone conclusion.54 This kind of argument is 
based on sound evidence and information and acceptable. But 
overall, Chaudhury's analysis, does not necessarily cover 
any aspect of Bangladesh foreign policy. It only focuses on 
the role of major powers in the Liberation War of 
Bangladesh. 
54 G.W. Chaudhury, 228. 
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Mizanur Ruhaman Shelly's work has concentrated on the 
role of the super powers during the Bangladesh crisis. 
Shelly's book has set the discussion in the perspective of 
international power game, the origin and development of 
Bengali nationalism, the nature of Indian role in the 
liberation war of Bangladesh, the role of the Soviet Union, 
China and the US during the Bangladesh struggle of 1971. 
Shelly's analysis regarding the role of the Soviet 
Union in the liberation war unfolded a new dimension. The 
author established this thesis that the reason behind the 
Soviet siding with India against Pakistan was to contain and 
encircle China. In fact, it was a part of Brezhnev's 
collective security plan in Asia, which Brezhnev announced 
in 1969 as the first secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party. It was as follows: "the course of events is also 
putting on the agenda, the task of creating a system of 
collective security in Asia."55 
But what important aspects are missing in Shelly's 
work? At first, Shelly has failed to show why the Soviets 
had to involve so deeply in the crisis. Actually, of all the 
super powers Russia was mostly interested in the Bangladesh 
movement because of geo-political reasons. Similarly, Shelly 
presented the role of China in the Bangladesh liberation war 
in an oversimplified way. According to Shelly "...the 
Chinese government remained silent with the East Bengal 
55Cited in Mizanur Rahman Shelly, 107. 
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issue.56 In fact, this kind of comment simply misleads the 
researchers toward neutral political analysis. The fact was 
that from the very beginning to the end of the Bangladesh 
crisis, China strongly sided with Pakistan.57 
Regarding role of the U.S.A. in the liberation war, the 
author mentioned that during the first phase of Bangladesh's 
liberation war, the U.S. posture was neutral and it 
described the problem in East Bengal as Pakistan's internal 
matter. The second phase started with the secret trip by 
Henry Kissinger, to China in July 1971. This marked the real 
beginnings of the Sino-U.S. detente. The third phase covered 
the period of Indo-Pakistan War. During this period, the 
United States backed Pakistan and accused India for the 
escalation of hostilities.58 
In the broad analysis, it appeared that although 
Shelly's work lacks conceptual framework and provides very 
brief analysis, it is true that his work is informative and 
insightful. Nevertheless, it will help make insightful 
analysis on the great powers role in the liberation war of 
Bangladesh. 
56Shelly, 107. 
57G.W. Chaudhury, 210-214; and also see Tariq Ali, "Pakistan and 
Bangladesh: Results and Prospects in Robin Blackburn (Ed.), Explosion 
in a Sub Continent (Penguin Books, 1975), 321. 
58 Shelly, 116-117. 
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The second category of studies59 focuses on the 
international relations of the South Asian countries. 
Brown's work is an account of history and contemporary 
social and political conditions of the subcontinent. The 
author unfolded the relations of South Asian countries with 
the United States from pre-independence period to the 
emergence of Bangladesh. 
Palmer's study primarily deals with the internal 
dynamics and external policies of India and Pakistan with 
the historical background of their unhappy state of 
relations and the United States-South Asian contacts. It 
provides historical evidence and information regarding 
agreements and disagreements of the South Asian two hostile 
neighbors with the United States. It's a classic work of the 
author on South Asian international relations. 
The third type of studies60 deals with different aspects 
of Bangladesh foreign policy and various aspects of Great 
Power's South Asian Policy. 
Lawrence Ziring's work is the testimony to the intense 
interest generated by events in South and Southeast Asia. 
The central thread of this study, however, is the posture of 
59w. Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972). Norman 
D. Palmer, South Asia and the United States Policy (New York: Hughton 
Mifflin, 1966). 
60Lawrence Ziring (Ed.), The Subcontinent in the World Politics: 
India. Its Neighbors and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1978). 
34 
the great powers. The probable aims and movements of the 
former Soviet Union and the United States in the region are 
given careful attention, and efforts are made to trace their 
historic involvement as well as project future attitude and 
performance. 
Actually, this book is a collection of several 
articles. The first article of the book is, "South Asian 
Tangles and Triangles," written by Lawrence Ziring. In his 
article, Ziring has shown Indo-Bangladesh bilateral 
relations. His analysis is based on Mujib and Zia regimes. 
The main argument of the author is that the Mujib 
governments main source of power was his total dependence on 
India. 
No doubt Mujib government was considered as a puppet 
government of India, but the problem of Ziring's analysis is 
that his observation lacks proper analysis and explanation 
for such a dependence on India. 
On the other hand, the author has shown that 
Bangladesh-India relations took a turn for the worse with 
the assassination of Sheik Mujibur Ruhaman and the beginning 
of the Ziaur Ruhaman regime. At this time, Indian government 
tried to destabilize Zia's government. 
Ziring in his article has covered various aspects of 
Bangladesh-India bilateral relations, but his analysis is 
very brief. 
35 
The second article of the book, "India and its 
Neighbors: Regional Foreign and Security Policies" is 
written by Leo E. Rose. The author has analyzed the Indian 
policy towards its neighbors. He has maintained that Indian 
foreign policy is based on universalistic moral principles 
of anti-colonialism, anti-neo-colonialism, and sovereign 
equality of all nation states, but when it gets down to 
immediate and vital interests, India has taken a hard line 
and shown uncompromising attitude. 
While analyzing Bangladesh-India relations, the author 
characterized Bangladesh as a client/state of India. In his 
very brief discussion, the author did not analyze any 
variable responsible for the patron-client relations. 
Similarly, the author has mentioned that after the fall of 
the Mujib regime, Dhaka had cautiously redefined its foreign 
policy and the policy makers in Dhaka became hesitant to 
involve in any Indian devised regional security system. In 
order to prove such statements, sufficient information, 
evidence and analysis are required. 
The fourth type of studies61 exclusively focused on the 
changing relationship of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh with 
the great powers. Chaudhury's work makes a perceptive 
analysis of the main areas of agreements and disagreements 
between Pakistan, India and Bangladesh with the United 
61G. W. Chaudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major 
Powers (New York: Free Press, 1975); William J. Brands, India. 
Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972). 
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States, the Soviet Union, and China. Chaudhury also unfolded 
the evolving process of Bangladesh in the context of the 
super power rivalry in South Asia. He further accounted the 
alliance and counter alliance of the South Asian states 
since the 1950s. It focuses on the roles of the great powers 
in the South Asian subcontinent and on the complex 
relationship in the context for power, influence and 
capability. Although Chaudhury's work is understandably 
biased (the author was cabinet member of the Pakistan 
government under President Yahya Khan). The overall study is 
very informative, analytical and insightful. 
Brand's study focuses on the key policy issues and 
decisions and the pattern of relations between India and 
Pakistan, complicated by great powers. The author unfolded 
the role of the United States in South Asia after the demise 
of World War II and the end of colonialism. This volume 
provides many useful historical evidences and information 
which enabled the United States to help build its present 
state of relations, with the South Asian States. 
After carefully reviewing the above scholarly 
literature's it has become evident that, most of the studies 
are concerned with the liberation war and the Mujib Regime 
(1971-1975) . Not a single study is based on comparative 
foreign policy analysis of the Mujib and Zia Regimes. In 
addition, almost all the studies ignored the Bangladesh's 
relation with the Muslim World. The most remarkable and 
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common lapse of all literature is that they have not studied 
the foreign policy of Bangladesh within a systematic 
theoretical framework. The present study is an attempt in 
this direction. 
Significance of the Study 
This study is of enormous significance for an 
understanding of the foreign policy of Bangladesh. It 
focuses upon the changing patterns of Bangladesh foreign 
policy during the Mujib and Zia regimes (1971-1981). In 
fact, no comprehensive study has so far been conducted on 
the foreign policy of Bangladesh, especially on these two 
major regimes. This study is the first academic inquiry in 
the context and content of the comparative foreign policy of 
Bangladesh. 
I hope it will enrich the existing literature on the 
subject. This study will contribute to related literatures, 
in political science, International relations, Diplomatic 
history, comparative politics, comparative foreign policy, 
and International Political-Economy. The information and 
analysis presented in this study will be useful to the 
students, scholars, and policy makers, who are working on 
the foreign policy of Bangladesh. This study is also 
considered significant because it suggests a new area or 
line of inquiry. It raises new questions and supplements the 
literature within the existing area of inquiry. Finally it 
demonstrates its ability to improve the existing level of 
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comprehension (it presents particular political phenomenon 
with a theoretical and analytical framework). 
Organization of the Study 
This study will be presented into nine broad chapters, 
including the introduction. The introduction will highlight 
the problematics of foreign policy analysis, statement of 
the problem, definitions of key concepts, methodology, 
research nature and research questions, theoretical 
framework, literature review, significance of the study and 
finally organization of the study. 
Chapter 2 will present the objectives, principles, 
elements and foreign policy decision making process in 
Bangladesh. 
Chapter 3 will analyze the Bangladesh-India relations, 
which will cover the roots of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, 
role of India in the Liberation War of Bangladesh and India- 
Bangladesh relations during the Mujib and Zia regimes (1971- 
1981), including the areas of cooperation and conflict. 
Chapter 4 will focus on Bangladesh-Pakistan relations, 
which will unfold the role of Pakistan and the birth of 
Bangladesh and bilateral cooperation and disputes between 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, during the Mujib and Zia Regimes.. 
Chapter 5 will cover Bangladesh-US relations, which 
will uncover the role of the US in the Liberation War of 
Bangladesh, normalization and development of Bangladesh-US 
relationship during the Mujib and Zia regimes. 
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Chapter 6 will deal with the Bangladesh-Soviet Union 
relations, covering the role of the Soviet Union in the 
Liberation War of Bangladesh and Bangladesh-Soviet Union 
relations during the Mu jib and Zia regimes. 
Chapter 7 will detail the Bangladesh-China relations, 
including Chinese role in the Liberation War of Bangladesh 
and Bangladesh-China relations during the Mujib and Zia 
regimes. 
Chapter 8 will analyze relations between Bangladesh and 
the Muslin world, focusing on the role of the Muslim world 
in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, and the gradual 
improvement of relations between Bangladesh and the Muslim 
world during the Mujib and Zia regimes. 
Chapter 9 will offer the final analysis of the author 
on the overall foreign policy of Bangladesh based on the 
research findings. In this chapter, the author will show 
the changes in the foreign policy of Bangladesh with the 
changes of the regimes. 
CHAPTER II 
OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPLES, ELEMENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN BANGLADESH 
The foreign policy of a state can be identified as a 
complex and dynamic political course that it pursues in 
relation to other states with a view mainly to protecting 
its own interest and achieving its own objectives.1 It is a 
sequence of interaction that spans national boundaries2 and 
the entire exercise revolves around the hierarchy of 
interests which a government strives to advance or defend.3 
British Prime Minister, Palmerstone once remarked: 
We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual 
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual 
and those interests; it is our duty to follow.4 
1Emujuddin Ahamed, Introduction in Emujuddin Ahamed (Ed.), The 
Foreign Policy of Bangladesh. (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd., 
1989) . 
2James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New 
York: The Free Press, 1971), 67. 
3F.S. Northredge, "The Nature of Foreign Policy" in F.S. 
Northredge (Ed.), The Foreign Policy of the Powers (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1968), 16. 
4Quoted in Chaudhury Mohammed Ahsen, "Foundation of Pakistan's 
Foreign Policy" in Latif Ahmed Sherwani et al. (Eds.), the Foreign ' 
Policy of Pakistan (Karachi: Allies Books Corporation, 1964), 26. 
40 
41 
Objectives of Bangladesh Foreign Policy 
Since its emergence as an independent state in 1971, on 
the international scene, Bangladesh has remained busy 
defining its role and determining its objectives from 
different perspectives. Like all other actors, Bangladesh 
has certain "core values" and interests which it is 
committed to preserve and even willing to make supreme 
sacrifices for their preservation. Such core values and 
interests as self preservation, maintenance of territorial 
integrity and the unity of its people form the basic content 
of foreign policy in Bangladesh.5 Economic development and 
the achievement of the higher level of living are also the 
primary objectives of Bangladesh foreign policy, which 
demands an uninterrupted external assistance in flow, 
because Bangladesh has very limited resources, poor 
infrastructure, and inadequate technical skills. To this 
end, interactions with other states through structured and 
well defined relationship with a view to satisfying domestic 
needs and aspirations, has been so much important for 
Bangladesh.6 Trade, aid, access to communication flows, 
sources of supply and foreign market are thus the middle 
range objectives of Bangladesh foreign policy.7 A peaceful 
world, prosperous and friendly neighbors in the region and 




happy self-reliant homes for all its people are Bangladesh's 
long range visions.8 In short, these are the values and 
interests that Bangladesh cherish most and its ruling elite 
of whatever ideological commitment it would strive to 
advance and defend .9 After careful examination of 
Bangladesh's short range , middle range and long range 
visions, the major objectives of Bangladesh's foreign policy 
towards its national interest can be listed as follows: 
Self-Preservation 
Economic Advancement 
Safeguarding as well as augmenting national power in 




Self-preservation is the fundamental objective of 
Bangladesh foreign policy. It refers to national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political-economic and 
cultural independence. It is directly linked with the 
question of national security. In the independent state 
system of the modern world, maintenance of national security 
has become a difficult task particularly for the small 




seeks to ensure its national security. It neither wants any 
aggressive activities against any country, nor does it want 
to see its territory encroached by any external power. 
Actually national security of a state can be maintained 
through achieving national power, but for the small states 
of the Third World, it is difficult to achieve required 
defense and economic capability in order to ensure their 
national security. Bangladesh is no exception of this 
pattern. 
Regarding the security of small states in the Third 
World countries, Maniruzzaman suggested excellent diplomacy 
to ensure the security of these states. According to him: 
Since the small states by definition lack an 
adequate traditional war capability, they must 
make up for their deficiency by excellence in 
diplomacy. They cannot therefore afford to have 
ebbs and flaws in their diplomatic excellence. 
For a small state high quality diplomacy must be a 
constant phenomenon in its external relations.10 
On the other hand, some scholars also believe that the 
security of small states are very much related with the 
cooperation among the small states themselves. In order to 
achieve this cooperation, regional cooperative organizations 
can play very effective role.11 
10Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Security of Small States in the 
Third World (Australia, England, and Florida: 1982), 15. 
11Zaglul Haider, "Indian Hegemony and the Security of South Asian 
States: SAARC Perspective", A Paper Presented at the 5th National 
Conference of the Bangladesh Political Science Association. 1991 (Held 
at Jahangir Nagar University, Dhaka). 
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Bangladesh is a peace loving country. To ensure peace, 
Bangladesh believes that it is only possible through 
protecting its national security. Bangladesh believes in the 
principle of no war, but peace and seeks to protect its 
national security by upholding national values. 
Economic Advancement 
Once the national security is taken care of, the next 
objective of the foreign policy of Bangladesh is economic 
advancement. One of the major causes for the Declaration of 
Independence of Bangladesh in 1971 was economic 
emancipation. Keeping it in mind, the national policy makers 
in Bangladesh have perceived that political independence is 
hollow if it does not provide the vision of a good life for 
the average Bangladeshi people. In an inter-dependent global 
economy the rich countries explore their markets, the poor 
countries seek to explore foreign aid and transfer 
technology from the rich developed countries. Having a very 
poor economy, Bangladesh is no exception of this pattern. 
Bangladesh at present requires foreign aid and assistance 
for a number of years to finance its development programs 
and projects. But this does not mean that Bangladesh will be 
purchased by money. Sacrificing its national independence 
and sovereignty, it can not accept any external aid. This 
spirit was clearly enunciated by the late Prime Minister 
Sheik Mujib: 
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We are not going to accept any foreign aid or 
assistance with strings, however difficult it 
might be to revive the war torn economy. 
Bangladesh is a self-respecting nation and would 
continue to remain sovereign and independent.12 
Enshrining the above principles, Bangladesh has already 
exerted influence upon the friendly donor countries. 
Safeguarding as well as Augmenting National Power 
National power deserves serious consideration in the 
foreign policy making of a country. It connects the total 
strength of the country which plays an important role in 
pursuing its foreign policy. Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. 
Perkins have viewed: 
Like sovereignty and nationalism, national power 
is a vital and inseparable feature of the state 
system. Power of some kind is the means by which 
states implement their policies, domestic as well 
as foreign.13 
While K.J. Holsti regarded power in international 
politics as "the general capacity of a state to control the 
behavior of others to protect and extend their own 
interests. "14 
Ray S. Cline has described national power as: 
A mix strategic, military, economic and political 
strength and weakness. It is determined in part 
by the military forces and the military 
establishment of a country but even more by the 
12Bangladesh Observer, February 14, 1973. 
13Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations 
(Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1970), 684. 
14K.J. Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1977), 21. 
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size and location of the territory, the nature of 
frontier, the population, the raw materials, 
resources, the economic structure, the 
technological development, the financial strength, 
the ethnic mix, the social cohesiveness, the 
stability of political processes, decision making 
and finally the intangible quantity, usually 
described as national spirit.15 
While among the realist scholars there are two types of 
definition of power. Some realists understand power to be 
the sum of military, economic, technological, diplomatic and 
other capabilities at the disposal of the state. Other see 
power as capabilities relative to the capabilities of other 
states.16 National power of Bangladesh indicates all kinds of 
resources and capabilities at the disposal of the state. 
Bangladesh is firmly determined to establish absolute 
control over its national resources, as well as to deny any 
foreign country, any claim to any resource in the territory 
including the sea-bed and territorial waters. Bangladesh 
must not yield to pressure of any foreign country demanding 
15
TO describe the elements of national power, Ray S. Cline has 
developed the following formula: 
Pp = (C + E + M) x (S + W) 
1) Pp = Perceived power 2) C = Critical mass 3) E = Economic 
Capability 4) M = Military capability 
5) S = Strategic purpose 6) W = Will to pursue national 
strategy. For details, see See Ray S. Cline, "World Power Assessment, 
1977" in The Theory and Practice of International Relations. Fifth 
Edition, Fred A. Snodermann , Ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, Inc., 1978), 62-63. 
16Paul R. Violti and Mark V. Kauppi, Internation Relations 
Theory: Realism. Pluralism, and Globalism (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1987), 43-44. 
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undesirable shares in its resources. Moreover, the sole 
attempt behind the formulation of foreign policy objectives 
of Bangladesh is to safeguarding and augmenting its national 
power. 
Upholding National Ideology 
In pursuing foreign policy, every state follows some 
particular ideology or at least has commitment to any major 
ideology prevalent in the contemporary world. As a small 
developing country, Bangladesh is not totally committed to 
the super power ideologies, i.e., capitalism or communism. 
Rather, it follows the non-aligned foreign policy as its 
development strategy and ideology. President Ziaur Rahaman 
of Bangladesh affirmed in the sixth non-aligned summit at 
Havana that "the policy of non-alignment is a cornerstone of 
our foreign policy."17 
In pursuing its foreign policy, Bangladesh subscribes 
non-aligned ideology because of its common experience, 
common perceptions, and unanimity of views. Other 
similarities include:18 
a. Politically all rejects bloc politics and 
political dominance and oppose the black hands of 
apartheid and colonialism. 
b. Economically all are raw material producing 
countries with a common interest in safeguarding 
17Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. Ministry of 
Foreign. Affairs. External Publicity Division. 
18Shaukat Hassan, "Bangladesh, Zia and the Non-aligned Movement," 
BUSS Journal Special Issue, no. 1 (1981): 85-86. 
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their resources. They all seek the re¬ 
distribution of the earth's resources. Moreover, 
all are capital scarce countries and all the 
countries desire to establish a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). 
c. Culturally none shares the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition and indigenously non-English speaking. 
d. Technologically all the countries are 
underdeveloped and aims at achieving high 
technology. 
Upholding National Prestige 
How far a country's foreign policy is effective depends 
upon its capability of upholding national prestige. In fact, 
national prestige can be enshrined through political 
development and economic advancement. Bangladesh is trying 
to uphold its national prestige in the world. Politically 
Bangladesh is trying to establish a stable democracy and 
economically, it is trying to upgrade the living standard of 
its citizens. 
Principles of Bangladesh Foreign Policy 
Every state follows some principles upon which the 
entire foreign policy revolves. As an active member of the 
United Nations (UN) and Non-aligned Movement (NAM), 
Bangladesh follows the principles enshrined in the UN 
Charter and the principles of NAM. In fact, Bangladesh's 
foreign policy has stemmed out of constitutional 
declaration. Article 25 of the Bangladesh Constitution 
states : 
49 
Bangladesh shall base its international relations 
on the principles of respect for national 
sovereignty, and equality, non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries, peaceful 
settlement of international disputes and respect 
for international law and the principles 
enunciated in the UN Charter.19 
The same article also states that Bangladesh "will 
strive for renunciation of the use of force in international 
relations and for general and complete disarmament."20 The 
same article further upholds "the right of every person 
freely to determine and build up its own social, economic, 
and political system by ways and means of its own free 
choice and supports the oppressed people's throughout the 
world waging a struggle against imperialism, colonialism, or 
racism."21 After careful examination of the constitutional 
declaration, the principles of Bangladesh foreign policy can 
be listed as follows: 
Friendship to All. Malice to None 
According to Article 1 
Bangladesh intends to develop 
nations based on the principles 
(2) of the UN Charter, 
friendly relations among 
of equal rights and self- 
19The Constitution of the People's Republic, of Bangladesh. 
Article 25, (Dhaka: The Government of Bangladesh: Ministry of Law, 




determination of the people's and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace.22 
This implies that as a new state, Bangladesh seeks to 
promote its national development through friendly 
cooperation with all like minded states. Moreover, it did 
not involve with any superpower in cold war politics. With a 
declared goal of "becoming the Switzerland of South Asia," 
Bangladesh decided to follow a non-aligned foreign policy. 
The spirit of non-alignment was reaffirmed in the 
constitutional provision of Bangladesh.23 
Nonintervention in the Internal Matters of the Other States 
Keeping harmony with Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, 
Bangladesh enshrines this policy.24 Following this principle, 
Bangladesh makes it clear that neither it likes to emerge as 
an aggressor nor does it likes the act of aggressor. 
Bangladesh does not like to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. 
Equality and Mutual Benefit 
22UN Charter. Article 1 (2). 
23Sayed Anwar Hussain, "Bangladesh and the Indian Ocean Zone of 
Peace" in Kabir and Shaukat Hassan (Eds.), Issues and Challenges 
Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy (Dhaka: Bangladesh Society of 
International Studies, BSIS, 1989), 157. 
24UN Charter. Article 2(7). For details, see A. Leroy Bennett, 
International Organizations: Principles and Issues (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991), 437. 
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By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of people's enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations, Bangladesh believes that all people's have 
the right to freely determine without external interference, 
their political status and to pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development and every state has the duty to 
respect this right in accordance with the provision of the 
Charter.25 
Respect—for Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, ami 
Political Independence of Other States 
According to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,26 
Bangladesh believes in the principle of equal treatment to 
all states irrespective of size, shape and power. By this 
principle, Bangladesh believes that all states enjoy 
sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and 
are equal members of the international community. In 
particular, sovereign equality includes the following 
elements, which Bangladesh believes: 
A. States are judicially equal 
B. Each state enjoys the rights inherent in full 
sovereignty. 
C. Each state has the duty to respect the 
personality of other states. 
25UN Charter. Article 2(1-2), For details, see Minchaun Kau 
(Ed.), A Comprehensive .Handbook of the United Nations vol. 2, (New 
York: Monarch Press, 1979), 775. 
26UN Charter, Article 2(4), For details, see A. Leroy Bennett, 
437. 
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D. The territorial integrity and political 
independence of each state are invariable. 
E. Each state has the duty to comply fully and in 
good faith with its international obligations 
and to live in peace with other states. 
F. Each state has the right to freely choose and 
develop its political, economic and cultural 
systems. 
To Ensure International Peace and Security 
As an active member of the United Nations, Bangladesh 
wants to play an important role in maintaining international 
peace and security. In order to ensure international peace 
and security, Bangladesh believes in the following 
principles : 
A. To refrain from threatening or using force 
contrary to the UN Charter. 
B. To refrain from any threat or acts directly or 
indirectly aimed at impairing the freedom, 
independence, or integrity of any state. 
C. To carryout in good faith its international 
agreement. 
D. Through national and international cooperation, 
efforts to achieve and sustain higher standards 
of living for all peoples. To settle inter¬ 
national disputes by peaceful means and to 
cooperate in supporting the United Nations 
efforts to resolve outstanding problems. 
In 1979, Bangladesh signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) in the interest of global peace. In this regard, the 
role of Bangladesh is explicitly stated by K.M. Kaiser, 
Bangladesh's permanent representative to the UN, in his 
address to the Indian Ocean Ad Hoc Committee on July 1979: 
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We would... support measures to establish an 
institutional framework within any universal 
collective security system that may be finally 
worked out for the resolution of disputes among 
the littoral and hinterland states themselves and 
to ensure that peace in the region is not 
threatened by any country or group of countries. 
In our view, this is an important aspect of the 
problem as our main objective is to ensure peace 
and we do not foresee peace automatically 
prevailing in the area once big power rivalry is 
removed.27 
Peaceful„Co-Existence 
Bangladesh believes in the principle of peaceful co¬ 
existence. This was clearly declared by Prime Minister Sheik 
Mujibur Rahaman in 1972. He said, "I would like it 
(Bangladesh) to become the Switzerland of the East."28 
Moreover, Bangladesh follows the principle of peaceful co¬ 
existence from the strategic consideration of national 
security, and development. Secondly, Bangladesh is committed 
to the Pacific Settlement and finally, Bangladesh encourages 
peaceful change and development in international affairs. 
Elements of Bangladesh Foreign Policy 
There are two elements of Bangladesh foreign policy: 
1. Constant elements which includes geography, 
1. e., the location, the shape and size of the 
country along with the boundaries. 
2. Variable elements composed of internal 
conditions of state such as domestic needs and 
values, quality of leadership, strength of 
27Cited in Bangladesh 3, nos. 20-1 (July 15, 1979): 8. 
28Bangladesh Ohsfirvar, (February 14, 1982), Quoted in Md. Abdul 
Halim, 7. 
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national institutions, nature of people's 
participation in politics, military capabilities, 
industrial capa-bilities, natural resources, food 
production, national morale, quality of diplomacy, 
and above all external environment. 
Constant Elements 
Geographic factors of a country constitute its constant 
elements of foreign policy. Geography of a country is so 
much important in the foreign policy decision making process 
is that, Napoleon once said, "the foreign policy of a 
country is determined by its geography."29 
The importance of geographical factors may better be 
understood if we consider the foreign policy of Great 
Britain. Sir Eyre Crowe once said: 
The general character of England's foreign policy 
is determined by the immutable conditions of her 
geographical situation on the ocean flank of 
Europe as an Island state with vast overseas 
colonies and dependencies whose existence and 
survival as an independent community are 
inseparably bound up with the possession of 
preponderant sea power.30 
The geographical location of Bangladesh is another 
preponderant fact that influences the decision makers. As a 
South Asian country, Bangladesh has common border with India 
on the West, North and also in part of the east leaving only 
the South where the Bay of Bengal embraces the Indian Ocean. 
Burma is linked to it on the Eastern flank and through 
29Quoted in Md. Abdul Halim, 8. 
30Quoted in Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International 
Relations: The World Community in Transition (Calcutta: Scientific 
Book Agency, 1970), 698. 
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Burma, Bangladesh is linked to the entire Southeast Asian 
region. China is not far off. In a way Bangladesh is a 
bridge head between the South Asian and the Southeast Asian 
regions.31 
After the US withdrawal from Vietnam in the early 
1970's and with the beginning of the fresh naval competition 
between the two super powers for the control of the Indian 
Ocean, the importance of Bangladesh due to geographic 
location has been enhanced to a great extent. Actually, the 
geo-political importance of Bangladesh is so much because of 
its location at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal which links 
with the Indian Ocean. 
On the other hand, from the boundary consideration, we 
see that Bangladesh is surrounded by India on almost three 
sides, West, North and East. This is a point of weakness on 
its part. Another point of weakness stems from its small 
size and shape. It is a small country having hardly any 
"depth," seen in terms of diversifying its national capital 
and industrial establishment and thus vulnerable to any 
external attack. However, its main strength is the access to 
the Bay of Bengal which encounters all of its weakness.32 
31Emujuddin Ahamed, "Introduction" in Emujuddin Ahamed (Ed.), the 
Foreign Policy of Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Pres3 Limited, 198Ï), 
vii. 
32 Halim, 9. 
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Variable Elements 
The variable elements of foreign policy are the 
internal conditions of a particular state viz., domestic 
needs and values, quality of leadership, strength of 
national institutions, nature of people's participation in 
the decision making process, military capability, industrial 
capacity, natural resources, food production, national 
morale, quality of diplomacy, and above all external 
environment. 
About the variable elements of foreign policy, Henry 
Kissinger once said: 
A nations value defines what is just, its strength 
determines what is possible, its domestic 
structure decides what policy can be 
implemented.33 
From the point of view of natural resources, we see 
that though Bangladesh lacks minerals like coal, oil, iron, 
etc., it has vast resources of natural gas and a tremendous 
potential of hydro-electric power. Jute and tea are the 
major agricultural resources. Though Bangladesh suffers from 
the shortage of food, which really constrains its freedom of 
action in international affairs to a great extent, yet 
Bangladesh has agricultural land which is among the most 
fertile in the world. Bangladesh is trying to meet up its 
food shortage by using modern agricultural technology. 
33Quoted in Ambassador Tabarak Hussain, "Bangladesh Foreign 
Policy: Domestic Inputs," Paper presented in a Seminar on Nation 
Building in Bangladesh: Retrospect and Prospects. Organized by BUSS, 
(Dhaka: October 13-14, 1985). 
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Bangladesh is in its initial stage of industrial 
development. It has the potential of developing into an 
industrial nation by utilizing indigenous raw materials. 
Militarily, Bangladesh is not a weak state, it has about .10 
million well disciplined regular armed forces, pledged to 
maintain the security and territorial integrity of the 
country. The regular government spending for the Bangladesh 
army is 22.2 percent.34 What is needed at present is 
disciplined, enlightened leadership, high national morale 
and excellent diplomacy for pursuing an active and vigorous 
foreign policy on the part of Bangladesh. 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process in Bangladesh 
Foreign policy decision making is a complex task of 
devising strategies that utilize a nation state's capability 
to achieve the goals its leaders set.35 It is more difficult 
for dependent developing countries like Bangladesh. In the 
foreign policy decision making process policy makers have to 
maintain balance between domestic and external environments. 
Domestic environment includes the domestic political 
situation, peoples aspirations, needs and requirements. 
Rosenau defined domestic and societal environment as those 
non-governmental aspects of political system that influence 
34Cambridae Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Nepal, Bhatan. and Maldives (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
219. 
35Richard L. Merritt, Foreign Policy Analysis (Lexington: 
Lexington Books, D.C. Health and Company, 1975), 1. 
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a states external behavior. Its major value orientations, 
its degree of national unity and the extent of the societal 
variables which can contribute to the contents of a nations 
external aspirations and politics.36 While external 
environment involves the structure of international system, 
worldwide distribution of power and resources, varying 
levels of technology, enduring patterns of trade and other 
transactions, perceptions, norms of individuals and state 
behavior more particularly religion and other cultural 
components, which enables a country to pursue certain course 
of action.37 Rosenau has viewed that the external environment 
or any actions occurring abroad influence the choice of a 
countries foreign policy. In addition, it encompasses the 
behavior of other countries towards the particular country 
and the response of that particular country to them.38 Policy 
makers are to assess the information collected from both the 
domestic and external environment before making the foreign 
policy decision. In the true sense, foreign policy decision 
making is the joint product of both domestic and external 
environments. Foreign policy decision making process in 
Bangladesh can be shown by Figure 1. 
36Quoted in C.W. Kegley, Jr. and E.R. Wittkopf, American Foreign 
Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 19. 
37Merritt, 1-2. 
38Quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf, 17-18. 
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N.A. National Assembly 
P.S. President 
P.M. Prime Minister 
C.M.L.A. Chief Martial Law Administrator 
F.M. Foreign Minister 
F.N.M. Finance Minister 
C. M. Commerce Minister 
D. M. Defense Minister 
C.B. Civil Bureaucrats 
M.B. Military Bureaucrats 
Fig. 1. Foreign Policy Decision Making Process in 
Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, foreign policy decisions are made at the 
interaction of both formal and informal institutions. 
Formal institutions are, National Assembly (NA), President 
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(PS) , Prime Minister (PM) , Chief Martial Law Administrator 
(CMLA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Commerce, other ministries, Civil Bureaucrats, 
and armed forces. While the informal institutions include 
Political parties, Press and Media, non-government 
institutions, and groups and associations. 
During the short period of Parliamentary experience, 
the Prime Minister as the Executive head of the state was 
the key person in the foreign policy decision making process 
in Bangladesh (1972-1975). But, with the inception of a 
presidential form of government since 1975, the President 
has become the key figure. During the time of direct 
military rule the CMLA used to play crucial role in the 
foreign policy decision making process. Although Parliament 
had a clear constitutional role, the nature of the power 
structure did not allow it to play contributory role in the 
foreign policy decision making process during the 
authoritarian regime. 
About the role of the Parliament, one political 
scientist wrote: 
The authoritarian nature of the executive head in 
Bangladesh did not afford the Parliament an 
opportunity to exercise any meaningful role in the 
general conduct of foreign policy. The Parliament 
neither could effectively examine proposed 
legislation on foreign relations, nor examine or 
debate any vital document or agreement with 
foreign countries. 
The Constitution of Bangladesh in 1975 (amended), 
empowered the executive authority to the President for the 
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foreign policy decision making process. He could formally 
appoint and recall diplomatic envoys, sign international 
contracts and deeds, letter of credence, warrants of 
credence and warrants of commission. 
Foreign ministry also plays an important role among the 
formal institutions. Virtually, the foreign minister is 
responsible for making and implementing policies. Under the 
democratic government the role of the foreign minister is 
very prominent. But under the military rule, the foreign 
minister usually plays the role no better than the personal 
advisor of the CMLA. Operationally, the Office of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the headquarter of Bangladesh 
Foreign Affairs. Normally about one third foreign service 
personnel remain with the ministry and the rest remain 
posted in various embassy's and high commissions. The 
Embassy's or High Commissions of Bangladesh are headed by 
either Ambassadors or High Commissioners or Charge d' 
Affairs (CDA). The major foreign policy functions like 
representation, negotiation, protection of defined values 
and interest, reporting, advising, and consulting activities 
are conducted by the Embassy's or High Commissions. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the primary contact point for 
all foreign offices located in Dhaka. It act as a two way 
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communication center between the domestic and external 
system.39 
In addition, many other related ministries viz., 
finance, defense, commerce, planning, Home affairs, and 
establishment also play very contributory role in the 
functional aspects of foreign relations. It is worthwhile 
to note here that the bureaucrats both civilian and military 
play a major role in the foreign policy decision making of 
Bangladesh too. Under normal conditions, when a democratic 
government is in power any foreign policy decision is 
usually initiated and made by the career diplomats and 
bureaucrats who hand it over to the Foreign Minister, and 
who in turn submits it to the Parliament for approval. Under 
martial law, the civil bureaucrats in collaboration with 
their military counterparts advise the CMLA and his advisors 
as to what particular foreign policy decisions are to be 
taken. 
The role of the Bangladesh armed forces has clearly 
manifested by the invitation of UN Security Council to 
Bangladesh army to form a part of the UN peace keeping force 
in Namibia, Iran-Iraq border, in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. 
The role of Bangladesh armed forces in the multinational 
force of Saudi Arabia, during the Persian Gulf crisis of 
39Ataur Rahaman, "Foreign Policy Making in Bangladesh: 
Institutions and Process" The BUSS Journal 6, no. 3 (1985): 324. 
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1991 also demonstrate its significant role in the foreign 
relations of Bangladesh. 
Besides formal institutions, informal institutions also 
play a very important role in the foreign policy decision 
making process of Bangladesh. Among those political parties 
play a very important role in influencing the foreign policy 
of the country outside the government. On the major foreign 
policy issues they give suggestions to the government, 
express their opinion through public meeting, public 
protest, and newspaper statements and influence the foreign 
policy decision. 
The press and media also play important role by 
covering news and views, highlighting major issues, on 
foreign policy and analyzing the governments policies. Press 
and Media create public opinion and influence the foreign 
policy decision making process. 
The Universities and special institutions, like 
Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies 
(BUSS) , Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) , 
Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs 
(BILIA), contribute to the foreign policy decision making 
process by undertaking studies on particular problems and 
issues of foreign policy.40 These agencies seek to create 
greater awareness on foreign policy issues by undertaking 
studies, organizing lectures, seminars and workshops. 
40 Ibid., 19. 
CHAPTER III 
BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS: MUJIB AND 
ZIA REGIMES (1971-1981) 
Because of its multi-farious importance, "India Factor" 
is an undeniable variable in the foreign policy making of 
Bangladesh. Historically, Bangladesh experienced two long 
centuries of British-colonial rule as part of Bengal, a 
province of the undivided India. Geographically, it is bound 
by India on the west, the north and the northeast. 
Strategically, Bangladesh is located within the range of the 
Indian Security System. Despite having basic religio- 
cultural differences,1 hardly any other factor merits 
greater consideration in the conduct of Bangladesh's foreign 
relations. 
Actually, friendship with India was the cornerstone of 
Bangladesh's foreign policy under the stewardship of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahaman. But the warmer friendship between 
Bangladesh and India was very short-lived. Mistrust and 
misunderstanding erupted with the changes of leadership in 
both countries. In fact, one of the major concerns in the 
South Asian subcontinent as Marcus Franda pointed out, was 
’■Bangladesh is predominantly a Muslim country having 85% Muslim 
population. India is the only Hindu state in the world with 83% Hindu 
population. See The World Almanac (New York: Howard Company, 1993) . 
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the failure of India and Bangladesh to make a meaningful 
progress towards cooperation.2 
However, in this study an attempt will be made to make 
a comparative study of Bangladesh-India relations during the 
Mujib and Zia Regimes (1971-1981). To this end the following 
issues will be addressed in this chapter. 
The Roots of Bangladesh Crisis. 
The Bangladesh Liberation War and the Role of India. 
Bangladesh-India Relations: Bilateral Cooperation. 
Bangladesh-India Relations: Bilateral Disputes. 
Summary. 
The. Roots of ..Bangladesh Crisis 
The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 was the product of 
disintegration of Pakistan. Bangladesh (former East 
Pakistan) gained the bitter experience of about a quarter 
century of union with Pakistan. Actually, the illogical 
geographical boundary of Pakistan (East Pakistan was 
separated from West Pakistan by one thousand miles of Indian 
territory) ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences 
between the two wings were compounded by economic 
exploitation and political domination of West Pakistani 
ruling elites over East Pakistan, which generated the seeds 
of nationalism among the people of East Pakistan and 
2Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade (New Delhi: South 
Asian Publishers in association with the University Field Staff 
International, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1982), 124. 
66 
ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh. In fact, the 
Bengali people were always unlikely partners in the Union of 
Pakistan - a geographical and cultural monstrosity.3 
The Bengali's finally gave farewell to the West 
Pakistani ruling elites in the general election of 1970. In 
the election, Sheikh Mu jib's Awami League emerged as the 
single majority party, while Z.A. Bhutto's Pakistan People's 
Party (PPP) emerged as the second largest party.4 The 
election results clearly reflected the polarization between 
East and West Pakistan. Even after the landslide victory of 
the Bengalis under the AL, leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the 
West Pakistani civil-military ruling elites refused to 
transfer power to the democratically elected leaders and 
finally, the Pakistani military dictator Yahya Khan opted 
for a military solution and responded with bullets, which 
created one of the biggest human tragedies since Hitler's 
collapse. The Pakistan military followed a systematic 
campaigns of indiscriminate slaughter.5 In fact, the 
3The New York Times. December 9, 1971. 
4The results of the national assembly election of 1970 were as 
follows: Awami League (AL)-160 3eats; Pakistan People'3 Party (PPP)-81 
seats; Muslim League (ML-)-9 seats; Muslim League (ML-Council)-7 
seats; Jammat-ul-ulema-i-Islam-7 seats; National Awami Party (NAP)-6 
seats; Jammat-i-Islami-4 seats; Pakistan Muslim League (PML)-2 seats; 
Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)-l seat; Markazi-Jamiat-up-ulema-i- 
islam-7 seats; Independents-16 seats. For details, see, Craig Baxter, 
Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1989), 96. 
5G. W. Chaudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: 
Indiana University, 1974), 181. 
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military action destroyed the last hope of keeping the unity 
of Pakistan and on March 26, 1971, Bangladesh was declared 
an independent and sovereign state.6 
The Bangladesh Liberation War and th.e_fLQ.le of India 
India started to get involved formally with the 
Bangladesh liberation struggle after the military crackdown 
in East Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
expressed her views in the Lokshaba on March 27, 1971: 
It is not merely a suppression of a movement but 
it is meeting an unarmed people with tanks. We are 
fully alive to the situation and we shall keep 
constantly in touch with what is happening and 
what we need to do. We must not take merely 
theoretical view. At the same time, we have to 
follow proper international norms.7 
At the outset of the brutal atrocities of the Pakistani 
army, the Bengali leaders and the Bengali resistance forces 
crossed the border of India, which was followed by millions 
of innocent Bengali people, who took refuge in India after 
the inhuman massacre committed by the Pakistani Army. India 
granted refuge to the East Bengali people as it had followed 
this policy in similar developments in other neighboring 
6Major Ziaur Rahaman, an army major of the East Bengal Regiment, 
in 1971, made the declaration of the independence of Bangladesh. 
Later, he became a Lt. General and finally he was the President of 
Bangladesh from 1977-1981. 
Bangladesh Documents, Vol. 1, 669. Also see New York Times, 
March 28, 1971. 
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states, i.e., following the 1959 rebellion in Tibet and the 
December 1960 royal coup in Nepal.8 
Finally the Indian Parliament took a resolution on the 
East Bengal which called upon the governments and people of 
the world to take urgent and constructive steps to make an 
end of the systematic genocide in East Bengal.9 New Delhi's 
policy towards the East Pakistani political refugees took a 
noble form in early April, and the Indian government 
permitted the establishment of an Awami League headquarters, 
on Indian soil eventually in Calcutta.10 On April 17, 1971, 
at Baidynatti Tala just across the border of East Pakistan 
(now, Mujibnagar under Meherpur District) AL leaders issued 
a declaration of independence and established a Bangladesh 
government in exile. 
At this time, training camps for the Bangladesh 
Liberation Forces were established with Indian assistance at 
a number of places in Indian territory close to the East 
Pakistani border. India was equally careful in its 
establishment of training camps for the Bangladesh 
liberation forces. India wanted to make sure that these were 
under the control of reliable moderate AL leaders or 
8Sisson & Rose, 142. 
9Indira Gandhi, India and Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and 
(New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), 16. 
10 Sisson & Rose, 142-143. 
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officers from the East Pakistani Rifles or Police, rather 
than the more radical political elements in the resistance.11 
On the other hand, the continued army repression and 
fighting caused a tidal wave of refugees from East Pakistan. 
In fact, within the nine months of Bangladesh's freedom 
movement about ten million12 Bengali refugees fled into India 
which made India more concerned.13 As a matter of fact, India 
became actively involved in the Bangladesh struggle after 
massive refugees poured into India. According to an 
authoritative source, by the end of May 1971, nine million 
refugees had arrived in small hill state of Tripura, while 
the indigenous population of that state was only 1.5 
million.14 
Indian authorities were very much concerned about the 
permanent settlement of the Bengali's in India. In order to 
make a political settlement, that would enable the refugees 
to return to their homes, Indian government repeatedly 
emphasized an agreement between the central government of 
Pakistan and the Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahaman. 
11Ibid, 143. 
12Bangladesh Documents. Vol. I & II (New Delhi, Publication 
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), 81. 
13Marcus Franda, 109. 
14 Sisson & Rose, 153. 
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On May 24, 1971, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister 
of India, openly threatened Pakistan in the Parliament: 
Conditions must be created to stop any further 
influx of refugees and to ensure their early 
return under credible guarantees for their safety 
and well being. I say with all sense of 
responsibility that unless this happens, there can 
be no lasting stability or peace in this 
subcontinent. We have pleaded with other powers to 
recognize this. If the world does not take heed we 
shall be constrained to take all measures as may 
be necessary to ensure our own security and the 
preservation and development of the structure of 
our social and economic life.15 
She also observed that there must be a political rather 
than military solution to Pakistan's problem in its Eastern 
Province, and that the great powers had a special 
responsibility to help see such a solution through.16 
Realizing the situation, Mrs. Gandhi made two decisions 
by which the refugees were accommodated and later returned 
home. First, during a series of public meetings, Mrs. 
Gandhi spoke clearly that the 1971 refugees would not be 
allowed to remain in India as a permanent resident. 
Secondly, Mrs. Gandhi established special organization with 
the Union Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, charged 
with the task of establishing and maintaining temporary 
camps for these refugees.17 
15
Lok Shaba Debates, (May 24, 1971), 187. 
16Sisson & Rose, 153. 
17 Marcus Franda, 111. 
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With the continuous influx of refugees, India appealed 
to the international community for relief assistance. In 
fact, the refugee problem was a serious burden on Central 
and West Bengal Provincial governments (where maximum 
refugees were accommodated) to provide minimal necessities 
for the vast number of refugees without international 
assistance. While replying to a question in the Upper House 
of Parliament (Rajyasabah) on June 15, 1971, Mrs. Gandhi 
commented: "We will have to go through hell to meet this 
situation (refugee problem)."18 
At this point, Indian government appealed to the 
international community especially to the great powers to 
see the reality of the situation and to press Pakistan for 
political settlement.19 Initially, India adopted a cautious 
policy of limited help and also ruled out the possibilities 
of direct military intervention as the Bangladesh Government 
in Exile was preparing for such action.20 But still like the 
U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., India was in favor of continuation of a 
United Pakistan.21 India started to involve very actively in 
the Bangladesh Liberation struggle from the months of June- 
18Indira Gandhi, 16. 
19Ibid., 18. 
20M.G. Kabir, "U.S. Policy and the Bangladesh Crisis of 1971," 
BIISS Journal 9, no. 2 (April 1988): 202. 
21Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon- 
Kissinger Geo-Politics and South Asia," Asian Survey (April 1980): 
391. 
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July 1977, when the recruitment of Mukti Bahini (freedom 
fighters) was intensified and India was giving training and 
providing arms and ammunition to fight against the strong 
regular army of Pakistan.22 
The Indian government's desperate attempt against 
Pakistan was not equally supported by all decision makers of 
India. Several prominent Indian leaders publicly counseled 
against any form of Indian involvement in East Pakistan. 
These included C. Rajagopal Chari, Governor-General of India 
from 1947 to 1950, and a former Chief Minister of Tamil 
Nadu; General Cariappa, the former Commanding General of the 
Indian Army and M. Karunanidhi, the Chief Minister of Tamil 
Nadu in 1971, who cited the developments in East Pakistan as 
a warning to India to avoid creating conditions that would 
encourage autonomy movements in its own territory.23 
Some politicians doubted the wisdom of Indian 
intervention in support of Bangladesh, on the grounds that 
this could prove to be a dangerous precedent for the Indian 
Bengalis.24 Bangladesh they noted meant, "country of the 
Bengalis" and India had a large number of Bengali's in its 
population who might be attracted by the "Amra Bengali" (we 
22General Arora's Interview published in The Weekly Bichittra. 
December 13, 1991, 37. 
23The Hindu. March 30, 1971. 
24Lawrence Ziring, "South Asian Tangles and Triangles" in The 
Subcontinent in the World Politics: India. Its Neighbors and Great 
Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 80. 
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are Bengalis") concept of a united, independent Bengal.25 
Some were concerned with the international reaction, 
particularly from several Islamic states with whom India had 
important ties. From the security perspective some officials 
argued that Indian interests were better served by an East 
Pakistan that was in fact "captive" to India and thus a 
complication to decision making in Islamabad than they would 
be by a second largest Islamic state in the subcontinent.26 
Some of the Parliament members even expressed their fear 
when both houses of Parliament were adopting resolutions 
supporting the Bangladesh movement.27 
The decision making elites of India could not totally 
ignore public views on the East Pakistani situation, but 
they handled all suggestions and criticisms quietly and 
considered the Indian long range national interests. 
Eventually, the decision of the government of India went in 
favor of military intervention. India rendered its aids and 
assistance to Bangladesh's liberation struggle into two 
ways : 
1. the arming and training of guerrilla force known as 
"Mukti Bahini" and 
25Sisson & Rose, 151. 
26Ibid, 151. 
27Norman Brown, The United States and the India. Pakistan. 
Bangladesh (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), 
218. 
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2. the invasion of East Bengal by the Indian army.28 
India's actual intention behind the active support to 
the Bangladesh movement, was not only to support the just 
cause of the Bengali's, but to weaken its' birth rival 
Pakistan. Indian intentions were clearly expressed by the 
statement of K. Subramanium, Director, Indian Institute of 
Defense Studies, on March 31, 1971, (within six days of the 
outbreak of the revolt in East Pakistan). According to him: 
"What India must realize is the fact that the break up of 
Pakistan is in our own interest, an opportunity, the like of 
which will never come again."29 
This was supported by the London Times, which published 
an article prepared by K. Subramanium in which he advocated 
the seizure of sections of East Pakistan and the 
establishment there of a provisional government of 
Bangladesh under Indian army protection.30 Indian intentions 
were also confirmed by other political analysts. One Indian 
analyst uncovered the major Indian gains in the emergence of 
Bangladesh, as follows: 
1. A political enemy on both of its borders will be 
replaced by a far weaker enemy on one side and a friend 
on the other. 
2. The Kashmir question will be rid of what remains of its 
28Dilip Kumar Mukerjee, "India and Bangladesh" in L.M. Singhui, 
(Ed.), Bangladesh: Background and Perspectives (New Delhi: Institute 
of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 1971), 42. 
29The Hindustan Times. April 1, 1971. 
30The Times (London), July 13, 1971. 
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sting, domestic as well as international. 
3.. The claim of secular democracy to be the best 
government system for the multi-racial developing 
countries will be strengthened and the myth of an 
enduring nationhood based on religion will be exploded. 
4 . The cynical role of China which has come out in support 
of the military regime in Islamabad in the region will 
be exposed and countered.31 
Though some analysts wanted to prove that India 
supported Bangladesh movement purely on humanitarian ground 
or to strengthen democratic traditions in the region, these 
arguments cannot be rationalized if counter arguments are 
presented by asking what role did India play to stop the 
freedom movements in "Khalistan" and Kashmir? So it is 
clearly evident that the major intentions behind Indian 
involvement in the Bangladesh struggle were its politico- 
economic and strategic interests.32 
One analyst pointed out that Indian desire to weaken 
her enemy coincided with the aspiration of Bengali 
nationalist forces and it suited both sides.33 
Apart from material support, India also took serious 
diplomatic steps and tried to raise world opinion in support 
of the Bangladesh movement. It played a very active role to 
31Ajit Bhattacharja, "Stakes in Bangladesh" in L.M. Singhui 
(Ed.), Bangladesh: Background and Perspectives (New Delhi: The 
Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 1971), 53. 
32For detail discussion, see Imtiaz Ahmed, "The Superpower 
Strategy in the Third World: The 1971 South Asian Crisis" in Emajuddin 
Ahamed (Ed.), Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small States Imperative 
(Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1982), 115. 
33Moudud Ahamed, Era of Sheikh Muiibur Rahaman (Dhaka: University 
Press Limited, 1983), 182. 
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save the life of Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman, when President 
Yahya Khan was going to arrange a secret military trial for 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman to execute him. Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi regarding this trial sent a message to the Heads of 
the government requesting them to exert their influence over 
President Yahya Khan so that the life of Sheikh Mujib could 
be saved.34 
Actually from late May 1971, India started a campaign 
throughout the world directed at persuading other 
governments to pressure Pakistan to revise its policy in 
East Pakistan by suspending their economic and military aid 
to Pakistan.35 
By the months of September and October, 1971, Indo- 
Pakistan border tension was gradually aggravating and India 
and Pakistan made repeated allegations against each other. 
In this situation the United Nations (UN) Secretary General, 
U Thant in a letter of October 20, 1971 to the heads of 
state of both India and Pakistan offered the use of his good 
offices in the potentially dangerous situation between the 
two rival countries. President Yahya Khan welcomed U 
Thant's offer but Mrs. Indira Gandhi emphasized the Indian 
view that only a political settlement in East Pakistan could 
solve the problem.36 
34




Meanwhile, as part of India's broadly based 
international campaign, Mrs. Indira Gandhi visited to 
Washington in early November 1971. She went to Washington to 
convince the U.S. leaders that East Pakistan civil war was 
the result of West Pakistani repression and genocide.37 
In Washington, President Nixon offered Mrs. Gandhi 
several proposals. First, he assured that the US would take 
full financial responsibility for the refugees support. 
Second, he referred to Yahya's agreement to unilaterally 
withdraw Pakistani forces from the East Pakistani-Indian 
frontier with only the understanding that India would 
respond in some way in the near future. But Mrs. Gandhi was 
unresponsive to the proposals. In fact, at that stage India 
was unwilling to give any opportunity to Pakistan to gain 
its control over the East Pakistan. Some analysts were 
convinced that the Indian government had decided to 
dismember Pakistan by force before Mrs. Indira Gandhi came 
to Washington and that the discussions there had been an 
exercise in futility.38 India also sent its diplomatic 
mission to the Muslim world, to explain that the East 
Pakistani Civil War was not another Indo-Pakistan dispute 
(i.e., Hindu versus Muslims) but rather a conflict between 
two hostile Muslim communities -East and West Pakistan. This 
37Sisson & Rose, 194-195. 
38 Ibid, 195. 
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was an effort to diminish support for Pakistan among the 
Islamic states and India was partially successful.39 
Finally leaving the devices of political and diplomatic 
settlements, India entered a war with Pakistan for the third 
time on December 3, 1971. All efforts of the United Nations, 
the United States, and other members of the international 
community to avert the war were considered by India as half¬ 
hearted and ineffective. 
Eventually defeating the Pakistani army Indian forces 
entered into East Pakistan by the first week of December 
1971. On December 16, 1971, Pakistan Army surrendered to the 
joint command of Bangladesh and India and Bangladesh 
achieved her final victory.40 
Though the Indian intervention ended the liberation war 
of Bangladesh within a short period of history, it was not 
welcomed by all freedom fighters and the common 
people equally. Protesting seriously the Indian 
intervention, different sections of the "Mukti Bahini," 
especially the leftists, claimed that the Bangladesh 
liberation war was stopped by the AL with the help of India, 
just as it was about to become a people's war. The radical 
39Ibid, 204-205. 
40On December 15, 1971, the instrument of surrender was signed in 
Dhaka at 16:31 hours by Lt. General A.K. Niazi on behalf of Pakistan 
Eastern Command, General Jagzit Singh Aurora, GOC-in-C of the Indian 
and Bangladesh forces in the eastern theater accepted the surrender. 
For details, see Indira Gandhi, 30. 
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leftists regarded the Bangladesh war as an unfinished 
revolution.41 
The Indian intervention was also seriously criticized 
by the western press as an irresponsible task aimed at 
dismembering Pakistan.42 As a matter of fact, with the 
liberation of Bangladesh and the break up of Pakistan, India 
proved herself as a regional "hegemon" and a "mini super 
power in the world." In fact, following Indian military 
victory over Pakistan, India prepared for the nuclear test, 
and a thaw began in South Asian power balance.43 
Bangladesh-India Relations: Bilateral Cooperation 
Political Level 
Within a month of Bangladesh's independent existence 
just after Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman had arrived at Dhaka from 
the Pakistani prison and had taken up office as Prime 
41The radical leftist parties in Bangladesh viewed that the 
Bangladesh Revolution was not even a nationalist revolution, because 
the bourgeosie leadership of the AL cannot be truly nationalist as 
they draw their support from imperialist powers and semi-feudal 
countries, only a party of proletariat can pursue the revolution 
correctly, see. Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh an Unfinished 
Revolution?", Journal of Asian Studies 34, no. 4 (1974), 897. 
42Washington Post and Guardian, two westerns newspapers 
criticized India for provoking a war. According to the newspapers, 
"The Indians have been rough, irresponsible, they have encouraged and 
directly taken part in the dismemberment of a sovereign state." See 
Washington Post. December 14, 1971 and The Guardian. November 25-30, 
1971. 
43Baldev Nayar, "Treat India Seriously," Foreign Policy 18 
(Spring 1975): 149. 
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Minister, the Western Press raised the question of viability 
of the new state Bangladesh. 
The Economist forecasted that one "real possibility 
before Bangladesh was to slip under the suzerainty of its 
ally and protector, India."44 Following The Economist, Trevor 
Ling, a western scholar predicted four possibilities which 
confront the new state. 
1. That both India and Bangladesh will remain 
satisfied with the present situation in which 
the latter is an independent, friendly state, 
external to India; this assume that no 
sufficiently strong dysfunctional factor 
(economic, international, or internal politics 
for instance) make a rearrangement necessary; 
2. That Bangladesh will before long be brought 
under the umbrella of India as an additional 
Indian state, along side West Bengal; 
3. That Bangladesh and West Bengal will become 
reunited to form a singly new state of Bengal 
within the Republic of India. 
4. That Bangladesh and West Bengal might together 
form a breakaway "Greater Bengal" state 
entirely outside India.45 
Eventually The Western forecasting proved fatal and 
Bangladesh has been surviving as an independent and 
sovereign state outside Indian orbit. 
In the immediate post liberation period, Indian 
influence in the major policy-making was the notable feature 
of Bangladesh foreign policy. In fact, the major policy 
44The Economist. January 15, 1972 
45Trevor Ling,"Creating A New State: The Bengali's of 
Bangladesh," South Asian Review 5, no. 3 (April 1972), 221. 
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decisions of Bangladesh were either dictated or influenced 
by India during this time. Indian Prime Minister, Indira 
Gandhi while welcoming Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman in New Delhi 
on his way back home after release from the Pakistani prison 
stated : 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman had promised freedom to his 
people and given it to them. India had taken a 
pledge to free Bangladesh, free Mujib and finally 
send the refugees to their homes and hearth. We 
have also kept our promise.46 
Mrs. Gandhi further added that it was her firm belief 
that secularism and democracy will prosper under the 
guidance of Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman.47 Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman 
in his speech assured Mrs. Gandhi that, he believed the idea 
of secularism, democracy and freedom of man and peace of the 
world.48 Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman ultimately kept his 
commitment by making nationalism, secularism, socialism and 
democracy as the guiding principles of Bangladesh 
Constitution.49 In addition, Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman and AL 
adopted an Indian model of parliamentary system with a 
single dominant party and a relatively free political 
46Bangladesh Documents. (Vol. II), 606. 
47Ibid. 
48The Indian Express (New Delhi), January 11, 1972. 
49The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 
Article 8(1) and 12. Government of the People'3 Republic of 
Bangladesh (Dhaka: Law and Parliamentary Affairs, 1972). 
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process with restrictions on the extreme leftists and 
extreme rightists.50 
In order to formalize the Bangladesh-India 
relationship, a 25-year treaty of friendship, cooperation 
and peace was signed between India and Bangladesh with a 
provision of renewal which followed the model of Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of 1971. This treaty was signed by Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahaman and Mrs. Indira Gandhi on March 17, 1972. But the 
treaty was denounced by the Bangladeshi people because of 
its very nature.51 Many scholars and political observers 
speculated that it will generate "Indian hegemonism." They 
doubted that India could use the treaty as an excuse for 
intervention in Bangladesh.52 In fact, after the Indian 
annexation of Sikkim in 1974, the fear of Indian 
"Expansionism" has flourished among the small neighboring 
countries like Bangladesh.53 
50Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New 
State," Asian Survey 13, no. 2 (February 1973): 202. 
51Article 9 and 10 of the treaty was very debated. Article 9 
stipulated that each party shall refrain from giving assistance to any 
third party against the other party. Article 10 said that no party 
shall undertake any commitment secret or open towards one or more 
states which may be incompatible. For details see Moudud Ahamed, Era 
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman (Dhaka: UPL, 1983), 187. 
52V.P. Dutt, Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing 
House Ltd., 1987), 239. 
53Atiur Rahaman and Zaglul Haider, "Political Economy of South 
Asian Regional Cooperation," Bangladesh Historical Studies 11-12, 
(1987-1988), 105. 
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The very significant event of Bangladesh-India 
relations during the Mujib Regime (1972-75) was to return 
the 150,000 Indian troops who entered into Bangladesh with 
the Mukti Bahini to expedite the freedom of Bangladesh. The 
Indian Army and technical experts and advisors continued 
their presence to assist and guide the government of 
Bangladesh. By March 25, 1972, the last contingent of the 
Indian Army left Bangladesh. But the Indian Army before they 
were withdrawn took away the vast quantity of arms and 
ammunition left by the surrendering Pakistani Army and left 
the nascent Bangladesh Army virtually disarmed.54 
Although several bilateral agreements were signed 
between India and Bangladesh during this time,55 the people's 
hatred gradually grew against Mujib's subservient foreign 
policy to India, which ultimately generated anti-Indian and 
anti-Mujib sentiment. This was deepened, when it was rumored 
that the Bangladesh government in exile had signed a secret 
54Talukder Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh in 1976: Struggle for 
Survival as an Independent State," Asian Survey 17, no. 2 (February 
1977): 191. 
55The agreements were: A 25-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation, March 1972; A 1-year Trade Agreement, March 1972; An 
Agreement for the Establishment of a Permanent Joint River Commission, 
April 1972; A 5-year Protocol on Inland Water Transport, November 
1972; The Delhi Declaration of 3-Way Repatriation, April 1973; An 
Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Land Demarcation, May 1974; An 
Interim Agreement on the Sharing of the Ganges Water, April 1975. See 
"Foreign Policy of Bangladesh-1," Pakistan Horizon 36, no. 3 (Third 
Quarterly 1983): 67-68. 
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treaty with India which was detrimental to the sovereignty 
of Bangladesh.56 
The nationalist forces accused the Indian government 
for forcing Bangladesh to enter into unequal treaties.57 
Protesting the subservient foreign policy of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahaman, the anti-Indian rightist elements and pro-Chinese 
leftist elements especially, the National Awami Party (NAP- 
Bashani) and Jatyo-Samajtantrik Dal (JSD-Rab-Jalil), 
described ruling AL as a "puppet" of India. During this 
time, most of the town and city walls were covered by 
posters bearing the slogan, "down with Indian imperialism."58 
Among many others, Maulana Bhasani,59 a well known 
nationalist leader, emerged as a champion of anti-Indian 
lobby in Bangladesh. He warned Sheikh Mujib that, if he 
56Soon after the independence, Col. Taher and Col. Zia Uddin two 
freedom fighters had stated that the Bangladesh government in exile 
had signed a secret treaty with the Indian government detrimental to 
the security of Bangladesh. For details see Abu Taher's Last 
Testament: Bangladesh the Unfinished Revolution," Economic and 
Political Weekly. (Bombay: Special, August 1977), 1328. 
57Ihs Weekly Holiday, April 22, 1973. 
58Personally I watched these posters bearing anti-Indian slogans. 
Also see The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dhaka: 
Bangladesh Books International, 1980), 163. 
59Maulana Bhasani started his political career under British 
India. He was a leader of the anti-British movement and a leader of 
the Pakistan movement in 1947. He was a leader of Pakistan Awami- 
Muslim League. Inspired by the Maoist revolution in China in 1949, he 
formed the Pakistan National Awami Party (PNAP). A great leader of 
the Bangladesh Revolution in 1971, he represented Chinese lobby in 
Bangladesh. He never cared for power, he always led the anti¬ 
establishment movement. He is one of the state's recognized national 
leaders of Bangladesh. 
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embraced India a day will come when they will all be in jail 
for collaboration.60 He declared Jihad (Holy War) against 
Indian exploiters and urged the army, police and para¬ 
military forces to unite against Indian influence in 
Bangladesh.61 
The Bangladesh-India honeymoon continued despite having 
strong anti-Indian tirade in Bangladesh. It was further 
demonstrated after Indian governments full support to the 
Mujib governments policy of one party authoritarian system 
in order to establish his so-called "socialism" or "second 
revolution. "62 
On the other hand, the Mujib government supported 
India's nuclear explosion, while other countries seriously 
criticized India's explosion of a nuclear bomb. Bangladesh's 
foreign minister Dr. Kamal Hossain said: 
While other countries may have an opinion of their 
own, but I do not think India's nuclear explosion 
for peaceful purpose will create any tension in 
the subcontinent.63 
Mujib's exclusive trust and fascination towards India 
was clear from his decisions of building his own Rakkhi 
^Motherland, May 15, 1973. 
61State3man. (Calcutta: June 4, 1973). 
62Sayed Sirajul Islam, "The Role of the State in the Economic 
Development of Bangladesh During the Mujib Regime (1972-1975)," The 
Journal of Developing Areas 19, no. 2 (January 1985): 196. 
63Lawrence Lifxhultz, "Bhutto's Trip: The Mood Changes," Ear 
Eastern Economic Review (July 8, 1974): 12. 
86 
Bahini (security force) trained by the Indian military. In 
fact, Mu jib's distrust of the regular Bangladesh army (most 
of the officers of the Bangladesh army were trained in 
Pakistan) dictated him to build this Rakkhi Bahini.64 Some 
analysts argued that Mujib equipped Rakkhi Bahini because he 
did not trust the army as he knew that his Pro-Indian and 
Pro-Moscow foreign policy was most unpopular with it.65 
However, the Bangladesh-India honeymoon was very short 
lived. It was over with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahaman and the end of the AL regime.66 Since the coup 
d'état of August 15, 1975, India seemed to lose its trusted 
friend in Bangladesh. But despite this, India decided to 
maintain good neighborly relations with it. The underlying 
reason behind India's decision was the fear of China and 
Pakistan stepping into fill the vacuum left by Indian 
disassociation. Although New Delhi had no intention of 
openly antagonizing the new leadership in Bangladesh and its 
diplomacy remained as usual, the Indian Press had commented 
that US imperialist, Pak ruling circles and Maoist" 
conspiracies were behind the anti-Mujib Putsch of August 
64Ibid. 
65G.W. Chaudhury, "Bangladesh's Coup and Counter Coups: Interna¬ 
tional Implications, QRBIS 12, no. 4 (Winter, 1976): 1586-1587. 
66For Mujib's assassination, see Lawrence Schultz, "Sheikh Mujib 
Pays The Ultimate Price," Far Eastern Economic Review (August 29, 
1975), 10-14. 
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1975.67 After Mujib's assassination, following a coup and 
counter coup of November 3, 1975 and November 7, 1975, 
General Ziaur Rahaman emerged as a strongman in Bangladesh 
politics.68 
With the advent of Ziaur Rahaman, Bangladesh-India 
relations became clouded with mistrust and misunderstanding. 
But Zia tried to erase the misunderstanding through 
diplomatic measures for greater national interest. Though 
the air of suspicion apparently disappeared from the scene 
and both countries stressed the need to maintain peace, 
stability and cooperation in the region, still the relations 
were not expanding for Bangladesh's close linkage, with 
Pakistan, China, U.S.A., and the Muslim world. Bangladesh's 
rapid transformation from the Indo-Soviet orbit to its 
opposite bloc in international politics and the formulation 
of new policy decisions were important setbacks for India. 
Since then the Indian government started exerting pressure 
67Lawrence Lifschultz, New Delhi's Views on the Dhaka Coups," Far 
Eastern. Economic Review, November 28, 1975. 
68Major Ziaur Rahaman declared the formal independence of 
Bangladesh on March 27, 1971. Later, he became a Major General of the 
Bangladesh Army. After the military coup of August 15, 1975, Ziaur 
Rahaman became the chief of the army staff. After the November 7 
revolution of 1975, Ziaur Rahaman was appointed the chief martial law 
administrator. He was the President of Bangladesh from 1977-1981. 
For details, see, Zaglul Haider, "The Bloodless Military Coup in 
Bangladesh: An Analysis," Journal of Political Science 2, (Dhaka 
University, 1983), 82-103. 
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to make the new Bangladesh government subservient to Indian 
desire .69 
After becoming President in April 1977, Ziaur Rahaman 
by a Presidential Proclamation amended the Bangladesh 
Constitution deleting the state principle secularism, which 
was replaced by absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah 
(God) . In addition, it was added in the Constitution that 
the state shall endeavor to consolidate, preserve, and 
strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based 
on Islamic solidarity.70 
In 1979, this amendment was ratified by the Parliament. 
This constitutional change in Bangladesh reflected 
Bangladesh's major shift from the Indian secular mood of 
politics, which Bangladesh subscribed in 1972. Naturally, it 
was a matter of displeasure to India who played the key role 
in the Bangladesh crisis of 1971.71 
In fact, there were several reasons behind India's 
dissatisfaction with Ziaur Rahaman's government in 
Bangladesh. First of all, the Indian government believed 
that Zia's military government ousted Mujib's government—a 
trusted friend of India. Aside, Ziaur Rahaman's emergence as 
69Lewis S. Simon, "How Indian Forces Beseiged Bangladesh Border 
Outposts," Washington Post. November 17, 1975. 
70Proclamation (Amendment), Order No. 1, for details see, The 
Bangladesh Times. April 23, 1977. Also see, Kristen Westerguard, 92. 
71Denzil Peiris, "Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Opening a Raw 
Wound," Far Eastern Economic Review. May 7, 1976, 10. 
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a strongman after Mujib, who shifted from indocentric policy 
and pursued both at home and abroad, a kind of policy which 
smack pro-Chinese, pro-Pakistani, and pro-American flavor. 
Actually, the deterioration of India-Bangladesh relations 
now "advanced by the alacrity" through Pakistan's formal 
recognition of Bangladesh.72 All these things convinced 
India that Ziaur Rahaman was the key plotter behind the 
killing of Mujib. 
Second, the Bangladesh army was controlled gradually by 
officers who were pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian. Because 
most of the senior army officers repatriated from Pakistan, 
had Pakistani military training and background, who did not 
like Mujib's own para-military force, i.e., Rakkhi Bahini, 
and who considered Mujib as a puppet of the Indian 
government. 
Thirdly, the emergence of anti-Indian Bangladesh's 
right wing Islamic groups under the patronage of Ziaur 
Rahaman. While Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman banned the communal 
politics in Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahaman, provided the 
Political Parties Regulation (PPR) in 1976. Taking the 
opportunity, the Islam based political parties started 
normal political activities.73 
72Lawrence Ziring, Bangladesh : From Mujib to Ershad (New 
York: Oxford, Karachi, 1992), 131-132. 
73Emajuddin Ahamed, "Current Trends in Islam in Bangladesh, 
Economic and Political Weekly 18, no. 25 (June 18, 1983) : 1116. 
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Fourthly, there was an increase in the pro-Chinese 
elements in Bangladesh under Zia Regime. While the Mu jib 
Regime suppressed pro-Chinese elements for anti-Indian and 
anti-Mujib activities,74 Ziaur Rahaman wanted to obtain the 
support of Chinese elements and internally maintained very 
good relations with them against the pro-Mujib activist. 
Finally, after his assumption of power Ziaur Rahaman 
introduced a linguistic territorial Islamic nationalism, 
which he called Bangladeshi nationalism. In his Bangladeshi 
nationalism, Ziaur Rahaman's recognition of Islam was 
understood by India as a policy to counteract Indian 
influence. All these factors contributed to making Zia an 
anti-Indian element which deteriorated the relationship 
between the Zia and Indian government. 
With the defeat of Indira Gandhi in the election of 
1977 and with the emergence of Morarji Desai as the Prime 
Minister of India, the relationship between the two 
countries improved significantly. During the short period 
of Morarji Desai's reign as Prime Minister, a number of 
agreements were signed between the two countries.75 Among 
740ne study shows that over 60,000 pro-Chinese leftists were 
arrested by the AL government until the military coup of August 1975. 
Mujib's force, Rakkhi Bahini reportedly killed 60,000 leftist workers 
and sympathizers in their operation for wiping out miscreants in 
different parts of the country. For details, see U.A.B. Razia Akter 
Banu, "The Fall of Sheikh Mujib Regime: An Analysis," The Indian 
Political Science Review 15, no. 1 (1981), 16. 
75During Morarji Desai*s regime, a number of agreements were 
signed between Bangladesh and India. Among these: 1. A five year 
Ganges water sharing accord was signed on November 5, 1975. 2. An 
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these, accord of sharing the Ganges water was important. In 
December 1977, President Zia toured India and similarly the 
Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai also paid a goodwill 
visit to Bangladesh in April 1979. The exchange of visits of 
the two heads of the government strengthened the 
relationship between India and Bangladesh. 
With the return of Indira Gandhi into power in 1980, 
the relationship between the two countries deteriorated 
further. However, President Ziaur Rahaman visited India in 
order to improve relations between the two neighbors. 
In August 1980, Indian External Affairs Minister 
Narshima Rao visited Bangladesh. At the conclusion of his 
visit a joint statement was issued, which stated that the 
two sides had agreed that they will not allow their 
territories to be used for hostile activities against each 
other and they would maintain tranquillity on the border.76 
In September 1980, President Ziaur Rahaman again paid a 
visit to India but Zia's move failed to satisfy India. The 
Indian River flow blockade attempts, unilateral seizure of 
two newly raised Islands in the Bay of Bengal, setting up of 
camps in Bangladesh territory and the failure to implement 
agreement to curb crimes including smuggling across the border was 
signed in September 1977. 3. The two countries reached an agreement 
on April 7, 1979 for greater economic cooperation, joint industrial 
ventures, harnessing of water resources, and rectifying the imbalance 
in trade. For details, see, Azizul Hogue, "Bangladesh in 1979: Cry 
for a Sovereign Parliament," Asian Survey 20, no. 2 (February 1980): 
228. 
76Azizul Hague, "Bangladesh in 1980: Strains and Stresses Oppo¬ 
sition in the Doldrums," Asian Survey 21, no. 2 (February 1981): 201. 
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1974 border agreement seriously strained the Bangladesh- 
India relations. 
In fact, Bangladesh-India relations on the whole took a 
turn for the worse from Mrs. Indira Gandhi's return to power 
to the Ziaur Rahaman's assassination in May 1981.77 Because 
Zia showed his unwillingness to subscribe to Indian regional 
and global perceptions.78 
Economic Level 
Apart from political level, economic relations between 
Bangladesh and India also play significant role in the 
relationship between the two neighbors. During the initial 
period of the Mujib regime, India played a very meaningful 
role in the rebuilding of Bangladesh economy. In the 
economic field, India emerged as the paramount aid donor to 
Bangladesh.79 In January 1972, Bangladesh and India issued a 
joint communiqué during the visit of Bangladesh's foreign 
minister, Abdus Samad Azad, to India and India guaranteed 
for full cooperation to Bangladesh in the economic 
reconstruction of the country. In fact, in the first six 
77Pre3ident Ziaur Rahaman was assasinated by an abortive coup on 
May 31, 1981 led by General Abul Manzour, General Officer Command of 
the Chittagong Cantonment. 
78Shaukat Hassan and Abdur Rab Khan, "Bangladesh Floods: The 
Political Debate" in Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign 
Policy (Dhaka: BSIS, 1989), 85. 
79Rahman Sobhan, The Criaia of External Dependence: The Political 
Economy of Foreign Aid to Bangladesh (London: Zed Press, 1982), 142. 
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months of Bangladesh's independence, 36 percent of all aid 
committed and 67 percent of aid disbursed came from India.80 
During this period India committed $222.7 million and 
disbursed 81.5 percent of this. Of the total disbursement, 
56.7 percent came as food, and the remaining were commodity 
and project aids.81 
One dependable study conducted by Rehman Sobhan shows 
that India provided 800,000 tons of food grains, worth $113 
million after the liberation, was made as a grant. 75 
percent of the $894 million committed as commodity aid to 
Bangladesh until June 1972 came as a grant. Of the $22 
million in commodity loans, $12 million was in soft loans, 
while the $20 million of project loans was on soft terms.82 
But India's economic assistance to Bangladesh gradually 
slowed down with the beginning of Ziaur Rahman's regime. 
From 1975, India's economic assistance to Bangladesh and the 
economic relations between the two countries reached a low 
ebb, because of Bangladesh's rapid transformation from an 
Indo-Soviet orbit to its opposite bloc (Western and Islamic 




EIPW of External Resources into Bangladesh (As of June 30, 
1991) (Dhaka: Economic Relations Department, Ministry of Finance, 
1992) , 65. 
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TABLE 1 
COMMITMENT AND DISBURSEMENT OF INDIAN AID TO BANGLADESH 
(From 1971-72 to 1981-82) 
(in million US $) 
Year Commitment Disbursement 
1971-72 222.712 181.463 
1972-73 15.576 34.395 
1973-74 46.810 9.994 
1974-75 17.500 19.609 
1975-76 7.397 29.721 
1976-77 0.00 21.045 
1977-78 0.00 5.170 
1978-79 15.00 0.993 
1979-80 0.00 4.562 
1980-81 0.00 2.770 
1981-82 0.00 9.141 
Total 324.9950 318.8630 
Source: Flow of External Sources into Bangladesh (as of June 30, 
1991) (Dhaka: Economic Relations Department, Ministry of 
Finance, 1992), 65. 
Fig. 2. Disbursement of Indian Aid to Bangladesh: 
A Comparison between the Mujib and Zia regimes. 
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Although there was no significant aid commitment during the 
Zia regime, it continued the previously committed aid to 
Bangladesh which totaled $318.86 million from 1971 to 1981. 
Of the total aid, 56.8 percent were grants and the remainder 
were loans with 5 percent rate of interest, payable within 
12 years, with 3 years grace period.83 
Another form of Indian aid to Bangladesh in the post 
liberation period was its technical assistance. It played a 
crucial role in the rehabilitation of the war-damaged 
communication network, especially restoring the railway 
system. The Indian technicians temporarily repaired damaged 
railway lines, bridges, culverts, airfields, cleared mines, 
and unexploded bombs, naval clearance of mines and wrecks, 
restoration of wharves and jetties. The major success of the 
Indian technical service was the repairing of the Hardinge 
Bridge .84 
Another major area of cooperation between Bangladesh 
and India was trade relations. The first formal step towards 
trade relations was the signing of the Trade and Payment 
Agreement (TPA) on March 28, 1972. The TPA provided that 10 
miles or 16 kilometers to the border of each country will be 
free of customs and currency. But this pact in practice 
83Sobhan, 141. 
84Indian technical service very promptly and very successfully 
repaired the 5385 feet long rail line and re-established the link 
between Northern and Southern Bangladesh. Several parts of the bridge 
were blown out by the retreating Pakistanis. See Morning News (Dhaka), 
April 6, 1973. 
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gave rise to whole scale smuggling. In fact, the high rate 
of smuggling at taka 15 billion annually was three times 
more than what Bangladesh earned from exports during the 
same period.85 Actually, with the large scale smuggling a 
group of top Awami Leaguers and some of Mu jib's close 
relatives were often accused to be involved. Mujib 
government's home minister even recognized that the 
smugglers were patronaged and protected by the top persons 
in the society. 
Due to the large scale smuggling this pact embittered 
the economic relations between the two countries. Finally 
this trade pact was terminated at the end of the first year 
of independence in the face of strong public protest. 
Actually, the unequal real value between the Bangladeshi 
taka and the Indian rupees encouraged smuggling. The 
exchange rate c Indian rupees was fifty percent higher than 
the Bangladeshi taka (100 taka was equal to 50 rupees) .86 
Moreover, the Indian government slackened the anti-smuggling 
operation along the Indian borders because smuggling always 
went in favor of India. Large scale smuggling deteriorated 
85V. P. Dutt, Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing 
House Ltd., 1987), 239. 
86Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1979: Economic Crisis and 
Political Polarization, Asian Survey 15, no. 2 (February 1975): 119. 
For an exclusive discussion on smuggling, 3ee W. B. Reddaway and Md. 
Mizanur Rahaman, "The Scale of Smuggling Out of Bangladesh," Economic 
and Political Weekly 11, no. 23 (June 5, 1976). 
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the economy of the newly emerged Bangladesh. One economist 
wrote : 
A large factor in the deterioration of the economy 
has been the policy of maintaining an open border 
with India to try at the same time to maintain 
some domestic control of prices and the exchange 
rate is like turning on the central heating in a 
house in winter but keeping its doors and windows 
open.87 
Under the trade relation, the balance of trade always 
was in favor of India during the Mujib regime. One estimate 
shows that by October 1972, the trade imbalance between the 
two countries was approximately 40 million rupees.88 Although 
both parties agreed to remove the trade imbalance by 
increased exports from Bangladesh side, the trade gap 
widened gradually, which was considered by some analysts as 
total domination of India.89 
A new trade agreement was signed between Bangladesh and 
India in July 1973, aimed at establishing a balanced trade 
between the two countries. Although it reduced the trade 
balance, still the trade imbalance between the two countries 
was $81 million in 1974, which was in favor of India. (Table 
2) 
87K. U. Ahmed, "The Condition of Bangladesh," South Asian Review 
7, no. 4 (July 1974): 327. 
88Denis Wright, Bangladesh: Origins and Indian Ocean Relations. 
1972-1975 (London: Oriental University Press, 1988), 135. 
89 'Chaudhury, 586. 
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TABLE 2 
BANGLADESH-INDIA TRADE RELATIONS 
(in million $) 
Year 
Bangladesh's 
Export To India 
Bangladesh's 
Import From India 
Balance 
of Trade 
1971-72 .7 93.9 -93.20 
1972-73 23.3 174.0 -150.70 
1973-74 .4 82.0 -81.60 
1974-75 5.3 83.3 -78.00 
1975-76 7.1 58.3 -51.20 
1976-77 .6 46.6 -46.00 
1977-78 2.3 43.6 -41.30 
1978-79 12.1 40.0 -27.90 
1979-80 8.0 55.6 -47.60 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics. International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Annual (1972-1981) 
Fig. 3. Bangladesh's Balance of Trade with India: A 
Comparison Between the Mujib and Zia Regimes. 
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Following the collapse of the Mujib regime and the 
advent of the Zia regime, although economic cooperation 
between the two countries became confined within limited 
areas, Zia could substantially reduce the trade gap. 
Although the balance of trade was still favorable to India, 
it was reduced to a great extent. During 1975-76 the first 
fiscal year of Zia's regime, the trade imbalance between 
Bangladesh and India was $-51.20 million, while it was 
$-47.60 million in 1981. Bridging the trade gap was Zia's 
major success in Indo-Bangladesh relations. 
Another aspect of Bangladesh-India trade relations was 
that Zia reportedly made an offer to sell natural gas to 
India. Zia government's intentions behind this policy was 
that the natural gas sales would immediately swing the 
balance of payments in favor of Bangladesh.90 Zia's policy to 
sell natural gas to India was seriously protested by the 
nationalist political parties in Bangladesh, who adopted the 
slogan that "we will give blood but no natural gas." 
Ultimately this proposal was abandoned by the government. 
Bangladesh-India Relations: Bilateral Disputes 
India emerged as the closest friend of Bangladesh in 
the immediate post liberation period of 1971. But, 
gradually, the relationship between the two countries has 
become less cordial. 
90 The Bangladesh Times. September 1, 1980. 
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India always tried to exert hegemonic influence on 
Bangladesh, since the latter's emergence. In fact, 
Bangladesh is one of the target points of Indian hegemonism. 
There have been many outstanding bilateral issues between 
the two countries which still remain unresolved for Indian 
unwillingness and unfriendly attitudes. These issues are the 
continuous sources of irritation. Following are the 
outstanding issues that strained the Bangladesh-India 
relations. 
Ganges Water Dispute 
Among the major problems between Bangladesh and Indian 
relations, the Ganges Water dispute is a predominant source 
of irritation since the independence of Bangladesh. 
Regarding its water resources, Bangladesh is at a serious 
disadvantage. The origin of most of the rivers of 
Bangladesh are outside the country. As a matter of fact, 
Bangladesh contains a combined delta of the Ganges, the 
Brahma Putra and the Meghna, bounded on the west, north and 
east by India, on the southeast by Burma and south by the 
Bay of Bengal.91 From a geographical setting and 
hydrological position, India is in an advantageous position 
over Bangladesh. As a result of the increasing upstream 
withdrawal of water by India, the share of water left for 
91Except 174 miles of common border with Burma and 455 miles 
of seaboard, the rest of the border of about 2309 miles lies with 
India. 
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Bangladesh has been found to be progressively inadequate to 
meet her minimum needs during the dry season. India appears 
to have pursued a water diplomacy that proved to be 
detrimental to Bangladesh's interests. India has taken up an 
ambitious plan for constructing some 54 barrages, storage, 
dams and other multi-purpose projects for utilizing the 
existing water resources of the Ganges, the Brahma Putra and 
the Meghna basins, of which 38 projects have been marked for 
the Ganges basin only.92 
India, the upper riparian country is constructing 
barrages, in almost all the major rivers and depriving 
Bangladesh from her due share in the water resources. The 
most conspicuous, "Farakkah Barrage" has been erected over 
the international river Ganges to divert its water to 
Bhagarati-Hoogly River in order to keep India's Calcutta 
port navigable and free from silts.93 This barrage is 
designed to improve communication facilities including 
drainage, sanitation, and water supplies in Calcutta as well 
as inland transport throughout West Bengal. The other 
probable purposes of the project are to control the Ganges 
92The Bangladesh Times. April 12, 1976. 
93India started the construction of the Farakkah Barrage in 1962 
and completed it in 1970 at the cost of US$ 208 million. The barrage 
is 75 feet high and 700 feet long. For details see, Ishtiad Hassan, 
"Bangladesh-India Relations: Issue and Problems" in Emajuddin Ahamed 
(Ed.), Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small States Imperative (Dhaka: 
The University Press Limiuted, 1989), 37. 
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Water in order to irrigate the Indian states of Uttar 
Pradash (UP) and Bihar.94 
According to the Treaty of Friendship, Peace and 
Cooperation between India and Bangladesh (Article 6, 
provided for expert level joint studies of flood control, 
river basin, irrigation and other problems) on November 28, 
1972, a Joint River Commission (JRC) was set up to maintain 
liaison between the two countries and to make a 
comprehensive study in the field of flood control, and 
irrigation by utilizing the joint rivers for the benefit of 
the people of both countries.95 Interestingly the question 
of the apportionment of the Ganges Water remained outside 
the preview of the JRC. After a summit meeting of the Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on May 16, 
1974, a joint commission of India and Bangladesh stated that 
during the period of minimum flow in the Ganges, there might 
not be enough water to meet the needs of the Calcutta port 
and full requirements of Bangladesh and the fair weather 
flow of the Ganges in the lean months would have to be 
94The other possible purposes of the barrage are to control the 
Ganges Water to irrigate the Indian states of UP and Bihar. It is 
evident from a significant development of India in the field of 
irrigation since the 1960's. In 1950-60 the gross irrigated area of 
India was 22.6 million hectares. By 1979-80 the figure had risen to 
over 50 million hectares. For details see Narul Islam Nazem and 
Mohammed Humayun Kabir, "Indo-Bangladesh Common River and The Water 
Diplomacy," BUSS Journal, no. 5, (December 1986), 11. 
95 Ishitiaq Hossain, 37. 
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augmented to meet the requirements of the two countries.96 
The two sides also agreed to reach a mutually beneficial 
agreement before the Farakkah Barrage was commissioned in 
1975. But controversy soon arose over the question of the 
augmentation of the fair weather flow of the Ganges. 
Bangladesh proposed augmentation through storage in the 
Ganges Basin while the Indian proposal included augmentation 
of the water through diversion of water from Brahma Putra by 
excavating a 200 mile long canal to the Ganges and the 
construction of two dams in the "Brahma Putra Basin" at 
"Dihang and Subansari . "97 
The Indian proposal was .not accepted by the Bangladesh 
government on the grounds that the diversion of the Brahma 
Putra water during the lean months would cause adverse 
effects on its downstreams and the excavation of a link 
canal through Bangladesh would cause serious problems in 
Bangladesh. Moreover, both the countries also differed over 
the amount of water to be funneled into Bangladesh. India 
proposed to withdraw 40,000 cusecs of water of the total 
discharge of 55,000 cusecs at Farakkah during the dry season 
for the clearance of Calcutta port. The diversion of 40,000 
cusecs of water at that time of the year would turn 
Bangladesh's northern region into deserts. 
96Bangladesh Documents, (Vol. II, No. 4), 13. 
97Ishtiaq Hassain, 40. 
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However, during the Mujib regime, on April 18, 1975, a 
short term agreement was signed between Bangladesh and India 
which allocated 11,000-16,000 cusecs of water for India from 
April 21 to May 31, 1975 (41 days) and ensured the remaining 
44,000-49,000 cusecs of water for Bangladesh. Though 
originally Bangladesh demanded for 55,000 cusecs now settled 
at 44,000-49,000 cusecs of water sacrificing its original 
demand after signing the agreement.98 (See Table 3). The 
short term agreement expired on May 31, 1975. After the 
expiration of the agreement, India unilaterally began to 
withdraw 40,000 cusecs of water at Farakkah, which posed the 
threat of economic ruination to one third of Bangladesh. 
TABLE 3 
BANGLADESH-INDIA WATER SHARING ACCORDING TO SHORT 
TERM AGREEMENT OF APRIL 18, 1975 
(amount in cusecs) 







April 21-30, 1975 55,000 44,000 11,000 
May 1-10, 1975 56,500 45,000 12,000 
May 11-20, 1975 59,250 44,250 15,000 
May 21-31, 1975 65,500 49,500 16,000 
Source: Ishtiaq Hassain, "Bangladesh-India Relations: Issues and 
Problems" in Emajuddin Ahamed (ed.), The Foreign Policy of 
Bangladesh (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd., 1984), 41. 
98Updated Bangladesh Proposal for Augmenting of the Drv Seasons 
Flows of the Ganges. Vol. 1, (Dhaka: Ministry of Agriculture, Water 
Development, and Flood Control, 1983), 1-2. Also see, Nazem and 
Kabir, 14. 
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The situation deteriorated drastically after the 
assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman through the coup 
d'etat of August 1975. In fact, India increased the 
diversions during the monsoon. In the dry months it 
continued to divert 40,000 cusecs of water at Farakkah 
unilaterally. Some political analysts argued that India 
seemingly did it from political motives, because Indira 
Gandhi's administration did not like the new government of 
General Ziaur Rahman. So, her government used the Ganges 
Water issue against the military government of Bangladesh 
and it viewed the violent overthrow of the Pro-Indian Mujib 
government as a manifestation of anti-Indian feelings in 
Bangladesh." Protesting Indian unilateral withdrawal of the 
Ganges Water, on May 17, 1976 Maulana Bhasani, the veteran 
politician of Bangladesh organized a "Peace March" to 
Farakkah with several hundred thousands of people.100 It was 
a silent non-violent march to demonstrate peoples demand for 
the due share of the Ganges. Peoples participation in the 
march was highly spirited by people of all walks of life. In 
fact, Maulana's intention was not to demolish the million 
dollar project of India, but to launch public agitation for 
Bangladesh's rightful share. Before the protest march, 
"B.M. Monoar Kabir, "Indo-Bangladesh Water Dispute: A Compara¬ 
tive Study," Regional studies (Islamabad) 9, no. 1 (Winter, 1990-91), 
66-87. 
100Bangladesh Observer, May 18, 1976. Also see, "Security 
Through Regionalism: India's Foreign Policy in the 1970's," Political 
Science Review 17, nos. 1-2 (1978). 
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Maulana Bhasani exchanged personal letters with Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi. In reply to Bhasani's letter, Mrs. Gandhi reminded 
him about the "156 Core" building cost of the Farakkah 
Barrage. She emphasized the necessity of the Barrage for 
the preservation of the port of Calcutta.101 Maulana Bhasani 
as the mouthpiece of the anti-Indian camp greatly criticized 
India's decision and declared: 
I, on behalf of the 80 million people of 
Bangladesh announce the firm belief that Indian 
government would not be able to subjugate or 
dominate the indomitable and freedom loving people 
of Bangladesh by political and economic aggression 
and pressure. 
In fact, the change of government in Bangladesh in 
August 1975, caused Mrs. Indira Gandhi's displeasure and 
India's attitude towards the new government in Bangladesh 
became hardened. The new government of Bangladesh even 
failed to convince India to come to the negotiation table, 
even after serious efforts. President Ziaur Rahaman himself 
was very much vocal about India's attitude. In response to 
India's attitude, he declared: 
We are concerned about the aggressions being 
carried out from across the border and also about 
the deliberate withdrawal of the huge quantum of 
water from the Ganges to the detriment of 
Bangladesh. We will face up these aggressions at 
all costs.102 
101
Quoted in Kurshida Begum, Tension Over the Farakkah Barrage: A 
Techno-Political Tangle in South Asia (Steiner-Verlag-Wierbaden, 
1988), 169. 
I02Bangladesh Observer. August 22, 1976. 
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Finally, under the circumstances and finding no other 
alternative to resolve the problem, bilaterally, the Zia 
government decided to internationalize the issue and raised 
it to the OIC foreign ministers meeting in May 1976, Non- 
Aligned (NAM) Summit in Colombo in August 1976 and in the UN 
General Assembly in November 1976.103 
In the meantime, with the defeat of Indira Gandhi in 
the election of 1977 and with the emergence of Morarji Desai 
as the Prime Minister of India the relationship between Zia 
and Desai governments improved progressively. In November 
1977, an agreement was signed between the two countries for 
a period of five years on the apportionment of the Ganges 
Water at Farakkah and augmentation of its flows. According 
to the agreement, out of total 55, 000 cusecs of water at 
Farakkah, Bangladesh got 34,500 cusecs and India got 20,500 
cusecs during the leanest period (April 21-May 30) . The 
allocation was fixed on the basis of flows reaching at 
Farakkah based on 75 percent availability calculated from 
the recorded flows of the Ganges at Farakkah from 1948 to 
1973. (Table 4) This was a diplomatic victory for Ziaur 
Rahaman's government. This agreement was seriously 
103The UN General Assembly included the item titled, "Situation 
arising out of the unilateral withdrawal of the Ganges Water at 
Farakkah" in the agenda of the 31st Session of the General Assembly 
and allocated it to the special political committee. India was 
harassed at the diplomatic efforts of Bangladesh and finally agreed to 
solve the problem bilaterally. For details see, B.M. Abbas A.T., 
"Agreement on the Ganges", paper presented at the Regional Symposium 
on Water Resources Policy in Agro-Socio-Economic Development (Dhaka: 
August 7, 1985), 7-8. 
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criticized by the Indian National Congress and the Communist 
Party of India (CPI). The agreement had already been decreed 
as a sell-out by the government of the Indian state of West 
Bengal, which said that the central government had 
sacrificed the interest of 
TABLE 4 
BANGLADESH-INDIA WATER SHARING ACCORDING TO THE 
AGREEMENT OF 1977 (BETWEEN JANUARY 1 AND MAY 31) 
(amount in cusecs) 
Supplied at Farakkah (Based 
on 75% Availability Amt for Amt for 
Period from Observed Data) Bangladesh India 
January : 1-10 96,500 58,500 40,000 
11-20 89,750 51.250 38,500 
21-31 82,500 47,500 35,000 
February : 1-10 79,250 46,250 33,000 
11-20 74,000 42,500 31,500 
21-28/29 70,000 39,250 30,750 
March : 1-10 62,250 38,500 26,750 
11-20 63,500 38,000 25,500 
21-31 61,000 36,000 25,000 
April : 1-10 59,000 35,000 24,000 
11-20 55,500 34,750 20,750 
21-30 55,000 34,500 20,500 
May : 1-10 56,500 35,000 21,500 
11-20 59,250 35,250 24,000 
21-31 65,500 38,750 26,750 
Source : Kurshida Begum, Tension Over the Farakkah Barrage: A Techno- 
Political Tangle in South Asia (Stuttgart: Steiner -Verlag- 
Weisbaden, 1988), 182. 
Calcutta to appease Dhaka.104 In addition to pursuance of 
the provision of the 1977 agreement both Bangladesh and 
India came up with a proposal for augmenting the Ganges flow 
during the dry season. Bangladesh proposed augmentation by 
building a series of storage dams in Nepal, while India 
104 The Economist, (October 8, 1977), 69. 
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offered the link canal proposal; the 200 mile long canal 
connecting Brahma Putra with the Ganges. But Bangladesh 
rejected the proposal as totally unreliable, while India 
rejected the Bangladesh proposal.105 
However, the agreement of the apportionment of the 
Ganges Water expired in November 1982. By this time 
political change took place both in India and Bangladesh. 
Indira Gandhi regained power in India through an interim 
election and after the assassination of Ziaur Rahaman, 
General Ershad took power by a military coup in March 1982. 
Before the expiration of the 1977 agreement, General Ershad 
and Mrs. Gandhi signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
on October 7, 1982, for the sharing of the Ganges Water for 
the next 18 months instead of renewal of the 1977 
agreement.106 The 18 month period expired in May 1984 and the 
105Bangladesh rejected the proposal because the proposed link 
canal will ruin a vast area of agricultural land in Bangladesh. 
Moreover, in the future, the link canal may itself become the main 
flow of Brahma-Putra as the canal will no longer remain a canal due to 
the rainy season floods and severe soil erosion. So, the Bangladesh 
government rejected the proposal describing it as logically 
unrealistic, technically impractical, and politically and economically 
disastrous. On the other hand, India rejected Bangladesh's proposal 
because India would not accept a third party. Despite the Nepalese 
agreement, India rejected the Bangladesh's proposal on the grounds 
that this scheme is too expensive and it would involve to many other 
states. For details see, Dilara Choudhury, "India-Bangladesh 
Relations: From Euphoria to Pragmatism," Regional Studies 7, no. 2 
(Spring 1989): 46. 
106The reason for which the 1977 agreement was not renewed was 
simple. The 1977 agreement provided a guarantee clause that if during 
the particular 10 day period, the Ganges flows at Farakkah, come down 
to such a level that the share of the Bangladesh is lower than 80% of 
the value shown in the agreement, it guaranteed supply of 80% water 
shown in the schedule. Indira administration did not want to continue 
this guarantee so a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed 
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MOU was again extended for another three years. In November 
1985 another MOU was signed extending the duration of the 
former 3 year agreement into five years.107 
Shanti Bahini Dispute 
The Shanti Bahini Dispute has become a major source of 
irritation between Bangladesh and India. This occurred 
after the political change of August 15, 1975 with the fall 
of Sheikh Mujib's regime and with the beginning of Ziaur 
Rahaman's regime. India has given shelter, arms and 
ammunition and provided training to the tribal Chakma Rebels 
of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT),108 known as "Shanti Bahini" 
to destabilize the internal situation of Bangladesh. 
Moreover, introducing new formulas and conditions, India has 
created obstacles on the way of the peaceful solution of the 
"Shanti Bahini" problem.109 In fact, the problem started in 
1957 when the Pakistan government took up the implementation 
instead of extending the agreement and the guarantee clause was 
dropped. 
107Dilara Chaudhury, 15. 
108 For details see, M.Q. Zaman, "Crisis in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts: Ethnicity and Integration," Economic and Political Weekly 17, 
no. 3 (January 16, 1982): 75. 
109The Shanti Bahini is the armed wing of the tribal political 
party, Jana Sanhati Samity, (JSS - The People's Solidarity 
Association) has been active since the mid-1970's. According to them, 
faced with the threat of losing their identities and the traditional 
tribal rights, the tribals began to respond to the government's 
policies of "detribalization", through increased armed resistance. 
See "Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts" Amnesty International 
Report, 1989-90 (London: August, 1991), 4. Also see, M.Q.Zaman, Ibid., 
78. 
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plan of Kaptai hydro-electric projects which marked the 
beginning of resource appropriation from the CHT for the 
greater benefits of the growing industrial economy of the 
country. After the completion of the project in 1962, a huge 
number of people were forced to evacuate their homestead and 
the vast area went under water and about 100,000 hilly 
people of 1800 farmers families were displaced and submerged 
40 percent of the total settled cultivable land.110 
But the settlement of the displaced people has not yet 
been done. After the emergence of Bangladesh, Prime 
Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman, dropped the special status 
of the CHT from the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, in 
order to integrate the hilly people with the mainstream of 
the country.111 During the early days of Bangladesh's 
independence a delegation of the hilly people led by M.N. 
Larma met with Prime Minister Sheikh Mujib on February 25, 
1972 and placed a four points demand which included: 
1. Autonomy of the CHT with its own legislature. 
2. Retention of the special status of the CHT 
according to the 1900 regulation in the 
Bangladesh Constitution. 
3. Continuation of the tribal chief's offices, and 
110A. I. Akram, "The Security of Small States in South Asia" in 
The Security of Small States, Eds., M. Hafiz and A. Rob Khan, (Dhaka: 
University Press Limited, 1987). 
111The Weekly Bichittra 2, Issue 2, (May 25, 1989) . 
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4. Constitutional provisions restricting the 
amendment of the regulation and imposition of a 
ban on the influx of new tribal people.112 
But Sheikh Mujib refused to recognize their demands 
separately from the mainstream of the people. He outrightly 
rejected their demands by identifying them as secessionists. 
He advised them to merge with the Bengali nationalism and 
"to do away with their ethnic identities." This uni-cultural 
state policy of Sheikh Mujib antagonized the tribal people 
and radicalized them to revolt against the government.113 
The reaction of the Chakma people came out through the 
formation of the Shanti Bahini, on January 7, 1973.114 In 
fact, faced with the threat of losing their identities and 
traditional tribal rights, the tribals began to respond to 
the government’s policies through increasing armed 
resistance. After launching of the Shanti Bahini in 
1973, M. N. Larma, the leader of the Shanti Bahini tried to 
communicate with the neighboring countries. He at first 
contacted the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) as they were 
112"Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts", Amnesty 
International Report. (London: August 1991), 4. Also see, R.g. 
Chowdhury, "Tribal Leadership and Political Integration," unpublished 
report, Chittagong University. 
113The CHT tribals refused to identify themselves with the 
Bengali nationalism. Chakma Leader M.N. Larma viewed in a 
parliamentary debate that,"I am a Chakma, not a Bengali. I am a 
citizen of Bangladesh, a Bangladeshi. You are also Bangladeshi, but 
your national identity is Bengali. The tribals can never be Bengali. 
See Bangladesh National Parliament Debate. (Vol. 1, No. 6, January 23, 
1974), 292. 
114 The Weekly Friday. May 15, 1984. 
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motivated by the communist ideology and they represented 
the armed wing of the Rangamati Communist Party (RCP) 
established on May 16, 1972.115 
Meanwhile, Larma having a negative response from the 
BCP, he took an initiative to get assistance from China, but 
it could not succeed.116 Later he sought India's assistance 
to float a resistance against the Bangladesh government in 
1974. But the endeavor failed due to the warmer relations 
of the Mu jib government with India. Moreover, India made 
continued efforts to inform Bangladesh about the activities 
of the Shanti Bahini instead of providing them with any 
assistance. 
But the situation changed dramatically with the 
assassination of Sheikh Mujib and with the emergence of 
Ziaur Rahaman. Taking advantage of cooler relations with 
the Zia regime, India welcomed the Shanti Bahini, providing 
them shelter in the Tripura and Mizoram states of India, 
established training camps and provided guerrilla training 
while equipping them with modern weapons in order to 
destabilize the internal political situation of Bangladesh. 
Since then, the Shanti Bahini members started sporadic 
attacks on the non-tribal areas. This was followed by the 
counter attacks by the Law Enforcing Agency (LEA) of 
115Md. Zaglul Haider, "Ethnic Problems in Bangladesh: A Case 
Study of the Chakma Issue in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)", 
(Unpublished) . Also see, The Weekly Bichittra. 
116Ihe Weekly Friday- 
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Bangladesh. As a result, several hundred people were killed 
in several incidents and several thousands compelled to take 
refuge in India. Under the above circumstances, President 
Zia took several political-economic steps to ensure economic 
development and bring peace and stability back in the CHT. 
Among many other measures he adopted multi-sectoral 
development programs for CHT aided by Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) at the cost of 1138.4 million taka. He also introduced 
the quota system for the hilly people so that their seats 
can be reserved in the services and the higher education 
institutions. 
Zia identified the problem of Chittagong Hill Tracts 
and instituted Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board, 
"for the economic development of the CHT, which was 
initiated by the Mujib regime. He launched a tribal 
convention in 1977 to maintain peace and stability in the 
CHT, but it reportedly failed to negotiate with the rebels 
for a peaceful solution. 
In order to bring the Chakma rebels under control, 
President Zia adopted two strategies, 1) peaceful 
negotiation and 2) side by side, President Zia tried to 
balance the hilly people by encouraging the people of 
overcrowded districts of Bangladesh to settle in the CHT. 
The ultimate goal of this strategy was to integrate the 
tribal people with the mainstream of the country. The 
government of Bangladesh estimated that the Bengali settlers 
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accounted for 9 percent in 1951. This figure has increased 
as much as 11.6 percent in 1974 and 39.4 percent in 1987.117 
To combat the situation, the Zia government adopted two 
tactics: peace negotiation, and a development program for 
the CHT. One of the two major thrusts for development has 
been the development of the communication system. The 
government undertook a comprehensive plan of worth $39.5 
million financed by the World Bank to improve and build new 
roads and highways even to the remotest place in the CHT.118 
The Zia government also introduced a cooperative farming 
project with the assistance of the Asian Development Bank.119 
The philosophy behind the project was that the successful 
implementation of the cooperative farming would achieve two 
purposes: first, it would resettle thousands of tribals who 
are now leading nomadic lives and secondly, it would help 
the government to establish law and order in the CHT.120 
On the other hand, in order to reach a political 
settlement, President Zia initiated another endeavor to get 
an agreement with the tribal rebels in the late 1980's. The 
closed door dialogue was held in Rangamati Circuit House and 
117Census Reports of 1961, 1979 and Monthly Statistical Report of 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1987. 
118The Bangladesh Observer. March 20, 1980. 
119S. Kamaluddin, "A Peace Offensive in the Hills," Far Eastern 
Economic Review. May 2-8, 1980. 
120 'M.Q. Zaman, 79. 
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substantial progress was also achieved. Bangladesh even 
tried to solve the problem by negotiation with India. 
Following the Indian Foreign Minister, Narashima Rao's visit 
to Dhaka in August 1980, both Bangladesh and India, in a 
joint statement, agreed not to allow its territory to be 
used for any hostilities against the other state and to 
maintain tranquility on the border.121 In spite of all the 
noble efforts of the Bangladesh government, the problem 
remained unresolved during the Zia regime due to 
manipulative control of India over the Shanti Bahini. Though 
the problem is a socio-politico-economic one, for external 
intervention, the problem took very acute and complicated 
shape. In fact, India tried to keep the Bangladesh 
government under political pressure for its major change of 
foreign policy goals; and anti-Indian sentiments in 
Bangladesh during the Zia regime also accelerated to make 
the problem more acute. In fact, the problem could be solved 
politically if the external intervention is stopped. 
Summary 
This chapter is mainly concerned with Bangladesh-India 
relations during the Mujib and Zia regimes. From the above 
analysis it has been revealed that during the first phase of 
the Mujib Regime (1971-1975), the relationship between the 
two countries was very much cordial, partly because of 
121Ihe Bangladesh Times, August 19, 1980. 
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India's crucial role in the Liberation War of Bangladesh and 
mainly for the Mujib government's submissive foreign policy. 
However, with the fall of the Mujib regime and the rise of 
Ziaur Rahaman, Bangladesh entered into the second phase and 
rapidly shifted from an Indo-Soviet bloc to its opposite 
bloc (western-chinese and islamic bloc). During this period 
(1975-1981) problems with India were regarded as the central 
problems of Bangladesh. Actually, with the Mujib's exit from 
the Bangladesh scene, the sweet relations between Bangladesh 
and India turned into sour. Since 1975, the government in 
Bangladesh has pursued policies which have been far less 
receptive of India's sentiments and concerns than was the 
case in the pre-1975 period. Because of Bangladesh's 
unwillingness to subscribe to India's regional and global 
perceptions and concerns, Bangladesh has since 1975, been 
perceived by India as being an unreliable and unfriendly 
country. The relationship improved temporarily during the 
short period of Morarji Desai's government. This time Zia 
successfully signed a five-year long agreement for the 
apportionment of the Ganges water, which was clearly a 
diplomatic gain of Ziaur Rahman over India. However, with 
the return of the Congress Party to power, India's policies 
towards Bangladesh reverted to the earlier pattern. During 
the whole period of Ziaur Rahaman, India tried to exert its 
hegemony by reviving the irritating bilateral problems, but 
Bangladesh seriously opposed these Indian efforts 
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bilaterally, regionally, and internationally, through its 
"outward looking" foreign policy. 
CHAPTER IV 
BANGLADESH - PAKISTAN RELATIONS: MUJIB AND ZIA REGIMES 
Wayne A. Wilcox once wrote: 
...if Pakistan is to become a nation, it requires 
years of common history and experience under 
gifted leaders, who while maintaining a consensus 
within their own circle, recognize their 
obligation to the broader public.1 
After 24 years 
several governments, 
India, a civil war, 
separated into two 
of independent existence, marked by 
Pakistan experienced three wars with 
several natural disasters, and was 
distinct countries, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. The years of common history and experience under 
gifted leaders never materialized.2 The crisis of national 
integration started in 1947. Just after the birth of the 
Muslim state of Pakistan,3 tensions deepened and widened 
3Wayne A. Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 221. 
2Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a 
Nation," Asian Survey 12, no. 2 (February 1972): 97 
3Pakistan emerged as a Muslim state under the Indian 
Independence Act of 1947 on the basis of the "Two Nations Theory." 
The Two Nations Theory was that the Muslims constitute one nation and 
the Hindus another. For detail see Hector Bolitho, Jinnah. Creator of 
Pakistan. (London: John Murray, 1954). Also see Manzooruddin Ahmed, 
"Iqbal and Jinnah on the Two Nation Theory" in C. M. Naim (Ed.), 
Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan: The Vision and The Reality (Maxwell: 




gradually and finally resulted in the failure of national 
integration in Pakistan. It also led to the birth of a 
nation-state Bangladesh on the world map as a sovereign 
entity on December 16, 1971, after having witnessed a nine 
months long bloody civil war. Before 1971, Bangladesh gained 
a quarter century long experience of Union with Pakistan 
under the "internal colonialism."4 The Bengali Nationalist 
Movement which started in 1950's as regionalism, later 
turned into an independence movement in the 1970's and 
finally contributed to the break up of Pakistan and the 
emergence of Bangladesh. The failure of the national 
integration of Pakistan once again proved as Rupert Emerson 
pointed out, "most of the new states of Asia and Africa are 
not yet nations in being but only nations in hope."5 
The roots of the disintegration of Pakistan were very 
much visible within the federal structure of Pakistan. By 
any standard of federalism, the ruling elites in Pakistan 
totally failed to build up a truly federal government for 
Pakistan. Rather they established a colony and hinterland 
4The theory of internal colonialism is presented by the Mexican 
sociologist Pablo Gonzalez Casanova (1970). By internal colonialism he 
meant the same condition of traditional colonialism found internally 
in nations today. See Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative 
Politics: The Search for a Paradigm, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1981), 302. 
5Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1961), 94. 
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in East Pakistan for dumping the finished product of West 
Pakistan.6 
It is noteworthy to mention as Morrise-Jones pointed out : 
The birth of Bangladesh entailed the death of 
Pakistan that was itself brought into the world 
just under a quarter of a century ago. Evidently 
old age cannot be given as the cause of death. 
But what did happen to Pakistan, what was it that 
"went wrong".7 
Immediately after the emergence of Bangladesh, the 
newly established state showed antagonism towards Pakistan 
for the loss of millions of lives and bloodshed. On the 
other hand, Pakistan was hostile towards Bangladesh for the 
eastern wing that it lost. It was very difficult for 
Pakistan to let go of its eastern wing. In fact, the 
Pakistanis were consoled by conceiving the notion that 
Bangladesh became independent with direct Indian and Soviet 
help and they continued their efforts in developing 
relations with Bangladesh. So naturally for attitudinal and 
psychological reasons, Bangladesh-Pakistan relations still 
remained under careful study.8 
However, the normalization of relations between 
Bangladesh and Pakistan started after the formal recognition 
6Zillur R. Khan, "March Movement of Bangladesh: Bengali Struggle 
for Political Power" in South Asia Series: Occasional Papers. No. 21, 
(Asian Studies Center: Michigan State University, 1974), 205. 
'W. H. Morris-Jones, "Pakistan Post-mortem and the Roots of 
Bangladesh," Political Quarterly 43, no. 2 (April-June, 1972): 187. 
8Shirin-Tahir-Kheli, The Foreign Policy of "New Pakistan," ORBIS 
20, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 742. 
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of Pakistan to the People's Republic of Bangladesh on 
February 22, 1974. Since then, hostilities between the two 
countries started to disappear from the scene. Pakistan 
realized that the alienation from an absolutely Muslim 
majority state in South Asia will encourage more deeply 
entrenched Indian vested interests in Bangladesh.9 Yet even 
after Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh, the former 
remained aloof from serious involvement with the latter. As 
a matter of fact, before the fall of the Mujib regime in 
1975, both Bangladesh and Pakistan maintained very limited 
and cautious relations with each other. The underlying 
reasons were Bangladesh's pro-Indian, and pro-Soviet foreign 
policy and secular state policy and Pakistan's anti- 
Bangladesh propaganda throughout the world. Indeed, 
Bangladesh-Pakistan relations improved dramatically with the 
advent of Ziaur Rahman as a strong man on the Bangladesh 
scene. This happened because of Ziaur Rahman's shifting from 
an Indo-Soviet orbit to pro-Western, pro-Chinese and pro- 
Islamic foreign policy. However, the main objective of this 
study is to explore Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. To this 
end the following issues will be addressed in this chapter. 
Role of Pakistan and the Birth of Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations: Mujib and Zia Regimes 
(1971-1981). 
Vernon Marston Hewitt, The International Politics of South Asia 
(Manchester University Press, 1992), 36. 
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Summary 
Role of Pakistan and the Birth of Bangladesh 
Pakistan started its political journey as an Islamic 
state and was constitutionally named as the "Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan" with the national flag 
embodying Islamic symbols of the "crescent" and the "star" 
on a green border. While the founding fathers of Pakistan 
defined the Islamic State as absolute trust in Allah (God) 
and his Supreme Sovereignty.10 
Although Pakistan was commonly known as an Islamic 
republic, it had never been allowed to function according to 
the principles of the Quran and the Sunnah of Islam. Rather 
its leaders followed Western lifestyle and western culture 
which were merely contradictions between the words and 
actions of the founding fathers. About founding fathers, 
commitment towards Islam, prominent Islamic scholar and 
politician, Sayed Abul-Ala-Moududi11 was very critical. He 
stated : 
Not a single leader of the Muslim League from 
Jinnah himself to the rank and file has an Islamic 
mentality or Islamic habits of thought or looks at 
political and social problems from the Islamic 
viewpoint.... Their ignoble role is to safeguard 
10Ziauddin Ahmad (Ed.), Ouaid-i-Millat Liakat-Ali Khan. Leader 
and Statesman (Karachi: Oriental Academy, 1970), 57. 
i:1Sayed Abul-Ala-Moududi founded Jamat-i Islami Party in 1941. 
He authored a huge number of books and articles on Islam and the 
Islamic movement. 
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merely the material interests of Indian Muslims by 
every possible maneuver or trickery.12 
As a matter of fact, the founding fathers of Pakistan 
used "Islam" more as a slogan than practice. Actually, after 
the independence of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah overnight 
transfigured himself from an Islamist to a liberal or 
secular leader. This liberal or secular trend is 
beautifully portrayed in his speech to the Pakistan's 
constituent assembly, where he had outlined the principles 
for the relationship between state and society in Pakistan: 
You are free to go to your temples, you are free 
to go to your mosques, or to any other place of 
worship in this state of Pakistan.... You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed that has 
nothing to do with the business of the state.... 
We are starting with this fundamental principle 
that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one 
state.13 
This serious contradiction between the theory and 
practice of Islam among the ideolog's of Pakistan was 
considered a serious debacle for the political development 
of the new nation. 
Apart from the ideological dilemma, the most formidable 
problem of nation building in Pakistan was the integration 
of Bengali sub nation. The crux of the problem was that the 
12Quoted in Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or Peoples Power. 
(New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1970), 33. Also see Aziz 
Ahmed, Islamic Modernization in India and Pakistan. 1857-1964 (Oxford, 
1967) . 
13Jinnah's speech to Pakistan Constituent Assembly, August 11, 
1947, in Speeches of Ouid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah. as Governor 
General of Pakistan (Karachi, 1948), 101. 
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Bengalis were not merely an ethno-cultural sub-group in 
Pakistan but actually constituted a majority (55.4%) of the 
country's total population.14 The ethnic problem between the 
two halves of Pakistan, was widened and compounded by 
geographical distance, linguistic distinctiveness, political 
domination, cultural heterogeneity, social and above all 
economic exploitation by the West Pakistani ruling elites 
over the East Pakistani majority masses. These were 
considered as challenges toward the national integration of 
Pakistan. In reality, Pakistan faced almost all the 
problems of national integration.15 
Rise of the Bengali Resistance and Vernacular Elites 
The beginning of the crisis which the Pakistan 
government failed to handle successfully was the state 
language issue. This led to a movement to win recognition 
for Bengali as one of the national languages alongside Urdu, 
which began in 1948.16 As the largest ethnic group, the 
Bengali's constituted about 56.4 percent in 1951 and 55.48 
14Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan;Failure in National Integration (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 6. 
15According to Myron Weiner, there are five problems of national 
integration: 1) Problem of creating a sense of territorial 
nationality, 2) Problem of establishing a national central authority, 
3 Elite-Mass gap, 4) Lack of minimum value, and 5) Problem of 
integrative institution. For details see, Myron Weiner, "Political 
Integration and Political Development," The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences 258 (1965): 52-64. 
16Farzana Shaikh, "Islam and the Quest for Democracy In 
Pakistan," The Journal of Common Wealth and Comparative Politics 24, 
no. 1 (March 1980): 80. 
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percent in 1961, and their commonly spoken language was 
Bengali. After the emergence of Pakistan, they wanted to 
make Bengali as one of the national languages side by side 
Urdu. While Urdu was the language of 3.37 percent in 1951 
and 3.65 percent in 1961 in Pakistan. In fact, the West 
Pakistani people's most commonly spoken languages were 
different regional languages like Panjabi, Pushtu, Sindhi, 
Urdu, and Baluchi. From linguistic consideration, East 
Pakistan very closely approximated a linguistic unit while 
West Pakistan presented a complex polyglot.17 
Despite meeting all the prerequisites of the national 
language the ruling elites in Pakistan considered only Urdu 
as the official language and ignored Bengali, the majority 
of the peoples language. 
This action seriously disappointed the East Pakistani 
Bengalis, who fought for Pakistan. They then launched the 
resistance movement, for the recognition of Bengali as one 
of the state languages of Pakistan. 
Following the violent language movement through 1948 to 
1952, the Bengali language was recognized as one of the 
national languages of Pakistan in 1954. Embracing a violent 
language crisis, the Pakistani rulers experienced a 
"disastrous and disruptive beginning.18 
17Jahan, 12. 
18K.B. Sayeed, The Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction 
of Change (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1980), 67. 
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Following the language movement, the East Bengal 
people's grievance and dissatisfaction were first reflected 
in the first popular election to the provincial assembly in 
which the ruling Muslim League (ML) embraced a crushing and 
humiliating defeat to the opposition united front of East 
Bengal in 1954.19 But the ruling elites did not allow the 
united front to function. 
Again at the national level, after the death of 
Governor General M.A. Jinnah, Najimuddin became a figurehead 
Governor General and Liakat Ali Khan emerged as executive 
prime minister. But after the assassination of Liakat Ali 
Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin became the prime minister, while 
Golam Mohammed, a "foul-mouthed" West Pakistani bureaucrat, 
became the very powerful Governor General. This time the 
prime minister became subordinate to the Governor General. 
When the Executive Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin 
tried to curb the Governor General's power by seeking an 
amendment of the India Act of 1935, the Governor General 
dismissed Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin.20 Nazimuddin's 
dismissal clearly demonstrates deprivation and disrespect of 
the ruling elites towards East Pakistan and its leadership, 
19Out of 309 seats in the East Pakistan, the ruling Muslim League 
won only 10 seats. All the provincial ministers including the Chief 
Minister, Nurul Amin failed to get elected. For detail analysis, see, 
Tariq Ali, Military Rule or People's Power (William Morrow and 
Company, Inc., 1970), 62. 
20Pakistan did not have its own Constitution until 1956. It was 
ruled by the government of India Act of 1935 from 1947-1956. 
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and this was the real-po-li-tik of the West Pakistani ruling 
elites .21 
In September 1956, Mr. H.S. Sharwardy, the most 
competent Bengali national leader, was appointed Prime 
Minister of Pakistan, who led a coalition government. But 
within a year Sharwardy had to resign at the point of 
growing hostility of the West Pakistani ruling elites. 
Segmented Development Strategy in Pakistan 
At the economic level, from 1947 to 1971, the ruling 
Pakistani elites followed a segmented development strategy. 
It ignored the eastern wing in its development plan, and 
developed West Pakistan at the cost of East Pakistan and 
successfully converted East Pakistan into an internal colony 
of the West Pakistan. In fact, the economic deprivation, 
exploitation and disparity between the East and West 
Pakistan constituted finally the disintegration and division 
of the country. While the East Pakistan's foreign exchange 
earning constituted almost three quarters of the foreign 
currency earnings during the first decade (50% in 1950-55 
and 61% during 1956-60).22 Unfortunately, the foreign 
21Before Najimuddin was removed as Prime Minister, he complained 
to Gholam Mohammed, "When I was Governor General, I never interfered 
with Liaquat." To this Gholam Mohammed replied, "Ah, but you see, I 
am not Najimuddin and you are not Liaquat.", cited in Tariq Ali, 66. 
22Stephen Lewis, Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in 
Pakistan (London: 1969), 142. Also see Gehstar Poupanek, Pakistan's 
Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), 23. 
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exchange earned by the east wing was appropriated by the 
west which was used to import raw materials for the west 
wing manufacturing. Another factor which led to the economic 
exploitation of the Eastern wing by the West was that most 
investment took place in the west and the east received less 
than one third of the total domestic investments and less 
than one third of the commodity imports. On the distribution 
of the expenditure from 1950 to 1970 only 23 percent of the 
expenditure was done in East Pakistan.23 Moreover, in the 
interwing trade, the balance of trade was always in favor of 
West Pakistan.24 Although East and West Pakistani Economists 
disagreed over the factors responsible for the growth in 
disparity, the East Pakistani Economists showed that their 
interests had been deliberately ignored and neglected by the 
West Pakistani ruling elites.25 
In fact, disparity in per capita income continued to 
rise. While East Pakistan's per capita income rose from 
RS269 in 1959-60 to RS291.5 in 1968-1969, West Pakistan's 
per capita income rose from RS355 to RS473.4. The disparity 
index rose from 28 percent in 1959-60 to 62 percent in 1968- 
23A.M.A. Muhith, Bangladesh: Emergence of a New Nation (Dhaka: 
B.B.I., 1978), 108. 
24Anisur Rahman, East and We3t Pakistan: A Problem in the 
Political Economy of Regional Planning (Cambridge: Center for 
Interational Affairs, Harvard University Press, 1968), 8. 
25K.B. Sayeed, The Politics of Pakistan: The Nature and Direction 
of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 78. 
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69.26 Acknowledging the regional disparity, Mahbub-ul-Haq the 
former Chief Economist of the Pakistan Planning Commission 
opined : 
It shows that if there are wide economic 
disparities between two regions, the pull of free 
market forces will tend to aggravate them. 
Economic growth will tend to become concentrated 
in the relatively richer region, with its better 
infra-structure, more aggressive entrepreneurs, 
and known opportunities for investment. Private 
saving from poorer regions will also go to the 
richer region in search of profitable 
opportunities. Foreign invest-ment will tend to 
follow to the richer region where some dynamism 
has been built up and returns seem to be safer and 
larger. Foreign aid and loans will be distributed 
more in favor of the richer region where those 
sound projects are located, on the basis of which 
foreign assistance has been negotiated. The 
Government becomes an unconscious ally in this 
process of concentration of economic forces-or 
"polarization process" as Myrdal has called it-by 
creating more infrastructure where bottlenecks are 
more obvious by distributing scarce resources like 
foreign exchange where demand for them is higher 
and by concentrating its admin-istrative personnel 
in the more dynamic region where the problems of 
control are more keenly felt. This is clear that 
this is what has happened in the case of East and 
West Pakistan. This was but a natural sequence of 
events in the absence of a clearly defined 
regional policy.27 
Having the experience of economic exploitation and 
appropriation by the West Pakistan the Two Economy Thesis 
was presented by the East Pakistan's economists in 1956, 
which recommended that the development in Pakistan be 
planned for two distinct economies for the two parts for the 
26Jahan, 29. 
27Mahbub-ul-Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study 
of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford, 1963), 113. 
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country. The main hypothesis of the two economy theory was 
that the economy of the two regions be regarded as 
completely separate and that separate economic policies be 
pursued in each wing. Revenue was to be controlled by the 
regions themselves, each region had control of its foreign 
exchange earnings. Each should have the freedom to pursue 
separate foreign trade policies to enter into trade pact 
with foreign countries, to adopt credit and fiscal policies 
best suited to the growth of its economy. Although the two 
economy thesis was regarded as the economic manifesto for 
East Pakistan's Bengali autonomist's, it was rejected by the 
Ayub Regime, branding it as a prelude to political 
disintegration.28 
From the Autonomy to the Independence 
Against the growing economic and political deprivation, 
the six points movement of 1966 led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
popularized rapidly in East Pakistan. It took violent and 
radical character after the initiation of the Agartala 
conspiracy case in 1966, which accused Mujib and Awami 
league for secessionist movement. Following the Agartala 
conspiracy case, the students of East Pakistan formed a 
Students Action Committee and launched the 11 Points 
Movement in order to secure regional autonomy, which was 
more radical in character than any other previous movement. 
28 Jahan, Ibid., 87. 
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The autonomy movement, in fact, crippled Ayub's 
administration. Finally on March 25, 1969, seeing his 
"political epitaph", Ayub quietly handed over power to 
General Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan 
Army. 
After the exit of Ayub Khan from power, Yahya1 s 
entrance as chief martial law administrator once again 
placed the country under martial law. Assuming political 
power, President Yahya announced a legal framework order 
(LFO) under which the first general selection in Pakistan 
was ever held on December 7, 1970 on the basis of one man 
one vote. In the election, the Bengali finally divorced the 
West Pakistani ruling ideas and ideologies and voted for 
Awami League (AL) . The election victory of Sheikh Mu jib's AL 
gave it the position of a single majority party, while Z.A. 
Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) emerged as the second 
largest party. The election victory gave AL such an 
advantageous position, which led to AL taking a strong stand 
regarding the future constitution of Pakistan.29 
On the other hand, Z.A. Bhutto "used" West Pakistan as 
a trump card for constitutional bargaining. He also used the 
West Pakistan's image and joined hand in hand with Yahya 
Khan in order to terrorize the majority party AL. 
29Mohammed Ayoob, "From Martial Law to Bangladesh" in Pran 
Chopra, (Ed.), The Challenge of Bangladesh (New York: Humanitarian 
Press), 49-50. 
133 
Finally, instead of showing respect to a democratic 
system, the West Pakistani ruling elites refused to accept 
the majority rule. The contention of the ruling elites was 
that the beginning of permanent Bengali domination could 
finally displace the political supremacy hitherto enjoyed by 
West Pakistan as a whole. President Yahya finally opted for 
a military solution. 
On March 25, 1970, military crackdown followed a 
systematic campaign of indiscriminate slaughter. Actually 
Yahya Khan's military action destroyed the last hope of 
keeping up the uinity of Pakistan. Finally Bangladesh 
emerged on the world map on December 16, 1971, after having 
a nine month long bloody liberation struggle. In fact, the 
collapse of Pakistan's political system or break up of 
Pakistan was the product of a 24 year long struggle against 
oppression, exploitation and subjugation of internal 
colonialism. 
Following David Easton's "system theory," it can be 
argued that the political system in Pakistan broke down in 
1971, largely because of output failure arising out of 
dissension and conflict between east and west Pakistanis. 
David Easton pointed out : 
Major tendencies to output failure will be set in 
motion as a result of the degree of a internal 
dissension and conflict to be found among the 
members that they find themselves unable to 
cooperate, negotiate or compromise. Their 
differences even to the minimum extent necessary 
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so as to discover some kind of acceptable output 
resolution.30 
In fact, the dissension arose largely because the power 
elites of West Pakistan formulated certain policies that 
provoked so much opposition and bitterness from the East 
that the system was brought to the verge of collapse. It 
might have been saved in March 1971, but the power elites 
were not prepared to let the system be transformed into one 
more acceptable to the East.31 
Bangladesh - Pakistan Relations: Muiib and Zia Regimes 
(1971-1981) 
The sudden but certain birth of Bangladesh was a matter 
of deep shock and great embarrassment for the people and 
government of Pakistan. In the redesigned South Asian 
subcontinent, both Bangladesh and Pakistan cautiously but 
seriously advanced towards establishing a relationship. But 
in the immediate post-liberation period, Bangladesh-Pakistan 
relations were conditioned by the following issues: release 
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from Pakistani Prison, recognition 
of Bangladesh and the release of the prisoners of war 
(POWs), repatriation of stranded Pakistanis and the Bengalis 
and distribution of assets and liabilities. 
30David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life (New York: 
Wiley, 1965), 233. 
31 K.B. Sayeed, 65-66. 
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Bilateral Disputes: Political Level 
Releas.a_.of Muiib, Repatriation of the PQWs and the Stranded 
Bengalis and Recognition of Bangladesh 
In the dawn of the independence, the release of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahaman from the Pakistani Prison, was anticipated 
more than anything among the Bengalis. By exploiting the 
release of Sheikh Mujib, Z.A. Bhutto wanted to soften 
Bangladesh's attitude towards the POWs and towards future 
cooperation between Bangladesh and Pakistan. In fact, it was 
early January, 1972, while mooting the possibility of Sheikh 
Mu jib's release, Bhutto had put forward the idea of an 
extremely loose federation between the two wings of the old 
Pakistan.32 
Bhutto's decision to release Mujib was an attempt to 
create an image in Bangladesh, as a moderate, conciliatory 
and pragmatic leader, whose overwhelming objective was to 
heal the breach between the two peoples by returning their 
hero to them.33 
It is true that it helped maintain political stability 
and peace in South Asia. Mujib was released quickly. After 
arrival, Mujib transformed himself from President to a Prime 
Minister and established his authority as an unchallenged 
32Time (US), January 10, 1972. 
33The New York Times. January 3, 1972. 
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and unparalleled leader—who was commonly known as 
Bangabandhu (friend of Bangladesh).34 
Before releasing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Z.A. Bhutto 
asked him to consider keeping links with Pakistan, but Mujib 
did not promise to Mr. Bhutto that Bangladesh would maintain 
any link with Pakistan.35 After his arrival at Dhaka, 
regarding the ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan, Sheikh 
Mujib said that the old ties between the East and West 
Pakistan had been snapped for good, and his Party would 
stand for "socialism, democracy, and secularism," which 
meant that Pakistan's concept of a Muslim state had been 
abandoned.36 
Although Mujib demanded the trial for those guilty for 
killing three and a half million people in Bangladesh under 
international supervision37 he appealed to his people not to 
seek revenge for the three million Bengalis who had been 
murdered by the Pakistani army during the nine months drive 
to suppress the Bangladesh liberation struggle. As a matter 
of fact, Mujib directed his people not to take any revenge 
34In the 19703, the students of East Bengal gave the title of 
"Banga Bandhu" to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for his uncompromising 
struggle against West Pakistani governing elites. 
35Sheelendra K. Singh (Ed.), Bangladesh Documents, vol. 2 (New 
Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
1977) . 
36Holing Worth, "Mujib Cuts Ties with Pakistan," The Daily 
Telegraph (London), January 11, 1972. 
3'The Daily Telegraph (London), January 11, 1972. 
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upon those non Bengali Biharis who sided with the Pakistan 
army during the liberation struggle.38 
Although Bhutto's gesture to release Mujib was the 
beginning of an uncomfortable journey towards the 
normalization of relationship between Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, both Mujib and Bhutto were under inside pressure 
from Bangladesh and Pakistan. The Bengalis, too, put Mu jib 
under pressure, to make a settlement with Bhutto, so that 
stranded Bengalis can return home.39 
Similarly, from Pakistan's side, Bhutto was under 
tremendous pressure for the return of 93,000 defeated 
Pakistani army troops. The families of the 93,000 soldiers, 
held in India were heavily pressuring Bhutto to recognize 
Bangladesh in order to make a settlement for their return 
home.40 Though Bhutto was caught by divergent pressures,41 he 
deliberately refused to recognize Bangladesh, because he 
believed that it was important to deny the existence of 
Bangladesh as a state in the national interest of Pakistan 
as long as possible so that negotiation on the POWs issue 
would be primarily between India and Pakistan. In order to 
38
FOX Butterfield, "Sheikh Mujib Home: 500,000 Give Him Rousing 
Welcome," New York Times. January 11, 1972. 
39Ihe Economist (London). 
40Salamat Ali, "Bhutto's Challenge," Far Eastern Economic Review. 
December 2, 1972. 
41Some political parties in Pakistan argued that recognition of 
Bangladesh would amount to validation of Indian aggression and also 
lead to an upsurge into secessionist movement. Ibid. 
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strengthen his position, Bhutto appealed to the world 
community not to recognize Bangladesh, on the ground that 
Bangladesh was a client state of India as the Indian troops 
and officials were still present in Bangladesh. Moreover, 
he warned world nations that recognition of Bangladesh would 
rupture diplomatic relations with Pakistan and accordingly 
he did so with many countries.42 But the continuous 
recognition of Bangladesh by the world proved Pakistan's 
strategy of diplomatic rupture unrealistic and 
unsustainable. The most important diplomatic attempt of 
Pakistan was to withdraw its membership from the 
Commonwealth just after Bangladesh's admission into it. 
Besides that, Bhutto toured Arab and Afro-Asian countries to 
persuade them against recognition of Bangladesh in 1972. At 
this point Bangladesh was receiving an abundance of world's 
sympathy and recognition. 
As recognition of Bangladesh and the settlement of the 
POWs dispute bilaterally between Bangladesh and 
Pakistan were disgusting and disgraceful for Z.A. Bhutto, 
he adopted a tougher diplomacy aimed at creating world 
opinion favourable to Pakistan to return 93,000 POWs. He 
employed his talents and energy to convince the major power 
of the world that India had no right to hold the Pakistani 
prisoners and there could be no trial of the prisoners of 
42 Wright, 169. 
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war because India was the aggressor and Pakistan army was 
only carrying out orders for withstanding a rebellion in 
East Pakistan which was the eastern wing of Pakistan up to 
December 15, 1971.43 But the Mujib government took a very 
strong stand on the question of trials on the grounds of 
genocide and human torture. In one public meeting Sheikh 
Mujib challenged Pakistani leader Bhutto and declared: 
Did you think [Mr. Bhutto] that I would forgive 
your soldiers who raped my mothers and sisters, 
burned my villages, and have killed my boys? Mr 
Bhutto, if I remain alive, their trial will be 
held in the soil of Bangladesh. Nobody can stop 
it. No matter how loudly you are shouting 
throughout the world I will not listen to anybody 
who raped and oppressed my mothers and sisters 
like animals, who killed my newly born baby by 
bullets.. .their trials will be held in the soil of 
this Bengal.44 
But at the same time Bangladesh had attempted to ensure the 
security of the Pakistani nationals including the Biharis45 
in Bangladesh in order to avoid the retaliatory action by 
Pakistanis upon the Bengalis stranded in Pakistan. Sheikh 
43Moudud Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Miibur Rahman (Dhaka: University 
Press Limited, 1983), 196. 
44Sheikh Mujib's speech at Rajshahi Madrasha Ground, May 9, 1972, 
in Banga Bondur Bhason (speeches of Banga Bondhu) (Ed.) Mizannur 
Rahman (Dhaka: Novel Publications, 1981), 55. 
45Biharis were active supporters of Yahya Khan. When Bangladesh 
was liberated, most of the West Pakistanis were evacuated to India 
with the defeated army but the Biharis were left behind. Many 
observers expected a massacre, but it didn't happen. Thousands of 
Biharis including most of the communities' leaders were arrested. 
Scores of thousands were forced out of their homes and shot and robbed 
out of their homes. But bloodletting on the expected scale was 
forestalled, initially by the Indian army and subsequently by the 
authority of the prime minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. See Herbert 
Feiter, "Beharri Sorrow," Far Eastern Economic Review. May 13, 1972. 
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Mujib himself accused Pakistan on this ground. On February 
23, 1972, he appealed to the United Nations Secretary 
General, Kurt Waldheim, to use his good office to ensure the 
security of the stranded Bengalis in Pakistan.46 
Pakistan's refusal to recognize Bangladesh and 
Bangladesh's threat of trial of the war criminals increased 
hostility between the newlyborn Bangladesh and Pakistan. In 
addition the mediation attempt by third party like the U.K. 
and Indonesia also failed to break the deadlock between 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. On the other hand, the Pakistani 
authority adopted a new strategy for the reunification of 
Pakistan--a device to fold the question of recognition of 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh interpreted the issue as part of 
conspiracy between Pakistan and China to confuse the issue 
of Bangladesh's sovereignty.47 In this hostile situation, 
Bangladesh planned a judicial tribunal including national 
and international juries, for the trials of war criminals.48 
On the other hand, following the precedents of all modern 
46Mujib complained to the U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim 
that Bengalis in Pakistan were living in a state of insecurity, facing 
knife assaults and looting of their property and the hardship of life 
in concentration camps. The Statesman (Calcutta), February 23, 1972. 
47Pakistan Senior Cabinet Minister Mr. M.K. Jatoi talked about 
the reunification of Pakistan to the world press, but Bangladesh's 
foreign minister, Mr. Abdus Samad Azad seriously protested it. Rounaq 
Jahan, "Bangladesh, in 1972: Nation Building in a New State," Asian 
Survey 13, no. 2 (Feb. 1973). Also see Asian Recorder 18, no. 15 
(April 8-14): 109. 
48S.M. Ali, "The War Trials," Far Eastern Economic Review. June 
24, 1972. Also see Far Eastern Economic Review. April 9, 1973. 
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wars (modern wars are generally followed by a peace 
settlement by the contending parties irrespective of any 
victory or defeat for any side) through an intensive 
diplomatic effort, Pakistan and India signed the historic 
Simla accord on July 1, 1972. The agreement paved the way of 
the repatriation of the 93,000 prisoners of war and the 
return of Pakistan's occupied territory in the war of 1971. 
Benazir Bhutto wrote: 
The Simla Accord returned the 5000 square miles 
taken from us by India. It led the foundation for 
the restoration of communication and trade between 
our two countries and did not prejudice the stand 
of Pakistan or india on the Jammu and Kashmir 
districts. The accord also paved the way for the 
return of our prisoners of war without the 
humiliation of the war trials that Mujib was 
threatening in Bangladesh.49 
In fact, through the Simla Agreement, Pakistan bypassed 
Bangladesh and attempted to undermine Bangladesh's sovereign 
existence and tried to solve the POWs question bilaterally.50 
But still the Bangladesh government continued to stick with 
its own stand and continued to put pressure upon India to 
withhold the troops so that they could be tried. When the 
fact surfaced that India would return the POWs to Pakistan, 
Sheikh Mujib argued that India could not have done so as the 
criminals surrendered to the joint command of Indo- 
49Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East: An Autobiography (London: 
Mandarin Paperbacks, 1989), 65. 
50Jagadish Raj, "Indo-Pakistan Relations since the 1971 War: An 
Indian Viewpoint," The Australian Journal of Politics and History 20, 
no. 1 (April 1974): 23-31. 
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Bangladesh forces.51 In April, 1973, Bangladesh officially 
announced its decision to try 195 POWs on the grounds of 
genocide and human tragedy. But Pakistan demanded the 
unconditional release of all the POWs and responded to 
Bangladesh's decision by preparing a trial for a large 
number of Bengali civil-military officials, stranded in 
Pakistan on the grounds of subversion, espionage and high 
treason.52 Bangladesh seriously protested Pakistani attempts 
by arguing that Pakistan does not have any legal rights to 
hold any such trial of innocent Bengalis and such an action 
would jeopardize the normalization of relations amongst the 
countries of the South Asian subcontinent.53 The action and 
counteractions of Bangladesh and Pakistan made the 
repatriation of the POWs and stranded Bengalis uncertain. 
Since the Simla Agreement had provided the provision to 
solve the trilateral problems through understanding between 
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, the net result of this 
effort was the Indo-Bangladesh joint declaration of April 
17, 1973. The declaration was issued after mutual agreement 
between Bangladesh and India. India also agreed to hand over 
195 POWs to the government of Bangladesh for trials on 
criminal charges. The declaration said: 
51Moudud Ahmed, 197. 
52Ibid., 200. 
53 Ibid., 198. 
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1. Simultaneous repatriation of the Pakistani POWs and 
civilian internees other than the 195 POWs required for 
trial on criminal charges 
2. Repatriation of the Bengalis detained in Pakistan. 
3. Repatriation of the non-Bengalis in Bangladesh who 
owe allegiance to Pakistan and opted for Pakistan.54 In the 
agreement, Bangladesh asserted that it should not take part 
in any discussion with Pakistan at any level except on the 
basis of sovereign equality, which meant Pakistan's 
recognition.55 But Pakistan refused to recognize Bangladesh 
and asserted that Pakistan could not recognize the 
competence or the authority in Dhaka to try the POWs on 
criminal charges. Pakistan went to the Hague World Court and 
formally filed a petition to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), protesting the proposed trial and claimed 
that there was no ground in international law to justify the 
transfer of POWs by India.56 Pakistan government further 
argued that since the alleged crime happened in a part of 
Pakistan and since the accused persons were citizens of 
Pakistan, according to the international law, only a 
54Mohammed Ayub, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: Search for a New 
Relationship (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1975), 113- 
114. Also see Sabiha Hassan, "Foreign Policy of Bangladesh - 1," 
Pakistan Horizon 36, no. 3 (Third Quarter, 1983). 
35The Bangladesh Observer. January 14, 1973. 
56In May, 1973, Pakistan filed this case in the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) but withdrew later in December, 1973. 
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competent tribunal of Pakistan could have the jurisdiction 
over this matter and it would be repugnant to Pakistan's 
sovereignty to surrender its exclusive jurisdiction. The 
Pakistan government also moved to the ICJ against the 
proposed trial with a request for an interim injunction 
against Indian transfer of 195 POWs to Bangladesh for war 
crime trials. In the meantime in July 1973, Bangladesh 
passed a law for the Punishment of Prisoners of War known as 
the International Crimes Act, 1973, and preparation for 
collecting evidences and the transfer of 195 POWs from India 
to Bangladesh was in the process of being finalized. At this 
point, Z. A. Bhutto raised the issue of the recognition of 
Bangladesh in Pakistan's Parliament.57 In July 1973, the 
National Assembly of Pakistan gave President Bhutto the 
power to recognize Bangladesh, but Bhutto ruled out 
recognition of Bangladesh until all Prisoners of War (POWs, 
i.e. 195 held for trials) were released.58 
At this stage, a series of discussions took place 
between India and Bangladesh and finally the Mujib 
government authorized supreme power to India to settle all 
matters with Pakistan and India consulting with Bangladesh 
signed the Delhi Agreement in 1973 with Pakistan, which 
57See Salamat Ali, "Bhutto's Challenge," Far Eastern Bconomic 
Review, December 1, 1972. 
72. 
58Sabiha Hasan, "Foreign Policy of Bangladesh," Pakistan Horizon: 
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ensured an arrangement for the simultaneous repatriation of 
the POWs (except the 195 charged on war crimes) and the 
stranded Bengalis in Pakistan. The agreement included an 
undertaking by Pakistan that it will not go for any trial of 
203 Bengalis on espionage charges.59 As far as the crime 
trial was concerned, the agreement said that the 195 accused 
would go to Bangladesh for trial only if Pakistan and 
Bangladesh agreed that the trials should take place.60 
According to the Delhi Agreement, repatriation took place 
from September 1973 to April, 1974.61 The effect of the 
agreement was to convert the trials of 195 POWs into a 
negotiation point between Pakistan and Bangladesh, but it 
did not assure Pakistan that Bangladesh would forget and/or 
forgive the trials. Speaking on this point in an address to 
the U.N. General Assembly on September 29, 1973, Pakistan's 
President Z.A. Bhutto said: 
The Delhi Agreement has left... unsolved the 
question of 195 Pakistani prisoners of war. 
Without an agreement for their repatriation, the 
full normalization of relations between the 
countries of the subcontinent is not possible.62 
59Retaliating Bangladesh's proposed trial of 195 POWs Pakistan 
also arranged such a trial of 203 Bengalis on espionage charges. 
60The Times (London), August 19, 1973. Also see Hindustan Times 
(New Delhi: August 30, 1973). 
61Government of Pakistan, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, Prime Minister of 
Pakistan: Address to the General Assembly (September 20, 1973), 7. 
62By April 1974, 400,000 Bengalis had been repatriated to 
Bangladesh. The stranded Bengalis had flown from Karachi to Dhaka 
through U.S. sponsored airlift. For details, see "Share and Share 
Unlike," The Economist (London), February 16, 1974. 
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So, on the question of recognition Bhutto remained silent up 
to the OIC Summit of 1974. Actually, Bhutto left no stone 
unturned in his campaign to free the accused POWs . Finally 
he used the OIC Summit as his last diplomatic maneuver to 
settle the POW's issue and the recognition of Bangladesh was 
his last trump card. As the Lahore Summit of the OIC was 
nearing, new diplomacy was devised to solve the Bangladesh- 
Pakistan dispute. To this end, Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat used his offices to settle the recognition issue 
between Bangladesh and Pakistan. Bangladesh however firmly 
refused to attend the OIC Summit until and unless recognized 
by Pakistan. At this juncture, the Secretary General of the 
OIC, Mr. Hasan-al-Tohamy, visited Dhaka and on the eve of 
the Summit a seven member delegation led by foreign minister 
of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah-al-Ahmed-al-Jaber visited 
Bangladesh. The delegation returned to Lahore on February 
22, 1974, and Z.A. Bhutto accorded the recognition of 
Bangladesh on the same day of February 22, 1974. As a 
gesture of good will, Sheikh Mujib flew to Lahore and 
attended the Summit, in spite of the annoyance of many 
Indians.63 But the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan was 
very cautiously observed by India and the west. While Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi, welcoming Pakistan's decision, hoped 
that it would restore normalcy in the subcontinent but at 
63In Calcutta, Indians burned the effigy of Sheikh Mujib for 
attending the OIC Summit. See Moudud Ahmed, 72. 
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the same time she regretted that India with 60 million 
Muslims had not been invited to the Lahore Summit.64 Some 
observers in New Delhi even said that it would be quite like 
Bhutto to invite Mujib to become Prime Minister of a re-born 
Pakistan.65 But some western observers had cautiously ruled 
out the possibility of Pakistan-Bangladesh-China axis. Even 
some western observers questioned, will Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman from the need to maintain friendly relations with the 
rich Arab nations, come increasingly under the influence of 
Islamabad?66 However, following Pakistan's recognition of 
Bangladesh on April 10,1974, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan 
signed a tripartite agreement at the foreign minister level 
in New Delhi. According to the agreement, the Pakistan 
government condemned and was deeply regretful for the 
crimes that had been committed by the 195 POWs, and 
Bangladesh in the interest of reconciliation and durable 
peace in the subcontinent decided to drop the trials of the 
accused POWs for war crimes. It was also agreed that 195 
officers selected for trial would be repatriated to Pakistan 
along with other prisoners of war and Pakistan agreed to 
64Salamat Ali, "Bhutto Embraces Bangladesh," Far Eastern Economic 




accept the stranded Pakistanis.67 Through the agreement, 
Mujib had to reverse his self declared, continuously 
promised trials of war criminals while the western 
journalists commented that Bhutto got 93,000 POWs released 
in return for nothing at all.68 
Repatriation of the Stranded Pakistanis (Biharis) 
Who were the stranded Pakistanis? They were non-Bengali 
poor Muslims who fled their homes, and migrated to the East 
Pakistan following the partition of British India in 1947. 
Many of them from the state of Bihar but many others from 
Calcutta, northern India, Bombay, and Madras. But their 
common language was Urdu like any other Pakistani. In the 
erstwhile East Pakistan and present Bangladesh, they are 
known as Biharis. The Biharis were convinced to serve the 
Pakistani authority in the former East Pakistan in the same 
way that the Eurasians and immigrant minorities had served 
67In the Delhi agreement Pakistan proposed the repatriation of 
the stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh to Pakistan. Pakistan placed 
three criteria for determining the eligibility for repatriation: 1. 
Central government employee; 2. Divided families; 3. Domiciled 
citizens. In addition, Pakistan also agreed to take 25,000 persons who 
constituted hardship. Pakistan confirmed that all those who fall under 
these categories would be received by Pakistan without any limits of 
number. See the text of tripartite agreement between Bangladesh, India 
and Pakistan, on April 9, 1974 (used from the embassy of Pakistan, 
Dhaka) . 
68The Economist (London), July 6, 1974, p. 50. The Guardian said 
in its editorial: "Mr. Bhutto, for all his protestations, had gained 
everything and lost virtually nothing. He renewed a highly 
advantageous peace settlement for New Delhi. He now got every one of 
his vanquished army home. See The Guardian (Manchester), February 23, 
1974 . 
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European rulers of Asian and African colonies.69 During the 
liberation war of Bangladesh, these Urdu speaking "Biharis" 
collaborated with the Pakistan army as they wanted. 
Immediately after the liberation of Bangladesh, these people 
became unwanted and felt insecure. In 1972-1973 one million 
stranded Biharis were given an option to identify their 
citizenship either of Pakistan or of Bangladesh, through the 
International Red Cross Society. Among them 500,000 opted 
for residing in Bangladesh and the rest wanted their 
repatriation to Pakistan.70 According to the agreement 
between Bangladesh-Pakistan and India (on April 10, 1974 in 
New Delhi), at the first stage of repatriation about 170,000 
"Biharis" repatriated under the auspices of the 
International Red Cross. After a couple of months the 
repatriation of the stranded Pakistans, initiated in 1973, 
had stopped because of the fund shortages of the 
International Red Cross Society.71 Since then Pakistan became 
69After the military crackdown of General Yahya Khan on March 25, 
1971, Biharis were Yahya Khan's active supporters and they 
participated and took leading part in genocide in East Pakistan. When 
Bangladesh became liberated, most of the West Pakistani civilians in 
the new nation were evacuated to India, with the defeated army. But 
the Biharis were left behind. See Herbert Feith, "Biharis Sorrow," Far 
Eastern Economic Review. May 13, 1972. 
70Moudud Ahmed, 204. 
^International Red Cross Society provided the airlifting 
facilities for the repatriation of the Biharis. 
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reluctant to accept the stranded Pakistanis.72 During the 
Mujib-Bhutto talks in Bangladesh in 1974 Sheikh Mujib handed 
two demands to Bhutto from the priority list, and the first 
was Pakistan would repatriate all Biharis immediately, but 
Bhutto refused to take responsibility for these stranded 
Pakistanis.73 After repeated reluctance was shown by Pakistan 
about the repatriation of the Biharis, the Mujib government 
tried to internationalize the issue and indeed raised the 
stranded Pakistanis issue in the Third World's Committee of 
the United Nations General Assembly in December 1974. They 
then raised it in the Commonwealth leaders Conference in 
Jamaica in May, 1975.74 But these diplomatic measures taken 
by Bangladesh during Mujib's regime could not make any 
progress regarding the settlement of the problem and still 
Pakistan and Bangladesh could not establish diplomatic 
relations with each other.75 
72In Pakistan opposition to the settlement of the "Biharis" came 
strongly from Sindh, where the Biharis were considered as economic and 
cultural threat to the Sindhi Population. Even Bhutto's Pakistan's 
People Party (PPP) did not appreciate and still not encouraging Bihari 
settlement in Sindh. 
73While answering questions of the newsmen, Bhutto said that "I 
have not come to Bangladesh with a blank cheque." See Kai Bird and Sue 
Goldmark, "Dhaka and Bhutto: The Slow Thaw," Far Eastern Economic 
Review (January 30, 1976). 
74M. Abdul Hafiz, "Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations: Still 
Developing?" Biiss Journal 6, no. 3 (1985): 360. 
75See Talukdr Maniruzzuman, "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis 
and Political Polarization," Asian Survey 15, no. 2 (February 1975): 
127. Also see Lawrence Lifschultz, "Bhutto's Trip: The Mood Changes," 
Far Eastern Economic Review (July 8, 1974). 
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But the coup d'etat of August 1975, which ended the era 
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, began a new era for Bangladesh- 
Pakistan relations. With the emergence of Ziaur Rahman as 
the head man of Bangladesh, he initiated serious diplomatic 
efforts for the repatriation of the stranded Biharis. In 
1977 President Ziaur Rahman paid an official visit to 
Pakistan during his South Asian tour and made substantial 
progress for the repatriation of the Buharis. Pakistan 
agreed to take back 25,000 stranded Biharis and 4,790 of 
them had been repatriated by sea. Pakistan again stopped the 
repatriation process on the ground of political 
instability.76 Again in July, 1978, Bangladesh's foreign 
secretary visited Pakistan and urged the government of 
Pakistan to complete the process of repatration of Biharis 
from Bangladesh.77 
However, because of the better relations between the 
two Presidents, i.e. General Zia of Bangladesh and General 
Zia-ul Hoque of Pakistan, repatriation of Biharis by air was 
resumed briefly in September 1979. But once again the 
repatration was stopped by Pakistan. At this point 
Bangladesh did not irritate Pakistan by raising the issue, 
because of Bangladesh - Pakistan's improved economic ties 
76Pakistan President General Zia-ul-Haq founded a trust in 
cooperation with the Mecca-based Muslim humanitarian organization— 
Rabita-i-Alam Al-Islam for the repatriation and rehabilitation of the 
stranded Pakistanis, but it became ineffective after the death of 
President Zia-ul-Hague. 
77The Weekly Robbar (Dhaka), September 11, 1983, p. 17. 
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and identical outlook in different regional and global 
issues.78 Hence the Bihari issue remained unresolved during 
the Zia regime.79 
Bilateral Disputes: Economic Level 
Distribution of ..Assets and Liabilities 
Another major irritation between Bangladesh-Pakistan 
relations was the distribution of assets and liabilities. 
After its independence Bangladesh claimed that it deserved a 
share of the common assets of the former united Pakistan. In 
a 1975 agreement, Bangladesh accepted half of Pakistan's 
pre-1971 external debt—but the asset sharing issue remained 
unresolved because of the unwillingness of Pakistan.80 
78In May, 1976, Bangladesh-Pakistan signed a three years trade 
agreement for the first time after Bangladesh's independence. 
Moreover, during Zia's regime, Bangladesh and Pakistan pursued the 
identical policy regarding Afghan issue, PLO issue, in the NAM, and 
the United Nations. Pakistan supported Bangladesh in the UNGA for the 
apportionment of the the Ganges water in a case against India. 
79During Erstad's regime (1982-1990) Pakistan's foreign minister, 
Lt. General Shahibjada Yakub Ali Khan came to Bangladesh in August 
1983 and at the conclusion of his visit expressed to the journalists 
that Pakistan might take 50,000 more Bihari3 from Bangladesh on the 
basis of criteria set in the tripartite agreement in 1974. From 
October 1-6, 1984, during the official visit of Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto to Bangladesh, the repatriation issue was discussed by 
President Erstad and Benazir Bhutto but no progress was achieved. In 
1992, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia visited Pakistan and discussed the 
issue with Prime Minister Nawaj Sharif of Pakistan, but still it 
remained unsolved. 
80Pakistan never agreed to talk regarding the sharing of assets 
from Bhutto to Nowaz Shashif, each of them diplomatically avoided the 
issue. For details, see James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden (eds.) 
Bangladesh: A Country Study (Area Hard Book Services, Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress, 1988) . See also Craig Baxter, 
Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1984). 
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According to the Bangladesh Planning Commission report, 
Pakistan should pay at least 2575.07 million rupees (257 
crore 57 lakh) as Bangladesh's share of the united 
Pakistan's assets81 (see Table 5). 
TABLE 5 
CLAIM OF ASSETS BY BANGLADESH TO PAKISTAN 
Organization Amt. on basis of population Amt. on basis of distri- 
bution of wealth 
1. Nat. Bank of Pakistan 200 crore 83 lakh (2008.30) 176 crore 75 lakh (1767.50) 
2 . Industrial Dev. Bank Not known 6 crore 82 lakh (68.20) 
3. Agri. Dev. Bank of Pak. 9 crore 5 lak (90.50) 10 crore 19 lakh (101.90) 
4 . Investment Corp. of Bang . 16 crore 78 lakh (167.80) 24 crore 98 lakh (149.80) 
5 . Pakis. Ind. Credit & Inv . 4 crore 44 lakh (44.40) 3 crore 96 lakh (39.60 
6. Pakistan Refugee Rehab. Finance Corp . Not known 1 crore 91 lakh (19.10) 
7 . Pakis. Insurance Corp. Not known 21 crore — - (210 .00) 
8. Pakis. Still Mills 3 crore 19 lakh (31.90) 2 crore 85 lakh (28.50) 
9. Oil & Gas Devel. Corp. 13 crore 74 lakh (137.40) 111 crore 52 lakh (115.20) 
10. Pakis. Vak Petroleum 2 crore 16 lakh (21.60) 2 crore 16 lakh (19.30) 
11. Pakis. Oil Field Ltd. Not known 5 lakh (.50) 
12 . Pakis. Inter. Air (PIA) 8 crore 18 lakh (81.80) 7 crore 26 lakh (72.60) 
13. Pakis. Sec. Plann. Corp. — 91 lakh (9.11) — 81 lakh (8.11) 
14 . Pakis. Tourism Div. Corp . —46 lakh (4.06) — 40 lakh (4.00) 
15 . Karachi Elec Supply Not known 7 crore 40 lakh (74.00) 
16. Pakis. Elec Agency 5 crore 7 lakh (50.07) 4 crore 53 lakh (45.30) 
17. National Ship. Corp. Not known 16 crore-- (160. 00) 
18. Pakis. Television Corp. 35 crore— (350. 00) 11 crore— (110 . 00) 
19. Tele. Indust, of Pakis. 3 crore 15 lakh (31.50) 2 crore 81 lakh (28.10) 
20. Print. Corp. of Pakis. 2 crore 55 lakh (25.5) 2 crore 25 lakh (22.5) 
21. Trading Corp. of Pakis. — 58 lakh (5.80) — 52 lakh (5.20) 
22^ Jute Trading Corp.  — 34 lakh (3.4) — 37 lakh (3.7) 
TOTAÎ,  257 crore 79 lakh  
Source: Adapted from a report published in Robbar. a leading 3engalis National 
Weekly, Dhaka, September 11, 1983. 
* 10 million is equal to one crore 
** Figures in the bracket ( ) indicates million rupees 
On the other hand the total external debt of Pakistan was 
some 3700 million rupees, according to the World Bank report 
and about 30 percent of it was spent in the former East 
81Bangladesh Planning Commissions estimated figure is published 
in the weekly Robbarr a Bengalis weekly, September 11, 1983, p. 19. 
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Pakistan.82 The Planning Commission's estimate shows that the 
liabilities of Bangladesh to Pakistan were 108.8 million 
rupees.83 (Table 6) 
TABLE 6 
LIABILITIES OF BANGLADESH TO PAKISTAN 
(in crore and million rupees) 
ORGANIZATION AMOUNT 
Equity Participation Fund 2 crore 63 lakh 
(26.30 million rupees) 
House Building Finance Corporation 8 crore 25 lakh 
(82.50 million rupees) 
TOTAL 10 crore 88 lakh 
(108.8 million rupees) 
Source: Adapted from a report published in the Robbar (September 11, 
1983): 14. 
For obvious reasons the bulk of the national assets of 
former Pakistan remained in West Pakistan because public 
property expanded and concentrated in the urban centers of 
the West Pakistan. As the capital of the central government 
remained in West Pakistan, industrial centers and national 
institutions like shipping, airlines, and other important 
federal institutions were located in West Pakistan. 
For the discriminatory policy of the ruling elites 
of the central government, East Pakistan inspite of having 
a majority of the population, remained neglected 
82Quoted in Ataur Rahman Khan, 324. 
83 Robbar, p. 14. 
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economically.84 Later a substantial part of meager assets 
located in East Pakistan were allegedly taken away by the 
Pakistanis during the period of the liberation war. 
Regarding the distribution of assets, Bangladesh 
proposed the following principles and demanded her share: 
a. Population basis: Bangladesh could demand 
56% of the total assets. 
b. Equal distribution Bangladesh could demand 





Bangladesh could demand 
51% of foreign exchange 
as East Pakistan contri¬ 
buted to national 
reserves. 
Bangladesh could demand 
44% of the total wealth.85 
Actually, the issue of the distribution of assets and 
liabilities hindered Bangladesh-Pakistan rapproachment since 
the beginning of Bangladesh's independent entity. In 1974, 
when Pakistan's Prime Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, came to 
Bangladesh, Mujib and Bhutto discussed the issue. Sheikh 
Mujib handed him a demand of 56 percent of the assets of the 
central government up to 1971.86 During the Mujib-Bhutto 
talks Mujib proposed for an agreement and a joint commission 
84M. Ra3hiduzzaman, "East-West Conflicts in Pakistan: Bengali 
Regionalism, 1974-1980, in A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton (Eds.), National 
Integration (Honolulu: The University Board of Hawaii-Honolulu, 1982), 
111. 
85Syed Serajul Islam, 57-58. 
86Kalbird and Sue Goldmark, "Dhaka and Bhutto: The Slow Thaw," 
Far Eastern Economic Review (January 30, 1976). 
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to examine the details. Mujib also demanded an immediate 
token payment within two months counting of quantifiable 
assets like gold reserves, ships and aircrafts, etc. to meet 
the increasing needs of Bangladesh.87 But Bhutto did not 
agree with Mujib's proposal and instead suggested to form a 
joint commission to examine the issue. As a matter of fact 
he did not make any formal commitment on the issue.88 
Finally, in the given situation, as Pakistan 
continuously showed its reluctance to resolve the issue, 
Bangladesh raised it in the Organization of Islamic 
Countries' Foreign Ministers' Conference (ICFM) held in 
Jeddah in July 1975, where Bangladesh's foreign minister 
sought the arbitration of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE 
(United Arab Emirates), on the question of division of 
assets and liabilities between Bangladesh and Pakistan. But 
this diplomatic effort ultimately did not work. In fact, 
Pakistan's real intention about the distribution of assets 
was clearly reflected in 1973 in an article published in the 
Pakistan Horizon a Pakistan government sponsored foreign 
policy journal. A. A. Akmut, one Pakistani foreign policy 
analyst wrote: 
The government of Pakistan too has left certain 
property in "Bangladesh." Some of these are fixed 
assets others are moveable. A good deal of 
87Iftakhar Ahmed Chaudhury, 213. 
""Pakistan and Bangladesh: Time to Pay Up," The Economist 
(London), July 6, 1976. 
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equipment of the armed forces has also fallen in 
the hands of Bangladesh and India. What will be 
the final disposition of such properties? Warlike 
stories are normally not returned to a defeated 
enemy — to which the Chinese comportment provided 
an exception in 1962. This means that the 
government of Pakistan will refuse to accept 
liabilities in this regard. As regards foreign 
loans, the government has already indicated that 
it will not accept liability for payment in 
respect of such loans or part thereof, as were 
applied to East Pakistan. This is very well in 
accordance with the principles enunciated above. 
At the same time Bangladesh and her citizens will 
be debarred from deriving benefits from assets 
located in or under control of Pakistan. Thus the 
picture emerges that all rights and liabilities in 
Pakistani citizens in respect of assets located in 
or under control of "Bangladesh" have disappeared 
and cannot be revived. This is one of the burdens 
of war -- a price paid for defeat.89 
Following the eclipse of the Mujib regime in Bangladesh 
and the collapse of the Bhutto rule in Pakistan, the new 
leaders of both countries took an effort to settle the 
matter. To this end President Zia of Bangladesh visited 
Pakistan in 1977. On conclusion of Zia's visit, it was 
stated in a joint communique that Pakistan was ready to 
discuss the question of division of assets and liabilities 
without any pre-condition.90 
Following Zia's visit, the foreign secretary of 
Pakistan came to Bangladesh in October, 1980, and discussed 
the issue. This time it was agreed that a working group 
composed of inter-ministerial representatives and experts of 
89A.A. Akmut, "Rights and Obligations in Regard to Assets Located 
in 'Bangladesh'," Pakistan Horizon 26, no. 3 (Third Quarterly 1973): 
9. 
90 'Daink Ittefaque. December 23, 1977. 
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the two sides would meet in Islamabad and examine the 
question of the distribution of assets and liabilities. But 
it could not accomplish a successful agreement. In 1981, 
after the assassination of President Ziaur-a-Rahman, the 
issue remained unresolved. As a matter of fact, the sharing 
of assets and liabilities continues to trouble relations 
between the two nations, even after almost a quarter century 
of separation. 
Banaladesh-Pakistan Relations: Bilateral Cooperation 
Political Level 
Apart from the conflicting interests, there are 
specific areas of politico-economic cooperation between 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. Albeit, Pakistan recognized 
Bangladesh during Sheikh Mujib's regime, indeed there were 
no diplomatic ties. After formal recognition of Bangladesh, 
Pakistan's President Z.A. Bhutto came to Dhaka on June 27, 
1974 for reconcili-at ion. Beyond the attempt to heal the 
wounds, Bhutto's tour posed a serious policy question for 
Bangladesh over the definition of future relations with 
Pakistan and the emergence of a new and intricate balance in 
the subcontinent as a whole. Mr. Bhutto's visit to Dhaka 
clearly demonstrated Pakistan's desire for rapproachement 
with Bangladesh. Mr. Bhutto actually apologized for what he 
called the "shameful repression and unspeakable crimes 
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committed in Bangladesh by the Pakistani army in 1971. "91 
While apologizing for the crimes committed by Pakistan's 
army in Bangladesh, Z.A. Bhutto offered this assessment: 
[the events of 1971 were] a dramatic tragedy 
inflicted upon us by a demented power crazy junta. 
...dictators were not our representatives anymore 
than they were yours. I will not defend what is 
indefensible. We were misinformed, misled and 
exploited. The people of Pakistan respect your 
decision and will cooperate with you to the extent 
that you desire. However, we should not forget 
there was once a dream without which there could 
have been neither Pakistan, nor Bangladesh.92 
Bhutto received a tremendous welcome in Bangladesh, 
which is analyzed by some experts as demonstration of Muslim 
unity against Indian domination.93 But Bhutto's tour could 
not achieve any progress towards the normalization of 
relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Bhutto's unwillingness towards the settlement of the 
stranded Biharis issue and the distribution of assets and 
liabilities, marked the abrupt departure of Pakistan's 
entourage and led to the failure of the mission. 
The diplomatic relations could not be established 
between Bangladesh and Pakistan up to 1975 until the coup 
91Lawrence Lifschultz, "Bhutto13 Trip: The Mood Change," Far 
Eastern Economic Review. July 8, 1974. 
92Although Z.A. Bhutto apologized for the crime committed by the 
Pakistan army, he did not apologize for his role. In a press 
conference concerning his role in the events of 1971, particularly his 
trips to the U.N. and Beijing, he replied: "Bangladesh was once part 
of Pakistan. How could I support the secession from Pakistan?" See 
Ibid. 
93For an analysis of Bhutto's trip to Bangladesh, see, The Times 
(London), June 28, 1974. 
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d'etat of August 15, 1972 which killed Sheikh Mujibhr Rahman 
and collapsed his regime. After the fall of the Mujib regime 
and with the end of the "entente cordial" that existed 
between Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Mrs. Ghandi and Leonid 
Brezhnev, Pakistan was the first country that renewed its 
recognition of Bangladesh and urged upon the Islamic and 
Third World countries to recognize Bangladesh: "This appeal 
stems from our anguished awareness of how our country was 
dismembered by international conspiracy culminating in 
aggression."94 The Pakistan government also attempted to 
establish diplomatic relations with Bangladesh, just after 
the fall of Mujib. On December 29, 1975, Bhutto in an 
interview with Time Magazine, commented that no nation, 
India or any other can prevent good relations between 
Pakistan and Bangladesh if the people of the two countries 
want them. However, "to what extent the relationship is to 
develop is really for the people of Bangladesh to determine. 
It was they who wanted separation. It is now up to them to 
tell us how close they want to come to us. We do not want 
to kill Bangladesh with kindness."95 Meanwhile, the new 
President of Bangladesh declared that his government would 
94The Times (London), August 16, 1973. For an excellent analysis 
of Bhutto's reaction after Mujib's fall, see G.W. Choudhury, 
"Bangladesh's Coup and Counter Coups: International Implications," 
Qrbis 19, no. 41 (Winter 1976). 
95Time (US), December 29, 1975. Also see, for comprehensive 
analysis, Shirin Tahir-Khely, "The Foreign Policy of New Pakistan," 
Qrbis 20, No. 3 (Fall 1976). 
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strengthen friendly relations with the neighbors. 
Eventually, Bangladesh-Pakistan diplomatic relations were 
restored by January 1976. This was followed by the 
restoration of tele-communication links and a signing of a 
trade agreement between the two countries.96 Apart from this 
both countries had maintained friendly gesture on different 
occasions.97 
In 1977, after the removal of President Bhutto from 
power, in Pakistan, and with the beginning of General Zia- 
ul-Haq's regime, Bangladesh-Pakistan relations improved 
significantly. In 1976, Bangladesh and Pakistan restored the 
trade links by signing a three-year trade agreement. In 1977 
President Ziar Rahman paid an official visit to Pakistan 
during his South Asian tour. President Zia's visit improved 
Bangladesh-Pakistan relations substantially. Since then, the 
two countries continuously exchanged delegations in many 
fields. In July 1977, Pakistan's foreign minister, Mr. Agha 
Shahi came to visit Bangladesh and this was reciprocated by 
Bangladesh's foreign minister Professor Shamal Hague in 1977 
96Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhury, "Pakistan and the Changing Pattern of 
Power Relations in South Asia," Pakistan Horizon 31, no. 1 ( Quarter 
1978): 90. 
97In September 1976, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto sent 
a message to President Sayem of Bangladesh at the death of 
Bangladesh's Chief of Air Staff, Mohammed Khademul Bashar and 
similarly, Bhutto sent another messages to General Zia in November, 
1976, at the demise of Maulana Abdul Humid Khan Bashani. Haau, 
September 3, 1976 and November 18, 1970. 
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and both countries agreed to introduce transit visas for 
their citizens.98 
Apart from bilateral relations both Bangladesh and 
Pakistan held identical views in regional and international 
forums, because both countries cherished and upheld the U.N. 
Charter, nonaligned Charter (NAM), OIC Charter and finally 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
Charter in which Bangladesh and Pakistan held a common 
perception regarding South Asian economic development. 
Moreover, both Bangladesh and Pakistan showed their 
determination to keep the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, 
and both countries believed that the Middle East problem 
could be settled only by means of unconditional and complete 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from Jerusalem. Both Bangladesh 
and Pakistan also shared the common perception regarding the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Apart from the international level, at the domestic 
level, President Ziaur Rahman took certain steps which 
helped make Pakistan more friendly to Bangladesh. During 
Zia's regime the collaborator Act of 1972 (which means 
serious punishment for collaboration with the Pakistan 
government during the liberation war of 1971) was repealed 
and the citizenship was offered and restored to some 
prominent Bengalis who did not return from Pakistan and 
98See The Bangladesh Observer. August 11, 1983. 
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other countries to Bangladesh after 1971." Moreover, the 
major constitutional amendment which strengthened 
Bangladesh's relations with Pakistan was Ziaur Rahman's 
assertion of "Bismilla her-Rahman-en-Rahim" ("in the name of 
God most gracious and most merciful") at the beginning of 
the Bangladesh Constitution.100 Article 8(1) of the 
Constitution which declared secularism, one of the 
fundamental principles of state policy was amended and 
instead of secularism, absolute trust and faith in Almighty 
Allah was introduced by Zia. Moreover, he added a new clause 
in the constitution. He introduced a clause in Article 25, 
declaring the intention of the state "for establishing, 
preserving and strengthening fraternal ties with the Muslim 
states on the basis of Islamic solidarity,"10i which marked 
the significant development of Bangladesh-Pakistan 
relations. In order to foster his Islamic belief and 
commitment, Zia always started his speech with Bismillaher- 
Rahman-er-Rahim and ended with "Bangladesh Zinabad-a-Urdo 
slogan" instead of "joy Bangla" (victory of Bengal), which 
was introduced by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. All these 
strategies at the domestic, regional and international 
"Robert S. Anderson, "Impressions of Bangladesh: The Rule of 
Arms and Politics of Exhortations," Pacific Affairs, no. 49 (1976): 
450. 
100The Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, The 
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. 
101 Ibid. 
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levels made him friendly to Pakistan. Even some analysts 
have argued that in the 1980s, both Pakistan and Bangladesh 
committed to create an Islamic Republic under the auspices 
of the military leadership of General Ziur Rahman of 
Bangladesh and General Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan.102 
At the rapid development of Bangladesh-Pakistan 
relationship, the opposition political party used to accuse 
Ziaur Rahman for making an imaginary confederation with 
Pakistan. Even some analysts argue that the future 
possibility of Bangladesh-Pakistan confederation appeared as 
an external threat to the security of Bangladesh.103 However, 
there is no doubt that Zia pursued an active foreign policy 
towards Pakistan designed to escaping Indian dominance and 
to pressuring India for making some concessions on the 
issues of the common Bangladesh-India problems.104 Again 
political relations were enhanced and strengthened through 
cultural relations. 
Economic Level 
Besides political relations, economic cooperation is 
also a remarkable aspect of relations between the two 
102Vernon Marston Hewitt, The International Politics of South 
Asia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). 
103The Awamileague leaders throughout the 1980s tried to create 
public opinion against Ziaur Rahman by propagating that he was forming 
a confederation with Pakistan. 
104Talukder Maniruzzaman, Group Interests and Political Changes: 
Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 
1982), 253. See also Vernon Mouston Hewitt, 37. 
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countries. During Mujib's regime there were no economic 
relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan.105 
The economic relations began to expand during Ziaur 
Rahman's regime because of Zia's major transformation from 
Indo-Soviet "tilt" policy to Pakistan, West and Islamic 
world oriented foreign policy. Actually the initiative of 
economic cooperation was taken by Pakistan just after the 
fall of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. After the August coup of 1975 
in Bangladesh, Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto of Pakistan 
offered Bangladesh a gift shipment of 50,000 tons of rice 
and cloth.106 
In 1977, during the official visit of Ziaur Rahman to 
Pakistan, both parties agreed to extend economic, commrecial 
and technical cooperation. Moreover, the two sides 
emphasized the importance of mutually beneficial cooperation 
based on sovereign equality and non interference in each 
other's internal affairs. This was the mark of Pakistan's 
respect to the sovereign equality of Bangladesh after 1977. 
In order to promote economic cooperation, the two countries 
signed a number of agreements and the landmark among these 
agreements was the setting up of a joint economic commission 
105Although there was no formal relations between Bangladesh and 
Pakistan during the Mujib regime, but reliable sources confirm that 
there were trade links between the two countries which were operated 
through third parties such as Singapore and Thailand. 
106Rahman Sobban, The Crisis of External Dependence: The 
Political Economy of Foreign Aid to Bangladesh (London: Zed Press, 
1982), 240. 
166 
on July 21, 1979.107 The joint economic commission was 
designed to provide an institutional framework for expanded 
technical and economic cooperation between the two 
countries. Under this technical cooperation, Bangladesh 
would provide the experience in the integrated rural 
development program (IRDP) and the cultivation program, in 
which Bangladesh had very good institutional framework, 
while Pakistan would cooperate in the field of cotton and 
wheat cultivation, horticulture, farming and railway.108 
Actually instituting joint economic commission109 was the 
reflection of farsight of the Zia government's foreign 
economic poilcy which opened up enormous possibilities for 
107In order to promote bilateral economic cooperation the two 
countries entered into a number of agreements, namely, a trading 
agreement in April, 1976. An air service agreement in June, 1978, and 
the major agreement for setting up of a joint economic commission on 
July 21, 1979. For details, see External Resources Division (ERD). 
Brief on Second Meeting of Bangladesh-Pakistan Joint Economic 
Commission, Ministry of Finance. Government of the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh. Also see the Agreed minutes of the third meeting of the 
Bangladesh-Pakistan joint Economic Commission held from July 30-August 
1, 1989, in Dhaka. 
108The Bangladesh Observer, October 25, 1980. See also Syed 
Serajul Islam. 
109The Joint Economic Commission was the product of the trade 
agreement of 1982. Article 9 of the agreement stated: "for the purpose 
of promoting the aims and objectives of these agreements, a committee 
of representatives to be designated by the respective government shall 
be established. The committee shall meet at least once a year or as 
often as may be mutually agreed upon, alternately in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. The functions of the Committee will be: (a) to review the 
implementation of the provisions of this agreement, (b) examine and 
recommend measures for the solution of problems which may arise in the 
implementation of this agreement or in the course of the development 
of trade between the two countries, (c) consider proposals made by 
either of the governments within the framework of this agreement aimed 
at further expansion and diversification of trade between the two 
countries." See The Bangladesh Observer, July 25, 1979. 
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increasing economic and commercial exchange between 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. The Joint Economic Commission 
indeed augmented the volume of trade and commerce during 
Zia's regime, from 1975-1981 and Pakistan became the biggest 
buyer of Bangladesh's jute and tea. Bangladesh reciprocated 
this trade by importing huge quantities of cloth and cotton 
from Pakistan. Statistics show that the trade relations 
between Bangladesh and Pakistan augmented so rapidly that in 
1976-77, Bangladesh's export earnings from Pakistan were 
48.97 crore taka and Bangladesh's spendings for import were 
8.05 crore taka. But in '81-'82 it increased so highly that 
Bangladesh's export earnings were 114.26 crore taka and 
spending for imports increased to 55.11 crore taka. The most 
important feature of trade relations between the two 
countries was that the balance of trade was always in favor 
of Bangladesh during Zia's regime.110 (Table 7) In the 
economic field, another development of Bangladesh-Pakistan 
relations was that Pakistan's commitment and disbursement of 
aids increased significantly during Zia's regime. Data shows 
that from 1975-81, Pakistan's total commitment and 
disbursements were $25.9 million, a significant improvement 
compared to Mujib's regime,111 which was $7.6 only. (Table 8) 
110For statistics, see Bangladesh Bank: Annual Export Receipt and 
Annual Import Payments. For details on Bangladesh-Pakistan economic 
relations, also see Zaglul Haider, "Bangladeshar Para-Rashtra Nity: 
Sheikh Mujib' O'Ziaur Rahmanar Shasan Kal (1972-82)," Slamaj Cirikkon 
(Shamaj Nirikoon Kendra: Dhaka University) No. 36, May 1990. 
ill Sobhan, 232. 
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TABLE 7 
BANGLADESH'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN 





Total Trade Balance of 
Trade 
1972-75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1976-77 48.97 8.05 57.02 + ) 40.29 
1977-78 72.98 29.49 102.47 (+) 43.49 
1978-79 60.61 29.76 90.37 (+) 30.85 
1979-80 89.26 41.47 139.73 (+) 56.79 
1980-81 89.05 96.52 185.37 (-) 7.47 
1981-82 114.26 55.11 169.37 (+) 59.15 
Source: ERD Brief, second meeting of the Banaladesh-Paki3tan Joint 
Economic Commission. April 5-7. 1987. (Government of 
Bangladesh, External Sources Division, Ministry of 
Finance, March 1987). 
* 10 million is equal to one crore. 
Fig. 4. Bangladesh's Balance of Trade with Pakistan: A Comparison 
Between the Mujib and Zia Regimes. 
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TABLE 8 
PAKISTAN'S AID COMMITMENT AND DISBURSEMENT TO BANGLADESH 
(in million US $) (1971-72 to 1981-82) 
Year Commitment Disbursement 
1971-72 0.00 0.00 
1972-73 0.00 0.00 
1973-74 0.00 0.00 
1974-75 7.60 7.60 
1975-76 25.00 25.00 
1976-77 0.92 0.92 
1977-78 0.00 0.00 
1978-79 0.00 0.00 
1979-80 0.00 0.00 
1980-81 0.00 0.00 
1981-82 0.00 0.00 
TOTAL 33.52 33.52 
Source : Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh (As of June 30. 
1991) . (Dhaka: Economic Relations Department, Ministry of 
Finance), 68. 
Fig. 5. Pakistan's Aid Disbursement to Bangladesh: A Comparison 
Between the Mujib and Zia regimes. 
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Summary 
Under the above analysis it is uncovered that despite 
having its 25 years of union with Pakistan, Bangladesh has 
emerged as a separate state out of the failure of the 
political system in Pakistan. Albeit, national interest 
suggests that, in international relations there can be no 
eternal friends, no eternal enemies, only national interests 
are eternal, Bangladesh and Pakistan only recognized each 
other. They did not even establish diplomatic relations 
during the Mujib regime. 
However, with the coup d'etat of August 15, 1975 and 
the emergence of Ziaur Rahman, Bangladesh-Pakistan relations 
improved significantly, because of Zia's foreign policy 
shifting from an Indo-Soviet nexus to pro-west, pro-China, 
and pro-Islamic triangle which was identical with Pakistan. 
Bangladesh-Pakistan's political rapprochement was followed 
up with the expansion of bilateral economic cooperation. 
In the final analysis, it is discerned that the 
Bangladesh-Pakistan relationship was clouded with mistrust 
and misunderstanding during the Mujib regime, partly because 
of the initial reservation that Bhutto and Mujib had for 
each other and partly because of the Mujib government's, 
Pro-Indian, pro-Soviet, anti-Pakistan, and anti-Islamic 
foreign policy and Pakistan's anti-Bangladesh propaganda. On 
the contrary, Bangladesh-Pakistan relations improved 
dramatically during the Zia regime, because of Zia's 
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transformation from Indo-Soviet "tilt" to pro-west, pro- 
Islamic and pro-Chinese foreign policy, which was 
symmetrical with Pakistan and served the national interest 
of Bangladesh significantly. 
CHAPTER V 
BANGLADESH-US RELATIONS: MUJIB AND 
ZIA REGIMES (1971-1981) 
Introduction 
The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent entity in 
the wake of a brutal blood bath, certainly is a landmark 
event in the world's history.1 This was the first country to 
achieve its independence since World War II through the 
instrument of civil war.2 It had far reaching consequences 
in the world politics as it prepared almost all the 
superpowers and big powers to fight for another world war. 
It drew world attention when both superpowers, i.e., the USA 
and the former USSR and one great power, China, actively 
involved in the crisis and supported the conflicting parties 
in the cold war politics. Strategically, it was very 
important to the superpowers, because the Bangladesh crisis 
of 1971 erupted at a time when the United States under 
^Three million unarmed Bengali people were killed by the 
Pakistan army during the 9 month long civil war and the war created 
the biggest human migration since World War II. Almost 10 million 
people took refuge in India after the Pakistan army's brutality in 
East Bengal in 1971. 
2Lawrence Ziring, "South Asian Tangles and Triangles" in 
Lawrence Ziring (ed.), The Subcontinent in the World Politics: India. 




President Nixon, was busy recasting its global and Asian 
politics to suit the needs of the new international system.3 
Although in the total context of United States foreign 
policy, South Asia is generally considered a low priority 
area, it is given higher priority only when internal 
problems or intra-regional tensions threaten broader 
effects, as happened in 1971.4 During the last part of the 
Bangladesh crisis when India and Pakistan directly were 
fighting each other, the US President Nixon ordered the 
nuclear carrier USS Enterprise to the direction of Bay of 
Bengal. In response the Soviet Union also sent its fleet to 
the Indian Ocean. China on its part was also mobilizing 
troops along the Sino-Indian border. The US-Soviet and 
Chinese maneuver could also have led the world towards a 
major confrontation.5 
By 1971, South Asia became an international crisis area 
with many international repercussions. The United States and 
China apparently sided with Pakistan against India which was 
championed by the Soviet Union. Although the US people had 
only modest sympathy and support towards the liberation war 
of Bangladesh, officially the Nixon-Kissinger administration 
3Wayne Wilcox, "The Indian Ocean and the Great Powers in the 
1970s," Mimeography (South Hamilton University 1973), 155. 
4Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and South Asia," Current 
History 76, no. 446 (April 1929): 146. 
5Sydney H. Schanberg, "Pakistan Divided," Foreign Affairs: An 
American Quarterly Review 15, no. 1 (October 1921): 131. 
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clearly sided with Pakistan and opposed the Bangladeshi 
movement. The US journalist Jack Anderson characterized it 
as a national tragedy, an abrogation of America's historic 
commitment to champion democracy throughout the world."6 
Indeed, the US policy was so "tilted" towards Pakistan 
that Christopher Van Hollen, the deputy assistant secretary 
of state for near eastern and South Asian Affairs, in 1971, 
mentioned that Henry Kissinger warned government officials 
that he was "getting hell every half hour from the President 
that we are not being tough enough on India. The President 
does not believe we are carrying out his wishes," Kissinger 
complained. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan.7 While 
Henry Kissinger himself admitted: 
The India-Pakistan war of 1971 was perhaps the 
most complex issue of Nixon's first term. What 
made the crisis so difficult was that the stakes 
were so much greater than the common perception of 
them. The issue burst upon us while Pakistan was 
our only channel to China, we had no other means 
of communication with Peking.8 
No matter what intentions America had behind its "tilt" 
towards Pakistan, evidence shows that the US clearly aided 
Pakistan and opposed the Bangladesh liberation war. The 
failure of the Nixon administration to condone Pakistan's 
6Jack Anderson with George Clifford, The Anderson Paper3 (New 
York: Random House, 1973), 212. 
7Christopher van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited, Nixon- 
Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia," Asian Survey 20, no. 4 (April 
1980) : 339. 
8Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Toronto: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1979), 913. 
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military atrocities in Bangladesh and its support to the 
Yahya Khan's military dictatorship in Pakistan against the 
Bengali people led to the total erosion of the United 
States' prestige and credibility among the Bengali people. 
But after the breakup of Pakistan and the birth of 
Bangladesh the US soon re-defined its policy and expressed 
its willingness to recognize the new reality in South Asia. 
As a matter of fact, the emergence of Bangladesh and the way 
in which it emerged called for a fundamental rudimentation 
of American policy towards the states of South Asia.9 
However, Bangladesh-US relations began to improve after 
1972, mainly because of Bangladesh's own initiative,10 and 
partly because of US diplomatic admission that its 1971 
behavior had been a "mistake."11 President Nixon himself 
regretted very diplomatically: 
We did not dispute the aspirations of the people 
of East Bengal for autonomy.... We opposed not 
^ayne Wilcox, "Introduction" in The Emergence of Bangladesh: 
Problems and Opportunities for a Redefined American Foreign Policy in 
South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Affairs Study, 1973), 1-2. 
10In a press conference on January 14, 1972, Mujib was asked if 
he would accept aid from the US, he said: "I will accept anything from 
anybody to save my people provided it is given without any condition." 
See Kessings Contemporary Archives. 1971-72. 26112. 
11Christopher van Hollen, the deputy assistant secretary of state 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs during the Bangladesh crisis 
of 1971, wrote that Nixon Kissinger's tilt policy towards Pakistan was 
a mistake. See Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited: 
Nixon-Kissinger Geo-Politics and South Asia," Asian Survey 20, no. 4 
(April 1980): 341. 
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independence, but the outbreak of international 
war.12 
Although the Nixon administration officially announced 
US recognition of Bangladesh on April 4, 1972, and 
established formal diplomatic relations on May 18, 1972,13 
US-Bangladesh relations were kept at a low profile during 
the first four years of Mujib regime (1972-1975). Mujib 
government's domestic and international policies created 
considerable frustration among the US policy makers. At the 
domestic level, the Mujib government's, socialist economic 
policy, and one party authoritarian system and at the 
international level, Bangladesh's shaping of a foreign 
policy towards Indo-Soviet and socialist direction were seen 
by the US administration with suspicion and were considered 
opposed to the US interest throughout the world. 
But after the August coup of 1975, with the fall of the 
Mujib regime and starting of Ziaur Rahman's era, US 
relations with Bangladesh began to improve significantly. It 
reached its peak during the last part of Ziaur Rahman's 
regime, because of Zia's major shift both at the domestic 
and international levels. At the domestic level Zia 
introduced a multiparty democracy, a liberal economic 
policy, particularly free market economy, denationalization 
12"US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace." A 
report to the Congress by President Richard Nixon, Department of the 
State Bulletin 68, no. 1771 (June 4, 1973), 791. 
13U.S. Department of the State Bulletin 67, no. 1735 (September 
25, 1972): 355. 
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and encouragement of private entrepreneurship, instead of 
Mujib's one party political system and Socialist economic 
policy. While at the international level, Zia pursued pro- 
American, pro-west, pro-Chinese and pro-Pakistan foreign 
policy, instead of Mujib's foreign policy direction of pro- 
Indian, pro-Soviet and pro-socialist world. However, the 
major burden of this chapter is to explore US-Bangladesh 
relations. To this end the following issues will be 
addressed in this chapter. 
Role of the USA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh-US Relations: Mujib and Zia Regimes 
(1971-1981) . 
Summary. 
Role of the USA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh 
Clearly the US pursued a "tilt" policy towards Pakistan 
during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971. This "tilt" was not a 
sudden US action in the sub-continent, rather it was the 
product of decades long US policy towards South Asia. The 
historical evolution of the US policy towards South Asia 
unfolds the fact that the US took their interest in the 
region since the cold war politics erupted. The US shaped 
its policy to support the anti-communist regime in the cold 
war politics. During the Korean crisis of 1950, the US 
became sanguine to Pakistan, because Pakistan supported the 
US position in the crisis. Moreover, Indian socialist 
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economic policy under Nehru and siding with the Soviet 
Union, forced the US to side with Pakistan aimed at 
containing communist expansion. In order to formalize the 
US-Pakistan detente, Pakistan joined the US sponsored 
defense treaty, Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
in 1954 and it also joined another western defense alliance, 
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. However, 
from 1954 to 1960, Pakistan was considered the closest ally 
of the US. A change in the US policy was revealed during 
the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. This time the US 
rushed increasing military aid to India, and the Kennedy 
administration pursued a Pro-Indian policy in South Asia. 
Since the Sino-Indian border conflict, India emerged as an 
important supporter of the US policy in Asia, as well as a 
useful collaborator of the United States in its containment 
policy of China. In response to new Indo-US rapprochement, 
Pakistan nomralized its relation with the Soviet Union and 
developed cordial entente with China. Pakistan's close link 
with China jeopardized the US-Pakistan detente. Against this 
backdrop, during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the US 
administartion under President Johnson remained neutral in 
South Asian politics. As the Pakistani military was equipped 
with the American weapons, during the war, at the cutoff of 
the US military aid, Pakistani weapons were becoming 
inoperative for the lack of spare parts. Therefore, the 
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relationship between the US and Pakistan reached their 
lowest point in history. 
The US policy towards South Asia further changed during 
the Nixon administration in the 1970s. The Sino-US 
rapprochement via Pakistan in the 1970s brought changes in 
the US policy towards South Asia. The Bangladesh crisis of 
1971 gave the United States a new opportunity to be more 
friendly with Pakistan. Nixon's policy of "China" opening 
improved the US-Pakistan relations in the 1970s 
significantly, because Pakistan was the only trusted friend 
of China, through which the US could cultivate its 
relations. At this point the US did everything possible for 
Pakistan against the Bangladesh struggle. 
United States' Mysterious Silence 
As regards to the US role in the Bangladesh liberation 
war Amaury de Rincourt wrote: 
When a new conflict occurred in 1971 over the East 
Bengali Revolt and the Savage repression that 
followed Pakistan leaders soon had to face the 
shattering of their dream of a United Muslim 
nation in the subcontinent.... In that war, the 
United States under Richard Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger deliberately tilted in favour of 
Pakistan.14 
Reincourt's observation clearly indicates the US 
position in the Bangladesh liberation war. However although 
the Nixon-Kissinger administration aimed at achieving its 
14Amaury de Reincourt, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of 
Afghanistan," Foreign Affairs 61, no. 2 (Winter 1982-83): 420. 
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cherished goals, bluntly supported the military dictatorship 
of Yahya Khan against the aspiration of the freedom loving 
people, the US Congress, the US Press and intellectuals 
opposed the Nixon-Kissinger's "tilt" policy towards 
Pakistan. As a matter of fact just after the military 
crackdown in Dhaka, the Nixon administration followed a 
policy of mysterious silence, and the US administration 
described the East Bengal's crisis as Pakistan's internal 
matter.15 
Although the Nixon administration maintained a studied 
silence in the wake of Pakistan's army's systematic 
genocide, the Bangladesh movement successfully attracted 
public and congressional sympathy and the media support. 
Even some analysts argued that the media's indignation with 
the policy eventually led to a new and more understanding 
policy toward the Bengalis.16 
The indiscriminate massacre of Pakistan government 
officials could not change the Nixon-Kissinger admini¬ 
stration's "tilt" towards Pakistan. It agitated many 
Congressmen and policy makers in the United States against 
15Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs in a statement on April 2, 1971, stated: 
The United States views the situation as basically an 
internal matter within Pakistan. See the statement by the 
State Department April 7, 1971, in US-South Asia Relations 
(Collection of speeches and statements), ed. R. K. Jain 
(New Jersey: Atlantic Highland, 1979), 3. 
16Charles Peter O'Donnell, Bangladesh: Biography of a Muslim 
Nation (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), 190. 
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the US government's policy in South Asia. Senator Edward 
Kennedy expressed his deep concern and took serious view on 
the Senate floor and described the genocide of Pakistan army 
in East Pakistan.17 
In addition, many Congressmen were critical of Nixon 
administration's policy in South Asia in general and in 
particular they were concerned about the use of American 
military hardware by the Pakistani forces. 
Both houses of Congress in the foreign relation 
committees expressed their disenchantment with US policy 
towards the subcontinent. Early May 7, 1971, a subcommittee 
of the senate foreign relations committee voted to suspend 
arms sales to Pakistan and subsequently Senator Saxbe (from 
Ohio) and Senator Frank Church (from Idaho) introduced an 
amendment to the foreign assistance act to ensure that the 
United States in its assistance efforts help the people of 
East Pakistan.18 Reliable reports also confirm that a group 
of liberal Republicans known as the Ripon Society issued a 
statement declaring that the continuance of US economic and 
military assistance to Pakistan would seriously jeopardize 
the freedom movement of Bangladesh. The statement said: 
The American arms are now being used along with 
Russian and Chinese to establish a reign of terror 
in East Pakistan. The American government must not 
17Speech by Senator Edward M. Kennedy in the US Senate on 
December 7, 1971. Congressional Record (December 10, 1971), 451250. 
1BNewsweekf August 2, 1971. 
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be a party to the killing of defenseless civilians 
or the forcible repression of the struggle of the 
East Pakistanis for the control over their own 
lives.... Peace and stability will return to South 
Asia when an independent East Pakistan takes its 
place in the community of nations and the American 
diplomatic efforts should be directed to a valid 
realization of this goal.19 
Apart from Congressional dissent, many American 
intellectuals pressurized the American administration not to 
act against the democratic aspiration of the East Bengali 
people. Besides congressional and intellectual concern, the 
US diplomats employed in Pakistan also became critical of US 
policy. On April 6, 1971, 20 US consulate officials led by 
Arthur Blood, the Consul-General in Dhaka expressed their 
common disgust with official American policy. The cable was 
entitled a "Dissent from US Policy Towards East Pakistan." 
The cable said: 
Our government has failed to denounce the 
suppression of democracy. Our government has 
failed to denounce atrocities. Private Americans 
have expressed disgust. We as professional public 
servants, express our dissent with current policy 
and fervently hope that our true and lasting 
interests here can be defined and our policies 
redirected.20 
In the face of the increasing domestic pressure for a 
positive attitude to the crisis, the administration came out 
with a public appeal requesting both India and Pakistan to 
19New York Times. April 7, 1971. 
20From the Carnegie Papers (in 1973 the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace commissioned a major study and analysis of the 
conduct of the US government policy during the 1971 Bangladesh 
crisis.) Quoted in Lawrence Lipschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished 
Revolution (London: Zed Press, 1979), 158. 
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use restraint and work for peaceful political accommodation 
of the East Pakistan crisis.21 On May 28, 1971, President 
Nixon sent letters to Indian prime minister Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi and Pakistan's President Yahya Khan outlining the US 
policy. Nixon wrote to Yahya Khan: 
I urge you to continue to exercise restraint both 
along your borders with India and in your general 
relations with that country. We are counseling 
the government of India to do the same. It is only 
in a peaceful atmosphere that you and your 
administration can make effective progress toward 
the political 
Pakistan.22 
accommodation you seek in East 
It is clear that Nixon urged Yahya for a political 
settlement but it failed to condemn military action of 
President Yahya Khan. On the other hand in a similar letter 
to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Nixon wrote: 
We have chosen to work primarily through quiet 
diplomacy. We have been discussing with the 
government of Pakistan and the importance of 
achieving a peaceful political accommodation and 
of restoring conditions under which the refugee 
flow would stop and the refugees would be able to 
return to their homes. The problems involved in 
this situation can and should be solved 
peacefully.... As one of Asia's major powers India 
has a special responsibility for maintaining the 
peace and stability in the region.23 
However at this point, the US administration saw the crisis 
as an internal affair of Pakistan and Washington's main 
21Time3 of India, June 14, 1971. 
22Richard Nixon, "US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging 
Structure of Peace," a report to the Congress, Department of State 
Bulletin 66, no. 1707 (March 13, 1972): 385. 
23Ibid. 
184 
concern was to prevent another Indo-Pakistan war, to provide 
the humanitarian assistance required in East Pakistan and to 
encourage a political settlement of the Pakistani civil war- 
-preferably one that would maintain at least a unified 
Pakistan.24 
U.S. Arms and Economic Aid to Pakistan 
Although the United States urged for a political 
settlement to both Pakistan and India, after the military 
crackdown in the East Pakistan, there were many reports of 
the use of American Arms by Pakistan army in killing and 
destruction in the East Pakistan. The U.S. government could 
neither deny nor confirm the fact.25 Senator Edward Kennedy 
criticized the US arms in his speech in the Senate: 
Through this period of crisis our national 
leadership watched this tragedy in silence at no 
time has any official of our government including 
the President condemned the brutal and systematic 
repression of East Bengal by the Pakistan army-a 
repression carried out in part with American guns, 
bullets and aircraft.26 
But this created serious agitation among the senators 
and the intellectuals of the USA. In early April 1971, a 
group of senators in a joint letter addressed to the 
24Rose and Sisson, 258. 
25The main reason behind the Pakistan army's use of U.S. weapons 
in East Bengal was that since Pakistan was the member of US sponsored 
security alliances SEATO and CENTO, it modernized her army with 100% 
US made weapons and aircrafts. 
26Speech by Senator Edward M. Kennedy in the U.S. Senate, 
December 2, 1971, Congressional Record (December 7, 1971), 45125. 
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Secretary of State William Roger, and expressed that they 
were: deeply distressed at bloodshed in East Pakistan and 
called on the Secretary to disclose even the most indirect 
American involvement there.27 
In a letter to the chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, on April 23, 1971, the Department of 
State explicitly stated that: 
We have been informed by the Department of Defense 
that no military items have been provided to the 
government of Pakistan or its agents since the 
outbreak of the fighting in East Pakistan on March 
25 and nothing is now scheduled for such 
delivery.28 
In fact under the domestic pressure from the Congress 
and the public opinion, the State Department took a decision 
under which the state department ordered a total embargo on 
new licenses (retroactive to March 25, 1971), but stipulated 
that equipment under old licenses valid for one year that 
had already been delivered should not be stopped.29 
Even after the existence of an arms embargo on 
Pakistan, the New York Times reported that violating the ban 
27nUS Arms for Pakistan: A Shameful Record," Washington Post. 
July 15, 1971. 
28Concrressional Records, vol. 117, part 16 (June 22, 1971), 
21317 . 
29Before the embargo, under the US-Pakistan agreement of October 
2, 1970, Pakistan could purchase some lethal weapons and essentially 
in sophisticated military weapons. See New York Times. October 8 and 
October 11, 1970. 
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order the US administration was supplying arms and 
ammunition to Pakistan.30 
But the administration's reply was that the items 
shipped to Pakistan were already in the "pipeline," that is, 
they had been purchased prior to March 25, 1971, and legal 
title to the equipment had been transferred to the agents of 
the government of Pakistan before that date. These shipments 
thus did not constitute a violation of April 6 suspension of 
military aid to Pakistan.31 
No matter what the explanations and logics behind the 
State Department for the arms supply to Pakistan were, the 
US media was very critical of the official U.S. position, 
outlining of the break of the official embargo, and branded 
the Nixon administration's policy as an astonishing and 
shameful record. However, the US arms supply continued to be 
shipped to Pakistan despite strong protest both within and 
outside the country. But the US administration defended the 
US government's policy by stating three reasons: 
30The New York Times on June 22 disclosed that two shiploads of 
arms were going to Pakistan. On May 8, the Sundeerbans, a Pakistani 
ship carrying arms to Pakistan sailed from New York without public 
announcement or public knowledge. On June 25, 1971, the New York Times 
reported that a Pakistani freighter, the Koukahla loaded with military 
equipment sailed from New York to Karachi after the United States had 
banned delivering arms to Pakistan. On June 29, 1971, New York Times 
reported that yet another Pakistani freighter, Kaptai would send for 
Karachi about July 2, "presumably with items on the ammunitions 
control list," and that four and five other ships would be sent with 
similar cargoes before mid August. 
31 Congressional Record 117, part 18 (July 8, 1971), 24358. 
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First: An embargo would be seen as an ill 
warranted intrusion into an essentially internal 
problem which can only be regained by the 
Pakistanis. 
Second: The cutting off of military supplies would 
encourage Pakistan to rely exclusively on other 
sources of supply, i.e. Soviet, Chinese and 
British arms shippers. 
Third: An embargo would be seen as a symbolic 
sanction. Such sanctions would undermine US 
efforts to maintain a productive political 
relationship with the government of Pakistan, to 
encourage the government of Pakistan along 
constructive lines in the areas of mutual 
interest, namely in the area of relief, refugee 
return and of political accommodation.32 
Although President Nixon told the Congress that no American 
arms were sent to Pakistan after November 1971, the Anderson 
Papers confirms by citing the minutes of the secret December 
6 meeting of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG),33 
that the Nixon administration tried to transfer military 
equipment to Pakistan through Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Such 
a transfer could not take place because of the opposition 
from certain influential senators.34 State Department 
officials also questioned about the legitimacy of such an 
arms transfer to Pakistan through a third country. 
32Con<Jge33iQnal Record 117, part 18 (July 8, 1971), 24398. 
33The Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) was charged with 
meeting the special need for coordination in crisis situation. Not a 
decision-making body, the WSAG served as a management team assuring 
flexible and timely actions by the responsible departments in the 
context of Presidential decisions and the developing situation. 
34Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Bilateralism in South Asia," World 
Affairs 36, no. 1 (Summer 1973): 79. 
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Christopher van Hollen, Deputy-Assistant Secretary speaking 
for the State Department affirmed that: 
The United States cannot permit a third country to 
transfer arms which we have provided them when we 
ourselves don't authorize sales direct to the 
ultimate recipient such as Pakistan, as we made a 
legislative decision not to sell to Pakistan.35 
Nixon Administration's "tilt” policy to Pakistan, defying 
the strong opposition of the US Press and Congressmen were 
severely criticized by the U.S. Press.36 
Although the World Bank, the US Congress and the Aid to 
Pakistan Consortium seriously opposed economic aid to 
Pakistan, President Nixon himself recommended economic aid 
to Pakistan in his news conference on August 4, 1971: 
We don't favor the idea that the United States 
should cut off economic assistance to Pakistan. We 
believe that the most constructive role we can 
play is to continue our economic assistance to 
West Pakistan and thereby able to influence the 
course of events in a way that will deal with the 
problem of hunger in East Pakistan which would 
reduce the refugee flow into India and which will 
we trust in the future look toward a viable 
political settlement.37 
Finally after serious internal and external pressures by 
late summer 1971, the US government had canceled virtually 
all economic and military aid programs to Pakistan. Despite 
this cancellation, the US continued food aid programs 
directed at preventing a serious famine in East Pakistan. In 
35Quoted in Ibid., 250. 
36nWhy Aid Pakistan," New York Times (June 30, 1971). 
37Public papers of the President of the United States: Richard 
Nixon, 1971, p. 850. 
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fact, under the title of an aid program, the US continued 
its economic assistance to Pakistan. On the other hand 
externally India was seriously concerned about US aid to 
Pakistan and trying to influence the Congressmen, especially 
Democrats and the US media, against the Nixon 
administration's policy towards South Asia. While Nixon's 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was visiting South 
Asia in June 1971, Mrs. Gandhi pressed Kissinger to cut off 
not only arms but also economic aid. Mrs. Gandhi pointed out 
that even though the value of this aid was miniscule the 
symbolism of any US support at all was a significant factor 
in Pakistani intransigence.38 
Despite having serious opposition to the United States' 
aid policy to Pakistan, the Nixon administration continued 
assisting Pakistan, both directly and indirectly. So it was 
revealed that the Nixon administration remained determined 
in its decision of sending aid to Pakistan against domestic 
and international protest because Washington intended to 
view Pakistan as a balance against India on the 
subcontinent.39 
U.S. Efforts for Political and Diplomatic Settlement 
From the very beginning of the crisis, as a matter of 
fact, the United States wanted a political settlement within 
38Henry Kissinger, 861. 
39Sydney H. Schanberg, "Pakistan Divided," Foreign Affairs 50, 
no. 1 (October 1971): 133. 
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the framework of United Pakistan against the Bengali 
aspiration of an independent Bangladesh. At first the United 
States branded the Bangladesh liberation movement as a 
separatist movement. The spokesman for the State Department 
in its April 5, 1971 statement said: 
The US State Department hopes that peaceful 
conditions can be reestablished in East Pakistan 
where fighting broke out last month between 
Pakistani forces and Bengali separatists. The US 
is naturally concerned at the reported loss of 
life, hardship and damage suffered by the people 
of Pakistan.40 
The first US attempt to make a political settlement of the 
crisis was taken in June 1971. The US wanted to act as a 
channel between the Bengali leadership and Pakistan 
President General Yahya Khan. Lawrence Lifschultz mentioned 
that eight secret meetings were held between the leaders of 
the Bangladesh government in-exile and the US officials.41 In 
fact, the US opened the negotiation with the Bangladesh 
government in exile's foreign Minister Khondaker Mostaque 
Ahmed for his American leanings.42 While Tajuddin Ahmed, the 
prime minister of the exile government was kept carefully in 
the dark for his pro-Soviet and pro-Indian bias. The United 
40Statement by the spokesman of Department of State, April 5, 
1971, in US-South Asia Relations, 1947-1982, vol. 3 (Collection of 
Statements and Speeches), 3. 
41During US negotiation with leaders of the exiled Bangladesh 
movement K. Mostaq'3 two important proteges were his foreign secretary 
Mahbub Alam Charshi and an official assistant, Taheruddin Thakur, 
commonly known as Mostaque Triangle, used to present there. See 
Lawrence Lifschultz, 114. 
42 Ibid., 111. 
191 
States offered its service as a mediator between the 
government of Pakistan and the Awami League in late summer 
in 1971, but it became ineffective because of the 
unfavorable response and lack of interest from Pakistan.43 
By the end of October 1971 the Indian Press was 
publicly warning against Bengali negotiations with foreign 
countries. This is how the US mediation of negotiation 
between the government of Pakistan and the Bangladesh 
government in exile was ended in a fiasco.44 
Apart from mediation efforts, the United States also 
suggested to Pakistan for a political solution to the 
problem, instead of a military option. The United States 
pressured Pakistan not to take any action in the trial of 
Sheikh Mujib. In August the US Secretary of State William 
Rogers made a statement to his Pakistani ambassador Agha 
Hilary, and said that Pakistan could lose the support of the 
United States if Sheikh Mujib was executed.45 On the other 
hand, the US effort to rescue Mujib from a death sentence 
also appeared in The Anderson Papers. It said that the U.S. 
policy and the local efforts of the Farland (US ambassador 
to Pakistan) kept Mujib alive.46 
43Sisson and Rose, 258. Also see Henry Kissinger, 872-873. 
44Ibid., 873. 
45For details, see Charles O'Dowell, Bangladesh: Biography of a 
Muslim Nation (Boulder and India: Westview Press, 1984), 14. 
46The Anderson Papers,. 222. 
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Again the United States presented its peace proposal 
for a political settlement of the Bangladesh crisis, during 
Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington in early November 1971. 
President Nixon presented a proposal for peace settlement to 
Mrs. Gandhi, which included that the United States would 
assume full financial responsibility for the refugees' 
support.47 
Apart from this, the US also established contacts with 
the Bangladesh leaders in Calcutta and during August, 
September and October of 1971 no fewer than eight such 
contacts took place. The government of Pakistan accepted the 
US proposal, but the Indian government discouraged such 
negotiations. Kissinger conceded: 
We told the government of India on many occasions 
the Secretary of State saw the Indian Ambassador 
18 times, I saw him seven times since the end of 
August on behalf of the President. We all said 
that political autonomy for East Bengal was the 
inevitable outcome of a political evolution and 
that we favored it. The difference may have been 
that the government of India wanted things so 
rapidly that it was no longer talking about 
political evolution, but about political 
collapse.48 
Throughout November 1971, tension erupted between 
India and Pakistan so dangerously that it seemed to be only 
47Carnegie Endowment Files, cited in Sisson and Rose, 194. 
48Background briefing with Henry A. Kissinger, Congressional 
Regard (December 9, 1971), 45735. Also see The Anderson Papers. 237. 
For an analysis of US proposal for peace settlement, see Wayne Wilcox, 
The Emergence Qf-Bangladeahi Rr.oblema and Opportunities £or_a 
Redefined American Policy in South Asia (Foreign Affairs Study: 1973), 
50-51. 
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a matter of time before war broke out . The United States 
again appealed to both the countries to defuse the 
situation. On November 12, 1971, Secretary of State William 
Rogers declared: 
...diplomatically, we are going to do all we can 
to prevent a war from breaking out and obviously 
if a war should break out we are going to do 
everything we can to stay out . We have no 
intention of getting into any other war.49 
On December 3, 1971, when the Indian army crossed the 
boundary of East Pakistan, it received strong US criticism. 
Realistically rather than formally, the war began from the 
last part of November. In this situation the US 
administration suspended all licenses for arms shipment to 
India.50 When the formal Indo-Pakistan war broke out on 
December 3, 1971, at the request of the U.S., an emergency 
session of the Security Council was called. The US permanent 
representative to the UN George Bush made a statement in the 
Security Council, and called upon India and Pakistan for an 
immediate cease fire and mutual withdrawal of armed forces. 
George Bush held the view: 
It is time that both countries dealt an immediate 
ceasefire and agree an immediate step to withdraw 
their forces.... Let us then all and quickly agree 
that a ceasefire in this tragic hour is essential 
and that a withdrawal of forces from foreign 
4department of State Bulletin, vol. LXV (December 6, 1971), 652. 
The US Secretary of State William Rogers made this statement in 
response to a question "If a war breaks out between India and Pakistan 
whose side are we going to take?" it was asked during the question and 
answer sessions after his speech. 
50New York Times. December 4, 1971. 
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territories must take place without delay, so that 
the progress can be made in building the condition 
in East Pakistan, political and economic and 
social, in which the refugees will return and in 
which peace can be assured.51 
But the repeated US efforts to obtain a Security 
Council resolution for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal 
of armed forces were blocked by Soviet vetoes.52 On December 
5, 1971, the US representative to the UN George Bush said 
that India was clearly the major aggressor.53 
At this point the U.S. took the issue to the General 
Assembly and the General Assembly passed the ceasefire 
resolution with the vote of 104 to 11 with 10 abstentions.54 
Since the General Assembly resolutions are non binding, the 
US again brought the issue to the Security Council and in a 
resolution on December 12, called upon India to accept a 
ceasefire and withdrawal of armed forces according to the 
General Assembly resolution.55 But the resolution was again 
vetoed by the Soviet Union. On December 12, George Bush said 
in his statement to the Security Council: 
51US representative George Bush made this statement in the UN 
Security Council on December 5, 1971. See The Department of State 
Bulletin, vol. 65, no. 1696 (December 27, 1971), 723. 
52See particularly the UN Resolution S/10416 and S/10425. 
53George Bush's statement on December 5, 1971, The Department of 
State Bulletin, vol. 65, no. 1696 (December 27, 1971). 
54Ibid. 
55 See UN doc. S/10446. 
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What are India's intentions? Pakistan's aims have 
become clear: It has accepted the General 
Assembly's resolution passed by a vote of 104 to 
11. My government has asked this question to the 
Indian government several times in the last week. 
I regret to inform the council that India's reply 
has been unsatisfactory and not reassuring.56 
But in the face of repeated Soviet vetoes, all the US 
efforts towards a peace settlement had failed and finally 
the climax came. In mid December, when Dhaka and the whole 
of East Pakistan had fallen down, and the Pakistan army was 
defeated by the Indo-Bangladesh joint command, and President 
Nixon decided to send the formidable naval task force into 
the Bay of Bengal in order to show its last support towards 
Pakistan.57 The immediate cause behind the United States' 
military showdown was that the United States had received 
convincing evidence that India wanted to seize a part of 
West Pakistan and destroy the Pakistan army. It is clearly 
acknowledged by President Nixon: 
We received convincing evidence that India was 
seriously contemplating the seizure of Pakistan- 
held portions of Kashmir and the destruction of 
Pakistan's military forces in the West. We could 
not ignore this evidence, nor could we ignore the 
fact that when we repeatedly asked India and its 
supporters for clear assurances to the contrary we 
did not receive them. We had to take action to 
prevent a wider war.58 
56Quoted in Henry Kissinger, White House Years. 911. 
57Ibid. On December 10, the American nuclear carrier Enterprise's 
four escorts were ordered to sail from their station in the Gulf of 
Tonkin toward Singapore and on December 14 sailed down the Strait of 
Malacca into the Bay of Bengal. 
58P.ublic Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard 
Nixon. 1972 (Washington: U.S. Goverment Printing Office, 1979), 301. 
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However, on December 16 after the defeat of the Pakistan 
army with the surrender of 90,000 Pakistan troops in East 
Bengal, India unilaterally announced its decision of a 
ceasefire on the western front. 
Finally it becomes apparent that throughout the 
Bangladesh crisis of 1971, the United States, in addition to 
its political economic and military support to Pakistan, 
attempted to make an attempt to make a political settlement, 
in favor of its ally Pakistan. US efforts for a peace 
settlement is confirmed by President Nixon: 
We established contact with Bengali 
representatives in Calcutta... President Yahya told 
us he was prepared to begin negotiations with any 
representative of this group not charged with high 
crimes in Pakistan... we informed India that we 
were prepared to promote discussion of an explicit 
timetable for East Pakistani autonomy. India was 
kept fully informed of all these developments at 
every stage. It indicated little interest.... But 
it is clear that a political process was in train 
which could have been supported and facilitated by 
all the parts involved if they had wished. This is 
the basis for profound disappointment we felt and 
expressed when war erupted.59 
Of course, the US took certain overt and covert steps 
towards a peace settlement in South Asia which is commonly 
branded as "tilt" towards Pakistan. In fact, careful 
observation of the Nixon administration's policy from the 
beginning to the end of Bangladesh crisis unfolds the truth 
that the US policy was tilted towards Pakistan, while Joseph 
59Richard Nixon, "US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging 
Structure of Peace," a report to the Congress, Department of State 
Bulletin (vol. LXVI, 1707, March 13, 1972), 385. 
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Sisco, Assistant Secretary of the State for Northeastern and 
Southeastern Affairs, characterized this "tilt" policy in 
the interest of all countries in the area as well as major 
powers who have an interest in the region.60 
The US-Bangladesh Relations: Mu jib and Zia Regimes. 
1975-1981 
Political Level 
Norman D. Palmer wrote: 
United States relations with Bangladesh got off to 
a very shaky start because of the United States 
tilt towards Pakistan during the 1971 civil war. 
More realistically the United States may have 
realized its mistakes in 1971 and soon recognized 
new realities in the area and Bangladesh may have 
had no alternative to the United States for the 
economic assistance that she desperately needs.61 
With the break up of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh, 
the Indo-Soviet axis gained a diplomatic victory over both 
the United States and China.62 In such a changed situation 
the beginning of the US relations with Bangladesh were very 
shaky and were likely to remain strained as long as Nixon 
remained in the White House.63 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the 
chief architect of the Bangladesh liberation war, who was 
60Hearing before the subcommittee on Near East and South Asia, 
125. 
61Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and South Asia," Current 
History 76, no. 446 (April 1929): 180. 
62Henry Kissinger, 911. 
63Peter Lyon, "Bangladesh: Fashioning a Foreign Policy," South 
Asian Review 5, no. 3 (April 1972), 235. 
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soft towards the US in his early career, turned out to be a 
vocal opponent of the US policy and branded it as 
imperialistic by watching the reality of the United States' 
total support to West Pakistan's oppressive policies in the 
Bangladesh crisis of 1971.64 But the Bangladesh-US relations 
improved slowly but steadily. The relations began to improve 
partly because of the US' admission that its 1971 "tilt" 
policy toward Pakistan was a mistake,65 and primarily for 
Bangladesh's own initiative, because it had no alternative 
but the United States for the economic assistance that she 
needed. 
However at the political level, the central issue of 
the US-Bangladesh relations was the question of recognition 
of Bangladesh. The US recognition of Bangladesh did not come 
in the immediate post liberation period. The US 
administration followed a policy of "wait and see" approach 
right after Bangladesh's emergence. 
The US recognition was delayed by the Nixon 
administration primarily on two considerations: first, the 
US was concerned about the political implications of an 
64See G.W. Chaudhury, "The Sino-Indian Rift and its Impact on the 
South and Southest Asia," Southeast Asia Spectrum 4 (January-March 
1976): 14. 
65According to some analysts: The US recognition of Bangladesh 
implied a recognition of a political-strategic error of the United 
States in 1971. For detailed discussion see Pradip Sarbadhikari, 
"Towards a Foreign Policy of Bangladesh," in the Occasional Papers: 
South Asia Series. No. 21 (eds.) Barbara Thomas and Spencer Lavan 
(Asian Studies Center: Michigan State University, 1972), 232. 
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immediate recognition of Bangladesh on regional affairs. The 
US did not want to recognize Bangladesh in such a way which 
would dissatisfy China and Pakistan.66 
Secondly the Nixon administration did not recognize the 
Indian intervention and the presence of Indian troops in 
Bangladesh and it was seen by the American policy makers as 
an imitation of sovereignty. 
Apart from the presence of Indian troops, the US 
government continued support for Pakistan, because of its 
SEATO commitments and refused to recognize Bangladesh. 
Recognizing Bangladesh would mean "betraying" to Pakistan. 
It is most likely that all these considerations served to 
delay the US recognition of Bangladesh. But despite the 
administration's delay, the US media and the US Congressmen 
individually were very sympathetic to Bangladesh and were 
very critical of the administration's policy. The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee held hearing on resolutions 
demanding the immediate recognition of Bangladesh.67 Four 
senators, Stevensen, Kennedy, Hookings (Democrat) and Saxbe 
(Republican) urged the US government for formal recognition 
of Bangladesh by arguing that the failure to recognize 
66US Secretary of State William Rogers news conference of 
December 23, 1971. See The Department of State Bulletin, vol. 66, 
no. 1699 (January 17, 1972), 54. 
67For detailed discussion see O'Donell, 145. 
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Bangladesh prevented a freeflow of necessary aid.68 Senator 
Kennedy played a very conspicuous role in the Congress. In 
February 1972, Kennedy visited Dhaka at the invitation of 
Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and he traveled to the 
war devastated areas of Bangladesh. Upon returning home, his 
statement in the US Senate, presented the preliminary report 
on his field trip to Bangladesh, in which he strongly 
condemned the US' delays regarding the recognition of 
Bangladesh and urged for an immediate recognition. Senator 
Kennedy held the view: 
American policy in South Asia is in shambles. 
Recent actions and pronouncements from the 
administration suggest, however, that little is 
being done to change this. But it must change. So 
let us begin anew in South Asia—let us start with 
Bangladesh. Let us recognize this new nation and 
the urgent humanitarian needs of the people.69 
Among others, Senator Stevenson visited Bangladesh in 
late January and attacked the Nixon administration's policy 
of non recognition and called President Nixon's policies 
toward Bangladesh "despicable."70 The Congress persisted in 
pressuring its views. On March 22, 1972, the Senate passed a 
resolution calling for recognition and a similar resolution 
was adopted by the House. Finally the US administration 
68Most foreign aid sent to Dhaka during the first several months 
after independence was channeled through the United Nations or through 
the private agencies. 
69Senator Edward M. Kennedy's statement in the US Senate 
presenting a preliminary report on his field trip to Bangladesh, 
February 25, 1972, in the Bangladesh Documents (vol. II), 203. 
70The Bangladesh Observer. January 30, 1972. 
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responded to the changed situation and events of South Asia. 
On April 4, 1972, the US government announced its 
recognition of Bangladesh only after the complete withdrawal 
of Indian troops from Bangladesh territory. While announcing 
the recognition, the Secretary of State William Roger 
expressed the American intention to develop friendly 
bilateral relations in order to assist Bangladesh in its 
immense task of relief and rehabilitation.71 The US 
recognition of Bangladesh was welcomed by Prime Minister 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who anticipated that the US 
recognition would lead to friendly cooperation between the 
two nations.72 Following the US recognition, the US Embassy 
in Dhaka and the Bangladesh Embassy in Washington opened up 
in order to formalize the diplomatic relations on May 18, 
1 972. 73 Although the normalization process of the US- 
Bangladesh relations started during Mujib's regime, the US 
policy makers regarded Bangladesh as a low profile area and 
showed very limited interests. 
At this point the US administration very carefully 
watched the events and incidents of South Asia and 
emphasized on peace and stability of the region, through 
which its ally Pakistan's greater national interest 
71Pepartment of State Bulletin (April 24, 1972), 597. 
72New York Times, April 6, 1972. 
73Pepartment of State Bulletinf vol. LXVI, no. 1720 (June 12, 
1972), 809. 
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(especially the release of the Pakistani POWs) could be 
served. On May 3, 1973, in his fourth annual report to the 
Congress on US foreign policy, President Nixon said: 
Today we can hope that the subcontinent has found 
a new foundation for stability. This will depend 
first and foremost on the normalization of 
relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
This means to begin with resolving the issues left 
by the events of 1971: the repatriation of the 
prisoners of war and other personnel detained; 
recognition and establishment of diplomatic rela¬ 
tions and resumption of trade and equitable 
division of assets and liabilities between 
Pakistan and Bangladesh.74 
The reasons behind US reservations towards Bangladesh were 
Mujib government's domestic and international policies which 
were opposed to US objectives and interests. At the domestic 
level the Mujib government introduced state socialism and a 
one-party system, while at the international level, Mujib 
pursued a foreign policy tilted towards an Indo-Soviet and 
socialist world. So, the Nixon administration very carefully 
observed Mujib government's domestic and foreign policy and 
expressed considerable frustration. 
In fact, at the very beginning, the Mujib government's 
hardliner leader, finance minister Tajuddin Ahmed, opposed 
the US assistance, unless it was channeled through the World 
Bank or any other international agency. This was because of 
74Public. Papers of the President of the United States: Richard 
Nixon, 1973 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 454. 
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his personal socialist views.75 His main intention was to 
follow a socialist path of development. But there was also a 
strong pro-US faction within the Mujib government, 
particularly headed by Khandakar Mostaq Ahmed, who 
influenced Sheikh Mujib to pursue a capitalist path of 
development.76 However, the debate ended when Mujib declared 
that Bangladesh would welcome aid unconditionally from 
external sources. Tajuddin was overshadowed by Sheikh Mujib 
who recognized that the urgent need of the country dictated 
accepting the assistance from every available source. 
Moreover Mujib's decision to replace the pro-Soviet foreign 
minister Abdus Samad-azad by pro-western Dr. Kamal Hassain 
in March 1973, was the clear reflection of Mujib's 
willingness to improve relations with the USA and the west. 
But the US-Bangladesh relations still remained very 
strained, what is described by Joseph J. Sisco, as limited 
to the dramatic relief effort to Bangladesh.77 
While outlining the U.S. policy towards Bangladesh 
President Nixon said: 
75Craig Baxter, Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting 
(Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), 107. 
76Khondaker Mastaq Ahmed, was the foreign minister of Bangladesh 
government in exile with whom US government had contact during the 
liberation war of Bangladesh and the US administration tried to make a 
political settlement of the Bangladesh crisis through the Mostaq 
channel. He was the influencial commerce minister of Mujib government. 
77Statement by Joseph J. Sisco, Asisstant Secretary for near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 
LXVIII, no. 1762 (April 2, 1973), 405. 
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Our interest in Bangladesh is in its stability— 
lest turmoil there affect other nations and in its 
genuine non-alignment and peaceful policies. 
Instability anywhere in the subcontinent is an 
invitation to interference from outside.78 
However, the US-Bangladesh relations remained very confined 
within very limited areas during late 1972 and early 1973. 
At this time the Mujib government was clearly critical of US 
policy in the North Vietnam and sided with the Soviet 
Union.79 Mujib declared in the annual convention of the 
ruling party Awami League in 1972: 
We achieved our independence at the cost of life 
and blood, not through the negotiation or 
roundtable conference. So, we shall support, the 
oppressed people against imperialists—if it is 
Africa, or Latin America, or Arab country; we will 
not change our policy.80 
Moreover, regarding the US bombing in North Vietnam, anti- 
American demonstrations continued in the major cities of 
Bangladesh and the angry demonstrators buried the United 
States information Service (USIS) in December 1972.81 
78,'US Foreign Policies for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace," a 
report to the Congress by President Richard Nixon, Department of State 
Bulletin, vol. LXVIII, no. 1771 (June 4, 1973), 791. 
79In 1972, I was a student of sixth grade, and I personally 
experienced the anti-American procession and demonstration. In almost 
every day the college and university students including the strong 
labor union in Bangladesh brought out procession expressing solidarity 
with the oppressed people of North Vietnam. The students raised 
slogans: "Down with US imperialism. We support the heroic people of 
Vietnam." 
80Inaugural speech of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the 2nd annual 
council session of the Bangladesh Awami league. In the Speeches of the 
BangaBandhu (Banga Bandur Bha3on) (ed. ) Mizaner Rahman (Dhaka: Novel 
Publications, 1988), 142. 
81 Baxter, 107-108. 
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Despite the hostilities exhibited towards the US, the 
Mujib government was trying to improve relations with the 
United States. In the autumn of 1974 Sheikh Mujib visited 
the United States to address the General Assembly 
session of the United Nations. During the visit, Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger met with Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman briefly at the UN General Assembly. Mujib 
also saw President Ford for a brief session.82 Although the 
Kissinger-Ford meeting promised US help to Bangladesh, they 
failed to change the attitude of the US administration 
towards the new nation. The US administration eventually did 
not support the Mujib government because of the US 
dissociation with the Mujib government's domestic and 
international policies. 
However, in October 1974, the US Secretary of State Dr. 
Henry Kissinger as part of his South Asian tour, visited 
Bangladesh, and had a meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman. He regarded him as a man of vast conception 
and assured all possible help for the development of 
Bangladesh. After meeting with the Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, Secretary Kissinger remarked in a news 
conference on October 30 at Dhaka: 
...and Bangladesh would not exist if the prime 
minister were not a man of vast conception. I 
expressed to the prime minister that the United 
States ever since the independence of Bangladesh 
82See Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution 
(London: Zed Press, 1979), 139. 
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has believed very strongly in the progress of and 
development of Bangladesh and we will do what is 
within our capabilities to help with the problems 
of food and with problems of development.83 
It is interesting to note that Mujib showed his sincerity 
and willingness to strengthen Bangladesh's relations with 
the US by firing the hardliner Finance Minister, Tajuddin 
Ahmed, just before Henry Kissinger's visit to Dhaka.84 In 
fact it was a signal of Mujib's interest towards the USA and 
the west. 
Although Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, from the beginning of 
his statesmanship, aligned with India and the Soviet Union, 
his relentless effort for opening relations with the United 
States, was of course dictated by national interest, which 
demanded emergency economic aid to withstand hunger, 
starvation and famine, in the newly born war ravaged 
country-Bangladesh. Because, the assistance, Bangladesh 
received so far from the Soviet Union, socialist countries 
and India, were quite inadequate for meeting the growing 
needs of the people. 
83Remarks by the Secretary Kissinger to the press, Dhaka, October 
30, 1974 following a meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman. See Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXXI, no. 1848 
(November 25, 1974), 715. 
84Tajuddin Ahmed was commonly known as a pro-Soviet and pro- 
Indian, key figure in Mujib'3 cabinet. He was fired by Sheikh Mujib on 
October 26, 1974. It is believed that Mujib was under heavy pressure 
from the World Bank, IMF and the US lobby and this combined with the 
Awami League's own factionalism and the role of pro-west Khondaker 
Mostaque faction was responsible for the ouster of Tajuddin Ahmed. 
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There is no doubt that Mujib's effort for promoting 
relations with the USA significantly increased US aid to 
Bangladesh, but it was not enough. In fact the US government 
could not trust Mujib administration, for the lack of his 
total commitment towards the west. Mujib government's 
alignment with the Soviet Union and the socialist world on 
the one hand and its aid seeking to the west, especially to 
USA for meeting its emergency needs were not appreciated by 
the US policy makers and the US did not respond at the call 
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman properly. 
However, following the August coup of 1975, the US- 
Bangladesh relations changed dramatically. After the 
military coup and counter coup of November 3, 1975, and 
November 7, 1975, Ziaur Rahman emerged as a strong man in 
Bangladesh politics. He at first acted as a defacto and 
later emerged as a dejüre leader and became the president of 
the country in April 1977 and stayed in power for over four 
years until his assassination on May 30, 1981. 
Ziaur Rahman understood the economic realities of 
Bangladesh and responded to the national interest which 
demanded the economic advancement of the country and meeting 
the immediate economic necessity of the people. Zia pursued 
pragmatic policies both on the domestic and external fronts. 
At the domestic level, instead of Mujib's one party system, 
he introduced multi party system, held elections, from the 
union level to the parliamentary and presidential levels. 
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Zia also altered Mujib initiated socialist path of 
development. He introduced free market economic system which 
encouraged privatization and denationalization at the 
domestic level. 
At the international level, Zia transformed from 
Mu jib's pro-Soviet and pro-Indian policy to pro-US, pro- 
Chinese, and pro-Muslim word policy. Zia's most domestic and 
foreign policy significantly increased the credibility of 
his regime in the eyes of US policy makers. The immediate 
goal of Zia's foreign policy was to counteract Indo-Soviet 
influences over Bangladesh, but not to antagonize India and 
the Soviet Union.85 At this point Zia developed warmly 
Bangladesh-US relations, which was observed by India and 
Soviet Union with suspicion, because of their loss of 
trusted friend, Sheikh Mujib in Bangladesh. 
Although the United States started changing its 
attitude towards Bangladesh from the very beginning of the 
Zia regime, still it did not consider Bangladesh for 
preferential treatment. At this point Bangladesh's position 
to the US State Department was as follows: 
Bangladesh would appear to be fairly far down the 
list of countries that need to be recognized and 
there are no significant US-Bangladesh policy 
issues that require discussion.86 
85Talukder Maniruzzaman, Group Interest and Political Changes: 
Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian 
Publishers), 253. 
86The above mentioned statement was made by the National Security 
Council when the Ambassador of Bangladesh, M.R. Siddiai requested an 
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Zia steadily moved Bangladesh closer to the United States 
during the Carter administration, while the Carter 
administration also demonstrated its interest towards 
Bangladesh from the very beginning of the Zia regime87 and 
pledged to work with Zia towards peace and prosperity.88 
On the other hand, as a member of the UN Security 
Council Bangladesh's role also impressed the United States. 
Bangladesh's constructive role in the UN Security Council 
was highly appreciated by the Carter Administration during 
the US hostage crisis in Iran in 1979. 
Zia administration also pursued an identical policy 
with the USA on major international issues. Bangladesh 
played a meaningful role in the United Nations by initiating 
a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
which was hailed by the US administration. But the two 
countries also disagreed on a number of issues, especially 
those concerning the Middle East. Zia's policy regarding the 
Middle East was that peace process in the region could be 
appointment with the US Vice President in February 1977. The US 
National Security Council replied: We see no need for the Vice 
President to meet with the Ambassador of Bangladesh and recommended 
against his doing so, unless the Vice President has personal reasons 
for wanting to do so or intends to receive a large number of 
ambassadors. See Memo, 70-77 Jeanne W. Davis to Danis Cliff, 2/12/77 
"C014, EX" Box-Coil, WHCF-Subject File-Jimmy Carter library. 
87"Ziaur Rahman, President of Bangladesh," Box 3742, letter, 
Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. to the U.S. Embassy Dhaka. WHCF- 
Name File, Jimmy Carter library. 
88The message said: "My heartiest congratulations on your victory 
in the June 3 presidential election. I look forward to continuing to 
work with you toward peace and prosperity for our peoples, see "Ziaur 
Rahman, President of Bangladesh" Box 3742, Telegram, President Carter 
to President Zia, 06/07/1978, WHCF-Name File, Jimmy Carter library. 
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established only after the immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories 
and the establishment of a Palestine state, while US policy 
towards Israel was very soft.89 Despite the differences of 
opinion the US-Bangladesh relations during the Zia regime 
did not deteriorate, rather improved significantly. Apart 
from this at the inspiration of the US, Bangladesh signed 
the Treaty of the Non Proliferation of the Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) and Bangladesh became the 111th Party of the NPT.90 The 
US welcomed Bangladesh's accession and hoped that its 
initiative will spur others in the region to follow 
Bangladesh's lead.91 In addition to this, Zia's domestic 
economic policy and foreign policy were highly applauded by 
the state department and the US repeatedly expressed its 
willingness to continue its assistance towards Bangladesh. 
However, it is explicitly clear that Bangladesh under 
Zia had build confidence among the US policy makers, that 
the US interest in Bangladesh can be best served by his 
administration. But still the US political interest in 
Bangladesh was limited and the US policy makers thought that 
instability in Bangladesh could have impact on the 
"Public Papers of the Presidents of tha United StatesL Jimmy 
Carter (Washington: U.S. Goverment Printing Office, 1978), 1927. Also 
see Ibid., vol. 2 (June 30-December 31, 1978), 1979. 
"Department of State Bulletin 79, no. 2032 (November 1929): 48- 
49. 
91 Ibid., 49. 
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subcontinent as a whole and the primary US objective in 
Bangladesh was claimed by the US officials as developmental 
and humanitarian. 
Zia met President Jimmy Carter twice, first in Tokyo 
and second time in Washington. After the Tokyo meeting, 
President Carter invited President Zia, the second time for 
a meeting and stressed on the deepening relationship between 
the US and Bangladesh.92 
Although Zia successfully managed to get an invitation 
from the White House, for this Zia had to play a tougher 
diplomacy and eventually worlds heavyweight champion 
Muhammed Ali worked as a conduit for a meeting between 
President Zia and President Carter, which was described by 
the National Security Council Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
as "Zia's latest ploy (to which incidentally we give full 
marks for imagination.)93 
Zia met with Carter a second time in Washington when he 
went to address the UN General Assembly session in 1980. 
President Zia and President Carter reviewed the bilateral 
relations and discussed regional and international issues of 
mutual concern. During the meeting President Carter 
applauded Bangladesh's democratic election, economic 
92"Ziaur Rahman, President of Bangladesh," Box 3742 letter from 
President Jimmy Carter to President Ziaur Rahman, WHCF-Name File, 
Jimmy Carter library. 
93Folder-WHCF-Sub-Exec" 1/20/77-1/20/81" Box Coll, Jimmy Carter 
library. 
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development and the role of Bangladesh in the Muslim world 
and the United Nations, and in the world affairs, especially 
regarding the US hostage issue. President Carter also 
branded President Zia as a very fine leader of Bangladesh. 
Carter said: 
President Ziaur, the very fine leader of 
Bangladesh. Since their war of independence in 
1971, tremendous progress has been made under his 
leadership.... The open and free election process 
which resulted in the election of President Ziaur 
has been an inspiration to the world. Also we have 
been very grateful at the leadership that 
President Ziaur has placed personally not only 
among the Muslim nations and the community there 
but indeed throughout the entire world community. 
As a member of the United Nations Security 
Council, Bangladesh played a very important and 
statesmanlike role during the difficult months 
just passed (hostage crisis).94 
President Carter also appreciated President Zia's 
statement in the United Nations General Assembly where he 
called upon the OPEC nations with their tremendous influx of 
capital to invest in the developing nations like Bangladesh 
to provide a better life and employment for the people 
there.95 
While President Zia in his speech said: 
We are very grateful indeed, Mr. President, for 
your special interest in the development, the 
economic development in Bangladesh, for which 
during your period, we have received full support 
and especially in the food sector, the support 
that you have given us. I can assure you that our 
94Public Papers of the President of the United States: Jimmv 
Carter. 1980-81 (Book II, May 24 to September 190) (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office) 1577-1579. 
95 Ibid., 1578. 
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people are grateful to the American people and to 
you, Mr. President, for the important role that 
your great country has played, the people of the 
United States and yourself to uphold the charter 
of the United Nations for maintenance of peace and 
stability in the world is something that we praise 
you for and especially your value that you attach 
to the question of human rights and human dignity 
is something that all of us, the whole world, 
could be proud of.96 
President Zia applauded President Carter for the 
meaningful role of the USA, especially in the social, 
political and economic development in Bangladesh including 
the restoration of democracy and launching of the second 
five year plan. While President Carter highly applauded 
President Ziaur Rahman's leadership and assured him of all 
possible cooperation in the successful implementation of the 
second five year plan. Moreover, both President Carter and 
President Zia characterized US-Bangladesh relations as 
excellent.97 
As a symbol of warm relations between Bangladesh and 
the US, Ziaur Rahman signed an agreement at Washington on 
July 13, 1978, concerning Peace Corps program in 
Bangladesh,98 but the agreement drew serious criticism inside 
the country which knowingly was never implemented. 
96Ibid., 1579. 
97Ibid. 
"Agreement concerning the Peace Corps programs in Bangladesh, 
signed at Washington on July 13, 1978. See Department of State 
Bulletin 78, no. 2018 (1978). 
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In November 1980, following the defeat of President 
Jimmy Carter in the US presidential election and with the 
election of Ronald Reagan as the leader of the United States 
of America, Bangladesh's President Ziaur Rahman in his 
message reminded President-elect Ronald Reagan that 
Bangladesh-US relations was excellent, and expected the 
growing cooperation of the two countries will reach at a 
higher level during the tenure of Ronald Reagan. Reagan, as 
a gesture of friendship and cooperation nominated Ms. Jane 
A. Coon as US Ambassador to Bangladesh on May 28, 1981." As 
a matter of fact, Bangladesh-US relations improved further 
during Ronald Reagan's regime except a little 
misunderstanding over a "news item" published in the 
Bangladeshi newspapers that Bangladesh was permitting the US 
to build a naval base at Saint Martin Island. The opposition 
parties seriously protested such a policy on the ground that 
it was opposed to Bangladesh's non-aligned character. This 
created a serious misunder-standing regarding the US 
interest in Bangladesh. But Bangladesh government removed 
the confusion and totally refused to admit it, and regarded 
it as totally baseless.100 
"Public: Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald 
Reagan. 1981 (January 20 to December 31) (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office), 472. 
100Ihe Daily Ittefaq, December 18, 1980. 
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However, Zia government could successfully impressed 
Reagan administration and improved further significantly the 
relationship between the two countries, which is 
demonstrated by the Assistant Secretary of the State for 
Near East and South Asia, Mrs. Jane A. Coon's statement 
before a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, on March 23, 
1981, which recommended for Bangladesh 904 million dollars, 
PL-480 programs of 107.7 million dollars and IMET funding of 
225,000 dollars, which was more than the previous fiscal 
year.101 
Nevertheless, Bangladesh-US relations were excellent, 
although Bangladesh had no cultural pact with the USA for 
unknown reasons. The United States also avoided the military 
relationship with Bangladesh despite request for military 
equipment. It was not until 1977 that a defense attache was 
added to the US Embassy staff in Dhaka. The international 
military education and training (IMET) was begun shortly 
before that. This small program brought a limited number of 
Bangladesh military personnel to the United States for 
specialized training. The State Department while justifying 
the IMET Program had remarked "We will help to improve an 
institution which contributes to stability in Bangladesh and 
101Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NEA, Jane 
A. Coon, before a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on March 23, 
1981. See Jain, 169. 
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in the region."102 However, at the political level in spite 
of having differences of opinion on different issues, 
Bangladesh-US relations were considered excellent. Actually 
the US administration highly appreciated Zia's policy, both 
at home and abroad, partly because of Zia's pragmatic 
foreign policy and partly for his rapid shift from Indo- 
Soviet axis to the west especially to the USA. In fact the 
US administration highly appreciated Ziaur Rahman's policy 
of political evolution, presidential elections of 1978, 
parliamentary election of 1979, withdrawal of restrictions 
on press freedom, withdrawal of martial law and finally the 
release of the political prisoners. Mr. Howard B. Schaffer, 
the country director for India, Nepal and Sri Lanka Affairs, 
has pointed out clearly in his "Review of US Policy in the 
1980s": 
Bangladesh states that its foreign policy is one 
of friendship towards all and genuine 
nonalignment. Relations with the United States are 
excellent and probably as good as they have ever 
been since that nation's birth. Our interests in 
Bangladesh reflect our desire for stability and 
humanitarian interest in improving the lot of 
Bangladesh's desperately poor majority. We welcome 
Bangladesh's position as a moderate in 
102State Department. Congressional Presentation, FY 197^ 
Security Assistance Program, vol. 1. Carter administration's fiscal 
year 1978, IMET budget requested for Bangladesh of $200,000 and the 
fiscal year 1979 IMET budget requested for Bangladesh of $250,000, 
intended to bring some Bengali military officers (it was 27 in 1979) 
to the United States for training. Also see International Policy 
Report, vol. iv, no. 1 (1978). 
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multilateral forums such as the United Nations and 
the nonaligned.103 
The development of Bangladesh-US relations further 
reflected during Reagan administration. President Ronald 
Reagan personally sent a message to acting President Abdur 
Sattar of Bangladesh on the death of President Zia to 
demonstrate US friendship towards Bangladesh. In the message 
Reagan said: 
I was shocked and deeply grieved to learn of the 
assassination of President Ziaur Rahman. The 
United States, indeed the world, had cause to 
respect President Zia's profound and compassionate 
commitment to a better life for the people and his 
dedication to the rule of law. His wisdom in 
international affairs will be sorely missed. I am 
confident that the people of Bangladesh are united 
in their determination to assure that the 
stability and progress of recent years will 
survive this tragedy.104 
Again, the US Ambassador to the UN Jeane A. Kirkpatrick 
visited Bangladesh, to show the support of Reagan's 
administration to cooperate with Bangladesh steadfastly, 
after the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman. She said: 
The United States looks forward to continued 
cooperation with Bangladesh in the field of 
economic development and in search of solution for 
problem for politically and economically inter¬ 
dependent world.... Our collaboration and consul- 
103Howard B. Schaffer, "Review of US Policy in the 1980s," 
Address before the Foreign Policy Conference for Asian-American at 
Hunter College in New York City on December 1, 1979. (Mr. Schaffer was 
country director for India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs in the Bureau 
of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.) Department of State Bulletin 
8, no. 1035 (Feb. 1980): 65. 
104Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald 
Reagan. 1981 (January 20 to December 31, 1981) (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1982), 413. 
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tation with Bangladesh is particularly important 
because we recognize Bangladesh as one of those 
countries which plays a peculiarly positive role— 
a voice of reason and moderation inside the United 
Nations.105 
In the final analysis, our findings reveal that during 
the Mujib regime, the US-Bangladesh relations at the 
political level were unstable and stagnant because of Mujib 
government's pro-Soviet and ambiguous policies towards the 
USA, but unlike Mujib, Zia pursued clear domestic and 
foreign policies identical with the United States, which 
helped reach US-Bangladesh relations at its peak. 
Economic Level 
In the economic development of a country it is almost 
impossible to find out a single country which did not depend 
on foreign aid. Bangladesh is not an exception of this 
pattern. Soon after its emergence Bangladesh required a 
large amount of foreign aid for the reconstruction and 
rebuilding of the war-ravaged economy. At the initial stage 
Bangladesh's finance minister Tajuddin Ahmed refused to 
accept any US aid partly because of the U.S. policy against 
the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971 and partially because 
of Bangladesh's socialist development strategy under Mujib 
regime.106 After the failure of Indo-Soviet authorities in 
105Statement by US Ambassador to UN Jeane J. Kirkpatrick at a 
news conference at Zia International Airport, August 21, 1981. See 
Jain, 172. 
106Excluding pro-Soviet Tajuddin Ahmed, Muzaffar Ahmad, President 
of Bangladesh National Awami Party (NAP) opposed US aid to Bangladesh 
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meeting the growing needs of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman realized the necessity of western aid in general and 
US aid in particular and welcomed foreign aid 
unconditionally from external sources.107 After Mujib's 
willingness expressed, the US administration slowly but 
steadily came forward with assistance. In fact the US relief 
efforts in Bangladesh continued even in the absence of 
diplomatic relations. Although the United States formally 
recognized Bangladesh in 1972 and established diplomatic 
relations in May 1972, as a matter of fact since January 
1972 first under the banner of the United Nations and from 
May 1972 (after the establishment of diplomatic relations) 
also directly, the United States contributed over a third of 
a billion dollars (1/3 billion) for relief and 
rehabilitation in Bangladesh.108 In fact the total US 
government contribution to the UN relief operation up to 
April 1972 was $100 million and included some $500,000 of 
food.109 In order to cope up with the staggering social and 
under any circumstances and publicly declared his intention to work 
for a close alliance between Bangladesh and the Soviet Union. 
107See Kessing Contemporary Archives: 1971-72. 2612. 
108US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping A Durable Peace—A 
Report to the Congress by President Nixon," Department of State 
Bulletin LXVII, no. 1971 (June 4, 1973) 791. 
109This information is provided by the former US representative 
to the UN George Bush in a letter to the UN Secretary General Kurt 
Waldheim on April 3, 1972. See Department of State Bulletin LXVI, no. 
176, May 15, 1972. 
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economic problems the United States contributed $267.5 
million up to April 1972.110 (Table 9) 
TABLE 9 
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO BANGLADESH DURING 
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1972 
U.S. Food and Logistical Support Through the United Nations 
1. 700,000 tons of Food for Peace 
2. High Protein Food for UNICEF Child Feeding $188.2 
3. Grant to Aid for Bangladesh $35.3 
4 . SS Man Batton $4.0 
5. Air Crop Services (Southern Air) $2.0 
$132.2 
U.S. Grant to Voluntary Agencies for Relief Operation in Bangladesh 
CARE - Housing $5.3 
Catholic Relief Service-housing and rehabilitation $8.0 
Church World Service-housing $1.0 
American Red Cross-nutrition and medical assistance $1.0 
Community Development-foundation-housing $.2 
Medical Assistance Program $.9 
Foundation for Airborne Relief Air Crop Services $1.5 
Education and Health Services $1.6 
$19.5 
Grant ta the Government at Bangladesh for the Following Purposes: 
Essential Commodity Imports 34.4 
Repair of Coastal Embankments 15.0 
Rehabilitation of Power Station and Lines 16.3 
Rehabilitation of Schools and Libraries 13.3 
Land Excavation, Inland Waterways and Dredging 6.0 
Rural Health Centers 5.0 
Airport and Other Needs 25.0 
115.0 
Other Relief Assistance 1.0 
TOTAL 267.5 
Source: Department, of State Bulletin 67, no. 1731 (August 28, 
1972): 233. 
110 'Department of State Bulletin LXVII, no. 1971, August 28, 1972. 
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Maurice J. William Deputy Administrator of the Agency for 
International Development and the coordinator of the US 
relief assistance to Bangladesh in a report said that the 
aid contributed about 1/3 of combined contribution of all 
donor countries.111 Among the $267.5 million, food and 
logistical supports were $132 million, grants to UN 
voluntary agencies were $19.5 million and economic 
assistance to the government of Bangladesh was $115 million 
(Table 9). 
According to the United Nations Relief Operations Dhaka 
(UNROD) an amount of foreign assistance to Bangladesh up to 
April 1972 in food grains, other commodities and cash showed 
that the US had already become the second largest donor 
(after India). During the same period the USSR contributed 
only $6.8 million or 1.7 percent of the total aid 
contributed to Bangladesh by 16 countries.112 In September 
1972 President Nixon's advisory panel members visited 
Bangladesh and recommended for $100 million of grant in aid 
for Bangladesh for the fiscal year of 1972-73 in addition to 
appropriate amount of PL-480 food stuffs.113 The advisory 
i:L1Ibid. 
1I2New York Times. April 26, 1972. 
113Advisory panel members letter to President Nixon, September 8, 
1972. Department of State Bulletin (October 30, 1972), 504. 
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panel's request was highly evaluated by President Nixon in 
order to help the war affected people of Bangladesh.114 
By June 1973 the United States provided Bangladesh with 
$433 million for grant assistance which was roughly one 
third of the total amount of the foreign assistance to 
Bangladesh.115 By 1973, the US had become the single largest 
donor of Bangladesh. President Nixon gave an account of US 
aid to the Congress in 1973: 
We provided $144 million in PL480 food and grants 
for food distribution; $21 million in grants to 
American voluntary agencies to aid in the 
resettlement of thousands of Bengali families; a 
$35 million grant to the UN relief operation in 
Dhaka, mainly for food distribution and $145 
million in bilateral grants to the Bangladesh 
government for essential commodities and to 
restore transportation services, power stations, 
hospitals, and schools for the rehabilitation of 
the economy.116 
Precluding these, the United States contributed $2 million 
to support the two-way airlifting for the repatriation of 
the Bengalis and the Pakistanis.117 
114President Nixon's letter to the members of his advisory panel 
on South Asian Relief assistance. Department of State Bulletin 67, no. 
1740 (October 30, 1972). 
115US Assistance to Bangladesh from independence to June 30, 1973 
(Dhaka: US Office of the Coordinator of Relief and Rehabilitation), 3. 
I16«us Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace," A 
Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon. Department of State Bulletin 
68, no. 1971 (June 4, 1973), 791. 
117The US contributed in response to appeals from the United 
Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and Sadruddin Agha Khan, the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR). Other contributors were: 
Australia, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and 
Turkey. East Germany and the Soviet Union bilaterally and the U.K. 
through the UNCHR, have contributed the use of aircraft. For details, 
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Although the US emerged as the single largest donor of 
Bangladesh by 1973, Bangladesh required much more for 
reconstruction work and Bangladesh expected more than what 
the US contributed. But the US policy makers expressed their 
frustration over the administration's failure of the foreign 
aid management and limitless corruption of the Mujib 
administration and regarded Bangladesh as an "international 
basket case."118 Moreover, the US administration was 
dissatisfied with Bangladesh government for its policy of 
state socialism at the national level and alignment with the 
Soviet Union, and socialist world at the international 
level. 
By 1974, Bangladesh desperately needed huge amounts of 
foreign aid to forestall famine in Bangladesh aroused by 
flood, damage of regular crops, as well as mismanagement and 
corruption of the ruling class. At this point Mujib tried to 
deepen its close relation with the western world. In 
September 1974, while addressing the UN General Assembly, 
Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman appealed for urgent 
see Department of State Bulletin 64, no. 1976 (November 26, 1973), 
669. 
118In December 1971, at a meeting of the National Security 
Council, Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson remarked that the 
new nation of Bangladesh was likely to become an "international basket 
case" to which Henry Kissinger replied that it would not necessarily 
be "our basket case." When columnist Jack Anderson revealed the 
minutes of this meeting a month later, the phrase "international 
basket case" became an integral part of Bangladesh's reputation. For 
details see "Bangladesh Aid to the Needy?" International Policy 
Report, Center for International Policy. Washington, D.C., vol. iv, 
no. 1 (May 1987) "Box 11" RG 220, Jimmy Carter library. 
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international aid to save Bangladesh from near starvation. 
Bangladesh by then became almost bankrupt, countries' 
foreign reserves were very insufficient. It needed 
desperately essential commodities, but had no money to pay 
for them. Inflation was running at the rate of 50 percent 
per year. The nation's gross national product was ten 
percent, less than 1969-70 when it was still East Pakistan. 
It had a balance of payment deficit of about $1000 million 
and flood loss was estimated to be over $4000 million.119 
However, at this staggering economic crisis, 
Bangladesh's prime minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman met with 
President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger. Although Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returned to 
Bangladesh with the vague promise of the US help to 
Bangladesh in the severe food crisis, Mujib's meeting could 
not produce any significant result, that led to the 
Bangladesh officials believe that the US had ignored Mujib's 
plea for emergency aid and considered Bangladesh as a low 
priority area. 
The US cool response towards Bangladesh in fact can be 
seen as a reason against Mu jib government's, socialist 
policy at the national level and internationally alignment 
with the Soviet Union and the socialist world in general, 
and in particular Bangladesh's role against the US policy in 
119Sabiha Hasan, Foreign Policy of Bangladesh, Pakistan Horizon. 
77. 
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Vietnam, Bangladesh's trade with Cuba against the US 
economic sanction. Although Mujib undertook several steps in 
order to attract western aid especially the US, i.e. in July 
1974 the Mujib government announced a new investment policy 
which comprised the raising of the ceiling on domestic 
private investment to taka 30 million and the allowance of 
foreign investment without any ceiling. By the mid 1974 
Mujib government decided to accept credit from the IMF120 and 
at the same time Bangladesh invited the World Bank to form 
an Aid Consortium and to increase its aid to Bangladesh. In 
October of 1974, aid to Bangladesh Consortium was formed.121 
In its first meeting at Paris the consortium granted 
credit worth $950 million, thus giving the regime in Dhaka 
the lease of life it desperately needed.122 While the 
economic crisis was turning to famine the US Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger visited Dhaka in October 1974 and 
120In 1974 Bangladesh decided to draw on the second credit 
tranche from the IMF. Unlike the 1st credit tranche which was fairly 
unconditional, while the drawing on second credit tranche of the IMF 
was subject to certain conditions regarding Bangladesh's monetary and 
fiscal policies. See Nurul Islam, Development Planning in Bangladesh: 
A Study of Political Economics (New York: St. Martin'3 Press, 1977), 
148-149. 
121Faced with the acute balance of payment crisis in mid 1974, 
Bangladesh government requested the World Bank to constitute a formal 
and regular consortium of donors under its chairmanship. Accordingly, 
Bangladesh consortium was established. The members of the Aid to 
Bangladesh Consortium were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, West German, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the U.K., the U.S., the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), the EEC, the IMF and the UNDP. 
122 Ishaq Hassain, 29. 
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promised to meet Bangladesh's food crisis within the 
capabilities of the United States.123 But Kissinger's 
assurance proved vague and such commitment was used 
exclusively for political reason, especially for 
aggrandizing the so-called American national interests. 
Kissinger stated the policy of foreign aid before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in June 1974: 
Our economic assistance is designed to reinforce 
developing nations efforts to bring a better life 
to their citizens, increasing their states in a 
cooperative global economy. There is no 
alternative for a network of relations that remove 
the incentive for war and deepen the stake in 
peace. If this is the reality, then obviously 
programs of foreign assistance are not handouts, 
they are done on behalf of international order and 
on behalf of an approach to the solution of 
problems that is in all our interests and very 
much in the American interests.124 
In the case of Bangladesh, as Mujib administration's 
over all policies were disapproved by the US administration 
despite having its certain policies influenced by the west, 
the US administration used food aid as a trump card, in its 
game, and delayed the shipment of the committed aid to 
Bangladesh in addition to the cancellation of two crucial 
grain shipments contracted by the Bangladesh with US grain 
123Secretary Kissinger's remark to the press conference at Dhaka, 
October 30, 1974. Department of State Bulletin LXXI, no. 1848 (Nov. 
25, 1974) . 
124Speech of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, quoted in the 
Department of State Bulletin (July 8, 1974), 49-55. For a 
comprehensive analysis of US aid policy see David Gordon, "United 
States Foreign Aid in Perspective," Current History 77, no. 448 
(July/August 1979). 
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exporters under short term deferred loans because of their 
doubts over Bangladesh's credit worthiness.125 The US food 
policies eventually contributed greatly to the famine of 
1974 which caused the death of more than hundreds of 
thousands of people. This also helped making Mujib 
politically unpopular and discredited. Finally, the US 
hostile attitude towards Mujib administration in Bangladesh 
and failure of the Mujib administration to cope with the 
growing economic crisis and political instability, forced 
Mujib to opt for a socialist model of government with a one 
party authoritarian system—BAKSAL. In fact, during Mujib's 
regime, although the US provided significant amount of 
foreign aid (694.58 million) in addition to contribution to 
the UN-led humanitarian assistance program, but it was 
insufficient. During this period the trading relations 
between the United States and Bangladesh were also 
insignificant. During 1972-75, Bangladesh's export to the US 
was $222.80 million while Bangladesh's import from the US 
was $905.50 million.126 and the balance of trade was always 
negative for Bangladesh and always in favor of the United 
125From 1972-73 to 1975-76 the total amount of US aid to 
Bangladesh was 694.58 million dollars, where food aid was $409.58 
million dollars, project aid was $103.83 million and commodity aid was 
$181.49 million. See ERD Brief on Bilateral Economic Assistance 
Program to Bangladesh as of September 20, 1990. 
126 Ibid. 
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States (Table 10).127 Apart from these in the economic field, 
the two countries also signed several agreements in the 
field of mutual interest but it did not make any difference 
or change of US attitude toward Bangladesh. However, the US- 
Bangladesh cautious relations changed dramatically with the 
collapse of the Mujib regime through the August coup of 1975 
and with the beginning of the Zia regime. Ziaur Rahman 
pursued an outward looking policy. 
TABLE 10 
BANGLADESH'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
(million of US $) 
Year Export Import Balance to Trade 
1972 44.3 151.5 (-107.20) 
1973 72.8 186.6 (-113.80) 
1974 52.4 221.2 (-168.80) 
1975 53.3 346.2 (-292.90) 
1976 64.5 157.0 (-92.50) 
1977 67.1 146.9 (-79.80) 
1978 79.0 192.5 (-113.50) 
1979 86.9 211.9 (-125.00) 
1980 73.2 359.5 (-286.30) 
1981 80.1 155.9 (-79.80) 
1982 78.3 186.5 (-108.20) 
TOTAL 791.90 2315.70 (-1563.80) 
Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook. International Monetary Fund 
(1971-1977). 1979-1983. Compiled, tabulated and edited by 
the author. 
127The total of Bangladesh's exports from 1972-1975 to the United 
States was 222.80 million dollars, while Bangladesh's imports during 
the same period from the United States was $905.50 million. Figures 
taken and collected from the Direction of Trade-Yearbook: IMF. 
1979/1983. 
229 
Fig. 6. Bangladesh's Balance of Trade with the United States: A 
Comparison Between the Mujib and Zia Regimes. 
Moreover, responding to Bangladesh's national interest Zia 
rapidly shifted from Mu jib's socialist economic policy and 
opted for free market economy, which greatly attracted the 
western donors, especially the USA. Moreover Zia's 
encouragement for privatization, and denationalization, 
greatly impressed the US policy makers. In December 1974 the 
Zia government issued the revised industrial policy and 
announced its decision to pay compensation to the former 
share holders of the industrial enterprise which had been 
nationalised and the ceiling on private investment was again 
raised from TK 30 million to 100 million.128 
128 'Nurul Islam, 254-55. 
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Before that the government amended the nationalization 
order enabling the government to transfer nationalized 
enterprises to its original Bengali owners.129 The effect of 
the new policy was a marked improvement in the private 
sector. Zia's economic policy was highly applauded by the 
western donors, especially US policy makers. In a statement 
on March 16, 1978, before the subcommittee on the Asia and 
Pacific Affairs. Mr. Adolph Dubs, deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated that: 
"Economically Bangladesh is better off now than at any time 
since independence."130 
Zia met President Carter twice, in Japan and in 
Washington and received promises of continued economic 
assistance from the United States, especially for his second 
five year plan. Although Zia requested increased American 
investment in Bangladesh, the Americans did not invest in 
the industries of Bangladesh. Immediately after Zia's 
assumption of power, the IMF established a special trust for 
Bangladesh, the World Bank, International Development 
Association (IDA) and the Asian Development Bank—all US led 
organizations announced major credits for Bangladesh.131 
Their credits increased Bangladesh's dependence on western 
129Kirsten Westergaard, 93. 
130Pepartment of State Bulletin 78, no. 2014 (May 1978), 50. 
131Robert S. Anderson, "Impression of Bangladesh: The Rule of 
Arms and the Politics of Exhortation," Pacific Affairs 49 (1976): 455. 
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aids, particularly on the USA. Although some intellectuals 
and politicians, defined Zia's policy of taking aid as over 
dependence on foreign aid, while the world bank report 
called it efficient government management.132 Of course many 
analysts were very critical of it. Rahman Sobhan regarding 
World Banks' role wrote: 
Within the framework of entente cordial which 
prevail between the World Bank and the policy 
makers of Bangladesh, the bank continues to be a 
major political force.... It is not surprising 
that the banks growing monopoly over Bangladesh 
economy influences the perspective of both 
domestic policy makers and donors.133 
Although Zia's policy of aid dependence was criticized 
by many politicians and intellectuals, it was Zia's credit 
that his government received admiration from the US and the 
western donors for his pragmatic foreign economic policy.134 
During the Zia regime (1975-76 to 1981-82), the average U.S. 
foreign aid disbursement was $190.36 million while during 
the Mujib regime, it was $135.52 million dollar despite 
having huge amounts of U.S. relief and through bilateral and 
multilateral agencies (Table 11). 
132Quoted in Ibid. 
133Rahman Sobhan, The Crisis of External Dependence: Xha 
Political Economy of Foreign Aid to Bangladesh (London: Zed Press, 
1982) . 
134Azizul Hague, "Bangladesh 1979: Cry for a Sovereign 
Parliament,Asian Survey 20, no. 2 (February 1980): 229. 
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TABLE 11 
COMMITMENT AND DISBURSEMENT OF US AID TO BANGLADESH 
(figures in million US$) 
Financial Commitment Disbursement 
Year Food Project Commodity Total Food Project Commodity Total 
1972-73 146.600 156.436 119.134 422.170 7.991 37.829 45.820 
1973-74 32.400 35.620 13.600 81.620 48.761 38.501 13.672 100.934 
1974-75 239.300 60.300 — 299.600 149.674 90.041 70.118 259.833 
1975-76 173.750 11.260 — 185.010 210.847 17.292 59.863 288.002 
1976-77 59.200 30.235 — 89.435 44.603 7.662 4.900 57.165 
1977-78 24.900 78.397 41.830 145.127 75.555 13.664 40.409 129.628 
1978-79 99.500 147.603 6.100 153.203 55.800 38.854 76.391 171.045 
1979-80 68.000 3.992 1.900 73.892 126.875 36.922 13.810 177.607 
1980-81 80.107 87.381 6.400 174.388 50.900 46.001 35.965 132.866 
1981-82 32.500 104.175 22.500 159.125 70.700 28.081 17.625 116.406 
Source: "Statement of Commitment and Disbursement of US Assistance to Bang iadesh 
from Fisal Year 1972-1973 to 1990-1991 " (As On September 30, 1990) Brief 
on IIS Bilateral Assistance ..Eroamn tc_ Banoladesh (as on September 30, 
1990), (Dhaka: External Resources Division, Ministry of Planning). 
Fig. 7. Disbursement of U.S. Aid to Bangladesh 
the Mujib and Zia Regimes. 
A Comparison Between 
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Apart from this during Zia's regime the United States 
had shown keen interest in different sectors of Bangladesh's 
development. In fact the western donors especially the US 
agencies responded positively to meet up the food 
requirements of Bangladesh. The major donor agencies were US 
food for peace and PL 480, the US AID, CARE, food for 
work.135 Among sectoral allocations, the United States 
provided aid for the institutional development in the field 
of agriculture.136 The US aid granted $6.5 million to the 
agricultural research institute in Dhaka. Moreover, the 
United States highly applauded Zia's population control 
policy. Zia declared population control as first priority of 
the government's program of action. While during the Mu jib 
regime it was not seemingly taken care of.137 The United 
States also showed interest and provided financial 
135For details, see Robert S. Anderson, "Impression of 
Bangladesh: The Rule of Arm3 and the Palizis of Exhortation," Pacific 
Affairs, 49, 1976. 
136Apart from US bilateral assistance, US supported Agency IDA 
provided a total of $869.7 million on loan up to November 30, 1977. 
Following were the sectoral allocations of IDA. Agriculture and rural 
development $215.9 million (of which irrigation was $113.9 million). 
Transport and telecommunication-$67.1 million, industry was $28.0 
million, cyclone rehabilitation $25.0 million, education $22.1 
million, urban water supply $22.1 million, population planning $15.0 
million, miscellaneous $49.0 million. And the total project aid was 
$444.7 million which the commodity aid (import credits) were $425.0 
million. See "Bangladesh: Aid to the Needy," International Policy 
Report: Centre for International Policy. Washington, D.C. pamphlet— 
Presidential Commission on World Hunger, General Records-Subject File, 
"Box" Carter library. 
137Kushwant Singh, "The International Basket Case," New York 
Times Magazine. January 26, 1978-79. 
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assistance for developing fertilizer plants and rural 
electrification programs in Bangladesh. In 1981 the US 
provided $18 million as grant and $32 million as loans for 
developing fertilizer plant, and $1.3 million as grants and 
$18 million as loans for rural electrification. Moreover, 
the United States also showed interest for the exploration 
of oil in Bangladesh. Three US oil companies began drilling 
in 1975 through concession.138 Each company invested $10 
million in Bangladesh between 1974-80. By the end of 1980 
the United States emerged as one of the best friends of 
Bangladesh, a major foreign donor and partner in 133 accords 
and the United States agencies operated a wide variety of 
development project in Bangladesh.139 
So it can be deducted that Bangladesh-US relations were 
excellent under Zia and the flow of US aid increased and the 
extent of dependence also increased significantly. In this 
regard Rehman Sobhan rightly pointed out that there was no 
area in the development field where donors did not have a 
say.140 
138See Robert S. Anderson, "Impression of Bangladesh: The Role of 
Arms and the Politics of Exhortation," Pacific Affairs 49 (1976): 459. 
139Ibid. 
1<,0Rahman Sobhan, The Crisis of External Dependence: The 




In the final analysis it is revealed that as part of 
its global strategy, the US sided with Pakistan while 
pursuing its South Asia policy, during the liberation war of 
Bangladesh in 1971, which was against the Bangladesh 
struggle. 
However, after emergence of Bangladesh, despite having 
its initial reservation for the newly born Bangladesh, it 
soon realized the new reality in South Asia and recognized 
Bangladesh and established diplomatic relations with it. But 
the relationship between the USA and Bangladesh was confined 
within limited cooperation during the whole period of Mujib 
regime, because the US policy makers were very suspicious 
about Mujib administration's domestic and foreign policy. 
Domestically Mujib government at first adopted a 
multiparty system in its first constitution in 1972 and 
later rejected it in 1975, and introduced one party 
authoritarian system, following the Soviet "totalitarianism" 
and banned all political parties including the freedom of 
press. This policy of Mujib government, seriously alienated 
Bangladesh from the United States. At the same time 
internationally, Mujib government followed a pro-Soviet and 
pro-Indian foreign policy in general which was against 
American interest. Specifically, Mujib government's policy 
against US policy in Vietnam war and trading relations with 
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Cuba forced the United States to show a hostile attitude 
towards Bangladesh. 
However, after the fall of the Mujib regime and with 
the rise of the Zia regime, Bangladesh-US relations improved 
significantly, because of Zia's shift from Mujib's policy 
both at the domestic and international levels. At the 
domestic level, Zia introduced free market economy, 
privatization and denationalization policy instead of 
Mujib's socialist system. Internationally Zia followed an 
"outward looking" foreign policy aimed at improving 
Bangladesh's relations with the west, particularly with the 
USA. In international forums, both Bangladesh and the USA 
pursued identical policy, unlike Mujib's era. Bangladesh's 
role against Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, highly 
impressed the United States. Moreover as a member of the 
Security Council, Bangladesh played a very constructive role 
during the US hostage crisis in Iran, which was also 
applauded by the US State Department. 
Finally, by the 1980s the USA emerged as the best 
friend and the largest donor and partner in 133 different 
accords. In fact, the US policy makers were very confident 
in Zia's foreign policy and regarded the US-Bangladesh 
relations as excellent and probably as good as they have 
ever been, since the birth of Bangladesh. But at the same 
time Bangladesh's dependence increased on the US. 
CHAPTER VI 
BANGLADESH-SOVIET UNION RELATIONS: MUJIB AND 
ZIA REGIMES (1971-1981) 
Tntrodnct ion 
As regards to former Soviet Union's perception toward 
the Third world one analyst pointed out: 
If one were to take an opinion poll of the public 
as well as specialists, one would find out that 
the majority believe that the USSR tries to 
utilize Third world areas to its sole diplomatic 
and economic advantage, to disrupt their ties with 
the west and to change the course of their socio¬ 
political development.1 
Although the people of the Third world countries had 
traditionally been regarded by the Soviet policy makers as 
potential allies of the communist world, in the immediate 
post World War II period the Soviet leadership were largely 
preoccupied with the problems of internal reconstruction and 
East European countries. They had paid superficial attention 
toward the Third world. Following the death of Stalin in 
1953 the Soviet policy underwent a dramatic change toward 
the Third world and they re-oriented their policy toward the 
Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "The Soviet Union and the Third 
World: From Khruschev's Zone of Peace to Breznev's Peace Program" in 
Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry (eds.) Soviet Economic and Political 




new states.2 Actually in the late 1950s and early 1960s with 
the rise of the nationalist movement and the end of the 
colonialism, a large number of new states emerged in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America and the Soviet ideologues and 
policy makers extended their support to the new states 
against colonialism. In the 1960s the Soviet Communist Party 
(CPSU) declared its alliance with these new states who 
fought colonialism and semi colonial yoke, in the vital 
interests of world socialism and world national liberation 
movement. The (CPSU) considered its national responsibility 
to help the people who were following the path of achieving 
and strengthening national independence.3 But although the 
Soviets used to claim that their policy was based primarily 
on a concern for the economic growth and political 
independence of the Third world countries, the evidence 
indicates that the Soviet involvement was indirectly related 
to specific Soviet interests. In the 1950s and early 1960s 
the Soviet policy in the Third world was determined by its 
competition with the United States and China. 
2Roger F. Pajak, "The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid Diplomacy 
in the Third World," Robert H. Donaldson (ed.) The Soviet Union in the 
Third World: Success and Failure (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1981), 384. 
Materials of the xxll congress of the CPSU. Translated and 
cited by A.A. Jamal in his "Bangladesh-USSR Relations in the Soviet 
Perspective," in Muzaffar Ahmad and Abul Kalam (eds.) Bangladesh 
Foreign Relations: Changes and Directions (Dhaka: University Press 
Limited, 1989), 39. 
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In fact during the periods of 1950s and 1960s the 
Soviets were largely motivated by an attempt to undercut the 
position of the United States in virtually any part of the 
world and they were operating on the assumption that any 
increase in the Soviet contacts would result almost 
automatically in a reduction of American influence. When 
the Chinese entered the competition in the early 1960s, the 
Soviets responded by expanding aid commitments to a number 
of African countries that had begun to develop competition 
with the Chinese.4 
The Soviet policy towards Bangladesh was no exception 
of its total policy objectives toward the Third world 
countries. The emergence of Bangladesh was augmented by the 
Soviet military and diplomatic support during the Bangladesh 
struggle of 1971. 
The Soviet Union was the first super power, which 
deplored publicly the Pakistan government's military 
crackdown in Bangladesh. It was also the first superpower 
which officially recognized Bangladesh within a month of its 
independent existence and it was one of the first states 
which established diplomatic relations with Bangladesh by 
the late January 1972.5 Bangladesh also very highly regarded 
the Soviet contribution in the liberation war of Bangladesh. 
4Roger E. Kanet, "The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: 
Policy or Policies?" in Kanet and Bahry, Ibid., 16. 
5See USSR and Third World 2, no. 3 (1972): 141. 
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Immediately after independence the Mujib regime adopted the 
principle of socialism as a state policy, and nationalized 
industries, banks, insurances and other major economic 
institutions in the period of 1972/1974. Finally the Mujib 
government introduced a one party authoritarian system in 
1975 under the name and style of BAKSAL (Bangladesh, 
Krishak, Sramik Awami League at the domestic level, which 
was parallel to the one party system in the Soviet Union). 
Internationally the Mujib government also aligned with the 
Soviet Union, India and other socialist countries, against 
the western, Chinese and Islamic world. In return the Soviet 
Union also extended its cooperation towards rehabilitation 
and the reconstruction of Bangladesh, significantly. The 
Mujib regime clearly maintained warmer relations with the 
Soviet Union. But it changed dramatically once Ziaur Rahman 
came to power after the military coup of August 15, 1975. At 
the domestic level, Zia changed secularism as a state 
principle, and introduced "faith and trust in the Almighty 
Allah (God), which was opposed to socialist ideology. 
Moreover, Zia encouraged privatization and denationalization 
with the state patronage.6 At the international level, Zia 
reshaped his foreign policy and aligned with the USA, China, 
and the Muslim world and shifted from Mujib's tilted policy 
toward the Soviet Union and India. Such rapid transformation 
6The Socialist principles imply that religion and private 
property are the instruments of exploitation. In a socialist state 
religion and private property do not have any official recognition. 
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of Zia's foreign policy produced cooler relations between 
Dhaka and Moscow.7 
However, this chapter seeks to analyze the Bangladesh- 
Soviet Union relations during the two major regimes of Mujib 
and Zia. 
To this end, the following issue will be addressed in 
this chapter. 
Role of the Soviet Union in the Liberation War of 
Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh-Soviet Union Relations: Mujib and Zia 
Regimes (1971-1981). 
Summary. 
Role of the Soviet Union in the Liberation War 
of Bangladesh 
Obviously, the support of the Soviet Union to the cause 
of Bangladesh was an important factor in the successful 
culmination of the liberation struggle.8 Throughout the 
crisis Moscow consistently supported India in tangible and 
intangible ways and championed the cause of Bangladesh."9 
7See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Group Interest Changes: Studies of 
Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982), 
253. Also see Ataur Rahman "Bangladesh and Big Power Politics in the 
Subcontinent," The Journal of Political Science 11, no. 1 (Dhaka 
University, 1985): 
0M.S. Rajan, "Bangladesh and After," Pacific Affairs 45, no. 2 
(Summer 1972): 191. 
9Norman D. Palmer, "The New Order in South Asia," Orbis 15, no. 
4 (Winter 1972): 1189. 
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Actually the Soviet Union's close ties with India was a 
vital factor in shaping the Soviet policy towards the 
Bangladesh crisis in 1971. However, the Soviet support to 
the Bangladesh struggle could be seen in three dimensions. 
1. The Soviet role during the initial stage of crisis. 
2. Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 and the Soviet aid to 
India and the Bengali guerrillas. 
3. India-Pakist an war and the Soviet role in the 
emergence of Bangladesh. 
The Soviet Role During the Initial Stage of Bangladesh 
Movement 
Right before the breakout of the Bangladesh crisis in 
the 1970's, the overall situation in the South Asian 
subcontinent were conducive for the Soviet Union. Mrs. 
Bandar Naike won the election in Ceylon, Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
was back in power with two-thirds majority in the Lokshaba 
and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won the general election in 
Pakistan with a landslide victory. All of the leaders had a 
friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union. Mujibur Rahman 
certainly seemed to be the next prime minister of Pakistan, 
which made a favorable environment for the Soviet Union in 
South Asia in the cold war politics.10 
The Soviet Union's growing interest about Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman's election victory grew because of Mujib's 
1CG.P. Desh Pande, "Soviet and Chinese Stakes" in Mohammed Ayoob 
and Aninrudha Gupta, Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood (Delhi: 
Vikas Publishers, 1971), 118. 
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commitment to non-alignment and the immediate withdrawal 
from the US sponsored defense alliances SEATO, CENTO and all 
other military pacts.11 The Soviet Union was impressed by 
Mujib's foreign policy orientation and extended its support 
toward Mujib's struggle for Bangladesh's freedom movement 
just after the military crackdown of March 25, 1971. 
The Soviet Union was the first country among the major 
powers that condemned the Pakistan army's massacre on March 
25, 1971. On April 2, 1971, President Podgorny sent a letter 
to President Yahya Khan to end the "bloodshed and 
repercussions in East Bengal and opted for a peaceful 
solution." Podgorny wrote to Yahya Khan: 
We consider it our duty to address you, Mr. 
President, on behalf of the Presidium of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet, insistently appealing for the 
adoption of the most urgent measure to stop the 
bloodshed and repressions against the population 
in East Pakistan and for methods for a peaceful 
political settlement.12 
The Pakistan government rejected Pogorny's message on the 
grounds that the message could not be considered as a 
friendly gesture.13 
President Yahya Khan in his reply to President Podgorny 
declared that Pakistan was determined not to allow any 
^Manifesto of the Awami League issued on the eve of the general 
election. See Bangladesh Documents, vol. 1, 81. 
12Moscow Home Service April 3, 1971, 19:00 and Tass in English 
19-12 GMT Summary of the World Broadcast, SU/3652/A3/1. 
13Mehrunnisa Ali, "East Pakistan Crisis: International 
Reactions," Pakistan Horizon 24, no. 2 (Second Quarter 1971): 55. 
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country to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs. 
President Yahya Khan's reply to President Podgorny was as 
follows : 
...no country including the Soviet Union can allow 
or has ever allowed anti-national and unpatriotic 
element to proceed to destroy it or to countenance 
subversion. The open and unashamed interference by 
India in the present situation in my country has 
only one objective, i.e. to inflame the situation 
further by encouraging and materially assisting a 
handful of people to create disturbances. We 
therefore once again call upon the Soviet Union to 
use her undeniable influence with India to prevent 
her from meddling in Pakistan's internal affairs. 
That would indeed be in keeping with the Soviet 
Union's interest in the maintenance of peace and 
tranquillity and continued economic progress in 
the subcontinent.14 
The Soviet protest against the military actions 
undertaken by Yahya was not seen by the Pakistani authority 
as a friendly gesture. Pakistani policy makers considered it 
as a high handed attitude on the Soviet's part and argued 
that the Russians who had crossed international boundaries 
and invaded Czechoslovakia and Hungary should not tell 
Pakistan to stay out of a part of its own territory and to 
stop the repression.15 The key actor of the 1971 crisis in 
Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto, seriously criticized President 
Podgorny's message and regarded it as a "blatant 
interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan" and 
14See Pakistan Horizon 24, no. 2 (Second Quarter 1971): 151-152. 
15Shirin-Tahir-Kheli, "Bilateralism in South Asia," World 
Affairs (Quarterly Review of International Problems) 136, no. 1 
(Summer 1973): 80. 
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pointed out that the Soviet note to Pakistan was against the 
famous doctrine of the Soviet leader V.I. Lenin, on the 
state conduct on the question of foreign interference.16 
Although the Soviet Union from the very beginning of 
the crisis clearly sided with India against Pakistan, Moscow 
still urged a peaceful solution of the conflict within the 
framework of a United Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Soviet 
Union rushed substantial quantities of arms to India, to 
ensure that their friend would be well armed, if it found a 
military solution necessary.17 At the same time the Soviet 
Union continued to believe in a peaceful solution to the 
problem and the integrity of Pakistan.18 
The rationales behind the Soviet Union's approach for a 
united Pakistan were: 
1. Encouragement of the secessionist movement would 
have jeopardized Soviet interest in Pakistan. 
2. The Soviet Union did not want to take any risk of 
creating a new state-Bangladesh. On the contrary, it 
supported United Pakistan with secular leadership like 
Sheikh Mujib. 
16Imtiaz Ahmed, "The Super Powers Strategy in the Third World: 
The 1971 South Asian Crisis" in Emajuddin Ahmad (ed.) Foreign Policy 
of Bangladesh: A Small Study Interactive (Dhaka: UPL, 1982), 116. 
17Robert H. Donaldson, "Soviet Security Interest in South Asia, 
in Lawrence Ziring (ed.) The Subcontinent in the World Politics: 
India. Its Neighbors and The Great Powers (New York: Praeger 
Publisher, 1982), 191. 
18 Ibid., 116. 
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3. The breakup of Pakistan, could have thrown the 
entire subcontinent into chaos and spread the seeds of 
secession to the rest of Pakistan and it would encourage the 
Indian secessionist movements too.19 
4. Finally, the Soviet Union did not want to lose the 
support of the West Asian Islamic states by dismembering 
Pakistan—which was the largest Muslim country in the world. 
So the Soviet Union at the first phase of the Bangladesh 
liberation war (March to July 1971) wanted a settlement 
within a united Pakistan. So, among the Soviet policy 
makers, alignment with the United Pakistan was more 
preferable than honeymoon with the newborn Bangladesh. 
The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and the Soviet Aid 
to .India and the. Bengali Gu.erril.las 
Although the Soviet Union supported the Bengali cause 
following the 1970s general election, still it believed in 
the concept of a United Pakistan, and transfer of power to 
the AL leaders. It was not prepared to encourage a 
secessionist movement in Pakistan. But the Soviets became 
unhappy with the US-Chinese strong move towards Pakistan. 
In fact, the Sino-American détente brought the Soviet Union 
very close to India. This was further strengthened by the 
failure of the Soviet attempt to build a collective 
security system, in order to counter the Sino-American 
19Vijay Sen Budhraj, "Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh," Asian 
Survey 13, no. 5 (May 1973): 485. 
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influence in Asia. In July 1971 the US National Security 
Adviser Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Peking for a Sino- 
American détente through the mediation of Pakistan, prompted 
the Soviet Union sign the treaty of peace, friendship and 
cooperation with India on August 8,1971. In fact both India 
and the Soviet Union confronted the Sino-American détente. 
They were more bitter because of Pakistan's mediatory role. 
So naturally, the Indo-Soviet treaty in such an important 
moment, was anticipated by the Soviet Union and effective 
for India. This treaty indicated to Pakistan that India was 
not alone. The main significance of the treaty was its 
timing. In view of American and Chinese support for Pakistan 
and India's consequent isolation as Rajan pointed out, the 
treaty gave an instantaneous psychological boost to the 
Indian government and people.''20 In fact the decisive 
provisions of the treaty were Articles VIII and IX. Under 
Article VIII, both parties made commitments not to join any 
alliance or launch attacks directed against each other. 
Under Article IX each party promised that in case of an 
attack or threat directed toward either by a third party, it 
would immediately start mutual consultation with a view of 
eliminating this threat.21 While interpreting the treaty 
20M.S. Rajan, "Bangladesh and After," Pacific Affairs 45, no. 2 
(Summer 1972): 198. 
21For the text of the "Treaty of the Peace Friendship and 
Cooperation between India and Soviet Union see R.K. Jain, Soviet South 
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Henry Kissinger pointed out that with the treaty Moscow 
threw a lighted match into a powder keg.22 
The Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 provided India with 
greater vigor than ever before and the Soviet Union 
recognized the Indian determined support to Bengali 
guerrillas and successfully deterred the Pakistani regime.23 
While in Pakistan, the Soviet-Indian treaty evoked bitter 
reaction and it was believed that the treaty would provide 
India with sufficient support for the cause of Bangladesh 
movement. It was considered by the Pakistani authority as a 
Soviet strategic move to have control over the Indian Ocean. 
Even after the Indo-Soviet treaty was signed Russia did 
not want to abandon Pakistan entirely to China,24 and took no 
such strong action against Pakistan until November 1971. But 
the Article IX of the treaty clearly signaled to Pakistan 
that if it attacked India, Moscow should not be expected to 
remain neutral. In fact, the treaty provided an opportunity 
for mutual consultation in the event of an attack or threat 
thereof on either party in order to remove that threat. 
Accordingly, the first consultation under the treaty did 
A3ia Relations: 1974-1978 (Atlantic Highland: Humanities Press, 1979), 
117. 
22Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1979), 867. 
23Summit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia (Boulder and 
London: Westview Press, 1986), 127. 
24Sydney H. Schanberg, "Pakistan Divided," Foreign Affairs 50, 
no. 1 (October 1971): 132. 
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take place at the end of October 1971.25 Actually Russia 
moved very cautiously and maintained a posture of 
substantial neutrality, until July 15, 1971, announcement of 
President Nixon's impending visit to Peking (commissioned by 
Pakistan's mediation).26 
A gradual shift in the Soviet policy was visible from 
September, 1971 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited 
Moscow. Although the Soviet Union regarded the conflict in 
East Pakistan as an internal problem of Pakistan, it 
approved Indian military intervention in East Pakistan if 
necessary.27 Actually, the Soviet Union still wanted the 
peaceful settlement of the East Pakistan crisis within the 
structure of a United Pakistan. Because, for the Soviet 
military strategists, West Pakistan was more important than 
East Pakistan.28 So Moscow instead of dismembering Pakistan 
wanted a definite decrease in the Sino-US influence in 
Pakistan, through the mechanism of a transfer of power to 
25M.S. Rajan, "Bangladesh and After," Pacific Affairs 45, no. 2 
(November 1972), 198. 
26Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhury, "Pakistan and the Changing Pattern of 
Power Relations in South Asia," Pakistan Horizon 31, no. 1 (First 
Quarter, 1978) . 
27Budhraj, 483. Also see Bhabani Sen Gupta, 58. 
28Soviet Union could not ignore the strategic location of West 
Pakistan where the United States had intelligence base, close to the 
USSR. Moreover West Pakistan was also linked with China by two roads- 
the old silk route reopened in August 1970 and the Kara Koram Highway 
completed in January 1971. 
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Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.29 It therefore stressed upon the 
release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the political 
settlement of the East Pakistan crisis. 
Following Mrs. Indira Gandhi's visit to Moscow, the 
Soviet Union's attitude towards Pakistan was increasingly 
changing.30 A few days later the Soviet President visited New 
Delhi and offered all possible assistance to India for a 
political settlement in the spirit of existing friendly 
relations with India.31 On October 24, 1971, Indian Prime 
Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi started her tour to six western 
capitals including Washington in order to gain western 
support for military intervention in East Pakistan. But Mrs. 
Gandhi failed to convince President Nixon of the necessity 
for a military solution. At the end of October 1971, a joint 
consultation between India and the Soviet Union was held in 
Delhi. The Indian side was led by foreign secretary T.N. 
Kaul and S.K. Banerji, Secretary East, while the Soviet side 
was led by Mr. N.P. Firyubin the deputy minister for foreign 
affairs. The consultation took place in accordance with the 
29
MOSCOW strongly supported Sheikh Mujibur Rahman because Mujib 
was supposed to be a Nehru of Paki3tan-an advocate of nonalignmnt, 
secularism, socialism and democracy. 
30See the Soviet Prime Minister Mr. Kosygin's speech at a 
luncheon given in honor of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. See R. 
K. Jain, 123. 
31 Jain, 129. 
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Article IX of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship 
and Cooperation.32 
At the beginning of the November, tension in the South 
Asian subcontinent was aggravating. Both India and Pakistan 
accused each other of border violations. The Soviet Press 
became overtly critical of Pakistan's policy in East 
Pakistan and started to focus upon the success of the 
liberation forces.33 From November it was very clear that 
Moscow had decided for an all out support for India in case 
of any probable Indo-Pakistan war. The Soviet's abrupt but 
certain change of attitude towards the East Pakistan crisis 
stemmed out of two reasons: 
First of all, the Soviet calculation revealed that the 
Chinese, even if they wished could perhaps do little to save 
East Pakistan, because technically winter was the most in 
convenient season for military movement in the Himalayan 
passes, which were likely to be snowed in. 
Secondly, an in-flux of Soviet arms to India had 
continued and the top ranking Soviet diplomatic and military 
officials (who visited New Delhi by the end of October) were 
convinced that India was in a position to destroy the war 
machine of the unpopular military dictatorship in East 
Pakistan with the Soviet military and diplomatic support.34 
32Jain, 129. 
33Muhith, 34. 
34 Budhraj, 493. 
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Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and the Role of the Soviet Union 
Following the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi, during her visit to Moscow in 
September 1971, had requested urgent and an immediate supply 
of the Soviet arms to India. It has recorded that in 
November three shiploads of arms were dispatched and an 
emergency airlift was launched to provide a limited quantity 
of specialized equipment, and spare parts, that the Indian 
army and air force had required.35 Pakistan was continuously 
protesting this massive arms supply to India, which totally 
upset the military balance in South Asia and increased 
tension between India and Pakistan. By November 1971, the 
Soviet Union completed its arms delivery to India, which was 
required to defeat Pakistan in case any war broke out. From 
early November 1971 the Soviet Press became strongly 
critical of Pakistan. After the formal declaration of war on 
December 3, 1971, the Soviet Union strongly sided with India 
and presented the Soviet doctrine to defend the Bangladesh 
struggle as a struggle for national liberation. The Soviet 
leaders defined the national liberation movement as: 
any war that is waged by a people for the sake of 
freedom and social progress, for liberation from 
exploitation and from national oppression or in 
35Sisson and Rose, 243. See The Times (London) November 6, 1971 
and the Dawn (Karachi). Also see Zubeida Mustafa, "USSR and Indian 
Action in East Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon 24, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 
1971). 
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defense of its state sovereignty against an 
aggressive attack is a just war.... The main types 
of war rarely emerge in "pure" form; several types 
often intertwine and one type changes into 
another.... National liberation wars of oppressed 
people against colonialists may go hand in hand 
with civil war against internal reactionary 
forces .36 
Following the escalation of fighting to the West 
Pakistan border, the Soviet Union warned Pakistan about its 
"grave responsibility" in "following this dangerous course." 
The Soviet Union asserted that the developments which "are 
taking place in direct proximity of the Soviet borders, 
therefore involve the interests of its Security." So, the 
Soviet government called for the steadfast ending of the 
bloodshed and for a political settlement in East Pakistan on 
the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of 
the people.37 After the Soviet direct support to India 
against Pakistan, relations between the Soviet Union and 
Pakistan deteriorated rapidly.38 Aside from this, the Soviet 
Union also lent its unqualified support to the Bangladesh 
liberation war in the Security Council, debate which was 
convened to discuss the Indo-Pakistan conflict.39 
36MarKism-Leninism on Wax and Army; A Soviet View (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1972), 70, 88. 
37Statement released by TASS on December 5, 1971. 
38See Mustafa, 61. 
39Statement by Mr. Jacob Malik the representative of the USSR, 
December 4, 1971. See Bangladesh Documentsr 47 (New Delhi, 1972), 438- 
441. 
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The Soviet Union proposed in the security council that 
the representatives of the Bangladesh movement be given a 
hearing. But the Soviet resolution was rejected by the 
council, having been vetoed by China.40 
During December 4, 1971 and December 21, 1971, when the 
Security Council debated over the conflict, the Soviet Union 
consistently supported the Bangladesh movement and vetoed 
three times to prevent the Security Council from adopting a 
US sponsored resolution calling for a ceasefire. On December 
5, the Soviet representative Mr. Jacob Malik said: 
It is only the people in East Pakistan in the 
persons of their elected representatives, who can 
decide upon their future fate in relation to 
whether East Pakistan remains part of Pakistan or 
whether it will establish an independent 
autonomous and separate state. No one should deny 
the right of those elected representatives.41 
In fact, expressing identical views with the Indian 
government, the Soviet representative first vetoed an 
American draft resolution proposing that the Security 
Council should call upon India and Pakistan to cease fire 
immediately and to withdraw their troops from each other's 
territories and to allow posting of the UN observers on both 
sides of India-Pakistan borders. At the next meeting the 
USSR again vetoed and prevented an adoption of an African- 
Latin American draft resolution which called for a cease 
40Mustafa, 71. Also see Budhraj, 995. 
41Statement by Mr. Jacob Malik, representative of the USSR, in 
the Secrutiy Council, December 5, 1971. See Bangladesh Documents. 442- 
445. 
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fire and withdrawal of forces, and also urged that efforts 
be intensified to bring about conditions necessary for the 
voluntary return of the East Pakistani refugees to their 
homes. The matter was next referred to the General Assembly, 
under the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," and the General 
Assembly passed the "Ceasefire Resolution" with the vote of 
104 to 11 with 10 abstentions.42 Since the General Assembly 
resolution was nonbinding, the United States again brought 
the issue to the Security Council and in a resolution on 
December 12, called upon both India and Pakistan to accept 
ceasefire and withdrawal of their forces, according to the 
resolution of the General Assembly. But the Soviet Union 
again vetoed for the third time in the Security Council. 
Finally, after the surrender of the Pakistan army on 
December 16, 1971, the USSR quickly endorsed India's 
unilateral ceasefire order on the western front, which in 
effect ended the war. Besides diplomatic move, the Soviet 
Union was also prepared militarily to face any Sino-US 
involvement in the crisis. It is reported that from December 
3, 1971, three Soviet warships passed from the Strait of 
Malacca into the Indian Ocean.43 
So in the final analysis it has become unfolded that 
the Soviet military and diplomatic support towards the 
42See U.N. doc. A/Res/2793 (xxvi). 
43Jack Anderson, The Anderson Papers (New York: Random House, 
1973), 259. 
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Bangladesh liberation struggle made it possible to emerge 
the new state Bangladesh within a short period of nine 
months guerrilla fight. Actually Moscow's immediate interest 
in the Bangladesh liberation struggle is clearly stated by 
Bhabani Sen Gupta: 
An independent Bangladesh separated from Pakistan, 
closely linked to India and hence disposed to be 
an ally against a hostile China constituted a 
political asset of no mean consequence to 
Moscow.44 
Apart from encountering Sino-Soviet rapprochement, many 
analysts believed that the Soviet policy towards the 
Bangladesh war was formulated in the light of the USSR's 
long term strategic interests in the region.45 
Bangladesh-Soviet Relations: Muiib and Zia Regimes 
.11211-1981) 
Bangladesh-Soviet Relations: Political Level 
Many political observers and analysts firmly believe 
that the Soviet support for India's policy towards the 
Bangladesh struggle was a decisive factor for the birth of 
44Bhabani Sengupta, 58. 
45Syed Anwar Hossain, "Role of the Super Powers and the Emergence 
of Bangladesh: A Review Article," Politics. Administration and 
Change 5 (July-December 1980): 124. One study has shown that India 
alrady has granted the USSR bunkering and other naval facilities in 
the Andoman and Nicobar Islands. A Soviet supply depot and training 
mission have been established at "Visakapatnam." If the USSR becomes 
India's sole arms supplier it could effectively influence Indian 
policies in its own favour. See Mustafa, 61. 
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an independent Bangladesh.46 Moreover the Soviet Union was 
the first major power which recognized Bangladesh and moved 
fast to demonstrate its keen interest in Bangladesh, against 
the declared hostility of China and the United States.47 On 
January 25, 1972, the Soviet President N.V. Podgorny and 
Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin sent messages to President Abu 
Sayed Chaudhury and Premier Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 
recognizing Bangladesh and within a month established 
diplomatic relations.48 Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman also responded with gratitude to the Soviet 
leaders.49 
Following the Soviet recognition, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
paid an official visit to Moscow from March 1-5 1972 and 
signed a joint declaration.50 The Soviet Union also pledged 
its readiness to extend cooperation in the development of 
Bangladesh.51 In response to the Soviet cooperation and 
friendship the Mujib government adopted the principles of 
46Peter Lyon, "Bangladesh: Fashioning a Foreign Policy," South 
Asian Review 5, no. 3 (April 1972): 235. 
47Philips Talbot, "Impression of Bangladesh: A Visitor's Report, 
Aaia, no. 24 (Winter 1971-72): 13. 
48R.K. Jain, 148. 
49Bangladesh Observer (Dhaka), February 24, 1972. 
5QPravda. March 5, 1972 (Reprint from the Soviet Press, 14, no. 
5, Sept. 3, 1971). 
51See "Joint Declaration by USSR and People's Republic of 
Bangladesh," Pravda (March 5, 1972). Reprint from the Soviet Press 14, 
no. 5 (September 3, 1971). 
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socialism and secularism, which were very close to the 
communist ideology. As a first step towards socialism, the 
Mujib government followed a socialist policy at the domestic 
level and pursued a foreign policy aligned with India-Soviet 
Union and other socialists states, against the US-China and 
the Muslim world at the international level. 
In order to strengthen its relation with the Soviet 
Union, in the immediate post-liberation period, pro-western 
Khondaker Mustaq Ahmed was ousted from the important office 
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and pro-Soviet Abdu 
Samad Azad was appointed as the foreign minister. On the 
other hand the key portfolio of the ministry of finance was 
awarded to Tajuddin Ahmad, who was well known as an ardent 
supporter of the Soviet socialism. At the domestic level, 
Mujib government introduced state socialism, which meant to 
Sheikh Mujib and his party Awami League a policy of 
nationalization.52 Mujib government in order to materialize 
its "so called socialism" nationalized all the banks, 
insurances and major industries. By 1972, 86 percent of the 
total industrial assets came under public ownership as 
compared to 35 percent before independence.53 Besides 
nationalization of industries and public sector agencies, it 
52See Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues 
(Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1980), 101. Also see Abul Fazal Huq, 
"Constitution-Making in Bangladesh," Pacific Affairs 46, no. 1 
(September 1973). 
53Kirsten Westergaard, State and Rural Society in Bangladesh: A 
Study in Relationship (London: Curzon Press, 1985), 75. 
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also had set up a number of new corporations to establish 
state control over the economy. To encourage the development 
of the public sector, governmental allocations of 
development funds had been heavily utilized for the public 
sectors. Simultaneously the government discouraged the 
private sector by fixing lower limits of investment.54 
Moreover, Mujib government also introduced a land reform, 
where a ceiling of 100 bighas (33 acres) was imposed and 
land revenue on small holding (below 25 bighas or 8 acres) 
was abolished.55 Although Mujib government wanted to 
establish socialism through a number of socialist economic 
policies56 the Awami League regime was actually an 
intermediate regime.57 Moreover socialism was introduced as a 
general principle without any clear guidelines as to how to 
implement it or it was not clear what would be the ultimate 
role of the public sector. 
However Mujib's socialist policy at the domestic level 
impressed the Soviet Union. Many political observers 
believed that Mujib's socialist path of development was 
designed and guided by the Soviet Union. It was reported 
that, during the last phase of Bangladesh struggle, before 
54A.M.A. Rahim, "An Analysis of the Planning Strategy in 





the fall of Dhaka a Russian delegation headed by first 
deputy minister Kuznetsov arrived in New Delhi to work out 
the organization of the Bangladesh government.58 It is also 
recorded that the USSR offered to train national cadres for 
various branches of industry and agriculture of Bangladesh. 
On the other hand the Mujib government followed a pro-Indian 
and pro-Soviet foreign policy at the international level. 
Some analysts argued that the main Soviet objective in 
Bangladesh was to bring Bangladesh under the umbrella of the 
"Asian Collective Security Scheme." It was achieved, when 
Bangladesh and India signed the friendship treaty in March 
1972, which was similar to the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 
1 97 1.59 In fact in the Soviet Bangladesh joint declaration 
during Mujib's visit to Moscow, the Soviet Union applauded 
Mujib's socialist foreign policy having non-aligned 
character60 while Bangladesh was very much impressed by the 
foreign policy of the Soviet Union aimed at strengthening 
58Sabiha Ha3an, Foreign Policy of Bangladesh-1. Pakistan Horizon. 
73. 
59The USSR offered to train "national cadres for the various 
braches of industry and agriculture of Bangladesh." See A.T.R. Rahman, 
"Administration and Its Political Environment in Bangladesh," Pacific 
Affairs 47 (1974): 189. Also see Hasan, 75. 
60In an interview with a TASS correspondent Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman said that the main principles of the foreign policy of 
Bangladesh would be non participation in military blocs, neutrality, 
peaceful co-existence, independence and friendship with all countries. 
See Pravda (January 18, 1972) reprinted in the USSR and The Third 
World 2, no. 2 (February 13, 1972): 78. 
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friendship and cooperation with all nations and all around 
support for national liberation movement.61 
Following Mujib's visit to the Soviet Union, the 
Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, Leonid Brezhnev, assured to do everything for the 
development of Bangladesh. Brezhnev proclaimed: 
Our line of support for the Republic of Bangladesh 
and cooperation with it stems from the fundamental 
policies of the communist party and Soviet states. 
For our part we shall continue to do everything we 
can for the development and strengthening of our 
relations with the Republic of Bangladesh.62 
At the international level, the Mujib government 
pursued a pro-Soviet foreign policy siding with the Vietnam 
against the US policy. Bangladesh also supported the Arab 
cause, against "continuing Israeli occupation of Arab 
territories which was identical with the Soviet position 
against the US foreign policy toward southeast Asia and the 
Middle East.63 
Another aspect of Bangladesh-Soviet relations was that 
the Soviet Union also played very important role for the 
admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations (UN) . On 
January 24, 1972, the UN Security Council met to consider 
the admission of the new members concerning the application 
61Pravda (March 5, 1972) in Reprint from the Soviet Press 14, no. 
5 (September 3, 1971). 
62Jain, 157. 
63See USSR-Bangladesh joint Declaration, Pravda. march 5, 1972, 
Reprint from The Soviet Press 14, no. 5 (September 3, 1971.). 
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of Bangladesh. On the same day the Soviet Union co-sponsored 
a draft resolution (s/10771), which was introduced by 
the permanent representative of India. The draft resolution 
proposed that the Security Council should recommend 
to the General Assembly the admission of the Peoples 
Republic of Bangladesh as a member of the United 
Nations.64 The Soviet representative said in the Security 
Council : 
Bangladesh without any doubt entirely meets all 
the requirements which the United Nations charter 
in Article 4 lays down for membership of the 
United Nations. The Soviet Union wholeheartedly 
supports the application of Bangladesh for 
admission to membership of the United Nations and 
is in favor of the immediate adoption by the 
Security Council of an appropriate recommendation 
on this matter to the General Assembly. As a co¬ 
sponsor of this draft resolution, we appeal to all 
members of the Security Council without exception 
and first and foremost to all the permanent 
members of the Security Council to adopt this 
important decision unanimously.65 
Despite strong Soviet diplomatic move in favor of 
Bangladesh's admission into the United Nations, China vetoed 
against Bangladesh's membership, which was seriously 
criticized by the Soviet Union.66 
After the Chinese veto, the Security Council was unable 
to take any decision regarding Bangladesh's admission. The 
64Statement by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, 
August 24, 1972. See Jain, 158. 
65Statement by the Soviet representative in the UN Security 
Council, August 24, 1972, in Ibid., 159. 
66Statement by the Soviet representative in the Security Council 
on August 25, 1972, see Jain, 170. 
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question of the admission of Bangladesh therefore came to 
the General Assembly for consideration. Again in the General 
Assembly Soviet Union played very strong role and patronized 
a resolution of 23 nations, which was led by Yugoslavia, 
which called for an early and unconditional admission of 
Bangladesh. The Soviet Union clearly stated that the 
admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations would 
correspond with the interest and the task of further 
normalization of the situation in the Indian subcontinent. 
While 16 other nations adopted another resolution which made 
Bangladesh's admission contingent with the settlement of the 
Pakistani Prisoners of War (POW) . It called for the 
repatriation of the POWs in accordance with the Geneva 
convention of the 1949 and relevant provisions of Security 
Council Resolution 307 (1971). After consulting both 
resolutions, the President of the General Assembly stated 
that the admission of Bangladesh into the UN should be 
considered along with the overall solution of the existing 
political, legal and humanitarian problems.67 
In response to the Soviet support towards Bangladesh in 
international forums, Mujib government reciprocated it 
towards the Soviet Union and its allies throughout the 
world. One major example of Bangladesh's identical policy 
with the Soviet Union was Bangladesh's trade contract with 
67 Jain, 171. 
264 
Cuba in 1974 which seriously aggravated the US-Bangladesh 
relations .68 
Although the Mujib government internationally pursued a 
pro-Soviet foreign policy, at the domestic level Mujib's 
party Awami League (AL) was not aligned with the pro-Moscow 
political parties, i.e. the National Awami Party (Muzaffar) 
and the communist party of Bangladesh (CPB). Even the AL was 
reluctant to recognize the role of the communists in the 
liberation struggle of Bangladesh, while the Soviet mass- 
media in contrast tried to boost the image of the communist 
party of Bangladesh (CPB).69 Following independence, during 
1972-1973, the CPB and NAP(M) became critical of the Mujib 
government for its non radical policies and its acceptance 
of US aid.70 Mujib government however did not give upper 
hands to the pro-Soviet NAP(M) and CPB. Before the national 
elections of 1973, the NAP(M) and CPB with the inspiration 
of the Soviet Union approached the AL to form a United 
democratic front. Actually, it was a strategy approved by 
Moscow designed to achieve the acceptability of the 
communists in a predominantly Muslim state and to ensure the 
share of the communists in the power structure. 
68See Rahman Sobhan, "Politics of Food and Famine in Bangladesh," 
Economic and Political Weekly 14, no. 48 (Dec. 1 1974): 121. Also see 
Far Eastern Economic Review, December 23, 1972 and January 15, 1973. 
69Sen Gupta, "Moscow and Bangladesh," Problems of Communism 
(March-April 1975), 62. 
70See Far Eastern Economic Review. December 23, 1972 and January 
15, 1973. 
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Contemplating the communist's goals, the AL turned down the 
communist proposal and each party contested in the elections 
separately. Although in the elections, the Soviet Union 
provided its all out support to the pro-Soviet NAP(M) and 
the CPB, the NAP (M) won a single seat and the CPB won 
nothing, while the AL won all but eight seats in the 
assembly.71 
In August 1973, anti-Mujib underground activities 
intensified, the pro-Chinese activists were conducting armed 
struggle against the Mujib regime, law and order situation 
was at a breaking point and economy was about to collapse. 
At this juncture, the pro-Soviet parties NAP(M) and CPB 
utilized the internal situation of the country and in August 
1973 again approached the AL with the inspiration of Moscow 
and proposed for the formation of a popular united front 
among the party organizations outside the government.72 In 
the face of hostile opposition from the pro-Chinese, pro- 
American and pro-Islamic forces, Mujib accepted the proposal 
71In the elections the AL won 291 seats out of 300, with 73 
percent vote while NAP(M) won 1 seat with 8 percent vote cast. It was 
ridiculous that Moscow radio described the NAP(M) as the runner up in 
the race although its total vote was just over one tenth of that 
polled by the AL. Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1973: Management of 
Factional Politics," Asian Survey 14, no. 2 (February 1974), 128. For 
the Moscow radio comments see Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
(FBIS), March 8, 1973. 
72It is recorded that in August 1973 a delegation of the CPB went 
to Moscow to confer with the leaders of the Soviet communist party. It 
was agreed that CPB and NAP(M) would concentrate their efforts on 
achieving the unity of democratic and national patriotic forces. See 
Izvestia (Moscow) August 19, 1973. 
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and launched the "united front" in October 1973 which gave 
the communists an opportunity to work together with a 
popular party in power. 
While reporting this development the Pravda observed: 
The long and difficult struggle for freedom and 
independence convinced the people of Bangladesh 
that only the united actions of all national 
patriotic forces made it possible to achieve 
national independence. The two year period of 
independent development (since) has shown that 
this unity is also necessary now at the important 
stage of building a peace loving democratic, 
independent state. That is why the broad 
progressive public in Bangladesh considers the 
creation of a united front of the three parties to 
be an important step on the road to strengthening 
the independence and social gains of the young 
republic.73 
Since then, the communists had started exerting 
influence on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and AL. Finally Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, following the Soviet model, introduced a 
Presidential form of government with one-party authori¬ 
tarianism. In fact the CPB with the Soviet approval came out 
with the prescription of this new model.74 CPB chief 
Monisingh asserted: 
Bangladesh has neither a strong capitalist class 
of big landlords. This makes it very different 
from that of India. We therefore need not live in 
a parliamentary system, which can only lead to a 
stratification of the classes and which in effect 
legitimizes exploitation of the poor by the rich. 
The parliamentary system cannot but be a major 
roadblock to significant social changes. What we 
need is an effective, efficient, honest and 
73Pravdar October 23, 1973. 
74 Bhabani Sen Gupta, 62. 
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ideologically sound government, a government of 
progressive and democratic forces under the 
leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.75 
The Soviet prescription through the local communists in 
Bangladesh (CPB and NAP(M) was welcomed by the pro-Soviet 
factions of the Awami League (Tajuddin-Sheikh Moni group) 
which suggested Sheikh Mu jib to accept the new model. 
Mu jib's new model of government replaced the 
parliamentary system by a presidential one, provided the 
president, supreme executive and legislative authority and 
even placed the judicial system under his control. Mujib 
declared himself as president of the republic for a five 
year term and under the same amendment of the constitution 
he dissolved all existing political parties and imposed one 
party rule in Bangladesh.76 Through the introduction of the 
one party authoritarian system, Mujib, a firebrand of 
democracy, transfigured himself into a stalwart of 
autocracy.77 However after the change of political system by 
Mujib government, according to the policy prescription of 
the Soviet Union (via the local communists), Bangladesh- 
Soviet Union relations became exceptionally warm and the 
75CPB Chief Monisingh'3 interview with Bhabani Sen Gupta, See 
Ibid. 
76For a detail analysis on BAKSAL, seeRounaq Jahan, Bangladesh 
Politics; Problems and Issues (Dhaka: UPL 1978), 95-130. See Taluder 
Mamiruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of the Mujib Regime and 
the Aftermath," Asian Survey 16, no 2, 101. 
77Shawkatara Husain, "Military intervention in the Politics of 
Bangladesh," Politics. Administration and Change v, no. 2 (1980): 90 
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Soviet Union seemed to be the guardian of the one party 
authoritarian system in Bangladesh. 
Besides political relations, Bangladesh-Soviet Union 
cultural ties during the Mujib regime were also 
exceptionally warm. After the independence of Bangladesh in 
December 1972 a cultural agreement providing for the mutual 
exchange of personnel and knowhow was signed in Dhaka. 
In the cultural field, one major achievement of the 
Soviet Union in Bangladesh was that the Soviet Union trained 
a good number of Bangladeshi students, and professionals 
during the Mujib regime, who many observers believe were 
supposed to help Mujib, run the new model of government. 
Soviet Ambassador in Bangladesh figured out that since 
independence more than 1700 Bangladeshi engineers, doctors, 
veterinary surgeons and specialists in many other fields had 
received higher education in the USSR up to 1990 and over 
600 Bangladeshi students were studying in the Soviet 
Universities and colleges on the basis of annually provided 
scholarship by the USSR for the Bangladeshi citizens.78 
However, with the fall of the Mujib regime through a 
military coup of August 15, 1975, Bangladesh-Soviet 
relations changed overnight. Following the eclipse of the 
Mujib regime, Ziaur Rahman emerged as the key figure of 
Bangladesh politics, who reshaped Mujib's policy both at 
domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, 
78 Ibid. 
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through constitutional amendment, Zia abolished Mujib's 
principles of secularism and socialism, and introduced 
absolute trust in Almighty Allah (God) instead of 
secularism. Socialism was replaced by social and economic 
justice. As a matter of fact Zia followed the capitalist 
path of development with free market economy, i.e., 
privatization and denationalization policies, against the 
socialist development strategy. On the other hand at the 
international level Zia disengaged Bangladesh from the Indo- 
Soviet orbit and rehsaped Bangladesh's foreign policy into 
pro-Western, pro-Islamic and pro-China oriented which worked 
against Indo-Soviet axis. The replacement of the Soviet 
trusted friend, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman with pro-Western, the 
pro-Chinese, and pro-Islamic Ziaur Rahman was observed by 
the Soviet authority with resentment and concern about 
potential Chinese gains in Bangladesh. The Kremlin in its 
first reaction on August 22, 1975 expressed that Mujib's 
overthrow might swing Bangladesh away from the Soviet Union 
and imperialism, Maoism, and internal reactionary forces 
might exert influence on future developments.79 While 
Izvestia commented: 
The coup deprived the country of an acknowledged 
leader of the liberation movement, whose declared 
goal was to carry out progressive social and 
economic reforms. The Soviet people will remember 
Mujibur Rahman not only as an inspirer and leader 
of the national liberation movement in Bangladesh 
79Christopher S. Wren, "Moscow Fears Bangladesh May Look to 
Peking," New York Times. August 27, 1975. 
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but also as an advocate of closer ties of 
friendship between the newly-independent republic 
and the Soviet Union and other countries of the 
socialist community.80 
After the fall of the Mujib regime, the relationship 
between Bangladesh and the Soviet Union was almost frozen 
for quite some time. In the following years the Soviet 
Union showed considerable dissatisfaction in their attitudes 
toward Zia regime. Because under Zia Bangladesh strengthened 
ties with US-China and the Muslim world, while its relations 
with the Soviet Union and India declined significantly.81 
Although the Soviet Union was dissatisfied with Bangladesh's 
policy both at domestic and international levels, it did not 
want to push Bangladesh to the Sino-US orbit. In December 
23, 1976, the Soviet deputy foreign minister visited 
Bangladesh to normalize relationship.82 During this period, 
the main Soviet objectives in Bangladesh was to disengage 
Bangladesh from the Sino-US axis. In an article 
Pravda commented: 
The Soviet public in common with progressive 
circles in other countries of the world is 
concerned over the attempts of reactionary and 
left wing extremist forces to create an atmosphere 
of terror, victimization of genuinely democratic 
figures and organization in Bangladesh. If right 
wing and left wing extremist forces are not given 
80M. Rastarchuk, "Bangladesh after the coup," Izvestia, September 
1, 1975, collected in Jain, 191. 
81Robert H. Donaldson, "Soviet Security Interests in South Asia," 
in Lawrence Zining (ed.) The Subcontinent in World Politics(New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1982). 
82The Bangladesh Observer. December 24, 1975. 
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a rebuff, this may be gravely detrimental to the 
democratic gains of the Bangladesh people, to what 
was achieved in its struggle of many years for 
national freedom and independence.83 
However, the Soviet efforts could not shift Zia's 
policy from the US-Chinese and Muslim world orientation, 
what suited most with the national interest of Bangladesh. 
Zia himself declared: 
...the most significant development in the field 
of foreign policy of Bangladesh is that Bangladesh 
is now in a position to make her own decisions and 
formulate her own independent policy to serve her 
national interests.84 
Ziaur Rahman although pursued a tilt policy toward the 
US-China and the Muslim world, he did not want to antagonize 
the super power like the Soviet Union and tried to normalize 
the diplomatic relations with it. 
Towards normalization of relations with Moscow, Health 
Minister Professor B. Chaudhury made a good will visit to 
Moscow on July 17, 1978 and handed a message of President 
Ziaur Rahman to the Secretary General of the communist party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Leonid Brezhnev; while Brezhnev 
reciprocated by sending a telegram to Zia after his election 
as President. 
But Bangladesh's denunciation of the Soviet invasion 
in Afghanistan and its strong initiative for a resolution in 
the United Nations condemning the Soviet invasion clouded 
83Pravda. Nov. 23, 1975, reprinted in Jain, 211. 
84The Bangladesh Times. August 21, 1977. 
272 
the Dhaka-Moscow relations. Moreover Bangladesh was very 
vocal against the Vietnamese invasion in Kampuchea and 
strongly demanded the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces. 
Zia's strong criticism against the Pro-Soviet elements in 
Bangladesh who wanted to stage Afghan style revolution also 
displeased the Soviet Union. Bangladesh-Soviet relations 
seriously strained in 1979, when Bangladesh openly charged 
the Soviet Union for opening a Soviet consulate at the port 
city Chittagong, without prior permission.85 Similarly in 
June 1981, Bangladesh made an official protest to the Soviet 
Union over the Soviet attempt to smuggle sophisticated 
electronic equipment into the country. In this connection 
the Soviet diplomats involved were recalled on Bangladesh's 
government's request.86 
Besides diplomatic level, an anti-Soviet and pro- 
Chinese lobby was very active during the Zia regime, because 
in the Mujib era the pro-Chinese and pro-Islamic political 
activists were the victims of Mujib's oppressive 
machineries. Ziaur Rahman patronized the Chinese and Islamic 
elements in Bangladesh for creating his support base against 
pro-Indian and pro-Soviet elements. 
85Azizul Hague, "Bangladesh in 1980: 
Opposition in the Doldrums," Asian Survey 
201. 
Strains and Stresses— 
21, no. 2 (February 1981) : 
86In April 1982 again two Soviet diplomats were expelled by 
Bangladesh on the grounds of espionage. 
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At this point a clear anti-Indian and anti-Soviet 
foreign policy of Bangladesh was discerned. Moreover the 
pro-Chinese politicians stimulated the government for 
maintaining a careful distance from the Indo-Soviet axis.87 
Because of the lack of cordial political relations 
there was no significant development in the cultural field 
except signing of a program of cultural and scientific 
exchange between the USSR and Bangladesh.88 
However, because of major shifts in Zia's policy from 
Indo-Soviet axis to the US-Chinese and Muslim world, 
especially with gradual increase of Chinese influence in his 
foreign policy decisions, Soviet influence in Bangladesh 
declined significantly, which strained the Bangladesh-Soviet 
relations. Although Zia's foreign secretary visited the 
Soviet Union to normalize relations, still the Soviet policy 
of limited relations remained unchanged because of Zia's 
"tilt" policy towards the US-China and the Muslim world.89 
Consequently, Dhaka-Moscow relations remained stagnant 
during Zia's regime, unlike Mujib era. But it was 
diplomatically correct, because the national interest of 
Bangladesh demanded the warmer relations with the US-China 
87Holiday. October 17, 1976. 
88The program cultural and scientific exchange between the USSR 
and Bangladesh was signed in Dhaka on May 20, 1978. See USSR and the 
Third World 8, nos. 2-3 (February-June 30, 1978). 
"Bangladesh's secretary of foreign affairs made a special visit 
to Moscow in December 1975, but it did not promote Bangladesh's 
relation with the Soviet Union. 
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and the Muslim world, for advancing the economic progress 
instead of economic stagnation.90 
Economic Level 
Considering the Soviet efforts in the liberation war of 
Bangladesh many observers expected that the Soviet Union 
will emerge as the main patron of the economic aid to 
Bangladesh for meeting the immediate necessity of the war 
ravaged economy. But the rising expectation soon transferred 
into a heightened frustration only when the Soviet Union 
provided inadequate economic aid to Bangladesh even during 
the Mujib regime which was familiar to the world as a pro- 
Indian and pro-Soviet regime. Moreover, the wide gap between 
the Soviet aid commitment and disbursement further eroded 
the Soviet credibility among the people of Bangladesh 
(Tables 12, 13). 
Although the Indo-Soviet lobbies in Bangladesh used to 
claim Bangladesh Soviet-relations as excellent at the 
economic level, it was far from satisfactory in a real 
sense. The critics saw in it a sinister design of the 
social imperialist.91 Many observers believed that the Soviet 
90Soviet Economic aid to Bangladesh wa3 very insufficient for 
rebuilding Bangladesh's war ravaged economy. While US aid to 
Bangladesh was much more higher than the Soviet Union. By the 1980s 
the US emerged as the largest donor of Bangladesh. See Craig Baxter 
Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting (Westview Press, 1984), 
107. 
91Virendva Narain, Foreign Policy of Bangladesh (Jai Pur: Alekh 
Publishers, 1987), 125. 
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economic aid to Bangladesh immediately after its emergence 
was a gesture of friendship. 
TABLE 12 
SOVIET COMMITMENT OF FOREIGN AID TO BANGLADESH 
(million US dollars) 
Year Food Commodity Project Total 
Grant Loan Grant Loan Grant Loan 
1971-72 — 4.351 25.65 — — 18.02 48.02 
1972-73 — — 4.00 6.50 — 44.44 54.45 
1973-74 — 32.00 — 4.04 — — 36.04 
1974-75 — 13.57 — 8.80 — 45.50 67.87 
1975-76 206.87 
(subtotal 71-75) 
1976-77 — — — — — — — 
1977-78 — — — — — 6.53 6.53 
1978-79 — — — — — — — 
1979-80 — — — — — — — 
1980-81 71.56 71.56 
78.09 
(subtotal 75-81) 
TOTAL 49.92 29.65 29.88 — 186.05 284.96 
Source: Reproduced from The Flow of External Resources Tnto Bangladesh (as of June 
30, 1991) (Dhaka: Economic Relations Department, Ministry of Finance 1992), 
65. 
Fig. 8. Disbursement of the Soviet Aid to Bangladesh: A Comparison 
Between the Mujib and Zia Regimes. 
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TABLE 13 
DISBURSEMENT OF THE SOVIET AID TO BANGLADESH 
(million US dollars) 
Year Food Commodity Project Total 
Grant Loan Grant Loan Grant Loan 
1971-72 — — — — — — 00 
1972-73 — 4.35 29.65 6.5 — 2.30 42.80 
1973-74 — 32.00 — 3.34 — 5.40 40.75 
1974-75 — 13.57 — 4.05 — 7.59 25.21 
1975-76 — — — 3.66 — 6.87 10.54 
1976-77 — — — — — 4.89 4.89 
1977-78 — — — 1.78 — 22.47 24.26 
1978-79 — -- -- — — 6.61 6.61 
1979-80 — — — — — 8.45 8.45 
1980-81 — — — — — 3.02 3.01 
TOTAL 4 9.92 29.65 19.33 -- 67.59 166.52 
Source : Reproduced from The Flow ai External Resources Into Rang 1adesh (as of June 
30, 
1991) (Dhaka: Economic Relations Department, Ministry of Finance 1992), 65. 
Actually it was neither Soviet friendship nor love for 
Bangladesh. It was both strategic and ideological Soviet 
designs of Sino-US containment policy of 1960s. In fact the 
Soviet economic aid to the Third world countries was spelled 
out according to the 22nd CPSU Congress held in 1961: 
the CPSU regards it as its international duty to 
assist the people who have set out to win and 
strengthen their national independence, all people 
who fight for complete abolition of the colonial 
system.92 
Following the Bangladesh liberation war, the Soviet 
Union obviously wanted Bangladesh to be in the anti¬ 
imperialist bloc in order to withstand the Sino-US détente 
92Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of 
CPSU (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1971), 491. 
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in the South and Southeast Asia. But the Soviet Union failed 
to keep Bangladesh within Soviet orbit completely, even at 
the time of the pro-Soviet Mujib regime, because of the 
Soviet inability to provide adequate aid to Bangladesh in 
order to avert famine, rehabilitate refugees and for 
remodeling the war torn economy. There was also an initial 
reservation among the leaders of the ruling party about 
western aid, particularly the USA, but the Soviet aid policy 
to Bangladesh forced it to embrace the US aid. About the 
Soviet response to Bangladesh's request during the Mujib 
regime, Rahman Sobhan wrote: 
When Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman went to 
the USSR in February 1972 he carried a big 
shopping list for commodity assistance. This was 
met by only a small grant to procure certain 
commodities provided by the USSR. Towards the end 
of 1972 another big list worth around one billion 
dollars was prepared by the Bangladesh Planning 
Commission for commodity assistance from the USSR. 
This did not appear to have been given any urgent 
attention by the USSR aid agencies.93 
However, the economic relation between the USSR and 
Bangladesh established at first through the inauguration of 
the weekly Dhaka-Moscow air service of the Soviet airline, 
Aeroflot on February 2, 1972.94 It was followed by a visit of 
a Soviet economic delegation to Bangladesh which assured the 
resumption and speedy completion of the Soviet projects 
93Rahman Sobhan, The Criais of External Dependence: The Political 
Economy °f Foreign Aid to Bangladesh (London: Zed Press, 1982), 126. 
94 Bhabani Sen Gupta, 56. 
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located in Bangladesh's territory. Moscow also agreed to 
divert the flow of aid amounting to 38 million rubles 
previously negotiated with Pakistan, for the completion of 
those projects located in Bangladesh.95 
The Bangladesh-Soviet economic cooperation started to 
grow up following the official visit of Prime Minister 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to Moscow during March 1-5, 1972, and 
the two sides examined the questions of economic cooperation 
and signed an agreement, which incorporated the construction 
of a thermal power station, radio broadcasting stations, an 
electrical equipment plant and a geological project for oil 
and gas .96 
Besides this, Bangladesh and the Soviet Union signed a 
joint declaration which incorporated the Soviet assistance 
to Bangladesh for the reconstruction of a merchant marine, 
development of a sea fisheries, and reconstruction of a 
railway transport. Under the joint declaration, the Soviet 
Union also agreed to provide helicopters to Bangladesh for 
the improvement of air communication with the interior areas 
of the country.97 
95Those projects were: 1. The Ghorasal Power Project and the 
installation of two powerful radio transmission lines. 
96Joint declaration by the USSR and the Peoples Republic of 
Bangladesh, Pravda March 5, 1972 (in reprint from The Soviet Press 14, 
no. 5 September 3, 1971). 
97Ibid., 21. See USSR and the Third World 2, no. 4 (1972): 191. 
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In March 1972, Bangladesh and the Soviet Union signed a 
financial and technical aid agreement, under which arrange¬ 
ment previously made by the Soviets with Pakistan would be 
fulfilled in Bangladesh.98 Another major aspect of the Soviet 
economic cooperation with Bangladesh was the Soviet salvage 
operation. A Soviet salvage delegation arrived in Dhaka on 
May 22, 1972. The Soviet Union signed an agreement with 
the Bangladesh government providing for free Soviet 
assistance in restoring normal conditions for navigation in 
the seaports of Bangladesh. Within a few days of signing the 
salvage operation, twenty Soviet ships arrived in Chittagong 
and the Soviet navy began to organize salvage operations in 
the Bangladesh ports of Chittagong and Khulna where 
blockages had been created (in response to the news that the 
US Seventh fleet was about to enter the Bay of Bengal) . 
However within a short period, with their ceaseless and 
skilled efforts, they cleared the port of Chittagong and 
Chaîna free from mines and sunken ships which impeded 
shipping traffic.99 While many political observers argued 
that Bangladesh's security within the Soviet orbit was 
underlined by the Soviet presence in Chittagong. A Soviet 
fleet comprising monitor ships traversed the Bay of Bengal 
"Charles Peter O'Donell, Bangladesh: Biography of a Muslim 
Nation (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984) . 
"Also see Peter Lynn, Bangladesh: Fashioning a Foreign Policy" 
South Asian Review 5, no. 3 (April 1972): 235. 
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under the pretext of port cleaning operation.100 In this 
regard many Bangladeshi's contemplated that the Soviet Union 
might be attempting to convert the Chittagong port into a 
Soviet military base. While, the Bangladesh government 
categorically denied publicly that the Soviet Union had 
given any naval base in Bangladesh.101 
Another major example of the Soviet economic 
cooperation in Bangladesh was its technical assistance for 
the exploration of natural gas. With the technical 
cooperation of the USSR, drillings in "Jaldi" and "Simutang" 
had been completed by the mid 1972, while the direct 
participation of the Soviet experts in Begumganj and Kamta 
gas fields were also very important contributions of the 
USSR. In fact the Soviet Union extended its cooperation by 
supplying equipments, materials, spare parts, and 
deportation of the Soviet specialists. Apart from this, 
during the Mujib regime Bangladesh and the USSR signed a 
contract in 1972 and extended economic and technical 
assistance for setting up of one 1,000 KWT medium wave 
station and six 2-KWT ultra wave transmitters.102 
100Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhury, "Pakistan and the Changing Pattern 
of Power Relations in South Asia," Pakistan Horizon 31, no. 1 (First 
Quarter, 1978): 90. Also see Craig Baxter, 109. 
101Bangladesh'3 foreign minister Abdus Samad Azad said that the 
Soviet Union had not been given a naval base in Bangladesh. See The 
Bangladesh Times, July 27, 1972. 
102The Asian (Hong Kong), March 12, 1972. Also see Bhabani Sen 
Gupta, 60. 
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In the field of trade and commerce, the Soviet barter 
trading placed very important position. Under the barter 
protocol of mutual deliveries of commodities, Bangladesh's 
export included the traditional commodity of Bangladesh viz: 
Jute, cloth, jute bags, tea, goat skins, etc. While 
Bangladesh's import from the Soviet Union included machinery 
equipment, spare parts, cotton, petroleum products, books, 
etc. During the Mujib regime, although the Soviet Union was 
a major trading partner of Bangladesh, the balance of trade 
was mostly in favor of the Soviet Union and against 
Bangladesh (Table 14). 
TABLE 14 
BANGLADESH'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION 
Year Bangladesh's Export 
to the USSR 
Bangladesh's Import 




1972 12.2 40.6 (-28.41) 
1973 15.8 94.8 (-79.01) 
1974 25.5 61.7 (-36.21) 
1975 22.4 66.9 (-44.5) 
1976 15.6 34.5 (-18.9) 
1977 21.9 45.5 (-23.6) 
1978 40.1 44.3 (-4.2) 
1979 55.9 28.8 (+27.1) 
1980 37.3 47.2 (-9.9) 
1981 33.4 40.0 (-6.6) 
Source : Tabulated from: 1. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1979 
(Washington D.C.: IMF, 1979), 75; 2. Direction of Trade 
Statistics Yearbook 1982 (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1982), 81; 3. 
Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1984), 87. 
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Fig. 9. Bangladesh's Balance of Trade with the Soviet Union: A 
Comparison Between the Mujib and Zia Regimes. 
One landmark example of the Soviet assistance towards 
Bangladesh was that during the food crisis of late 1973 and 
early 1974, Bangladesh persuaded the USSR to divert 200,000 
tons of food grain procured by it from Australia and Canada 
to meet the food crisis in Bangladesh, while Bangladesh 
wanted to return it by subsequent diversion to USSR of 
shipments from the US to Bangladesh under food aid. But the 
USA declined to support such an exchange and as a result 
Bangladesh was forced to negotiate a credit with the USSR to 
pay for the grain over a 10 year period.103 
103 Rahman Sobhan, 127. 
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Finally, in the aftermath of the severe economic crisis 
and political instability, the Mujib government adopted a 
socialist development strategy. Following Mujib's option 
for socialist model of economy in 1975, it was widely 
believed that this would highly be rewarded with the Soviet 
economic assistance, but actually nothing at all came out of 
the USSR. In fact the total Soviet aid commitment to 
Bangladesh (food commodity and project aid) from 1971 - 1975 
was $222.3 million while during the same time the total 
disbursement was $108.77 million (See Tables 12 and 13). 
Actually the Soviet economic aid in terms of outright grants 
and loans was quite inadequate for the stupendous 
requirements of Bangladesh.104 This obviously discredited 
Mujib government among the Bangladeshi people and helped 
erode the Soviet image in the eyes of the Bangladeshi 
masses . 
However, after the military coup and counter coups of 
1975, with the emergence of Ziaur Rahman as the key figure 
of Bangladesh politics and after Zia's restructuring of 
domestic and international policies (especially Zia's 
transformation from the centrally planned economy to a free 
market economy and Zia's shift from Indo-Soviet orbit to 
pro-western pro-Chinese and the Muslim world triangle), the 
Soviet-Bangladesh economic relations slowed down gradually 
104See Report on Bangladesh-Soviet Union Bilaterial Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (Commercial Section, Embassy of Bangladesh, 
Moscow). 
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and at certain point became stagnant. During the whole 
period of Zia's regime, Moscow's economic relations with 
Dhaka remained very confined within limited areas. The trade 
turnover, which had increased rapidly during Mujib's period 
began to fall down sharply during Zia's regime. On the 
contrary, Bangladesh had improved its economic tie with 
Washington-Bejing and the Muslim world, against the Indo- 
Soviet axis. During this period the Soviet economic aid was 
so insignificant that the total Soviet aid commitment during 
this period was $78.03 million and the disbursement was 
$57.76 million.105 
During this time the Soviet Union only continued 
financing the old projects, committed during the Mujib 
regime. Besides this, agreement between the techno-export of 
the Soviet Union and petro-Bangla was signed in February 
1977 for two years which provided for additional technical 
know-how and equipment for oil and gas exploration. In May 
1977, the sixth barter trade protocol was signed between the 
two countries which provided for exchange of commodities 
each way during 1977. In 1978, the Soviet aided General 
Electric manufacturing plant was set up in Chittagong, which 
105The total Soviet aid commitment during 1972-1981 was $284.90 
million and disbursement was $166.52 million while total Soviet 
commitment during Mujib regime (1971-1975) was $206.87 million and 
disbursement was $108.76 million. On the contrary during Zia regime, 
the total Soviet commitment was $78.03 million and the disbursement 
was $57.76 million. See Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh (as 
of June 30, 1991) (Dhaka: Economic Relations Department, Ministry of 
Finance, 1992), 65. 
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was a major aspect of economic cooperation between the USSR 
and Bangladesh during the Zia regime.106 In addition the 
Soviet Union also rendered assistance in geological 
exploration for gas and oil during this period. 
Finally, it has been discerned that the economic 
cooperation between Bangladesh and the Soviet Union reached 
at an stagnant position after the fall of the Mujib regime 
and it remains unchanged throughout the whole period of 
Ziaur Rahman, because of Zia's rapid transformation of 
domestic policy, i.e. from socialist to capitalist path of 
development and it was further affected by Zia's rapid shift 
of foreign policy from Indo-Soviet orbit to "tilt" towards 
Washington-Beijing and Ryadh—opposed to the Soviet Union 
and its ally-India. 
Summary 
In the final analysis it is uncovered that the Soviet 
support towards the Bangladesh struggle of 1971 stemmed out 
of the Soviet strategic consideration. 
Following the Bangladesh Revolution, the Mujib 
government, followed a clear pro-Soviet policy and adopted 
socialism, and secularism as state principles, at the 
domestic level and pursued pro-Indian and pro-Soviet foreign 
policy at the international level. Finally having influenced 
by the Soviet Union the Mujib government adopted a socialist 
106USSR and Third World 8, nos 4,5,6 (July-December 1978): 70. 
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political and economic system and introduced a single party 
dictatorship, with the slogan of Ek Neta, Ek Desh, 
Bangabandhu, Bangladesh (one leader, one country, Banga 
Bandu, Bangladesh). Although the Soviet Union attempted to 
bring Bangladesh under the umbrella of a socialist system, 
all its dreams nipped in the bud, with the assassination of 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Mujib's assassination was observed by 
the Soviet Union as an embarrassment. 
However, with the advent of Ziaur Rahman as the key 
political figure of Bangladesh scene, Bangladesh shifted its 
foreign policy from the Indo-Soviet orbit overnight and the 
Bangladesh and the Indo-Soviet triple entente clearly 
disappeared from the scene. Ziaur Rahman domestically 
changed Mujib's policy of socialism and secularism and 
instead introduced free market economy, while absolute trust 
and faith in Almighty Allah (God) replaced secularism which 
were totally opposed to socialism and secularism. At the 
international level Zia initiated a pro-western, pro-Chinese 
and a pro-Muslim world foreign policy and came out of Indo 
Soviet orbit. In particular Zia formalized Bangladesh's 
relations strongly with the USA-China and the Muslim world. 
Zia's rapid transformation from India and the Soviet Union 
was marked by them with great disappointment, which 
reflected in Bangladesh-Soviet relations during the whole 
period of Zia regime (1975-81). The Soviet Union placed 
considerable reservation in their attitude towards Zia 
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regime at the political level, and at the same time the 
Soviet economic aid program slowed down considerably from 
its initial high level of activity. Again the Bangladesh- 
Soviet strained relationship was impregnated by Dhaka's 
denunciation of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan which 
augmented the Bangladesh's relations with the USSR to a new 
low. 
CHAPTER VII 
BANGLADESH-CHINA RELATIONS: MUJIB AND ZIA REGIMES 
(1971-1981) 
Introduction 
The close ties between Bangladesh and the Peoples 
Republic of China stemmed out of increasing Chinese 
alignment with the Third World countries.1 Actually both at 
domestic and international levels, Beijing's leaders and 
spokesmen unambiguously assert that China is a member of the 
Third world. Moreover, Chinese hold the view that China 
does not only belong to the Third world, because it has 
shared the same historical experience with other Third world 
1Mao divided the world into three spheres; the first world is 
composed of the two super powers, the United States and the USSR; the 
second world comprising the developed world of Europe and Japan; the 
Third world encompasses socialist countries and oppressed 
underdeveloped nations. Mao described the Third world as the main 
force in world wide aggression against imperialism and hegemonism. 
See Lilian Craig Harris, Washington Papers: China's Foreign Policy 
Toward the Third World (Wa3h-ington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985), 3. Another school 
of thought believes that the Third world is simply a residue; what is 
left when one has subtracted from the world as a whole the industrial¬ 
ized west--mostly living under a system of capitalist or mixed 
economies—and communist empires of Russia, China and their 
satellites. That residue contains countries of different degrees of 
economic advancement and with a vast number of different types of 
social and government organizations. See Max Beloff, "The Third World 
and the Conflict Ideologies" in W. Scott Thompson (Ed.), The Third 
World: Promise of US Policy (San Francisco: ISC Press, 1993), 90. 
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nations, but strengthening [its] unity and cooperation with 
Third world nations is (China's) basic foreign policy.2 
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping very confidently claimed 
Chinese membership to the Third World in April 1974 in a 
special session of the United Nations General Assembly. He 
clearly enunciated: 
Judging from the changes in international 
relations, the world today actually consists of 
three parts or three world, that are both 
interconnected and in contradiction to one 
another. The United States and the Soviet Union 
make up the first world. The developing countries 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America and other 
regions make up the Third world. The developed 
countries between the two make up the second 
world.... China is a socialist country and a 
developing country as well China belongs to the 
Third world... China is not a super power, nor will 
she ever seek to be one.3 
Aside from China's self claim to the Third world 
membership, it is very much symmetrical with the developing 
states of the Asia, Africa and Latin America. The strongest 
theme in Chinese foreign policy is to change the old order 
and to set up a new international economic order.4 China's 
role as an actor in the global politics, especially in the 
international institutionalized framework, is welcomed by 
2Banyue Tan, "Ten Questions in Foreign Relations," Translated in 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report China (June 11, 
1984): A3. 
3Peking Review. April 12, 1974. Also see Peter Van Ness, "China 
and the Third World," Current History 67, no. 397 (September 1974): 
176. 
4Bruce Larkin, "China and the Third World," Current History 69, 
no. 48 (Sept. 1975): 75. 
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the developing and under developed countries, which provided 
much needed impetus to the Third world's political and 
economic agenda in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement 
and the North-South dialogue.5 Some analysts argue that 
China's principal identification is not with the socialist 
states but with the less developed states of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America.6 In 1954 at the first National Peoples 
Congress, Chinese Premier Chou en-Lai announced the five 
principles of peaceful co-existence,7 as the basis of 
Chinese foreign policy which is being followed by the Third 
world nations as the cornerstone of their foreign policies. 
Following the "Bandung Conference" of 1955 China brought the 
theme of solidarity and cooperation of the Afro-Asian 
countries into its political phrase book.8 Actually China 
repeatedly sided with the Third world countries in global 
5Robert A. Manning, "The Third World Looks at China," China and 
the Third World: Champion or Challenger? (eds.) Lilian Craig Harris 
and Robert L. Worden (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Co., 
1986), 141. 
6Larkin, 75. 
7The five principles are: 1) mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) non interference 
in each other's internal affairs, 4) equality and each other's mutual 
benefit, 5) peaceful co-existence. See Harris and Worden, 2. 
8Although the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was well 
represented at the symbolic founding of the Third world conference at 
Bandung, there were differences of opinion in the conference. Some 
Bandung participants agreed that China was closer in outlook to the 
Nonaligned states than to the developed nations. Others believed that 
China was closer to the developed nations because of its immense 
population and potential national power. See Harris and Worden, 3. 
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forums, against the industrial north.9 Of course there are 
valid arguments that China's foreign policy continues to be 
propelled by the consideration of national interest and 
China's identification with the Third world contribute 
towards the achievement of those Chinese objectives, which 
are ensuring national security and international recognition 
of China's position of prominence and authority.10 
China's close tie with the South Asian countries, 
especially Bangladesh, is no exception of its policy towards 
gradual alignment with the developing countries of Afro-Asia 
and Latin America. Bangladesh's national interest also 
demands close cooperation with China for improving South- 
south cooperation and the economic development of the 
developing countries. Bangladesh's strategic interest also 
demands cordial link with China against Indian expansionism 
and hegemonism.11 At this level, both high and low foreign 
9In the special session of the United Nations in April 1974 
Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping, enthusiastically endorsed the 
Arab's use of oil as a political weapon during the Arab-Israeli war, 
hailing it as a pioneering action and proposed that "what was done in 
the oil battle should and can be done in the case of other raw 
materials." See Peter Van Ness, "China and the Third World," Current 
History 67, no. 397 (Sept. 1974): 107. 
10Harris and Worden, 5. 
nThe small states of South Asia looked towards India with 
suspicion and mistrust. They accuse India for not considering its 
small neighbors as sovereign equals. Moreover, Indian annexation of 
Sikkim in 1974 and recently Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 1986, 
have accelerated the fear of Indian hegemonism and expansionism among 
the neighboring states. 
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policy of Bangladesh demanded alignment with China.12 Apart 
from these, there are many commonalities between Bangladesh 
and China which strengthen the link between the two 
countries. These are: 
First of all, both countries have agrarian 
economy, dominance of rural population, absence of 
super technology, unskilled labor forces and the 
burden of over population. 
Secondly, both countries share similar experience 
of struggle against national repression, foreign 
domination and occupation, which make both of them 
natural ally of each other. 
Thirdly, as an initiator of South Asian 
association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
Bangladesh has drawn very close to China. 
Fourthly, both countries adopted the five 
principles of peaceful co-existence and follow a 
non-aligned foreign policy with a tilt toward 
Third world countries. 
Finally, Bangladesh and China hold identical views 
on many regional and global issues in various 
regional and global forums.13 
Recent past in June 1990, Chinese Premier Li Peng while 
meeting with visiting Bangladesh's Prime Minister Khaleda 
Zia said "it is consistently the policy of China to be 
friendly to Bangladesh,"14 while Bangladesh's Prime Minister 
12High foreign policy is concerned with national security and 
survival and low foreign policy, deals with matters relating to 
foreign trade, investment and economic cooperation among countries. 
See R.N. Cooper, "Trade Policy in Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy. 
1978. 
13Zaglul Haider, "Bangladesh-China Relations: A Review," Regional 
Studies (Islamabad) 9, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 72. 
14See "Bangladesh's Prime Minister in Beijing," Beijing 
Review 34, no. 26 (July 1991): 7. 
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Khaleda Zia said that Bangladesh held identical views with 
China regarding international situation.15 But the present 
state of excellence between Bangladesh-China relations did 
not prevail during the liberation struggle of Bangladesh. 
China seriously opposed the liberation movement of 
Bangladesh, because of Indo-Soviet "tilt" towards the 
movement against Chinese trusted friend Pakistan. Moreover 
China did not consider Bangladesh struggle as a real 
liberation war. From the Chinese point of view it was not a 
genuine guerrilla war fought by peasants and workers. 
Rather, it was a separatist movement launched not by the 
masses but by a handful of persons who wanted to dismember 
Pakistan.16 
Because of its skeptical role in the liberation war of 
Bangladesh, its revolutionary image received a setback in 
Bangladesh. But following the birth of Bangladesh mistrust 
and misunderstanding disappeared gradually from the scene. 
During the first four years of the Mujib regime (1971-1975) 
there were no diplomatic relations in effect between 
Bangladesh and China. At this point the absence of formal 
15See "Bangladesh Prime Minister in Beijing," Bei-iing Review 34, 
no. 26 (July 17, 1991): 7. 
16G.W. Chaudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major 
Powers (New York.: Free Press, 1975) . Also see Mizanur Rahman Shelly, 
"Emergence of a New Nation in a Multipolar World: Bangladesh (Dhaka: 
University Press Limited, 1979): ix. Also see Syed Anwar Husain, "Role 
of the Super Powers and the Emergence of Bangladesh: A Review 
Article," Politics. Administration and Change 5, no. 2 (July-Dee 
1980) : 128. 
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ties was caused by the strong Chinese reservation about 
Bangladesh. Immediately after the emergence of Bangladesh, 
the increasing influence of the Indo-Soviet axis in 
Bangladesh and the fashioning of the Mu jib government's 
foreign policy tilted towards Indo-Soviet orbit seriously 
inhibited the process of China's rapprochement with the new 
nation Bangladesh. As Indo-Soviet axis was appeared to be 
annoying to China, Premier Chou en-Lai commented: "the fall 
of Dhaka to the Indian army on December 16, 1971, is not the 
end of the problems but just the start of them."17 However, 
the situation changed dramatically following the pre-dawn 
coup of August 15, 1975, which caused the assassination of 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and toppled his pro-Indian and pro- 
Soviet government. With the emergence of Ziaur Rahman at 
first defacto and later de'jure leader, Bangladesh-China 
relations began to normalize. It was improving 
significantly, right after Zia's rapid transformation of 
Bangladesh's foreign policy from Indo-Soviet orbit to its 
opposite camp of Sino-US and the Muslim world. Since then 
the two countries have been maintaining very friendly 
relationship, which is regarded by both Bangladesh and China 
as the "time tested" friendship.18 
17Quoted in G. W. Chaudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974): 224. 
18See Peking Review 34, no. 26 (July 17, 1991) . 
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However, this chapter seeks to undertake a comparative 
study of Bangladesh-China relations during the Mujib and Zia 
Regimes (1971-1981) . To this end this chapter will be 
organized into the following subsections: 
Role of China in the Liberation War of Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh-China Relations: Mujib and Zia Regimes 
(1971-1981). 
Summary. 
Role of China in the Liberation War of Bangladesh 
Chinese interest in the South Asian region was not a 
new event. China became active in the South Asian politics 
since 1960s. From the Sino-Indian War of 1962, China started 
to play a very crucial role in the sub-continent. In the 
aftermath of the U.S. "tilt" towards India in the 1962 Sino- 
Indian War, Pakistan chose to adopt "bilaterism," which 
propelled Pakistan's closer tie with China. Again during the 
Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 over the Kashmir issue, China 
strongly sided with Pakistan and showed its resolve to 
support Pakistan against Indian aggression of Pakistan's 
territory.19 Chinese unconditional support towards Pakistan 
during the 1965 war enabled her to be a trusted friend of 
Pakistan. By the late 1960's Peking-Pindi nexus became so 
19S. P. Seth, "China as a Factor in Indo-Pakistan's Politics, 
The World Today 25, no. 1 (January 1969): 43. Also see William J. 
Brands, India. Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1972), 290. 
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deep rooted that the Indo-Soviet axis power was looking for 
an opportunity so that the increasing influence of China in 
South Asia could be checkmated. 
In the aftermath of Brezhnev's collective Security Plan 
of 1969, and after the cultural revolution of China, both 
the Soviet Union and China had competitively shown their 
interest in Pakistan in order to forestall each other's 
influence. After the resignation of Ayub Khan and 
installation of General Yahya Khan in 1969, Chinese premier 
Chou-en-lai assured continued support for Pakistan, while 
the Soviet Union began to influence Pakistan to subscribe 
the "Asian collective security system." The Chinese were 
anxious about the Soviet pressure on their time tested 
friend—Pakistan. While criticizing the collective security 
system, Chou-en-lai viewed: 
The so-called Asian collective security system is 
a new step taken by social imperialism in its 
intensified efforts to rig up a new anti-China 
military alliance. Flaunting the sign board of 
"collective security" social imperialism actually 
aims at aggression and expansion against Asian 
countries, trying to force them to abandon their 
sovereignty and independence.... The Chinese 
government will always firmly support the Pakistan 
people against foreign aggression, firmly support 
the Kashmir people in their struggle for the right 
to national self determination.20 
Against the backdrop of Pakistan-China honeymoon, the 
Bangladesh liberation struggle of 1971 drew special 
attention of China toward Pakistan. Chinese immediate 
20 'Washington Boat, April 9, 1971. 
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reaction to the Bangladesh crisis was expressed on April 6, 
1971 and China accused India of interfering in the internal 
affairs of Pakistan and bluntly endorsed Pakistan's 
position. China designed its policy towards the crisis from 
its regional and global perceptions. In the first place, 
Pakistan's strategic location and geographical proximity to 
China brought the two countries closer to each other. They 
have a common border of about 300 miles and a common hostile 
neighbor.21 
Secondly, Chinese hostility with the Soviet Union and 
the USA and adversarial relations with India and deep 
friendship with Pakistan directed it to support Pakistan's 
position. 
Thirdly, being the largest Muslim country Pakistan had 
special position in the Muslim world. China wanted to 
promote its relation with the Muslim world via Pakistan. As 
a matter of fact China's Pakistan connection helped in 
normalizing its relation with Iran and Turkey.22 
Finally, maintaining peace, stability and security of 
Pakistan was very important in the interests of China. A 
threat to Pakistan's independence would endanger the peace 
and security of the proximate region. Therefore, very 
obviously Chinese national interest directed her to side 
21Both Pakistan and China are bordered with India and Soviet 
Union--contmon hostile neighbor. 
22Mehrunnisa Ali, "East Pakistan Crisis: International Reaction," 
Pakistan Horizon 24, no. 2 (Second Quarter 1971): 40. 
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with Pakistan in the Bangladesh crisis.23 Although Chinese 
revolutionary image was tarnished in Bangladesh, it did not 
hesitate to provide moral and material support to Pakistan. 
It was a carefully designed policy decision of China. It 
was a case of siding with a friend without any consideration 
of justice or injustice. Following the Pakistani military 
crackdown in Bangladesh on March 26, 1971, the new China 
news agency reported that Pakistan army had taken action to 
suppress the secessionist movement.24 Chinese official 
reaction was expressed by a letter of Chou en-lai to 
Pakistan's president Yahya Khan, which appeared to express 
strong support for Pakistan. The letter included: 
Your excellency may rest assured that should 
Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression 
against Pakistan. The Chinese government and the 
people as always support the Pakistan and people 
in their just struggle to safeguard state 
sovereignty and national independence.25 
The pro-Chinese elements in Bangladesh were confused 
and upset at China's support towards Pakistan, despite Yahya 
Khan's military atrocities which were apparently in conflict 
with the principles of revolutionary social changes.26 About 
23lbid. 
24Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession in Pakistan. 
India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkley: University of 
California, 1990), 250. 
25Ibid. 
26Ataur Rahman, "Bangladesh and Big Power Politics in the 
Subcontinent," The Journal of Political Science (Dhaka University) 2, 
issue 1 (November 1985): 17. 
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the embarrassment of the pro-Chinese leftists, Maniruzzaman 
wrote : 
The pro-Peking leftists who had already split into 
several factions prior to the liberation struggle 
became totally confused when Peking chose to 
support the Yahya regime in its brutal suppression 
of the liberation movement.27 
Despite the disappointment of pro-Chinese elements in 
Bangladesh, China rationalized its support towards Pakistan 
by the five principles of peaceful co-existence, what Mao 
Zedung initiated. The Chinese while justifying their 
position in Bangladesh presented these five principles of 
peaceful co-existence and argued: 
We firmly maintain that all nations should 
practice the well known five principles of mutual 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
non aggression, non interference in each others 
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and 
peaceful co-existence.28 
The Chinese decision of extending open support to the 
military atrocities of Yahya Khan frustrated the Maoist 
activists in Bangladesh, because they thought that the 
Bengalis were ideologically more close to China. The 
Bengalis resisted the friendship with the imperialist power 
and Pakistan's joining of the regional defense treaties like 
SEATO and CENTO, and cherished Maoist ideology. In fact, 
very logically, the Bengalis sought Chinese support. But in 
27Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Radical Politics and the Emergence of 
Bangladesh," in Paul R. Brass and Marcus Franda (eds.) Radical 
Politics in South Asia (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1973), 273. 
28Renmin Ribao, "What are Indian Expansionist Trying to Do?" 
Peking Review (April 16, 1971): 11. 
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the Bangladesh crisis, China clearly confronted its 
revolutionary ideologies and supported the military dictator 
Yahya Khan.29 While the pro-Chinese leftists considered that 
Chinese role towards the Bangladesh movement was wrong and 
they also opposed the Awami League and Indian dominance in 
the Bangladesh struggle. Some pro-Chinese elements under the 
leadership of Maulana Bhasani fled to India and fought to 
liberate Bangladesh from India. While other groups 
considered the Chinese attitude towards Bangladesh struggle 
was wrong but they also contemplated that the Awami League 
led movement was a design of Indian expansionism and Soviet 
social imperialism.30 So they did not go to India and fought 
from inside the country against Pakistani occupation forces. 
As a matter of fact China, which once had championed the 
cause of national liberation movement, and had pledged its 
adherence to the five principles of peaceful co-existence, 
now opposing the Bangladesh liberation war, siding with the 
military dictator of Pakistan, really amazed the freedom 
loving people throughout the world, including many Chinese.31 
While Chinese support was considered by Pakistan as bluntest 
foreign policy decision that emerged from Peking in a long 
29A.M.A. Muhith, Bangladesh: Emergence of a Nation (Dhaka: 
Bangladesh Books International 1978), 352. 
30See Talukder Maniruzzaman, 275. 
31For details, see A.M.A. Muhith, 353. 
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time.32 Pakistan Times commented regarding Chinese support: 
"In the hour of our need and trials and tribulations, the 
great people's Republic of China unfailingly comes to our 
aid with its moral and material support."33 
So it is clear that the Chinese policy throughout the 
crisis had two distinct features: (1) it was a policy of 
strict non intervention, and (2) unconditional and blanket 
support for Pakistan's state sovereignty.34 Although the 
pro-Chinese political activists in Bangladesh expected 
Chinese support for their liberation struggle, due to its 
support for Pakistan, China lost its political credibility 
among many Bengalis and the pro-Chinese elements in 
Bangladesh became political orphan throughout the whole 
period of crisis. This really had upset the pro-Chinese 
elements in Bangladesh. Actually, the rationales for 
Chinese policy towards Bangladesh were: 
First of all, China considered the Bangladesh struggle 
as a secessionist movement. It was difficult for China to 
support a separatist movement when China itself was seeking 
the unification of Taiwan with the mainland. 
32Pawn (Karachi), May 27, 1971. 
33Editorial, The Pakistan Times (Lahore), April 14, 1971. 
34Tariq Ali, "Pakistan and Bangladesh: Results and Prospects," in 
Robin Blackburn (ed.) Explosion in a Subcontinent (Penguin Books, 
1975), 321. 
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Secondly, according to the Chinese standard it was not 
a genuine guerrilla war fought by peasants and workers. It 
was a separatist movement launched by "handful of persons," 
who wanted to sabotage the unity of Pakistan. 
Thirdly, the Bangladesh movement was considered by 
China as a struggle between aggression and anti-aggression, 
between division and anti-division and between subversion 
and anti-subversion.35 
Fourthly, China did not approve Awami League's policy 
and leadership. The Awami League stood for close relations 
with India and Mujib was well known as pro-American from his 
early political life. Therefore it was doubtful that after 
assuming power, the party would work for the workers and 
peasants. 
Finally, China believed that those who were fighting 
for Bangladesh were being aided financially and militarily 
by foreign powers which aimed at the dismemberment of 
Pakistan while the Chinese perception of guerrilla war was 
that guerrillas must fight their own war without the aid of 
an outside power.36 
Considering all these factors, China interpreted the 
liberation war of Bangladesh as a criminal act of Indian 
35See Mizanur Rahman Shelly, Emergence of a New Nation in a 
Multipolar World: Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press, 1979), 95-107. 
36G.W. Chaudhury, 210-214. Mizanar Rahman Shelly, 95-107. Also 
see Meherunnisa Ali, "China's Diplomacy During the Indo-Pakistan war, 
1971" Pakistan Horizon 26, no. 1 (First Quarter 1972): 59. 
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expansionism backed by the "Soviet social imperialism" the 
two forces which consistently supported the Bengali struggle 
in 1971. So China officially regarded the Bangladesh 
struggle as a counter revolutionary effort in the East 
Bengal in order to aggrandize its narrow class interests 
with the help of reactionary and revisionist external 
powers.37 Even after the birth of Bangladesh, Peking Review 
in its editorial said: 
What kind of "fait accompli" is the so called 
Bangladesh after all? The whole world can see that 
it has been created by the Indian government 
through naked aggression and subversion with the 
support of the Soviet revisionism. By putting up 
the signboard of so-called support to "national 
self-determination" Soviet revisionism cannot 
cover up in the least the essence of the issue.38 
China not only provided political support to Pakistan, 
it also continued its economic and military aid to Pakistan 
after Pakistan army's massacre of March 25, 1971. It also 
allowed the unloading of a large shipment of arms consigned 
to the Pakistani army in East Pakistan that had been shipped 
before March 25, but did not reach at the Chittagong harbor 
until April 1971.39 Although Beijing honored its previous 
military aid to Pakistan, it was unwilling to endorse new 
37Lee Lescaze, "Watchful Dragon," International Herald Tribune 
(April 13, 1971. 
38Renmin Ribao, "It is Impermissible to Legalize india's Invasion 
and Occupation of East Pakistan" Peking Review 15, no. 5 (February 4, 
1972): 8. 
39 Sisson and Rose, 251. 
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arms aid throughout 1971.40 Despite having Chinese strong 
support towards Pakistan, Beijing clearly informed Islamabad 
its unwillingness to intervene directly in the hostility. 
However, China remained silent in the crisis from April 
to November 1971, despite Indian charge, that China was 
deploying troops on India's Himalayan border as a 
diversionary tactic to bolster the morale of its ally 
Pakistan and reduce pressure on it by heightening Indian 
concern about the Sino-Indian border situation.41 By this 
time Henry Kissinger had completed his secret visit to 
Peking via Pakistan and Sino-American rapprochement was in 
progress. Following Kissinger's visit to Peking, on August 
9, 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed the friendship 
treaty, which threatened China, and prohibited China from 
the possibility of its involvement in the crisis. Like the 
U.S.A., the Indo-Soviet treaty was felt by Peking as a 
"bombshell" too.42 At this point although China continued its 
support to Pakistan, it was also urging for a negotiation 
40Ibid. 
41The Indian defense minister, Jag Jivanram on June 8, 1971, told 
the Parliament that 100,000 Chinese troops in Tibet were believed to 
be exposed along the Indo-Tibetan border. However, on July 28, 1971, 
the Indian ministry of defense informed the parliament that there was 
no Chinese troop movement along the Indo-Soviet border. See Chester 
Bowles, "America and Russia in India," Hindustan Standard (June 27, 
1971). Also see CDSP 27, no. 23, (1971). 
42Henry Kissinger wrote in his White House years "On August 9 
came the bombshell of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty." See Henry 
Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1979), 861. 
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between Pakistan and India. This was hinted by the Chinese 
leaders when Z.A. Bhutto was sent to Beijing by Yahya Khan 
in 1971. At a banquet given in honor of Pakistani leader, 
the then acting Chinese foreign minister Chi-Peng-Fei urged 
that a reasonable settlement should be sought by the 
Pakistani people themselves. Chi Peng Fei said: 
The Chinese government and people are greatly 
concerned over the present tension in the 
subcontinent. We maintain that the internal 
affairs of any country must be handled by its own 
people. The East Pakistani question is the 
internal affair of Pakistan and a reasonable 
settlement should be sought by the Pakistan people 
themselves and it is absolutely impermissible for 
any foreign country to carry out interference and 
subversion under any pretext.43 
As a matter of fact Bhutto's visit to China was very 
important at that point, because the Pakistan authority 
wanted to secure Beijing's military support in the context 
of: (1) Indian military deployment on the East Pakistan 
border, (2) increased guerrilla activities inside the East 
Pakistan, (3) Indo-Soviet defense treaty of August 1971, (4) 
Indian mobilization of world support towards intervention in 
Pakistan, (5) the US decision to stop the arms supply to 
Pakistan, and finally, Pakistan was asking a reward from 
China for the mediatory role towards the US-China 
rapprochement. However, China showed her reluctance towards 
military aid to Pakistan.44 
43Chi Peng-Fei's speech, Peking Review (November 12, 1971), 5. 
44 Ibid. 
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In a return banquet given by Bhutto which was attended 
by Chinese premier Chou en-lai, the Chinese leader dwelt on 
Sino-Pakistan bilateral relations and made no comment on 
external threat to Pakistan.45 This came as a disappointment 
to Mr. Bhutto who told newsmen that Pakistan could hope for 
very little help from China.46 Actually China urged Pakistani 
leaders for a political settlement in East Pakistan 
regardless of Chinese support to maintain integrity to 
Pakistan.47 One of the reasons behind China's unwillingness 
of involvement in a military confrontation in South Asia was 
Indo-Soviet Treaty of friendship, which concerned China very 
much. After the treaty China preferred a diplomatic 
settlement because: 
- China was not strong enough to confront India and the 
Soviet Union simultaneously. 
- China itself was passing through a series of 
political crises. 
45See, Premier Chou-en-lai1s speech at a return banquet given by 
Pakistan's leader Mr. Z.A. Bhutto in Peking Review (November 12, 
1971), 23. 
46G.W. Chaudhury, 201. Another study shows that Bhutto asked the 
Chinese Premier whether China would come to assist Pakistan in the 
event of war with India. Premier Chou replied that war was unlikely, 
but if it occurred Chinese military forces would not intervene 
directly in support of Pakistan although China would support Pakistan 
politically and provide material assistance. See Sisson and Rose, 251. 
47Myedul Hasan, Muldahara Ekattar, (Dhaka: UPL 1986), 139. Also 
see M.G. Kabir, "US Policy and the Bangladesh Crisis of 1971," Biiss 
Journal 9, no. 2 (1988): 205. 
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- China and the Chinese peoples liberation army (PLA) 
had not yet fully recovered from displacement caused in all 
sectors of the society by the cultural revolution. 
- The PLA was involved in management, reconstruction 
and administrative-tasks that occupied the elite units of 
the main forces and their officers, all of whom were deeply 
involved in politics at every level. 
- Technically winter was the most inconvenient season 
for military maneuvers in the Himalayan passes which were 
likely to remain snowed in. 
- Under these conditions China and PLA were very 
anxious to fight for Pakistan—a matter of secondary 
interest to China.48 
However, prior to the beginning of the formal Indo- 
Pakistan war on December 3, 1971, China on the one hand 
supported Pakistan against "Indian aggression" and opposed 
the Bangladesh liberation war. On the other hand, it called 
for a peaceful settlement of the crisis of Pakistan, through 
consultations and mutual withdrawal of forces. But after the 
breakup of the war, from late November and early December 
1971, China in consultation with the USA started strong 
48Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, China's Southwestern Strategy: 
Encirclement and Counter Encirclement (New York: Praeger Publishers), 
54. Also see Zaglul Haider, "BD-China Relations: A Review," Regional 
Studies 9, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 74. Also see Vi jay Sen. Budhiraj, 
"Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh," Asian Survey 13, no. 5 (May 
1973): 492. 
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diplomatie efforts in favor of Pakistan.49 On the evening of 
December 4, 1971 at the UN Security Council's urgent 
meeting, Chinese permanent representative, Mr. Huang Hua 
denounced the Indian government's action against Pakistan 
and stated: 
The question of East Pakistan is purely the 
internal affair of Pakistan in which no one has 
any right to interfere. It is impermissible for 
the Indian government to commit armed aggression 
against Pakistan by using the question of East 
Pakistan as a pretext. The Indian government 
asserts that it has sent troops to East Pakistan 
for the purpose of self defense. This is a sheer 
gangster logic. The facts show that it is India 
which has committed aggression against Pakistan 
and not Pakistan which has "menaced" the security 
of India.50 
On December 5, 1971 China vetoed on the Soviet proposal 
for inviting a representative of Bangladesh and considered 
the Bangladesh concept as "so-called Bangladesh."51 
49About the US-China secret diplomatic understanding Henry 
Kissinger wrote: 
"November 23 was also the day of my first secret meeting 
with the Chinese in New York. Huang Hua was now permanent 
representative of the Peoples Republic of China to the 
United Nations.... At this point I could do little more 
than brief Huang Hua on the military situation. I showed 
him the draft resolution we would submit to the Security 
Council, if the issue were taken up there, indicating we 
had not made a final decision. Huang Hua emphasized that 
China would support Pakistan in the Security Council, but 
would follow Pakistan's lead as to whether to take the 
issue there." 
For details, see Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 889. 
50Peking Review (December 10, 1971), 7. 
51Peking Review 50 (December 10, 1971), 8. 
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On the other hand, on the same day, China proposed a 
draft resolution in the Security Council and called upon 
India and Pakistan to cease hostility and to withdraw 
respectively from the international border between India and 
Pakistan and to disengage from each other, so that 
conditions could have been created for a peaceful settlement 
of the disputes between India and Pakistan.52 
But China's call for troops withdrawal was resisted by 
both India and the Soviet Union and Chinese diplomatic 
efforts had failed. As Bangladesh war neared its climax in 
December 1971, China's criticism appeared to be sharper 
against Indian expansionism and "Soviet Social imperialism." 
China compared the Bangladesh struggle with the Tibetan 
uprising of 1959. On December 8, 1971 the People's Daily of 
China commented: 
The Indian government's criminal act of 
engineering of so-called Bangladesh is consistent 
with the tactics used by the Indian reactionaries 
in carrying out aggression against its neighbors. 
It invariably exerts the utmost efforts to show 
discord among the nationalities of its neighbors, 
grooms a number of running dogs which bark at its 
command and engineers subversion and secession. It 
acted in this way against the Tibetan region of 
China.53 
When Indo-Pakistan war was progressing towards an end, 
China very consistently viewed the problem as a Soviet bid 
to fish in a troubled water. On December 10, 1971, refuting 
52Ibid., 10. 
53Quoted in Mizanur Rahman Shelly, "Chinese Attitude Towards 
Bangladesh," Asian Affairs 2, no. 2 (July-December 1980): 193. 
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a TASS statement that the Pakistan government's action in 
East Pakistan was the main cause of the tension between 
India and Pakistan, the Peking Review in its editorial 
critically evaluated the Tass statement as "sheer nonsense" 
and refuted the Soviet statement by saying that the East 
Pakistan question was entirely Pakistan's internal affair 
and asked the Soviet Union, how can the internal affair of a 
country become the main cause of tension between states?54 
However, China was so sanguine towards Pakistan, 
against the Bangladesh struggle that on December 15, 1971, 
prior to the surrender of Pakistan's army, the Chinese 
representative in the UN Security Council expressed its firm 
support towards the Pakistan government.55 Finally on 
December 16, 1971, when Pakistan army surrendered to the 
Indo-Bangladesh joint command, the Chinese government 
further expressed their resolute support toward Pakistan. 
The statement said: 
The Chinese government and people firmly support 
the Pakistan government and people in their 
struggle against aggression, division and 
subversion.... We hold that there can be no 
neutrality on the question of aggression versus 
anti-aggression, of division versus anti-division 
and of subversion versus anti-subversion.56 
54Renmin Ribao, "Refuting the TASS Statement," Peking Review 50 
(December 10, 1971): 11. 
55Statement by the Chinese representative Huang Hua in the UN 
Security Council, December 15, 1971 in R.K. Jain (ed.) China South 
Asian Relation (compilation of documents) (Sussex: Harvester Press, 
1981), 231. 
56 Ibid., 235. 
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Following Indian recognition of Bangladesh, Peking 
denounced it as a "New Delhi farce" and interpreted that as 
a puppet regime forcibly imposed upon the East Pakistan 
people by India. It also accused the Soviet Union as the 
real director of the "Bangladesh farce."57 Peking very 
strongly attacked Indian expansionists for trying to 
dismember Pakistan and establish a puppet state in East 
Bengal, like that which the Japanese had set up in Manchuria 
in East China.58 
Even after the birth of the Bangladesh, the Chinese 
vice premier Li Hsien-nien, in a statement on December 26, 
1971 declared: 
We sternly condemn the Indian aggressors for these 
sanguinary crimes. The Indian government must stop 
forthwith the massacre and persecution of the 
Pakistan people and immediately and 
unconditionally withdrew its aggressor forces from 
East Pakistan and all the other places they have 
occupied.59 
Although many analysts argued that China opposed the 
Bangladesh struggle because Chinese did not consider it as a 
real national liberation movement, from the Maoist point of 
view. It is very much over simplification of Chinese policy 
towards the Bangladesh movement. It is easily understandable 
57The Daily Telegraph (London), December 8, 1971. Also see 
Mehrunisa Ali, "China's Diplomacy During the Indo-Pakistan War 1971," 
Pakistan Horizon 26, no. 1 (First Quarter 1972): 55. 
58Pekinq Review 50 (December 10), 11. 
59 R.K. Jain, 237. 
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that the Chinese policy of supporting Pakistan against the 
Bangladesh movement was shaped by Chinese national interest 
and more specifically, geo-political factors.60 
Bangladesh-China Relations; Mujib and Zia Regimes 
(1971-1981) 
Political Level 
Following the birth of Bangladesh, during the short 
span of the Mujib regime (1971-1975), there was no 
diplomatic tie between Bangladesh and China. At this point 
prominent pro-Chinese politician, Mulana Bashani wrote a 
letter to chairman Mao and premier Chou, urging them to 
recognize Bangladesh, but China remained silent and instead, 
showed gesture of good will for Pakistan. To make Pakistan 
happy, it also closed the Chinese consulate in Dhaka, on the 
view of occupation of East Pakistan by Indian troops. In 
fact China had suffered a major setback in the Bangladesh 
conflict of 1971, which increased Indo-Soviet influence in 
the subcontinent—the enemies of China. 
In the redesigned context of South Asia, immediately, 
after the emergence of Bangladesh, Tajuddin Ahmed, the 
premier of the new nation, Bangladesh pledged Chinese 
recognition of Bangladesh and said that China was a great 
nation with the tradition of fighting against imperialism 
60Syed Anwar Husain, "Role of the Super Powers and the Emergence 
of Bangladesh: A Review Article," Politics. Administration and Change 
5, no. 2 (December 1980): 129. 
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and expected that China would change its attitude towards 
the new nation.61 But China did not respond to the call of 
Tajuddin and refused to recognize Bangladesh. Siding with 
Pakistan China also protested strongly the alleged killings 
of the stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh and sent a letter 
to the Security Council urging to end the killings of 
Pakistanis in Bangladesh.62 Aside from this, China supported 
Bhutto's position for the so-called unity of Pakistan with 
its former Eastern wing Bangladesh. The Chinese premier 
Chou-en-lai declared during Pakistan's President Z.A. 
Bhutto's visit to China in 1972: 
The Chinese government and people resolutely 
support the Pakistan government and people in 
their just struggle in defense of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and against 
foreign aggression and interference and resolutely 
support the people of Kashmir in their just 
struggle for the right of national self- 
determination. We firmly maintain that the 
resolution of the UN General Assembly and the 
Security Council should be respected and 
implemented and that the Indian government should 
withdraw its armed forces from Pakistan's 
territory and cease its military provocation 
against Pakistan.63 
In August 1972, Bangladesh's foreign minister Abdus 
Samad Azad again expressed Bangladesh's desire to establish 
diplomatic relations with China. Abdus Samad Azad said: 
61USSR and the Third World 2, no. 1 (December 6-January 16, 
1971): 13. 
62The Daily Telegraph (London), December 29, 1971. Also see 
Peking Review. December 31, 1971. 
63 See Peking Review 15, no. 5 (February 4, 1972), 6. 
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We have extended our hands of friendship towards 
China and we sincerely hope that this will be 
reciprocated by the Chinese leaders who I am sure 
will find profound good will and respect for them 
among the people of Bangladesh.64 
But China did not respond to the call of Bangladesh and 
refused to recognize the newly independent country. On 
August 26, 1972 when Bangladesh applied for the membership 
of the United Nations, Chinese representative to the UN 
Hoang-Hua vetoed the application and moved a separate 
resolution urging that the application be refused until all 
Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs) had been repatriated and 
all the foreign soldiers removed from Bangladesh.65 Naturally 
the Chinese action caused much disappointment among the 
Bangladeshis. Mujib government believed that "Peking was 
continuing a deliberate policy calculated to create tension 
and instability in the subcontinent."66 Regarding Chinese 
image in Bangladesh after the veto the Far Eastern Economic 
Review reported: 
China's own supporters here have been discomforted 
by the veto various Maoist elements had hoped that 
despite the past China held initiative in 
regaining ground sooner or later. Today many pro- 
Peking elements feel the veto has stung Bengali 
nationalism so deeply that China has robbed itself 
64Bangladesh Observer (August 27, 1972). 
65G.W. Chaudhury, 239. 
66A.L. Khatib, "Dhaka Wags a Sad finger at China," Far Eastern 
Economic Review. September 9, 1972. 
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of the capacity to normalize relations at a time 
of its own choosing.67 
Chinese veto to the United Nations against Bangladesh's 
entry, was seriously criticized even by the most prominent 
pro-Peking leader Maulana Bashani.68 However after the 
recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan on February 22, 1974 
and the agreement for the repatriation of the Pakistani 
POWs. China refrained from vetoing Bangladesh's entry into 
the world body and enabled Bangladesh to become a member of 
the United Nations in September 1 97 4 . 69 Welcoming 
Bangladesh's admission into the UN the Chinese 
representative to the UN Chuang Yen expressed China's desire 
to establish good neighborly relations with Bangladesh. 
Chuang Yen said: 
We are ready to develop good neighborly relations 
with the countries on the subcontinent, on the 
basis of the five principles of peaceful co¬ 
existence and further enhance our traditional 
friendship with their peoples. The Chinese 
government and people will always firmly support 
the people in South Asia in their struggle against 
hegemonism and expansionism.70 
Though Chinese attitude towards Bangladesh started changing 
from the mid 1974, still it did not recognize Bangladesh 
67lbid. 
68Maulana Bashani 3aid in a statement that "I do vehemently 
protest in the bitterest language," against the Chinese veto. See 
Ibid. 
69The UN Security Council on June 10 meeting adopted a resolution 




till the last day of the Shiekh Mujib era. China even did 
not have any diplomatic relations with Bangladesh during the 
Mujib regime. Moreover the pro-Chinese elements were very 
active and critical of Mujib governments pro-Indian and pro- 
Soviet policies. During 1973/75 the Mujib government was 
seriously threatened by the guerrilla activities of the pro- 
Chinese activists, and the government responded with brutal 
and coercive machineries71 and killed and arrested several 
thousands of pro-Chinese leftist activists as a means to 
stop the guerilla activities. Among the pro-Chinese leftists 
who had been killed by the Mujib's para-military force, 
Siraj Sikder was very prominent. He was the chief of the 
East Bengal Sarbohara Party and became the main challenge to 
the Sheikh Mujib regime.72 As the guerrilla activists 
intensified their fight against the Mujib government, 
Mujib's coercive and repressive machineries also became 
acute which attempted to crush the pro-Chinese elements very 
brutally. Mujib government's action against the pro-Chinese 
guerrillas increased Chinese dissatisfaction towards the 
Mujib regime and despite having Mujib government's repeated 
71For details, see Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974: 
Economic Crisis and Political Polarization," Asian Survey 15, no. 2 
(February 1975): 121. 
72Siraj Sikder was arrested on January 1, 1975 and a day after 
arrest he was killed brutally by the Mujib's Rakkhi Bahini. Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, the then prime minister of Bangladesh indirectly 
admitted the responsibility of Siraj Sikder's killing by publicly 
declaring, "Where is Siraj Sikder?" See Nural Amin, "Pro Chinese 
Communist Movement in Bangladesh," Journal of Contemporary Asia 15, 
no. 3 (1985): 156. 
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urges and efforts, still Peking did not recognize and 
Bangladesh-China relations could not yet be formalized. 
But Bangladesh-China relations started anew overnight. 
In the wake of the military coup of August 15, 1975 and the 
assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and with the 
emergence of Ziaur Rahman as a defacto leader, China 
recognized Bangladesh. China saw Mujib's overthrow as a 
matter of embarrassment for both India and the Soviet Union. 
It recognized Bangladesh on August 31, 1975 and opened a 
diplomatic mission in Dhaka to demonstrate its support to 
the new regime. While Bangladesh government warmly welcomed 
the recognition and expressed the confidence that the 
relationship will be strengthened and consolidated in the 
mutual interest and benefit of the two countries and the two 
peoples.73 Following recognition, both Bangladesh and China 
have established diplomatic relations on October 4, 1975.74 
Regarding Bangladesh-China rapprochement, Peoples Daily 
wrote : 
We are pleased with the decisions and we are 
convinced that the existence of Bangladesh which 
firmly defends state sovereignty and national 
independence and pursues a genuinely nonaligned 
policy will surely be conducive to safeguarding 
73Peking Review 18, no. 36 (September 5, 1975): 6. 
74For details see USSR and the Third World 5, nos. 6-8 (1975): 
280. 
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peace and security in the South Asian subcontinent 
and in Asia.75 
After diplomatic relations, Chinese influence increased 
substantially in Bangladesh. The Maoist elements became very 
active and they officially set up Bangladesh-Chinese 
friendship society. But India and the Soviet Union became 
very much disappointed in the gradual increase in Chinese 
influence in Bangladesh. A Moscow broadcast (in English) for 
South Asia commented: 
Reactionary forces in Bangladesh supported by 
imperialism and Maoism are active as reports from 
Dhaka indicate. They are using every possible 
means to create chaos in the country and are 
trying to present themselves as the country's 
leading political force. They use terror, 
blackmail and political demagogy, justifying their 
actions by alleged threats from outside such as a 
"Soviet menace." This anti-Soviet hysteria is 
being deliberately whipped up by leftist and 
rightists, pro-imperialist forces and is aimed at 
separating the people of Bangladesh from their 
reliable friend, the Soviet Union. The 
reactionaries use the myth of a so-called Soviet 
menace to suppress the forces of progress and 
democracy inside Bangladesh which are the main 
obstacle preventing the reactionaries from 
achieving their objectives.76 
In fact, the reasons behind the increasing Chinese influence 
in Bangladesh were that the new administration gave up 
Mujib's Pro-Indian and Pro-Soviet foreign policy and pursued 
a non-aligned and independent foreign policy outside the 
Indo-Soviet orbit, which was supported by China. Moreover, 
75Quoted in G.W. Chaudhury, "Bangladesh's Coup and Countercoups: 
International Implications," ORBIS 19, no. 4 (Winter 1976): 1595. 
76USSR and the Third World 5, nos. 6-8 (July 7-December 31, 
1975): 281. 
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the Chinese objectives in Bangladesh were to relinquish the 
primary role of India and the Soviet Union, which was 
possible only after the overthrow of Sheikh Mujib in August 
1975.77 
Actually Bangladesh-China rapprochement and Bangladesh 
and Indo-Soviet ambivalence can be seen from Ziaur Rahman's 
redesigned foreign policy perspectives. Ziaur Rahman's new 
move towards changing relations with Pakistan and the Muslim 
world, simultaneously deteriorated Bangladesh-India 
relations, which significantly have improved the Bangladesh- 
China relations. But the Bangladesh-China honeymoon was a 
very disgraceful matter to both India and the Soviet Union. 
Bangladesh's rapprochement with China was growing 
faster as Bangladesh was moving away from Indo-Soviet orbit. 
At this stage Bangladesh's primary interest in China was 
Chinese support in case of probable threat from India.78 
While analyzing the Bangladesh-China friendship Peking 
Review commented: 
China and Bangladesh have been friendly to each 
other. Their friendly good-neighborly relations 
have been growing continuously since the 
establishment of diplomatic ties. China resolutely 
supports the Bangladesh peoples struggles to 
safeguard its national independence and develop 
its national economy. Bangladesh supports the 
77Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Chinese Objectives in South Asia: Anti- 
Hegemony vs. collective Security," Asian Survey 18, no. 10 (October 
1978) : 1011. 
78Zaglul Haider, "BD-China Relations: A Review," Regional Studies 
9, no. 2 (Wpring 1991): 76. 
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Chinese people in their struggle against 
imperialism and hegemonism.79 
Bangladesh-China relationship was further expanded and 
formalized after the then chief martial law administrator, 
General Ziaur Rahman paid his first visit to China on 
January 2-6, 1977. During this time China pledged its full 
support and cooperation towards Bangladesh against 
"expansionism and hegemonism" by which China meant Indian 
and the Soviet Union's maneuvering in Asia.80 
At the welcome banquet given by the state council, vice 
premier Li Hsien-nien stated: 
There is a profound traditional friendship between 
the peoples of China and Bangladesh.... The 
Chinese government and the people firmly support 
the government and people of Bangladesh in their 
just struggle to safeguard national independence 
and state sovereignty and resist foreign 
interference.81 
In reply Ziaur Rahman welcomed the growing cordiality 
of the two countries' relations. Speaking at the banquet 
Gen. Zia proclaimed: 
Bangladesh stands shoulder to shoulder with the 
people of the third world in their struggle 
against expansionism and hegemonism. Bangladesh 
supports the just struggle of the Third world 
countries for establishment of a new international 
economic order.82 
79Peking Review 19, nos. 32-33 (August 19, 1976). 
80G.W. Chaudhury, "China's Policy Toward South Asia," Current 
History (April 1974): 117. 
81Peking Review 20, no. 2 (January 7, 1977): 19. 
82 Ibid. 
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Moreover during Zia's visit, China held identical views 
with Bangladesh as regards to the Middle East and Indian 
ocean.83 Aside from Bangladesh-Chinese shared perception 
regarding the regional and international issues, China 
supported Bangladesh against India on the question of the 
apportionment of the Ganges water dispute over the Farakkah 
barrage. Following Ziaur Rahman's visit to Peking the 
political relations between Bangladesh and China improved so 
meaningfully that the Chinese offered military supplies to 
Bangladesh and China reportedly pledged to send four 
squadrons of Mig- 21s for the Bangladesh air force.84 
Bangladesh-China relations further accelerated after 
Chinese vice premier Li Hsien-nien's visit to Bangladesh, in 
March 1978, who was accompanied by foreign minister Huang 
Hua. The visit of Chinese leaders to Bangladesh was a 
milestone between the two countries. In the banquet given in 
honor of vice premier Li, president Zia indicating Indian 
hegemonism, pointed out : 
It is heartening to us as well as to other 
countries of the Third world that the friendly 
people of your great country share with us the 
vision of a world order free from imperialism, 
colonialism and hegemonism in any form.85 
While supporting Bangladesh's standing Li enunciated: 
83Peking Review 20, no. 2 (1977) : 20. 
84Chaudhury, Current History. 157. 
85 Peking Review 21, no. 13 (March 31, 1978): 3. 
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We always maintain that all countries, big or 
small, are equal and that big countries should not 
bully small ones and strong countries should not 
presume weak ones. Whether a country treats others 
as equals or seeks hegemony is a major criterion 
for judging whether that country follows the five 
principles of peaceful co-existence.86 
Following vice premier Li's visit Ziaur Rahman went to 
North Korea on their tenth anniversary of the founding of 
the "Democratic Republic," where he had very fruitful 
dialogue with the Chinese vice premier Teng Hsiao-Ping who 
was the head of the Chinese delegation. This further 
strengthened the Bangladesh-China relations. 
But in 1978, Bangladesh's relationship with China was 
going to be rifted just after the appointment of S.M. Kibria 
as the secretary for foreign affairs, who was noted for pro- 
Moscow leaning.87 In 1978, S.M. Kibria arranged a visit for 
the Vietnamese vice premier to Dhaka at the height of Sino- 
Vietnamese tension. The Chinese leaders were displeased with 
this gesture of Bangladesh government to their enemy. In 
fact, it was clearly provocative for Bangladesh to welcome 
the Vietnamese vice premier when China was extending its 
hands of friendship towards Bangladesh.88 Moreover, Kibria 
was also making hectic efforts to re-establish honeymoon 
86lbid., 4. 
87Foreign secretary S.M. Kibria is well known for pro-Moscow 
leanings. It is believed among the observers and intellectuals that he 
was trying to influence the Mujib government to subscribe the 




relationship with Moscow as it was during the Mujib regime, 
which seriously angered China. Of course, such an action 
would upset China and would go against Bangladesh's national 
interest because Bangladesh needed very badly China's 
friendship and cooperation at that stage. 
But as President Zia took timely actions, Bangladesh- 
China relations did not deteriorate, rather it improved 
significantly. Regarding Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea 
Bangladesh clearly supported Chinese position and 
Bangladesh's foreign minister Shamsul Haq said: 
With a view of achieving a durable peace... it is 
therefore essential that all foreign troops from 
the area of conflict should be withdrawn so that 
the people themselves are able to resolve problem 
in a peaceful manner, without outside 
interference .89 
While Bangladesh's representative K.M. Kaiser in the UN 
Security Council called for the withdrawal of all troops 
from Kapuchea.90 
Bangladesh-China relations improved amiably after the 
second visit of President Zia to China in 1980. This time 
President Zia and Premier Hua Guo-feng had a wide ranging 
exchange of views and reached complete agreement on major 
international issues like Afghan question and Kampuchea 
question. Regarding Afghan question Chinese premier said 
"Speech by Bangladesh Foreign minister Shamsul Huq in Peking on 
November 15, 1975. See Jain, China-South Asia Relations (a collection 
of documents) (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1981). 
"Statement by Bangladesh representative K. M. Kaiser in the UN 
Security Council on Sino-Vietnamese Conflict (Feb. 24, 1979): 271. 
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that a genuine settlement of the question could be possible 
only when the Soviet Union withdraws all its troops 
unconditionally and the Afghan people should be allowed to 
decide their own destiny. While Bangladesh's president held 
identical views with China and was opposing the invasion and 
occupation of Afghanistan by foreign troops, strongly 
demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from that 
country. 91 
Regarding the Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea, both 
leaders held the view that the settlement could only be 
possible only when Vietnam completely withdraws its 
occupation troops and the people of Kampuchea can handle 
their own affairs.92 
Apart from growing bilateral relations with China, 
during Zia regime, the activities of the pro-Chinese 
activists also increased significantly. The pro-Chinese 
radical activists extended their support to Ziaur Rahman, as 
the Bangladesh-China relations improved steadily. In fact 
there were several reasons behind pro-Peking radical 
elements' support towards the Zia regime: 
First of all, Zia wanted to improve Bangladesh's 
relations with China in order to "counteract any undue 
dependence on India." This was the long cherished goal of 
91Beiiing Review, no. 31 (August 4, 1980): 8. 
92Ibid. 
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the pro-Chinese elements in Bangladesh since the days of 
independence. At this point the pro-Chinese could translate 
their policy into reality through Zia. 
Secondly, domestically, Ziaur Rahman was trying to 
reduce the influence of the Awami League and so, he needed 
the support of the anti-Awami League forces. At this point 
the pro-Chinese activists clearly strengthened the hands of 
Zia because they were the worst sufferers of the Awami 
League regime. 
Thirdly, Maulana Bashani, Mohammad Toha, and the 
prominent pro-Chinese leaders, supported Zia's assumption of 
power to resist Indian hegemonism and the Soviet social 
imperialism. While many renowned pro-Chinese leaders got 
important portfolios in Zia's cabinet including Senior 
Minister Mashiur Rahman, Deputy Prime Minister S.A. Bari 
A. T. and Education Minister Kani Zafar Ahmed. In fact an 
important part of Zia's political party--Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP)—came out of pro-Chinese political 
parties. 
Finally, Ziaur Rahman's policy of canal digging and 
mass literacy program greatly attracted the pro-Chinese 
radicals, which they regarded as revolution by Zia. Although 
these were liberal economic programs, Zia used these as 
revolutionary tactics. 
In addition to amalgamation of many pro-Chinese leaders 
with Ziaur Rahman's political party - B.N.P., a good number 
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of pro-Chinese political parties still survived as 
independent political party during Zia's regime.93 So it is 
discerned that both domestically and internationally Chinese 
influence increased significantly in Bangladesh politics 
during the Zia regime, which had seriously upset both the 
Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet elements in Bangladesh. 
Criticising Chinese influence in Bangladesh, the Soviet 
news media TASS reported: 
After the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with such countries as Saudi Arabia and the 
Peoples Republic of China, right wing forces 
including the Bashani group notorious for its 
extremist and Maoist views became noticeably more 
active in Bangladesh. On the initiative of 
Bashani group, a society for Bangladesh-Chinese 
friendship was officially set up.... Its 
leadership comprises figures of the most differing 
complexions, who strike anti-Indian and anti- 
Soviet attitude. All these people were opponents 
of the foreign policy of late President Mujibur 
Rahman.94 
Apart from excellent political relations, Bangladesh- 
Chine relations were further strengthened by the cultural 
agreement between the two countries which was signed on 
November 17, 1979.95 Under this agreement both countries 
exchanged tourists, students, cultural delegations, Buddhist 
Delegation and Journalists. Moreover after this agreement 
educationists, scientists, and technocrats of both countries 
93See Nurul Amin, The Pro-Chinese Communist Movement in 
Bangladesh, Journal of Contemporary Asia 15, no. 3 (1985). 
94USSR and Third World 2. nos. 6-8 (1975): 281. 
95For details, see, The Bangladesh Observer. November 19, 1979. 
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got opportunities for exchange of experience and knowledge 
through exchange of visits between the two. Apart from this 
an agreement between NCNA and the Bangladesh News Agency 
(BSS) on exchange of news was signed in Peking on April 28, 
1 97 8 , 96 which strengthened the ties between the two 
countries. 
Finally it can be argued that during the Mujib regime 
(1971-75) Bangladesh-China relations had no existence on the 
earth, rather China regarded Bangladesh as a puppet state of 
Soviet social imperialism and Indian hegemonism. But after 
the assassination of Sheikh Muzibur Rahman, China recognized 
Bangladesh as an independent state, established diplomatic 
relations and effectively strengthened relations from its 
nadir to its peak, because of Zia's sudden but certain shift 
from the Indo-Soviet orbit and alignment with the Peoples 
Republic of China. In fact, in view of Sino-Soviet rivalry 
in South Asia, Bangladesh-China rapport was important in the 
interest of China to keep Bangladesh away from the Indo- 
Soviet orbit. For Bangladesh, it was an imperative from the 
perspective of its national interest to strengthen its tie 
with China in order to checkmate the hegemonism of giant 
neighbor India.97 
96See USSR & Third World 9, nos. 2-3 (February-June, 1978): 25. 
97See Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and ita 
Aftermath (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books Internation Limited, 1980) p. 203. 
Also see M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Political Evolution of Bangladesh." 
Current History 76, no. 44 (April 1979): 183. 
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Economic Level 
As China did not recognize Bangladesh during the Mujib 
regime, there was no direct economic link between the two 
countries from 1971 to 1975. Only very insignificant volume 
of trade was conducted through third countries, although 
unofficial delegations used to visit China to participate in 
trade fairs, to explore possibilities for the expansion of 
commercial ties between the two countries. In fact, the 
economic relations between Bangladesh and China were 
virtually nil during the Mujib regime, as China gave no 
project or commodity aid to Bangladesh barring a small 
amount of food aid as grant.98 Following the military coup 
of August 15, 1975, and the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, China recognized Bangladesh, and opened a diplomatic 
mission in Dhaka, while the Bangladesh mission in Beijing 
began its operation formally in January, 1976. Since then 
the economic relations between Bangladesh and China have 
been growing steadily. At this point Bangladesh's national 
interest demanded Chinese economic aid and cooperation, in 
the nation-building activities of Bangladesh. Because Indian 
and the Soviet economic assistance were virtually stopped, 
after the overthrow of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—a trusted 
friend and ally of both India and the Soviet Union. 
The political changes through the August coup of Bangladesh 
98Sabia Hasan, "Foreign Policy of Bangladesh," Pakistan Horizon 
(Winter 1982): 77. 
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in 1975 paved the way for the normalization and development 
of economic cooperation between China and Bangladesh. 
In 1977 General Ziaur Rahman, the then commander in 
chief of the Bangladesh armed forces, paid a four-day 
official visit to China. Zia's visit opened up a new chapter 
in the field of Bangladesh's economic relations apart from 
political rapport. An economic and technical cooperation 
agreement and a trade and payment agreement (TPA) were 
signed in Peking on January 4, 1977." While on March 10, 
1977, a Chinese trade delegation signed the first purchase 
contact with Bangladesh jute mills corporations (BJMC). 
Another agreement signed on March 16, 1978, and China agreed 
to buy 4,000 bales of jute goods from Bangladesh.100 On the 
other hand at this time Bangladesh had started to import 
inexpensive and reliable goods from China, from bus tires to 
surgical instruments.101 
Following Zia's visit to Peking, Chinese vice-premier 
Li Hsien-nien also visited Bangladesh from March 18-21, 
1978, and the two countries signed two agreements on 
"For the agreement see Peking Review 20, no. 2 (January 7, 
1977): 3. 
100Ibid. 
101Robert S. Anderson, "Impression of Bangladesh: The Rule of 
Arms and Politics of Exploration," Pacific Affairs, no. 49 (1976): 
450. 
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economic and technical cooperation and on scientific and 
technical cooperation.102 
The economic and technical cooperation stipulated an 
interest-free Chinese loan of US $58.3 million (580 million 
Taka) payable for ten years. During this time China for the 
first time had started giving economic aid to Bangladesh. 
Though the quantum of Chinese aid was smaller than that 
given by the Western industrial countries, it was 
nevertheless liberal.103 Table 15 shows China's foreign aid 
disbursement to Bangladesh during the Mujib and Zia regimes. 
TABLE 15 
CHINESE FOREIGN AID DISBURSEMENT TO BANGLADESH 
(in million US$) 
Year Disbursement 
Grant Loan Total 
Non Project Aid 
Disbursement 
Grant Loan Total 
Project Aid 
Disbursement 
Grant Loan Total 
1972-75           .. .. .. 
1975-78 1.000 2.000 3.000 1.900 — — — 
1978-80 — 4.000 4.000 — — — — 
1980-81 — — — — — — 8.514 8.514 
1981-82 — — -- — 2.667 2.667 — 11.347 
11.347 
source: Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh (Ministry of 
Finance, Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 
December 1987) (as of June 1987). 
102Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua and Dr. M.N. Huda adviser 
to the Bangladesh's president (in charge of the ministry of planning) 
signed both agreements on March 21, 1978. See Peking Review 21, no. 13 
(March 31, 1978). 
103
A Brief on Bangladesh-China Economic Relations, External 
Resources Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh, 
July 1987. 
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Fig. 10. Chinese Aid Disbursement to Bangladesh: A Comparison Between 
the Mujib and Zia regimes. 
Bangladesh-China economic cooperation augmented further 
following president Zia's second visit to China in 1980. 
This time Zia claimed that China had extended its total 
support to Bangladesh in its effort to meet the challenges. 
In the economic field, this time the Trade and Payment 
Agreement (TPA) was replaced by a five-year Long Term Trade 
Agreement (LTTA) which was signed in Dhaka in 1980 for the 
period of 1980-84.104 
The LTTA stipulated each way trade of US$ 200 to 250 
million. It provided for barter trade as well as trade in 
convertible currencies. It also provided mutual most-favored 
nation's treatment in matters relating to shipping, and 
imposition of custom duties, etc.105 Apart from this, the two 
governments also signed agreements on maritime transport, 
104On its expiry, another identical long term agreement for the 
period of 1985-1989 was signed in Dhaka in December 1986. 
105 Ibid., 23. 
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economic and technical cooperation and science and 
technology.106 
Besides agreements for economic cooperation and 
development from 1976/1982, China signed 4 credit protocols 
and provided 163 million RMBY under credit protocol.107 
(Table 16) . Although economic cooperation between Bangladesh 
and China increased substantially during the Zia regime 
problems raised in bilateral shipping and civil aviation 
agreements. Bangladesh-China bilateral shipping agreement 
was signed in November 1978. The agreement provided for 
sharing of cargo on 50:50 basis and according to "most 
favored nation's treatment" to each other's vessels. 
Bangladesh shipping corporation (BSC) started its Far East 
Service from April 1980 and for the discharge of export 
cargo and inward sailing, connected China for loading import 
cargo. But the BSC vessels could not avail 50 percent share 




107Bangladesh-China Joint Commission Report, 1989, 45. 
108 Ibid., 26. 
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TABLE 16 












P.A. - C.A. 
Amount 
Utilized 
P.A. - C.A. 
First credit Dec. 9, 1976 3.00 - 3.00 3.00 3.00 - 
Second credit Mar. 3, 1978 80.00 20.00 100.00 80.00 19.86 79.20 - 17.70 
Third credit July 24, 1980 25.00 25.00 50.00 23.37 25.00 22.87 - 25.00 
Fourth credit Nov. 29, 1982 3.82 6.18 10.00 3.82 6.18 1.50 - 6.18 
Total 111.82 51.18 163.00 110.19 51.04 106.70 - 48.88 
1 RMB Y = US $ 0.269 
PA = Project Aid 
CA = Commodity Aid 
source: Bangiagesh-Ciiiaa-Joint Commission Sa&aignL Beijing, October 27-31, 
1989. Brief for the Bangladesh Delegation, External Resource Division, 
Ministry of Planning, Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh), 
Annexure B. 
Apart from shipping agreement, another problem was 
regarding civil aviation. An air transport agreement between 
the government of Bangladesh and the People's Republic of 
China was signed on July 24, 1980 during the state visit of 
President Ziaur Rahman to China. It was agreed at the time 
of concluding the agreement that the two sides would hold 
negotiation in Dhaka on route schedule and other relevant 
issues facilitating the commencement of the air service 
between the two countries. Since then Bangladesh had been 
trying to settle this matter. But Chinese authorities showed 
less interest by arguing that the existing traffic between 
the two countries was inadequate and thereby commencement of 
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air service between the two countries would not be 
economically viable.109 
Apart from these minor problems, the economic relations 
between Bangladesh and China was excellent during the Zia 
regime. Besides Chinese foreign economic aid, foreign 
military aid was also another major area of cooperation 
between the two countries. Beijing came forward as Dhaka's 
major arms supplier after the Soviet Union scrapped all 
military assistance to Bangladesh following the collapse of 
the Mu jib regime. China built the largest arms and 
ammunition factory in Bangladesh (at Joydevpur) and also 
took over Bangladesh's Soviet built MIGs which Moscow 
refused to service after the overthrow of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman. Reliable sources confirm that China delivered 14, 
F-6 in 1977 and 24 F-6 in 1979.110 
It also received 18T-59 MBT in 1981.111 One analyst has 
uncovered the fact that China had agreed to send four 
squadrons of MIG 21s for the Bangladesh Air Force. The 
Chinese were willing to provide as many as 12 squadrons but 
Bangladesh was unable to accept so many because of the lack 
109Ibid., 27. 
110SIPRI, World Armament and Disarmament Yearbook 1979 and 1980 
(London, 1979), 207-208 and (London, 1980), 135. 
111Sabia Hasan, 81. 
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of storage and maintenance facilities.112 China also provided 
training to the Bangladeshi pilots in order to operate these 
fighters.113 
Bangladesh-China trade relation was another successful 
story of Zia regime. During the period the quantum of trade 
between Bangladesh and China rose significantly. Although 
the balance of trade was always in favor of China, 
Bangladesh increasingly bridged the trade gap by increasing 
volume of export to China (Table 17) . Moreover, an 
additional advantage of trading with China was the facility 
for barter trade which made the trade relations more easier. 
Table 17 shows that during 1971-1981 Bangladesh's total 
import from China amounted to US$ 353.80 million while 
Bangladesh's export to China was $115.10 million. At this 
time, trade imbalance against Bangladesh amounted to $241.70 
million. Another form of trade relationship between 
Bangladesh and China was barter trade. 
112G.W. Chaudhury found this information from his discussion with 
Bangladesh's president Ziaur Rahman in March 1977. See Chaudhury, 




BANGLADESH'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
(in million US$) 
Bangladesh's 
Export to China 
Bangladesh's 
Import From China 
Balance 
of Trade 
1972 - NIL - NIL 
1973 - NIL - 1.4 (- 1.4) 
1974 - NIL - 1.6 (- 1.6) 
1975 - NIL - 2.9 <- 2.9) 
1976 - 6.0 - 7.0 (- 1.00) 
1977 - 15.3 18.5 (- 3.20) 
1978 - 24.4 44.5 (- 20.10) 
1979 - 19.4 64.8 (- 48.40) 
1980 - 31.1 99.7 (- 68.60) 
1981 - 18.9 113.4 (- 94.50) 
TOTAL - 115.10 353.80 (-241.70) 
Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: 1979) 75. 
Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington, D.C.: IMF 1984), 
85. 
Fig. 11. Bangladesh's Balance of Trade with China: A Comparison 
Between the Mujib and Zia regimes. 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Bangladesh and China in 1975, the two countries also 
exchanged many goods and commodities under barter 
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agreements.114 So in the final analysis it is discerned that 
Bangladesh-China relations improved significantly during 
Zia's regime, for his realistic foreign policy response 
towards the national interest. Externally, friendship with 
China forestalled the Indo-Soviet menace to Bangladesh and 
internally Chinese economic cooperation contributed 
significantly towards the economic growth and development. 
Summary 
During the liberation war of Bangladesh the Chinese 
played very skeptical role. Its reservation about the 
liberation struggle of Bangladesh stemmed out of its global 
perceptions viz: hostility towards the Soviet Union, 
adversarial relations with India and strong tie with 
Pakistan. Following the independence of Bangladesh, the 
clouds of mistrust and misunderstanding hindered the 
Bangladesh-China rapprochement. During the short span of 
Mujib's regime (1971-1975), despite having Mujib 
administration's deliberate aspiration, China refused to 
recognize Bangladesh and also vetoed against Bangladesh's 
admission into the UNO in 1974. At this stage China branded 
114Bangladesh'3 export to China includes: raw jute, jute goods, 
leather, leather products, hides and skins, paper and paper products, 
newsprint, electric cable, telephone cable, spices, rayon, cellophane, 
molasses, and fertilizer. While Bangladesh's import includes: coal, 
cement, liquid industrial products, metal and minerals, pig iron, dyes 
and chemicals, machinery and tools, cereal and food stuffs, oil gas, 
rape 3eeds, edible oil, spare parts for textile and jute mills. See, 
Sultan Ahmed, "Communication and China's External Relations with 
Particular Reference to Bangladesh," Asian Affairs 4, no. 4: 445. 
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Mujib administration as a puppet government of the Indian 
hegemonism and the Soviet social imperialism. The Mujib 
administration failed to redress the Chinese grievances and 
could not pursue an independent foreign policy outside the 
Indo-Soviet orbit, what China wanted. In fact the August 
coup of 1975 paved the way for the normalization of 
relations between Bangladesh and China. The fall of the 
Mujib regime began a thaw in Bangladesh-China relations. 
Since then Bangladesh-China relations have been growing 
warmer. From 1976-1982 during the total reign of Ziaur 
Rahman, Bangladesh-China relationship reached its peak which 
was formalized by high level diplomatic visits and through a 
series of agreements for bilateral economic cooperation 
including the Long Term Trade Agreement (LTTA). Zia 
overnight shifted from the Indo-Soviet orbit and directed 
Bangladesh's foreign policy towards China, which was highly 
applauded by China and it emerged as one of the closest 
friends of Bangladesh. 
In the final analysis, it is clear that Bangladesh's 
national interest and Chinese national interest intersected 
each other in 1975, after the fall of the Mujib regime. 
Since then Bangladesh-China relationship has been 
progressively growing and by the 1980s it reached its peak 
from its nadir. 
CHAPTER VIII 
BANGLADESH AND THE MUSLIM WORLD1 
MUJIB AND ZIA REGIMES (1971-1981) 
Iatxfl.du.ct ion 
Portraying Bangladesh's Muslim characteristics, Philips 
Talbott wrote: 
Bangladesh emerged as a state of 70 to 75 million 
people, roughly 85 percent of them Muslims in an 
area the size of Wisconsin. By population it thus 
ranks as the eighth or ninth largest state in the 
world. It is also the second largest Muslim state, 
after Indonesia (and before India and Pakistan 
which now rank third and fourth respectively in 
Muslim population).2 
However, although a predominantly Muslim state, Bangladesh 
began its political career with a secular constitution.3 
1The term Muslim world is used here to denote the member 
countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), because OIC 
is the first formal institutional step which accommodated all Muslim 
countries in the world. While discussing the Bangladesh's relations 
with the Muslim world, I have discussed only Bangladesh's relation 
with those countries having good political and economic relations. 
The countries having insignificant relations with Bangladesh are 
precluded. Bangladesh's relation with Pakistan is deliberately 
excluded from this chapter because Chapter IV has dealt with only 
Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. 
2Philips Talbott, "The Subcontinent: Ménage à Trois," Foreign 
Affairs 50, no. 4 (July 1972): 700. 
3Sheikh Mujib explained secularism in the following words: 
Secularism doe3 not mean absence of religion. The 75 
million people of Bangladesh will have the right to 
religion by law. We have no intention of that kind.... 
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While the constitution imposed embargo on religious politics 
and abolished political recognition of religion by the 
state, and discrimination on religious grounds.4 Although 
Bangladesh identified itself as a Muslim state by attending 
at the Islamic conference (OIC) in Lahore in 1974, 
Bangladesh's relations with the Muslim countries were very 
cool. Because most of those countries opposed the Bangladesh 
liberation war and the creation of Bangladesh was seen by 
them as an Indo-Soviet ploy which led to the dismemberment 
of the largest Muslim country in the world—Pakistan. Again, 
after the birth of Bangladesh, Mu jib's secular state 
principles, identical with India and socialist state 
ideology, opposed to Islamic culture and ideology widened 
the gap between Bangladesh and the Muslim world. Moreover, 
Pakistan's campaign among the Muslim nations against 
Bangladesh and the Israeli bid to be friend by announcing 
its recognition of Bangladesh5 also antagonized the Muslim 
Muslims will observe their religion and nobody in this 
state has the power to prevent that. Hindus will observe 
their religion and nobody has the power to prevent that. 
Buddhist and Christians will observe their religion and 
nobody has the power to prevent that. Our only objective 
is that nobody will be allowed to use religion as a 
political weapon. See Sheikh Mujib's speech in the 
Parliament, November 4, 1972, Bangladesh Observer. 
November 5, 1972. 
4Quoted in S.M. Shamsul Alam, "Islam, Ideology, and the State in 
Bangladesh," Journal of Asian and African Studies 25, nos. 1-2 (1993): 
96. 
5The Israeli Parliament-Knesset-recognized Bangladesh in April 
1972. Moreover, on July 12, 1971, it took a resolution by condemning 
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states. Actually, Bangladesh's emergence as an independent 
state by dismembering the powerful Muslim state Pakistan was 
seriously misperceived by the Muslim states particularly by 
the Arab states. Bangladesh, however, very rapidly gained 
the support of the Muslim world by adopting various 
strategies and diplomatic measures, which soon began to 
bring dividends and by the end of 1973 Bangladesh got 
recognition from as many as 38 states. Although the Lahore 
Summit of the OIC worked as a watershed, in which Bangladesh 
was admitted as a full member of the OIC, many powerful 
Muslim states including Saudi Arabia still did not recognize 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh-Muslim world relations dramatically 
shifted after the coup d'etat of August 15, 1975 which 
caused the fall of the Mujib regime. After Mujib's 
assassination the successive government decided to change 
the name of the predominantly Muslim country from the 
People's Republic to the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh. 
This decision originated out of the drive of the new 
government to have better relations with the Muslim world.6 
Bangladesh-Muslim world relations developed signifi¬ 
cantly with the advent of Ziaur Rahman and Bangladesh 
achieved a very prestigious position in the OIC during the 
Zia regime. Zia's sponsorship of the constitutional 
the mass killing and destruction of the Pakistani army. See Nurul 
Momen, Bangladesh: The First Five Years (Dhaka, 1980), 181-184. 
6G.W. Chaudhury, "Bangladesh's Coup and Counter Coups: 
International Implication," ORBIS 19, no. 4 (1976): 1591. 
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amendment, which deleted secularism as one of the 
fundamental principles of state policy and absolute trust 
and faith in Allah (God) further strengthened Bangladesh's 
relationship with the Muslim world.7 Moreover, the Zia 
government added a new clause to Article 25 of the 
constitution which said: The state shall endeavor to 
consolidate, preserve, and strengthen fraternal relations 
among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity.8 As a 
matter of fact Bangladesh-Muslim world relations reached to 
its peak from its nadir during the Zia regime and Bangladesh 
played a vanguard role in promoting the interest of the 
Muslim Ummah.9 
About the Bangladesh-Muslim world relations under Zia, 
Rodney Tasker wrote: 
Although he [Zia] has not proclaimed the country 
with its 85% Muslim population, an Islamic state, 
he has changed the constitution to bring the 
country closer to the Islamic fraternity than 
Mu jib's secular state. This has brought quick 
dividends as regards relations with Saudi Arabia, 
which would have no dealing with the Mujib regime. 
Since Zia came to power, diplomatic relations have 
7Muhammed A. Tayyeeb, "Bangladesh: The Dilemma of Independence," 
Asian Affairs: An American Review (January-February 1978): 178. 
3The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. 
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, February 28, 1979. 
9Shaukat Hassan, "Bangladesh Foreign Policy: Introductory 
Remarks," in M.G. Kabir and Shaukat Hassan (eds.) Issues and 
Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy (Dhaka: Bangladesh Society 
of International, 1989), 15. 
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been established with Saudi Arabia which is now 
the fourth largest aid donor to Bangladesh.10 
However, in order to make a comparative study of 
Bangladesh-Muslim world relations during the Mujib and Zia 
regimes, the following issues will be addressed in this 
chapter. 
Role of the Muslim World in the Liberation War of 
Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh-Muslim World Relations. 
Summary. 
Role of the Muslim World in the Liberation War of 
Bangladesh 
Most of the Muslim countries of the world either 
explicitly or implicitly supported Pakistan and condoned the 
Bangladesh liberation war in 1971.11 From the very beginning 
to the end, the Muslim world misinterpreted the Bangladesh 
movement. They regarded it as the internal problem of 
Pakistan and left the solution of the problem in the hands 
of the military ruler of Pakistan. Regarding the Muslim 
worlds concern about the Bangladesh movement, Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh wrote to the OIC 
Secretary General Tenku Abdul Rahman in March 1972: 
10Rodney Tasker, "In Pursuit of a Vision," Far Eastern Economic 
Review. October 12, 1979. 
11Richard Hrair Dekmejian, "The Islamic Revival in the Middle 
East and North Africa," Current History (April 1980): 168. 
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It is a matter of regret that you have not felt it 
necessary to say anything about the position of 
Bengalis in Pakistan. I have also to recall with 
regret that during the last nine months when three 
million Bengalis were killed in cold blood by the 
West Pakistani forces you did not raise your voice 
to stop the killings of innocent Muslims and of 
other communities in the second largest Muslim 
state.12 
It was in fact very surprising that most of the Muslim 
countries, especially the Arab world, had failed to raise 
their voice or protest or even express their sympathy for 
the innocent people of Bangladesh against the military 
attacks of Pakistani rulers. This demonstrates that they 
were supposed to be "paralyzed into action," for not 
offending Pakistan and thus considered the Bangladesh 
movement as an internal affair of Pakistan.13 Actually almost 
all the Muslim states overtly and covertly supported 
Pakistan against Bangladesh struggle. Although the Muslim 
world's attitude towards Bangladesh was not directed by the 
Islamic theory of international relations,14 it served their 
12Iimes Of India, March 28, 1972. 
13Z.V.B. Karnik, "Challenge to the U.N.O.," United Asia 23, no. 3 
(1971) : 204. 
14According to the Islamic theory of international relations, 
relations among nations are based upon ten identifiable sources: 
i) Qur'an, ii) the sunnah or the traditions or practices of the 
prophet Muhammad, iii) diplomatic conduct of the Khulfa Rashidun 
(Orthodox Caliphs), iv) the practice of Muslim rulers not repudiated 
by the juris consults, v) recognized Muslim jurist's opinion, which 
are divided into two categories: a) Ijma: consensus of opinion and b) 
Qiyas: individual opinion, vi) arbitral awards, vii) treaties, pacts, 
and other conventions, viii) official instructions to commanders, 
admirals, ambassadors, and other state officials, ix) international 
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national interest. Among the Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Morocco, Iran, Kuwait, UAE and other sheikdom of the 
Persian Gulf directly supported Pakistan with their utmost 
vigor, while other Arab states like Egypt, Syria, Iraq and 
Algeria remained comparatively silent like the Muslim 
countries of Southeast Asia.15 As a matter of fact, despite 
having many differences with Pakistan, still the Muslim 
countries supported Pakistan16 against the Bangladesh 
legislation regarding conduct of foreigners and foreign relations, x) 
custom and usage. For details see Hafeez Malik, "Islamic Theory of 
International Relations," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern 
Studies 2, no. 2 (Spring 1979): 86. See also Muhammad Hamidullah, 
Muslim Conduct Qf State (Lahore: Ashrat, 1961), 121. 
15Asgar Ali, "Bangladesh and Muslim World," United Asia 23, no. 3 
(1971): 195. Also see Denis Wright, Bangladesh: Origins and Indian 
Qcean Relations (1971-1375). 
16Among Muslim countries, Iran with whom Pakistan had close 
historical, geographical, and cultural ties and association through 
RCD and CENTO called upon all nations of the world not to interfere in 
the internal affairs of Pakistan. Turkey, also a member of RCD and 
CENTO, expressed the view that the matters should be settled without 
any foreign influence. Indonesia officially regarded the happenings in 
Pakistan as its internal affair and that outsiders had "no right 
whatsoever to interfere." Indonesian foreign minister officially said 
that Indonesia will not recognize Bangladesh government in East 
Pakistan because it does not want to see other people's countries 
split. Malaysia also declared that the developments in East Pakistan 
was the internal matter of Pakistan. President Bakar of Iraq and Saudi 
Arabian foreign minister in an official statement declared on behalf 
of their respective countries full support for the territorial 
integrity of Pakistan. Similarly Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, 
Senegal and Libya extended their firm support to Pakistan's unity and 
integrity. President Boumedienne of Algeria warned the outsiders that 
"any attempts aimed at aggravating the crisis would widen its 
dimension and generate conflict that can only favor intervention of 
imperialism in an already stricken region." President Anwar Sadat of 
United Arab Republic (UAR) bluntly declared: "Whatever happens we 
shall continue to support the integrity of Pakistan." See Dawn 
(Karachi), March 30, 1971, April 4, 1971, April 10, 1971, April 19, 
1971; Pakistan Times (Lahore) April 5, 1971, Dawn. April 21, 1971, 
June 15, 1971. 
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struggle. During the crisis, they extended their support to 
Pakistan by: 
(i) adhering the principle of non-interference, 
(ii) branding the East Bengal crisis as an internal 
matter of Pakistan, 
(iii) and asking foreign powers not to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Pakistan.17 
Apart from individual support of the Muslim countries, 
the OIC extended its unequivocal support towards Pakistan. 
In fact, the third conference of the foreign ministers of 
the OIC declared its full support to Pakistan, its 
territorial integrity, national sovereignty and 
independence.18 Moreover, the media of Muslim countries19 and 
17Mehrunnisa Ali, "East Pakistan Crisis: International Reaction," 
Pakistan Horizon 24, no. 2 (Second Quarter 1971) . 
18See Justice Quaderuddin Ahmed, "The East Pakistan Crisis and 
the Jeddah Conference of Muslim Countries," Pakistan Horizon 25, vol. 
1 (First Quarter, 1972). 
19An Iranian newspaper Kayhan International described the 
situation in East Pakistan as an internal matter and warned that any 
attempt at meddling with the internal affair of Pakistan would amount 
to a direct attack on the country's sovereignty and integrity. 
International Tribune of Indonesia pointed out that the objective of 
India was to weaken Pakistan internally and through its dismemberment 
to retain Indian hold over Kashmir. The Baghdad Observer said: 
Pakistan deserves all the good will of the Arab people and their 
warmest manifestation of friendship, especially at this moment of 
stress. L'opinion of Rabat condemned India for "obviously aiding and 
abetting the rebellion in East Pakistan." For details see Mehrunnisa 
Ali, "East Pakistan Crisis: International Reactions," Pakistan Horizon 
24, no. 2 (Second Quarter 1971): 57. 
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international Muslim organizations20 strongly supported 
Pakistan and opposed Bangladesh movement. Actually, the 
support of the Muslim world towards Pakistan was justified 
by Z.A. Bhutto as follows: 
Pakistan is also a leading member of the Muslim 
world, which sweeps in a vast area from the 
Atlantic through Africa and the Middle East to 
Indonesia, touching the shores of the Pacific. 
Imperishable affinities born of culture, religion 
and historical experience bind us to other Muslim 
nations and underline our community of interest. 
Together with our neighbors, Iran and Turkey, we 
have established an organization for regional 
cooperation for development. We have supported the 
just cause of the Arab world, which in turn stood 
with us in our hour of trial in 1971. Their 
subsequent support has strengthened our position 
immeasurably. Not only has it demonstrated to 
Pakistan the friendship of her Muslim brethren, 
but it has displayed to the world the solidarity 
of the Muslim nations.21 
Although Bhutto defined the support of the Muslim state 
towards Pakistan as solidarity of the Muslim nations, there 
were several reasons actually behind their support against 
Bangladesh and towards Pakistan. 
1. Solidarity of the Muslim countries is one of the 
fundamental principles of the OIC. Although 85 percent 
20Muslim organization all over the world expressed their sympathy 
and support to Pakistan in its effort to maintain its territorial 
integrity. In a statement by Syed Amin-Al-Hussein, President of the 
Motammar Al-Alam-Al-Island, condemned the continuous interference of 
India and other foreign power. The Islamic World Congress, the joint 
secretariat of five international Muslim organizations and the 
Moroccan Istiglal Party, all condemned Indian interference and 
extended their support to Pakistan's unity and integrity. Cited in 
Dawn (Karachi), April 18, 1971, May 19, 1971, and May 18, 1971. 
21Z. A. Bhutto, "Pakistan Builds Anew," Foreign Affairs 51, no. 3 
(April 1973): 553. 
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Muslim population was fighting for Bangladesh in 1971, the 
movement was actively supported by the Hindu India and the 
socialist Soviet Union. The Muslim states considered the 
Indo-Soviet instrumental role towards Bangladesh movement as 
a grand design to dismember the largest Muslim country, 
Pakistan, and so they opposed the struggle as an internal 
matter of Pakistan which could be solved without outside 
interference. 
2. Strategic considerations of the Muslim world also 
led them to rally behind Pakistan. Indo-Bangladesh joint 
action against Pakistan with the material support of the 
Soviet Union was seen by the Muslim world as a Soviet- 
diplomatic device for the expansion of its control towards 
South Asia. It was very surprising because it happened at a 
time when Soviet influence in West Asia and in the Middle 
East was almost declining. In fact, the Soviet involvement 
with Pakistan crisis also concerned the security of many 
Muslim states, especially who had close border with the 
Soviet Union. The Muslim world as a whole was worried about 
the expansion of the Soviet interference, from Pakistan to 
Afghanistan, Iran and other Persian Gulf states, which would 
inevitably threaten the existing status quo in West Asia and 
the Middle East. 
3. Pakistan's relation with the Muslim world was very 
prominent and its position was very important as the largest 
Muslim state and the most active member of the QIC. Moreover 
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as the West Pakistani elites ruled the country from 1947 to 
1971, and since West Pakistan was the capital of the country 
and center of the economic activity, so by understanding 
Pakistan, mainly they understood West Pakistan.22 East 
Pakistani leaders and East Pakistan were not that much 
familiar with the Muslim world. Moreover, the foreign policy 
matters of Pakistan had been dealt by the elites of the 
central government who were mostly from the West Pakistan. 
East Pakistan had no separate entity in foreign policy 
issues. So during the crisis of 1971, the Muslim countries 
did not get clear picture about what was going on in East 
Pakistan. By presenting the whole East Pakistan crisis to 
the Muslim world, from the West Pakistani viewpoint, 
Pakistan created a wrong impression in the Muslim world 
about the political development in its erstwhile eastern 
wing. 
4. Finally, the early recognition of Bangladesh by 
Israel created widespread misperception in the Arab world. 
In fact the freedom movement of Bangladesh got Israeli 
support. Israel expressed the sympathy for the newborn 
country Bangladesh in early 1972 when it was not yet 
recognized by any Arab country. Bangladesh realized that 
Israeli intention did not originate out of just sympathy and 
sincerity but it was designed to create a psychological 
22Golam Mostafa, "Bangladesh Foreign Policy, The Middle East 
Factor," BUSS Journal 7, no. 1 (January 1986). 
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image among Bangladesh and the Islamic world. So Bangladesh 
didn't accept Israeli recognition. Although Bangladesh 
categorically regretted the Israeli recognition and 
emphasized its unwillingness to have any relations with 
Israel, it aroused considerable Arab concern. 
Bangladesh-Muslim World Relations: 
Mu jib and Zia Regimes (1971-1981) 
Bangladesh-Muslim World Relations; Political Level 
Denouncing the role of the Muslim world, during the 
liberation war of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared 
that: "Arab world did nothing about my people who are also 
followers of Islam, by permitting Pakistani cruelty."23 Even 
after the emergence of Bangladesh, many countries of the 
Muslim world refused to recognize it. Many of the Muslim 
countries wanted the reunification of Bangladesh with 
Pakistan. Although Bangladesh emerged as the second largest 
Muslim state after Indonesia with its 85 percent Muslim 
population, Bangladesh was not recognized by any Muslim 
country. In fact there were several factors which delayed 
the Muslim worlds recognition of Bangladesh. 
1. India's support of Bangladesh against Pakistan was 
seen by the Muslim states with suspicion and mistrust. Some 
even considered the Bangladesh movement as an act of ruining 
23 Times of India, March 28, 1972. 
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an Islamic state, which was well known to the Muslim world 
as Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Some analysts argued that 
the ruling elites in Pakistan used Islam as an instrument to 
support unpopular regime and an inequitable social, economic 
and political order.24 Moreover Pakistan armies brutal 
atrocities in the name of Islam was placed to the Muslim 
world by Pakistani authority as conspiracy and propaganda 
against Islam and the Muslim Ummah. So the Muslim world 
considered the birth of Bangladesh as the dismemberment of 
Pakistan and they refused to recognize the break away 
nation. 
2. The early recognition of Bangladesh by Israel, a 
common enemy of the Muslim world (all Muslim countries 
boycotted Israel from their international relations) also 
created wide misperceptions in the Muslim world. Although 
Bangladesh categorically rejected the Israeli recognition 
and expressed its unwillingness to have any relations with 
Israel, it created considerable camouflage that whether 
Bangladesh was anti-Islamic or not. 
Moreover during the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971, 
the Pakistani military junta played up its Islamic image and 
branded the Bengalis as Kafirs (infidels) and in this war of 
24Mohammad Ayoob, "Two Faces of Political Islam: Iran and 
Pakistan Compared," Asian Survey 19, no. 6 (June 1979): 537. 
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infidels, they very successfully gained the support of the 
Muslim world.25 
On the other hand, Bangladesh's increasing cordial 
détente with Hindu India and socialist Russia aggravated 
Muslim world's concern over Bangladesh. The presence of 
Indian soldiers in the Bangladesh soil also let the Muslim 
world believe that Bangladesh was a periphery of mighty 
India. So they did not consider that the recognition of 
Bangladesh would strengthen Muslim solidarity in the world. 
3. After the birth of Bangladesh Mujib's constitutional 
option for secularism, paralleled India, contributed to the 
view that Mujib was taking away the country far from Islamic 
Ummah. Moreover, Mujib's banning order on Islamic politics 
and abolition of Islamic foundation, just after the 
independence of Bangladesh, although established Mujib as a 
secular leader and gave Bangladesh—a secular state 
character, it prohibited Mujib and Bangladesh from fraternal 
relations with the Muslim world. Actually, Mujib's secular 
policy led to the banishment of Islam from public life and 
demonstrated an intense hostility towards Islam as a 
political and cultural symbol.26 It is believed that Mujib 
25Ahmed Shafiqul Haque and Muhammad Yeahia Akhter, "The Ubiquity 
of Islam: Religion and Society in Bangladesh," Pacific Affairs 60, no. 
2 (Summer 1987): 202. 
26M. Rashiduzzaman, "Islam, Muslim Identity and Nationalism in 
Bangladesh," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 
1 (Fall 1994) : 41. 
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introduced secular state principles in order to retain the 
loyalty of the Hindu minority which constituted 12 percent 
of the population of Bangladesh.27 Here the main drawback of 
the Mujib's policy was that he failed to realize that Islam 
was not only the dominant majority faith but an unyielding 
political identity impossible to ignore.28 So, the Muslim 
world at large did not consider it an imperative to 
recognize Bangladesh immediately after its independence. 
4. Some vital factors which delayed the recognition of 
Bangladesh by the Muslim world were Pakistan's threat to the 
world nations that those recognizing Bangladesh would face 
certain rapture of diplomatic relations with Pakistan, and 
Islamabad actually did follow through with the threat. 
Pakistan believed that it was in its interest to deny the 
viability of Bangladesh as a state as long as possible, so 
that negotiations on the prisoner of wars (POWs) would be 
primarily a matter between India and Pakistan. Recognition 
of Bangladesh would give it a stronger negotiating position 
on this question, and Bhutto was keenly aware that Mujib was 
determined to try Pakistani soldiers accused of atrocities 
during the war.29 In particular, Bhutto pleaded to the 
Muslim world for holding recognition of Bangladesh. More 
27Zillur R. Khan, "Islam and Bengali Nationalism," Asian Survey 
25, no. 8 (August 1985): 846-847. 
28Rashiduzzaman, 58. 
29 Wright, 172. 
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specifically Bhutto led a mission to the Muslim world in 
late January 1972 and appealed to the Muslim leaders not to 
recognize immediately to Bangladesh. Bhutto's main argument 
was that their withholding of recognition would give him 
time to restore relations with Bangladesh and negotiate the 
settlement of the POWs issue. 
Although the Muslim world as a whole withheld the 
recognition of Bangladesh immediately after its emergence, 
the Mujib government worked hard to establish relations with 
the Muslim world. To Mujib, recognition of Bangladesh by the 
Muslim world specially nine oil rich Arab country out of the 
thirteen OPEC members was more important than Islamic 
solidarity. At this point Bangladesh seriously needed 
foreign aid and wanted assistance from the Arab world, for 
the reconstruction of the war ravaged economy.30 To this 
end, at the domestic level, Mujib administration released 
the leaders and workers of the Islamic parties under general 
amnesty, who were detained for collaboration with the 
Pakistan army during the Bangladesh war. The Mujib 
government also retained "Islamiat" (Islamic studies) and 
Arabic in the academic syllabus of the school as a symbol of 
Islamic flavor. Moreover, the government re-established the 
Islamic foundation—an academy for research and publication 
on Islam. To convince the traditional Ulemas (Islamic 
30Syed Anwar Husain, "Bangladesh O' Islami Bessaw," 38. 
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scholars) and the strict followers of Islam, Mujib increased 
slightly the budgetary allocation for madrasa education, as 
a means to gain the support of the traditional Ulema's and 
pious masses for his regime. All these steps were part of 
Mujib's strategy, designed to persuade the Muslim world that 
"Islam" was not in danger in Bangladesh.31 
At the international level, the Mujib administration 
was taking several steps to meet the differences between 
Bangladesh and the Muslim world. As a first step of Mujib's 
diplomatic move, Bangladesh attended the Afro-Asian 
solidarity conference (AAPSO) , on January 10, 1972, held at 
Cairo.32 In this conference, Bangladesh was admitted as a 
full member of the AAPSO with the vote of the majority 
members of the Arab world. Following Afro-Asian solidarity 
conference several Muslim countries, especially Malaysia and 
Indonesia officially recognized Bangladesh by March 1972. 
At the end of 1972 among the Arab countries, Iraq and the 
Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen recognized Bangladesh 
among the Arab world. Bangladesh continued its diplomatic 
31See S.M. Shamsul Alam, "Islam, Ideology and the State in 
Bangladesh," Journal of Asian and African Studies 28, nos. 1-2 (1993): 
97. Also see Akmal Hussain, "Bangladesh and the Muslim World," in 
Emajuddin Ahmed (ed.) Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small States 
Imperative (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1984): 87. 
32A four member Bangladesh delegation was sent to Cairo to attend 
the AAPSO conference, which was led by Mollah Jalal Uddin. In this 
conference Pakistan was seriously condemned and accused for genocide 
in East Bengal in 1971. Protesting Bangladesh's presence in the 
conference, Pakistan boycotted the opening session of the conference. 
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efforts toward the Muslim world after the AAPSO conference. 
In September 1973 Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman participated in the fourth summit conference of the 
Non-Aligned movement (NAM) held in Algiers, an event now 
regarded as a landmark in Bangladesh's relation with the 
Muslim world. In the NAM summit Mujib personally appealed 
to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, President Anwar Sadat of 
Egypt. Col. Gaddafi of Libya and the Lebanese Prime Minister 
for better relations.33 All of these events helped remove 
many of the earlier misgivings about Bangladesh. Following 
the Algiers Summit two important Arab countries, Egypt and 
Syria recognized Bangladesh. After the NAM Summit, Egypt, 
Algeria and Malaysia started strong diplomatic efforts in 
favor of Bangladesh, among the Muslim countries, which 
resulted in the recognition of Bangladesh by many of the 
Muslim countries by August 1975.34 
Bangladesh continued to strengthen the Islamic 
connection by identifying itself with the Arab cause against 
the Israeli aggression. After the outbreak of the fourth 
33Mastafa, 39. Also see Syed Anwar Hussain, 32. 
34The Muslim worlds' recognition of Bangladesh: Malaysia/ 
Indonesia, March 1972; Iraq, June 24 1972; Afghanistan, Feb. 18 1973; 
Algeria/Mauritania/Tunisia, July 17 1973; Morocco, July 20 1973; 
Egypt, Sept. 15 1973; Syria/Zaire/Gabon, Sept. 15 1973; Sudan, Sept. 
16 1973; Libya, Sept. 19 1973; North Yemen, Nov. 1973; Kuwait, Feb. 22 
1974; Jordan, Nov. 1973; Pakistan/Turkey, March 6 1974; UAE, Aug. 16, 
1975; Saudi Arabia, Aug. 19 1975; Iran, Aug. 20 1975; Quatar, Aug. 21 
1975. See Zaglul Haider, "Bangladesher Parorashtra Nity," Samaj 
Nirikkonr no. 36 (May 1990), CSS: Dhaka Univ.: 60. 
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Arab-Israeli war in October 1972, Bangladesh expressed its 
total solidarity with the Arab world. It very strongly 
condemned the Zionist aggression and sent a 28-member 
medical team to Syria for the treatment of the war victims 
and 5,000 freedom fighters as a voluntary force to fight for 
the Arab cause against Israel.35 Bangladesh's clear stand in 
the Arab-Israeli war and its diplomatic and moral support 
for the Arab cause impressed the Arab world, and received 
wider Arab confidence and following the war Bangladesh had 
successfully improved its relations with the Muslim world. 
Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman conceded 
that Bangladesh's support to the Arabs during the Arab- 
Israeli war of 1973 have established Bangladesh as a true 
friend of the Arabs.36 
Apart from early recognition, among the Muslim 
countries Malaysia and Indonesia, supported Bangladesh's 
membership in the United Nations. Malaysia on September 23, 
1972 and Indonesia on October 2, 1972, made strong pleas for 
the admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations. 
Although Afghanistan recognized Bangladesh later, on 
February 18, 1973, still it advocated for Bangladesh's 
admission into the UN. Moreover before formal recognition 
35Hussain, 37. 
36Sheikh Mujib's Address to the Nation on the Victory day of 
Bangladesh, December 16, 1973, Bangladesh Documents (vol. 2, October- 
Decmeber 1973), 14. 
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Egypt, Iraq and South Yemen voted in favor of Bangladesh's 
membership in the World Health Organization (WHO). 
Bangladesh's relations with the Muslim world took a 
dramatic turn in the Lahore Summit of the OIC. The second 
largest Muslim country-Bangladesh refused to attend the OIC 
summit at Lahore unless Pakistan recognize Bangladesh. At 
this stage President Anwar Sadat of Egypt played the role of 
conduit between Dhaka and Islamabad. Finally after tough 
diplomacy by the Muslim world, Pakistan recognized 
Bangladesh on February 22, 1974 and on February 24, 1971, 
Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman led a 22 
member Bangladesh's delegation to the Lahore Summit of the 
OIC. Since then Bangladesh emerged as an important member of 
the OIC. In the OIC Summit Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman unequivocally supported the Arab and the Palestinian 
cause. Sheikh Mujib proclaimed: 
We must regain our right over Jerusalem. We salute 
the brave martyrs and valiant heroes of the 
Ramadan war, who by their valor and their 
sacrifices destroyed many myths and created new 
executive conditions with all promise that right 
and justice will eventually triumph.37 
In fact on the eve of the Lahore Summit Bangladesh was 
recognized by Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and later on by 
Quatar, UAE, Bahrain and Oman. The Lahore Summit of the OIC 
was a landmark development. It gave Bangladesh the full 
37Speech of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the Second Islamic Summit 
Conference in Lahore on February 24, 1974. Bangladesh Documents 2, no. 
3 (January-March 1974): 22. 
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membership of the OIC. Moreover Bangladesh was considered as 
an influential member of the OIC and the Muslim world. 
Shortly after obtaining its membership of the OIC Bangladesh 
displayed its commitment to the Islamic Ummah and became the 
co-founder of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in April 
1975. This bank was established with the aim of giving 
support to the ongoing development projects of the Islamic 
countries .38 
Besides, OIC membership, as a gesture of friendship, 
prime minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman visited Egypt in 
November 1974. It was Egypt which received Prime Minister 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman first amongst the Arab states. During 
Mujib's five day visit to Cairo, he had meeting with 
President Anwar Sadat and other ranking ministers and signed 
a cultural agreement for consolidating cultural educational 
and technical aid between the two countries, based mainly on 
exchange scheme.39 
Although among the Muslim countries all but Saudi 
Arabia recognized Bangladesh by August 1975, Mujib could not 
establish any strong tie with them because of his domestic 
policy option for secularism and socialism and alignment 
with India, Soviet Union and the socialist world, at the 
international level. In spite of Mujib's strong diplomatic 
38Husain, "Bangladesh and the Organization of Islamic 
Conference. " 
39Morning News (Dhaka), November 7, 1974, November 10, 1974. 
360 
effort to cultivate close friendship, the Muslim world ended 
its responsibility by recognizing it as a legitimate state 
only. 
The August coup of 1975 and the abrupt change in 
Bangladesh politics is considered as a breakthrough for 
Bangladesh's relation with the Muslim world. After the 
assassination of President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the new 
government at first declared a change from the Peoples 
Republic to the Islamic Republic.40 This decision was 
announced to demonstrate its desire to have better relations 
with the Muslim countries. But later reconsidering imminent 
danger from secular India, Islamic republic was repealed and 
Peoples Republic was re-announced.41 
In fact after the abrupt change of government in August 
1975, Saudi Arabia, the leading member of the Arab world and 
the largest oil rich country recognized Bangladesh on August 
16, 1975. At this point Pakistan renewed its recognition to 
the new regime in Bangladesh and Pakistan's leader Z.A. 
Bhutto, appealed to the OIC and the Third World countries to 
recognize the new regime.42 Actually, with the advent of 
Ziaur Rahman at first defacto and later dejuré leader, 
40New York Times. August 16, 1975. 
41G.W. Chaudhury, "Bangladesh's Coup and Counter Coups: 
International Implications," ORBIS 29, no. 4 (Winter 1976): 1591. 
42The Guardian. August 16, 1975. 
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through the process of military coup, Bangladesh was looking 
for an Islamic identity both at the domestic and 
international levels.43 To this end Zia brought revolutionary 
changes both at the domestic and foreign policy. The Zia 
regime substantially shifted from the Mujib regime and at 
first changed the constitution and gave increasing attention 
to Islam in the constitution. In the preamble of the 
constitution, he introduced "Bismilla-hir-Rahmanir-Rahim" 
(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) in 1977 
by a Presidential Proclamation and by the same proclamation, 
he amended Article 8(1) of the constitution and dropped 
secularism from the constitution and instead inserted 
"absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah shall be the 
basis of all actions," in the constitution.44 Zia totally 
deleted Article 12, which contained the mechanism for 
implementation of the principles of secularism. While 
defending the constitutional amendment Zia said in an 
interview : 
In 1977 we changed our constitution and the 
constitution brought in Islamic provisions. We 
give religion due importance in our national life. 
Our people are very religious.45 
43Vernon Maston Hewitt, The International Politics of South Asia 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992): 97. 
44The full text of the proclamation (amendment) order 1977 in 
Bangladesh Observer (April 23, 1977). 
45Ziaur Rahman's interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review. 
October 12, 1979. 
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Socialism, another principle of the constitution, was also 
re-defined by Zia as social and economic justice. By 
another presidential proclamation Article 38 of the 
constitution, which forbade the operation of the religion 
based political parties, was abolished and thus allowed the 
Islamic political parties return to the political arena in 
Bangladesh.46 
Again at the international level, Zia made a drastic 
change and shifted Bangladesh foreign policy from Indo- 
Soviet orbit and brought it close to the west, China and the 
Muslim world. In order to strengthen Bangladesh's 
relationship with the Muslim world, Zia inserted a new 
clause to Article 25 of the constitution which stated: "The 
state shall endeavor to consolidate, preserve, and 
strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based 
on Islamic solidarity."47 As a matter of fact Zia pursued a 
pro-Islamic foreign policy in order to achieve the national 
interests. In the post-August coup of 1975 period, peoples 
grievances against Mu jib's "secular stance," led to the 
development of Islamic feeling among them. At this point, 
46Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues (Dhaka: 
UPL 1987), 207. 
47See Article 25 of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of 
Bangladesh, The Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Law (Dhaka: 
Bangladesh Government Press, February 27, 1979). Also see Ahmed and 
Nazneen, 796. Also see. Shaukat Arasan, "Bangladesh Foreign Policy: 
Introductory Remarks," in M.G. Kabir and Shaukat Hiassan (eds.) Issues 
and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy (Dhaka: BSIS, 1989), 
3. 
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the whole nation by and large aspired to have alignment with 
the Muslim world. To Zia it was a domestic compulsion to 
have fraternity with the Muslim world.48 He utilized the 
popular sentiments and established prompt rapprochement with 
the Muslim world which served both national interest and 
regimes interest. At that point Bangladesh's national 
interest mainly demanded economic assistance from the oil 
rich Arab countries. Because in the backdrop of the 
inadequate Indo-Soviet contribution for the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction of Bangladesh's economy, it desperately 
needed petro dollars to finance its ambitious economic 
programs.49 To this end, apart from constitutional changes at 
the domestic level, Zia also started the use of Islamic 
customs and traditions and emphasized on Islamic festivals 
in the social life of the nation.50 
Moreover Zia promulgated the political party's 
regulation (PPR) in July 1976 in order to regulate the 
activities of the political party, which gave enormous 
opportunity to the banned Islamic parties. Taking the 
advantage of the PPR, many political parties including 
48K.M. Mohsin, "Trends of Islam in Bangladesh," a paper presented 
in a seminar on "Islam in Bangladesh: Society, Culture and 
Institution," organized by Bangladesh Ithias Samity, December 24-26, 
1982), 6. 
49Ibid. Also see S.M. Shamsul Alam, 101. Also see Zillur R. Khan, 
Also see Ahmad and Nazneen, 796. 
50Based on my personal observation of Zia regime from 1972-1981. 
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Jamaat-i-Islam, Muslim league, and other Islamic parties re¬ 
started their political activities as independent parties. 
Zia also tried to be closed to the Arab world, by restoring 
the citizenship of several Islamists who remained overseas 
by repealing the collaborators Act.51 
In fact, Zia seriously attempted to identify and 
present Bangladesh as a genuine Muslim state to the Muslim 
world having Islamic customs, tradition and prestige. Zia's 
constitutional changes and domestic Islamic reforms 
impressed the Muslim world and they extended their 
cooperation towards Bangladesh. 
The Zia administration rapidly solidified itself with 
the Muslim countries and repeatedly expressed its interest 
in the promotion of Bangladesh's relation with the Muslim 
world.52 In 1977 President Zia paid an official visit to 
Saudi Arabia, which in fact laid down the foundation for the 
further development of Bangladesh's relation with the Arab 
world. In the same year Zia visited Iran, Egypt and Pakistan 
and in 1978 he visited Kuwait and Iraq, which significantly 
51Robert S. Anderson, "Impressions of Bangladesh: The Role of 
Arms and the Politics of Exhortation," Pacific Affairs no. 49 (1976): 
453. 
52The then chief martial law administrator and the defacto leader 
of Bangladesh, General Ziaur Rahman declared in a public meeting in 
Dhaka in 1976: "We have religious, historical, cultural relations with 
all the Muslim countries of the world and we want to further 
strengthen our relation with them." See Chief of Staff and Deputy 
Chief Martial Law Administrator, Major General Ziaur Rahman's speech 
at Suhrawardy Uddyan, on May 1, 1976 in the Bangladesh Observer (May 
2, 1976) . 
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increased Bangladesh's activity with the Muslim world.53 With 
the expansion of Bangladesh's relation with the Muslim 
world, Bangladesh also received very crucial support from 
the Muslim world in time of need. At the international 
level, when Bangladesh contested for the Security Council 
Seat, its candidature was supported and endorsed by the 9th 
Islamic Foreign Ministers conference held in Dakar, 
Senegal.54 Similarly, Bangladesh's position over Farakkah and 
Ganges water dispute with India, was supported and endorsed 
by the Seventh Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in May 
1976. Farakkah issue was included in the Joint Communique of 
the Seventh Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference.55 
By establishing close ties with the Muslim world, in 
fact President Zia emerged as an active and influential 
leader of the OIC. Bangladesh became the member of: 
1. Fifteen member permanent committee on Jerusalem 
known as the Al-Quds committee, 
2. Three member Al-Quds Summit Committee, 
3. Nine member OIC Peace Committee (Islamic Peace 
Committee) formed to mediate in the protracted and 
fratricidal war between Iran and Iraq, 
53See Sabiha Hasein, "Foreign Policy of Bangladesh," Pakistan 
Horizon 36, no. 4 (1984): 87. 
54Mastafa, 41. 
55Syed Anwar Husain, Bangladesh and the Organization of Islamic 
Conference," Asian Affairs no. 49( 1984): 25. 
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4. Thirteen member permanent committee of the Islamic 
solidarity fund. 
No doubt Bangladesh's entrance in the above listed 
vital committees of the OIC demonstrate Bangladesh's 
important position both in the OIC and the Arab world. Apart 
from this, Bangladesh played very effective role and pursued 
very balanced foreign policy towards the Muslim world in 
different issues, during the crisis time of the Ummah. 
Bangladesh's role in different crisis ridden issues are 
listed below: 
Palestine Issue 
Regarding the Palestine issue Bangladesh took very 
strong, unequivocal, unambiguous, and persistent policy. On 
this issue, Zia government did not differ with the Mujib's 
policy. Like Mujib's Palestine policy, President Zia also 
clearly maintained that the just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East was possible only through restoration of the 
inalienable rights of the Palestinians and immediate 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the all occupied Arab 
territories including the Holy City-Jerusalem, and 
recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
as the only legitimate organization of the Palestinians. In 
June 1976, Bangladesh initiated a proposal in the UN 
Security Council, which demanded the immediate withdrawal of 
the Israeli forces from the Arab territories occupied since 
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1 967.56 The principled position taken by Bangladesh was 
highly appreciated by the Muslim world as a whole, and as 
recognition of Bangladesh's active role it was elected 
member to the Jerusalem Committee both at the ministerial 
and summit levels. Bangladesh was also elected to the eight 
member non-aligned committee on Palestine. As members of 
all these committees Bangladesh played a very constructive 
role towards speedy and comprehensive solution to the core 
problem of the Middle East crisis. 
Afghanistan Issue 
Afghan issue was another major diplomatic issue which 
Bangladesh handled very carefully. It was a herculean 
diplomatic task for Zia regime for two reasons: (1) the 
problem involved a super power (Soviet Union) that played 
very contributory role in the emergence of Bangladesh as an 
independent nation, (2) as a vanguard member of the OIC and 
the Islamic world, Bangladesh had a special responsibility 
towards Afghanistan and the Muslim world. However, 
contemplating Bangladesh's national interest and the 
interest of the Muslim Ummah, Bangladesh clearly took very 
strong stand against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. 
Following the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, 
Bangladesh called for an extraordinary session of the OIC 
^Bangladesh Observer, May 22, 1976. Also see Syed Anwar Husein, 
"Bangladesh O' Islani Bissaw," 44. 
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and sponsored a resolution for the suspension of Afghan 
membership from the OIC.57 Secondly, both in the Security 
Council and General Assembly Bangladesh, along with five 
other Non-Aligned countries, co-sponsored a draft resolution 
calling for immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan.58 Moreover at the Non-Aligned forum, Bangladesh 
categorically condemned the Soviet military invasion in 
Afghanistan and expressed solidarity and support to the 
liberation struggle of Afghan people against the Soviet 
supported Karmal regime, and strongly demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan.59 
Actually, Bangladesh's strong stand stemmed out of 
several factors: 
1. Since the Arab countries were very important donors 
of Bangladesh and the Soviet invasion was seemingly opposed 
by the Arab world and the Muslim world and Bangladesh had a 
moral obligation to take a principled stand against the 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. 
57Syed Anwar Husain, 28. 
580n January 5, 1980, Bangladesh along with five other non- 
aligned countries co-spon3ored a draft resolution calling for an 
immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. But it was 
vetoed by the Soviet Union on January 8. Bangladesh played a very 
instrumental role in the adoption of a draft resolution by the General 
Assembly calling for an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan. For details see Nurul Momen, "Bangladesh at the Security 
Council: The Arab-l3raeli Issue," in Emajuddin Ahamad (ed.), Foreign 
Policy of Bangladesh: A Small State Imperative (Dhaka: UPL 1984), 106. 
59Shaukat Hassan, "Bangladesh, Zia and the Non-Aligned Movement," 
BUSS Journal Special Issue no. 1 (1981): 91. 
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2 . Although Moscow played a meaningful role in the 
liberation war of Bangladesh, following the Mujib regime, 
Moscow's economic aid to Bangladesh decreased substantially 
and it was virtually insignificant during Zia's regime. So 
from the viewpoint of national interest, Bangladesh had no 
obligation to support the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan. 
3. Communist invasion in Afghanistan, against a Muslim 
state and a non-aligned country seriously concerned the 
whole Muslim Ummah. As a leading member of the OIC and the 
Muslim world, Bangladesh shared that concern. 
4. Finally, Bangladesh sided with the United States, 
the key player in opposing the Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan, which was incidentally the largest donor and 
diplomatic friend of Bangladesh. It gave Bangladesh a golden 
opportunity to come closer to the United States. Although 
Bangladesh's role in the Afghan crisis seriously antagonized 
India and the Soviet Union, it helped Bangladesh to be 
friendly with the United States and the Muslim world, which 
was more important from the point of view of Bangladesh's 
national interest. From the security of small states 
perspective, Bangladesh also took the right decision, 
because the best way to ensure the security of small states 
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is to resist superior force once a conflict has developed.60 
Of course, the handling of Afghan crisis was a major success 
of Zia's foreign policy decision. 
Iran-Iraq War 
The Iran-Iraq war seriously concerned Bangladesh during 
the Zia regime, because of its close fraternal relations 
with both countries. From the very outbreak of the war in 
September 1980 Bangladesh called upon the conflicting 
parties to cease hostility and solve the dispute through 
peaceful negotiation. To this end, Bangladesh in its own 
capacity supported Resolution No. 479, adopted by the UN 
Security Council, and called upon Iran and Iraq for 
immediate cease-fire on the basis of UN resolution and 
international law. 61 
A major initiative for peaceful settlement of the war 
was taken in Taif in the third OIC summit in 1981. In this 
summit a nine member OIC peace committee was formed 
including Bangladesh (Islamic Peace Committee) to mediate 
the fratricidal war between Iran and Iraq. In the Taif 
summit Bangladesh proposed concrete measures to bring about 
an immediate cessation of hostilities and a just and 
60Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Security of Small States in the 
Third World (London, England: Miami, Florida, USA, 1982) . 
61Abdur Rab Khan and Golam Mostafa, "Middle East Situation Since 
Camp David: Implication for Bangladesh," BUSS Journal 3, no. 1 
(1982): 47-64. 
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honorable settlement of the dispute in accordance with 
international law.62 As a member of the OIC peace committee, 
President Zia along with nine-members committee eight times 
took efforts for peaceful settlement. Zia visited Iran and 
Iraq along with other committee members and met with the 
leaders of both countries with concrete peace proposal.63 But 
because of the uncompromising attitude of both Iran and 
Iraq, the Islamic peace committee was not successful in 
peace settlement.64 However, in its individual capacity 
Bangladesh under the Zia regime attempted to maintain a very 
balanced relation with both Iran and Iraq.65 
Bangladesh-Muslim World Relations: Economic Level 
Since the very beginning of Bangladesh's independent 
existence, Bangladesh was trying to explore foreign aid from 
external sources in general and Muslim world in particular 
especially from oil rich Arab countries. But in the 
immediate post liberation period, as the political relations 
of Bangladesh were not so much cordial, economic relations 
62Address by President Ziaur Rahman at the Third Islamic Summit 
Conference, January 25-28, 1981, Taif Saudi Arabia (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh), cited in Mastafa. 
63See Syed Anwar Husain, "Bangladesh O' Island. Bissawa," 47. 
64Syed Anwar Husain, "Bangladesh and the Organization of Islamic 
Conference," 29. 
65After the Zia regime, during the rule of General Ershad, 
Bangladesh clearly had warm relation with Iraq, which lowered the 
relations with Iran. Diplomatically it was inconsistent with the 
national interest of Bangladesh. 
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also could not develop significantly with the Muslim states 
especially with the Arab countries. Although Mu jib 
administration, by dint of its toughest diplomacy succeeded 
in getting recognition from most of the Muslim countries 
except Saudi Arabia, it could not acquire significant 
economic aid from these countries. In fact, faced with 
mounting economic crisis at the domestic level (while 
foreign currency reserves reached at almost zero in 1973- 
74), Bangladesh was desperately looking for economic 
assistance from the Muslim world. But Mu jib government's 
secular and socialist approach proved fatal to achieve the 
flow of Arab aid except very few donations. Among those 
Egypt donated ten thousand pounds of flood relief,66 while 
Saudi Arabia contributed US $10 million through the United 
Nations for famine relief,67 and the UAE offered US $5 
million. Although the economic assistance from the Muslim 
world during the Mujib regime was insignificant, Sheikh 
Mujib and his cabinet colleagues in order to improve 
economic relations undertook a serious diplomatic effort and 
toured the Arab countries in September 1974. Following 
Mujib's relentless diplomatic effort in October 1974, Mujib 
received a pledge of US $51 million from Iraq and US $10 
66Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), August 29, 1974. Also see Denis 
Wright, 242. 
67Pawn (Karachi), August 29, 1974. 
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million in food aid from Saudi Arabia.68 During the total 
period of Mujib regime (1971-1975) economic assistance from 
the Muslim world was negligible except very insignificant 
donations from the Arab countries. Until 1974-75 fiscal 
year, there were no bilateral food, project or commodity aid 
from any Muslim country. Some analysts believe, the reasons 
for the lack of aid from the Muslim world, during the two 
and half years of Mujib regime were its suspicion and lack 
of confidence in Mujib government.69 Although no Muslim 
country extended their bilateral economic aid to Bangladesh, 
Iran, UAE and Kuwait joined hand in hand with 17 non¬ 
communist countries and 9 international organizations and 
formed the aid to Bangladesh consortium in October 1974.70 
Apart from this during the devastating flood and mounting 
economic crisis of 1974, Bangladesh received aid from Muslim 
countries, the OPEC and Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
amounting to $166.2 million.71 Although trading relations 
were in existence, these were confined within limited areas 
and the volumes of trades were insignificant. (Table 18) 
68Pawn (Karachi), October 16, 1974. 
69Armal Hussain, "Bangladesh and the Muslim World," in Emajuddin 
Ahamad (ed.), Foreign Policy of Bangladesh (Dhaka: UP2, 1984), 89. 
70Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis and 
Political Polarization," Asian Survey 15, no. 2 (February 1975): 120. 
71See Rahman Sabhan, The Crisis of External Dependence: The 
Political Economy of Foreign Aid to Bangladesh (London: Zed Press, 
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Actually one landmark event of Bangladesh-Muslim world 
relations during the Mujib regime was that Bangladesh was 
the co-organizer of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), 
founded in April 1975. Unfortunately before getting much of 
its economic benefit, the Mujib regime collapsed in August 
1975. Because of Bangladesh's ideological differences with 
the Muslim world, under Mujib, despite having Middle Eastern 
countries increasing demands for more migrant workers, they 
did not consider Bangladesh.72 So Bangladesh could not become 
a supplier of manpower to the oil rich Arab world and it was 
deprived from badly needed foreign currency while the 
country's foreign exchange reserve was virtually nil by 
1974 . 
So clearly it is unveiled that, as political relations 
between Bangladesh and the Muslim world were insignificant, 
economic relations also remained stagnant during the Mujib 
regime. Despite having Mujib's relentless effort to promote 
relations with the Muslim world, it did not have significant 
impact on rapprochement, because of Mujib's secular and 
socialist approach for state management and external 
grouping with the secular India, socialist Russia, and the 
Communist world. 
72See Mokerrom Hussain and Richard F. Lcwy, "Migration from 
Bangladesh to the Middle East: Volume Trend and Consequences," Asian 
and African Studies 24, no. 1 (March 1990): 76. 
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However, with the assassination of Sheikh Mujib and the 
collapse of his regime, like the political relations, 
economic relations between Bangladesh and the Muslim world 
advanced substantially. Instead of socialism and secularism, 
the new government of Ziaur Rahman introduced "Islamic 
Provision Bimillah-hir-Rahman-ir-Rahim" in the constitution 
and deleted secularism, while instead of socialist strategy 
of development introduced free market economy, with state 
patronaged policy of denationalization and privatization. 
While at the international level, Zia administration shifted 
from Indo-Soviet orbit and aligned with the Muslim world, by 
introducing provision in the constitution that the state 
shall endeavor to consolidate preserve and strengthen 
fraternal relations with the Muslim countries. 
Actually Zia highly prioritized Bangladesh's national 
interest and strengthened relations with the Muslim world by 
changing the domestic and foreign policy decisions of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman. As Ziaur Rahman made serious attempt to 
augment relations with the Muslim world, especially with the 
Arab world, the Arab leaders also responded positively 
towards Bangladesh. In fact, the more political relations 
had developed, the more economic aid had come from them. 
Eventually, Middle Eastern countries emerged as a major 
source of aid to Bangladesh.73 
73Seven yaars of external assistance to Bangladesh. (ERD, 
Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh), 1982. Dhaka, June 
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As an attempt to improve relations with the Muslim 
world, Zia very frequently visited the Arab countries. In 
1977, President Zia paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia, 
Iran and Egypt. In 1978 he visited Kuwait and Iraq. During 
1977-1978, several good will delegations, from both 
Bangladesh and the Muslim states visited each other and 
signed number of agreements which formalized and 
strengthened Bangladesh's economic relations with the Muslim 
world.74 Islamic multi-lateral organizations like OPEC and 
IDB also became important donors for the development 
projects in Bangladesh during the Zia regime. In fact during 
1974 to 1981, IDB provided Bangladesh $25.1 million while 
during the same period OPEC supplied $24.3 million which 
were mostly harnessed and received during the Zia regime.75 
Apart from this, bilaterally, Bangladesh and Iran 
signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation in 
1977. While $300 million Saudi Development fund was set up 
in 1976 to finance a $516 million railway construction 
1978. Also see Sabiha Hasan, "Foreign Policy of Bangladesh II," 
Pakistan Horizon 36, no. 4 (1984): 87. 
74Ibid., 88. 
750PEC and IDB are two multilateral institutions of the Muslim 
world. OPEC started funding Bangladesh from 1974-75 fiscal year, which 
covered only one year of the Mujib regime. IDB was founded in April 
1975, but with the collapse of the Mujib regime it could not receive 
any benefit from this, while the whole benefit of these two 
institutions were enjoyed by the Zia regime (1975-1981) . See Rahman 
Sobhan, 230; also see Ibid., 143. 
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project in Bangladesh.76 In fact the OPEC countries (Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) emerged as 
important donor countries for Bangladesh. During 1971-1981, 
the OPEC countries disbursed $509.6 million,77 in which only 
$166.2 million was during the Mujib regime (1971-1975)78 and 
the remaining 343.40 million was disbursed during Zia's 
regime ( 1 975-1981 ) . 79 Besides aid from bilateral and 
multilateral sources, Bangladesh proposed for the 
establishment of the Islamic Center for Technical and 
Vocational Training and Research (ICTVTR) in Dhaka and it 
was approved at the 9th OIC foreign minister's conference in 
April 1978, in Dhakar, Senegal.80 During the Zia regime 
Bangladesh became the member of the Islamic Chamber of 
Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange (ICCICE).81 Its 
membership facilitated Bangladesh for trade, commerce and 
industrial cooperation with the Muslim world. Bangladesh, 
76Rahman Sobhan, The Crisis of External Dependence: The Political 
Economy Of Foreign Aid Banaladsah (London: Zed Press, 1982), 230- 
31. 
77Rehman Sobhan, 231. 
78$166.2 million includes ADB and OPEC's aid too. 
79Based on the calculation of difference. 
80The objective of the center is to assist "the process of 
converting the vast manpower stock of the Islamic countries into a 
viable human capital for development by imparting technical and 
vocational training. See Syed Anwar Husain, "Bangladesh and the OIC," 
20. 
81 Ibid., 21. 
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under President Zia also played a very instrumental role in 
the OIC for transforming the Islamic solidarity into a 
politico-economic reality. To this end Bangladesh tabled a 
number of proposals at the 10th OIC foreign ministers 
conference in May 1979. The proposals included: 
1. an exchange of capital human resources. 
2. proper harnessing of manpower resources for 
productive uses, 
3. concerted efforts to generate required resources to 
meet the basic necessities of life, and 
4. formation of an Islamic economic community.82 
Among these, the proposal for the formation of Islamic 
economic community was crystallized into an idea of Islamic 
Common Market (ICM) and was co-sponsored by Bangladesh and 
Turkey at the third Islamic Summit at Taif.83 The idea behind 
this proposal was to ensure greater cooperation among the 
Muslim countries. The ultimate objective of the common 
market was to commence full economic integration among the 
member states. The proposal is still under consideration. 
Bangladesh's constructive role in the OIC for the 
economic development of Islamic Ummah placed it in an 
important position in the OIC and the multilateral 
82Bangladesh Observer. May 22, 1976. 
83"Bangladesh in the Third Islamic Summit Conference," Bangladesh 
in International Affairs 4 (January 1981): 10-13. 
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institutions of the Muslim countries like OPEC and IDB 
during the Zia regime. 
Aside from this, Bangladesh's instrumental role in the 
OIC and IDB, gave Bangladesh a very potential labor market 
for its laborers (both skilled and unskilled) in the Middle 
East. Although Bangladesh first entered in the Middle 
Eastern labor market in 1976, it achieved remarkable success 
in the following years of Zia's regime. With an intensive 
effort very soon it was able to achieve remarkable success 
in securing employment in different Arab and Gulf states. In 
1976 the total Bangladeshi manpower employed in the Middle 
Eastern countries was 5591 (91.3%) of the total overseas 
employment, while by 1981, it was increased at 55787 (96.1%) 
of the total employment abroad. (Table 19) 
TABLE 19 
BANGLADESH'S MANPOWER EMPLOYMENT IN THE MUSLIM COUNTRIES 
(No. of persons) 
Year Algeria 
Bahrain 










1976 -- 338 281 587 — 643 173 113 1221 214 1989 — 5559 6087 91.3 
1977 11 870 339 1238 — 1315 718 1492 2262 1379 5819 -- 15443 15725 98.2 
1978 17 762 982 1454 — 2243 2394 2877 1303 3212 7512 — 22756 22809 99.7 
1979 25 827 4 2362 73 2289 1969 3777 1383 6490 5055 — 24254 24485 99.0 
1980 3 1351 2 1927 127 3687 2976 4745 1455 8695 4895 — 29815 30573 97.5 
1981 — 1392 — 13153 66 5464 4162 7351 2268 13384 6418 — 53658 55787 96.1 
Total 56 5540 1608 20721 266 15641 12392 20355 9892 22079 31688 — 151485 155461 96.97 
Source: GoXam Mostafa, "Bangladesh's Foreign Policy: The Middle East Factor," 
BTTSS Journal 7, no. 1 (January 1986): 47. 
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Fig. 12. Bangladesh's Overseas Employment in the Muslim World: 
The Zia Regime. 
With the increasing outflow of manpower to the Middle East 
countries, the remittance also increased significantly. In 
1976 the total remittance was U.S. $9 million, while in 1981 
it reached $171.6 million, which was almost twenty times 
higher than 1976. (1 dollar is taken as 40 taka.) (Table 20) 
TABLE 20 
REMITTANCE FROM THE OVERSEAS EMPLOYEES 
TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES 
Year in core taka* in million $ 
1976 35.85 8.96 
1977 125.16 31.29 
1978 165.59 41.39 
1979 266.74 66.68 
1980 523.81 130.95 
1981 686.35 171.58 
TOTAL 1803.50 450.85 
Source: Table prepared from Golam Mostafa, "Bangladesh Foreign Policy: 
The Middle East Factor," BUSS Journal 7, no. 1 (January 
1986): 49. 
* 40 taka is taken as one(l) dollar. 
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Fig. 13. Remittance from the Overseas Employees: The Zia Regime. 
Another success story of Bangladesh's relations with 
the Muslim world, was its trade relationship during the Zia 
regime. It is true that the balance of trade between 
Bangladesh and the Middle Eastern countries are always 
negative because Bangladesh imports very costly petroleum 
and petroleum products from the Middle Eastern countries, 
while exports mainly tea, jute, jute goods, fish, fish 
preparation, vegetables, animals, sanitary filling and 
ready-made garments, to the region. 
Although Bangladesh's balance of trade was always 
negative with the Middle Eastern countries the fact is that 
the Bangladesh's export to these countries increased over 
the years during the Zia regime, while it was seriously 
strained under the Mujib regime. (Table 21) 
TABLE 21 
BANGLADESH'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD 
(in million US $) 
Countrv 1976 1977 
Export 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
Total 
Exoort 1976 1977 
Import 





Malaysia . 9 .3 .5 .5 2.9 .2 5.30 5.3 7.4 13.6 20.3 46.3 56.7 149.60 -144.30 
Maldives . 1 n n n n n .1 n n n n n n n + . 1 
Turkey 6.0 5.2 8.4 8.5 7 . n 45.90 n n 10.8 .9 .1 n 11.80 +34.10 
Bahrain n n n n n n n n n n n 6.7 .3 n -7.00 
Egypt 14.8 15.9 15.6 17.6 17.6 11.5 97.0 n 2.8 2.3 1.5 8.4 3.6 18.60 +78.40 
Jordan n n n n n . 1 . 1 n n n n n n n + . 1 
Lebanon n n i. i n n 2.1 3.2 n n n n n n n + 3.2 
Syr. Arab Rep. 6.3 7.4 10.5 9.7 13.2 32.3 79.40 n n n n n n n +79.40 
Yem Arab Rep. . 1 .5 n n 1.0 .6 2.20 n .7 .2 n n n .90 + 1.30 
Yem P 0 Rep. n n n n n n n 1.2 .2 n n n n 1.40 -1.40 
Algeria . i 1.0 .1 1.5 .5 3.3 6.30 n n n n n .2 .2 + 6.10 
Indonesia .2 n n n .7 2.6 3.5 . i .5 .8 1.8 15.2 45.0 n n 
Iran 11.4 14.2 15.2 17.6 47.8 43.7 149.9 46.6 50.9 51.1 .2 39.9 4.9 193.60 -43.70 
Iraq 3.6 1.5 16.4 13.7 18.9 13.2 67.30 3.3 .9 4 .1 46.3 26.0 .6 80.76 -13.46 
Kuwait .2 .1 .4 .6 .3 . 6 2.20 5.2 26.3 11.8 19.4 12.3 28.2 103.20 -101.00 
Libya .2 .5 n n .1 n .8 n n n .1 n n n n 
Nigeria 3.1 7.8 5.6 2.0 1.9 2.2 24.80 n n n n n n n +24.80 
Oman n n n n n . 1 . 1 27.7 .5 n n .8 n 29.00 -28.90 
Satar n . i .i . i .3 . 4 1.0 n n n n n n n + 1.00 
Saudi Arabia n .5 .3 .4 . 9 4.7 .8 3.8 22.5 17.6 88.5 225.8 306.5 664.7 -657.90 
UAE .2 .7 1.4 1.6 1 .1 1.8 6.70 18.0 80.5 61.8 73.2 137.2 161.4 532.10 -525.40 
Guinea .4 .1 . 1 n . 1 . 1 .8 n n n n n n n + .8 
Morocco 1.0 1.4 .8 3.0 1.7 .5 8.40 . 6 n n n n n n + 7.80 
Sierra Leone .2 .1 .5 n n n .8 n n n n n n n + .8 
Somalia n n n .4 n n .4 n n n n n n n + . 4 
Sudan 6.8 15.6 4.0 18.4 34 35.0 114.30 n n n n n n n +114.30 
Tunisia 1.3 1.6 .2 n .5 . 9 4.5 n .6 n n n n n + 3.90 
Afghanistan .6 .8 1.2 . 9 1.0 1.5 6.0 1.0 n n n n n n + 5.00 
Senegal . 6 .3 n .3 n n 1.2 n n n n n n n + 1.2 
Uganda . 4 .7 n n n n 1.1 n n n n n n n + 1.1 





Data available shows that Bangladesh's export to Middle 
East was 9 percent in 1976-77, which increased significantly 
during the Zia regime and rose to as high as 21 percent in 
1980-81.84 While Bangladesh's import also increased during 
this period, simultaneously with the exports. Bangladesh's 
total import from the Middle Eastern region, constituted 8.5 
percent during 1975-76 and it reached at 22.4 percent in 
1981.85 Apart from those in the trading field, another 
development was Bangladesh's trade relationship with the 
African Muslim countries and southeast Asian countries. 
Although relations with the Muslim countries of Southeast 
Asia and African states established during the Mujib regime, 
Zia augmented economic relations with these countries 
significantly. 
Summary 
Finally, it is revealed that at the political level, 
Bangladesh-Muslim world relations started to grow since the 
post-liberation period. During the first phase (1971-1975), 
Mujib regime was exclusively engaged in diplomatic efforts 
for obtaining recognition from the Muslim world. Mujib's 
domestic policy, especially secularism and socialism as 
84See Annual Export Receipts 1983-84, Statistical Department 
(Bangladesh Bank, Table II), 48-156. 
85See Bangladesh's Import From the Middle East, Annual Import 
Payment: 1983-84 (Statistical Department: Bangladesh Bank, Table II). 
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state principles and constitutional measures of the Mujib 
administration against Islamic politics constrained 
Bangladesh-Mus1im world relations. While at the 
international level, Bangladesh's alignment with the Hindu 
India and the socialist Russia and the communist world 
hostiled Muslim world's attitude towards Bangladesh. 
Actually, during the Mujib regime, the Muslim world, 
particularly the Arab world, remained hostile to Bangladesh, 
especially hostile to the secular character of the 
constitution, hostile to the commitment to socialism and 
hostile to the alignment of the state with the Soviet Union, 
socialist world and India. Following the August coup, 
with the advent of Ziaur Rahman Bangladesh rapidly changed 
both of its domestic and foreign policies. Through 
constitutional amendments, Zia deleted secularism from the 
constitution and gave Islamic flavor to it, by inserting 
"Bis Millah-er-Rahmanir-Rahim" in the preamble of the 
constitution. Moreover socialism was re-defined as social 
and economic justice, while free market economic system was 
patronized by the state. At the international level Zia 
overnight shifted from Indo-Soviet orbit and aligned with 
the Muslim world. In order to ensure special relations with 
the Muslim world, Zia pledged to consolidate, preserve and 
strengthen fraternal relations with Muslim countries, based 
on Islamic solidarity. Zia's effort brought Bangladesh back 
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to the very heart of the Muslim world, and Bangladesh became 
a leading member of the OIC and the Muslim world. 
Similarly, because of weak political relations during 
the Mujib regime, economic relations were very 
insignificant. Until 1974-75 the Muslim countries, 
especially Arab world, did not contribute Bangladesh any 
food project or commodity aid, except very insignificant 
amount of donation as part of humanitarian assistance. 
Although trade relation was in existence during the 
Mujib regime it was also confined within limited countries 
and the volume of trade was insignificant. 
Following the fall of the Mujib regime, Bangladesh's 
political alliance with the Muslim world improved 
significantly which culminated the economic relations 
subsequently. Apart from bilateral economic relations, IDB 
and OPEC, the two multilateral institutions of the Muslim 
world came forward to assist Bangladesh's development 
project with substantial economic aid. During Zia's period, 
Bangladesh's overseas employment and Bangladesh's trade 
relation improved significantly with the Muslim world. While 
in 1976, the total remittance from the Middle East was 9 
million, it reached as high as 171.6 million, which was 
almost twenty times higher than 1976. Moreover, by 1980s the 
Muslim world emerged as a major donor of Bangladesh. 
So in the final analysis it is unveiled that economic 
relations are dependent on political relations. As Mujib's 
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political relation with the Muslim world was cooler than 
Zia, Mujib's economic relation was weaker with the Muslim 
world than Zia too. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In the final analysis, it has been revealed that in the 
foreign policy decision-making process of a developing 
country like Bangladesh, national interest is supreme and 
sovereign. It is not only a legitimate but a fundamental 
cause for national policy. According to the theory of 
national interest, in the post-1iberat ion period, 
Bangladesh's national interest demanded such a pragmatic 
foreign policy which would ensure self preservation, 
economic advancement, safeguarding national power in 
relation to other states, upholding national ideology, 
values and national prestige. 
Immediately in the post liberation period, the Mujib 
regime, which shouldered the responsibility of formulating 
the foreign policy unfortunately could not follow the 
theory of national interest, rather followed the principles 
of the national liberation war in framing the foreign policy 
of Bangladesh. Although in the post-liberation reality 
any rationally shaped foreign policy of a country is 
supposed to be directed by the theory of national interest, 
Mujib's foreign policy was guided by the principles of the 
national liberation war, i.e., socialism and secularism, 
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which dictated Bangladesh's alignment with the pro¬ 
liberation forces at the international level viz: India and 
the Soviet Union which consequently projected Bangladesh's 
hostility towards the anti-liberation forces at the 
international level. For example, Mujib's foreign policy was 
formulated as anti-U.S., anti-China and anti-Muslim world 
who supported Pakistan against the Bangladesh struggle in 
1971. Though Mujib's policy demonstrated his deep 
commitment and clear allegiance to the values of the 
national liberation war, it undermined the national 
interest. In the aftermath of the devastating war, 
Bangladesh needed huge amounts of external aid, in order to 
remodel its war-torn economy. Although both India and the 
Soviet Union provided significant amounts of foreign aid to 
the Mujib regime, it was quite inadequate for its enormous 
needs. India was incapable of fulfilling Bangladesh's 
gargantuan needs, while the Soviet Union failed to provide 
adequate aid to Bangladesh for sustaining its economy. On 
the other hand, the USA, the western world, China, and the 
Muslim world did not respond to Mujib's call positively, 
because of his socialist and secular policy at the domestic 
level, and pro-Indian and pro-Soviet policy at the 
international level. Due to the lack of adequate external 
assistance, Mujib failed to meet the minimum needs of the 
people, and distrust and disappointment erupted against the 
Mujib regime and his pro-Indian and pro-Soviet policy proved 
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ineffective while the values of the national liberation war, 
especially socialism and secularism appeared to be extra 
burden on the people of Bangladesh. This ultimately 
dissociated Mujib from mass aspiration and eroded his 
credibility. Eventually Mujib had to pay the ultimate price 
and his regime was overthrown through the military coup of 
August 1975, without any public protest. 
However, with the eclipse of the Mujib regime, and the 
emergence of Ziaur Rahman, at first defacto and later dejure 
leader, rapid and major changes occurred both at the 
domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, 
Zia deliberately distracted from the so-called values of the 
liberation war viz; socialism and secularism. He at first 
amended the constitution, and abolished secularism and 
inserted Bismilla-her-Rahmanir-Rahim in the preamble of the 
constitution and pledged to maintain fraternal relations 
among Muslim countries, based on Islamic solidarity. At this 
landmark decision, the Muslim world quickly and 
unequivocally responded to Zia's call with moral and 
material support unlike Mujib. On the other hand, instead of 
socialism, Zia introduced free market economy which was 
highly applauded by the USA and the west and the US policy 
towards Bangladesh changed quickly and mistrust, misunder¬ 
standing and reservation of the US and western policy makers 
about Bangladesh gradually disappeared from the scene. 
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On the other hand, at the international level, Ziaur 
Rahman very promptly shifted from the Indo-Soviet orbit and 
aligned with the USA, west, China and the Muslim world. 
Although Zia's policy gradually weakened and rifted 
Bangladesh's relations with India and the Soviet Union, it 
could not pose serious threat to Bangladesh's national 
interest. In order to forestall Indo-Soviet threat and to 
ensure the security of Bangladesh, Zia established strong 
ties with the USA, China and the Muslim world. While at the 
increasing flow of foreign aid and the growing economic 
cooperation between Bangladesh and its new allies, (i.e., 
US, China and the Muslim world), Zia could successfully 
renovate the new economy and his foreign policy was regarded 
as pragmatic both at home and abroad and it was mostly in 
conformity with the national interest of Bangladesh. 
However, in this chapter I shall focus on the fundamental 
changes in the Bangladesh's foreign policy from the Mujib to 
Zia regime. The changes will be shown in terms of 
Bangladesh's relations with the key countries. 
Bangladesh, and India 
In the post liberation period, as regards to 
Bangladesh's relations with India, Mujib's foreign policy 
was considered pro-Indian. This was because India supported 
the Bangladesh struggle with utmost vigor. Finally through 
the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, the Bengali freedom fighters 
liberated Bangladesh, under the overt and covert support of 
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the Indian army. In fact, India's decision to dismember 
Pakistan stemmed out of several factors: 
(1) The Bangladesh liberation war was the prime time to 
dismember its birth rival--Pakistan, otherwise such an 
opportunity would never come again. 
(2) Pakistan—a political enemy on both sides of the 
border will be replaced by a far weaker enemy on the one 
side (Pakistan) and a friend on the other (Bangladesh). 
(3) India desired to emerge as an Asian super power and 
to maintain its hegemony will be fulfilled. 
(4) Finally, India wanted to establish a weak and 
subservient government in Bangladesh. 
However, following the independence, Mujib clearly 
followed a "tilted" policy towards India, in order to pay 
back his debt which he owed to India during the liberation 
war. To this end, at the domestic level, Mujib followed the 
Indian model of secularism and multi-party democracy with a 
single dominant party system. At the international level 
Mujib pursued a pro-Indian foreign policy, which was 
formalized by the signing of a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, 
and Cooperation between Bangladesh and India, for a period 
of twenty-five years. This generated "Indian hegemonism," 
and led Mujib to pursue a subservient foreign policy to 
India. Taking full advantage of Mujib's submissive foreign 
policy, India politically treated Bangladesh as a weak 
client state. This was demonstrated in the Indo-Bangladesh 
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Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which forbade Bangladesh to 
undertake any commitment, secret or open, towards one or 
more states, which may be incompatible with that treaty. 
At the political level again India showed its 
chauvinism with Bangladesh regarding the Ganges water 
dispute. Though according to the Bangladesh-India Treaty of 
Friendship, Peace and Cooperation, a Joint River Commission 
(JRC) was set up to meet the water disputes, interestingly 
enough the question of the apportionment of the Ganges water 
remained outside the purview of the JRC. Although a short 
term agreement from April 21 to May 31, 1975 (41 days) was 
signed during the Mujib regime, which ensured 44,000-49,000 
cusecs of water for Bangladesh, India unilaterally withdrew 
vast quantities of water (40,000) at Farakkah just after the 
end of the 41-day agreement which posed a serious threat of 
economic ruination to one third of Bangladesh. 
At the economic level, although India emerged as a 
major donor, it was unable to provide sufficient economic 
aid to Bangladesh in order to keep the economy running. 
Moreover following the dawn of independence, India treated 
Bangladesh as a subservient economy and Bangladesh economy 
became dependent. 
Indian dominance was evident after Indian Army's 
(150,000 Indian troops who entered into Bangladesh to 
expedite the liberation of Bangladesh) looting of the vast 
quantity of arms and ammunition left by the surrendering 
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Pakistani army. The systematic looting of the Indian army 
especially in the mills and factories has angered and 
enraged Bangladesh's civil-military officials. 
Another aspect of Bangladesh-India relations during the 
Mu jib regime was the border trade pact. This pact in 
practice gave rise to the whole scale smuggling. Because of 
the large scale smuggling this pact embittered the economic 
relations between the two countries . Bilaterally although 
Bangladesh-India relations were formalized by a series of 
economic agreements and although India provided immediately 
the technical assistance to Bangladesh in order to operate 
roads, bridges and other communication system, Indian 
limitless smuggling from Bangladesh made Bangladesh's mills 
and industries almost ineffective and its economy was 
virtually going to collapse. Albeit, India emerged as the 
largest donor of Bangladesh, Mujib's policy made Bangladesh 
a totally subordinate and dependent on India. 
But following the coup d'etat of August 15, 1975 with 
the fall of the Mujib regime the new leader of Bangladesh 
made an effort to translate the national interest of 
Bangladesh into reality and very promptly shifted from his 
predecessor's policy both at the domestic and international 
levels. At the domestic level, Zia changed his policy from 
Mujib's old route of secularism and socialism. Zia abolished 
secularism through constitutional amendment and instead 
constitutionally pledged to provide absolute trust and faith 
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in Almighty Allah. Zia gave farewell to socialism by 
introducing a free market economy, i.e., privatization, 
denationalization and encouragement of the private 
ownership—a clear path of capitalist development. 
While at the international level, Zia shifted from the 
Indo-Soviet orbit very rapidly and tied the fate of 
Bangladesh with the USA, the west, China and the Islamic 
world. At this point national interest of Bangladesh 
demanded economic development and national security of the 
country. Zia's new alignment with the USA, China and the 
Muslim world, resulted in an adequate amount of foreign aid 
which was utilized for the national economic development of 
the country. Regarding the political security, although 
hostile India and the Soviet Union posed a new threat to 
Bangladesh, its strong tie with China, the Muslim world and 
the USA worked as a counter balance. Although Bangladesh 
under Zia was considered as an unreliable and unfriendly 
country by India, Zia successfully accomplished the national 
interests. Whereas the Mujib government failed to solve the 
major issue, like the Ganges water dispute, Zia by his 
challenging foreign policy internationalized the issue by 
raising it in the OIC, the NAM and in the UN General 
Assembly and pressurized India, which ultimately forced the 
post-Indira, Janata government to sign an agreement for the 
apportionment of the Ganges water between the two countries 
for a period of five years. 
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While at the economic level, Bangladesh-India relations 
became very stagnant during the Zia regime. It was mainly 
confined within the traditional trade relations between the 
two countries. Because of Zia's shifting from the Indo- 
Soviet orbit, India slowed down its economic assistance to 
Bangladesh, but his foreign policy opened up several new 
avenues and explored supplementary foreign assistance from 
the U.S., China, and the Muslim world which ultimately 
better served the national interest of the country, as 
compared to the Mujib regime. 
Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations 
After the failure of the national integration of 
Pakistan, in the redesigned south Asian region, both 
Bangladesh and Pakistan very cautiously but seriously tried 
to establish a new relationship. For Pakistan it was an 
imperative to get released the 90,000 prisoner of war 
(POW's) including 195 alleged war criminals who were 
supposed to be tried by the Bangladesh government. For 
Bangladesh it was essential because it needed Pakistan's 
recognition in order to normalize its relations with the 
Muslim world and China. Finally on the eve of the Lahore 
summit of the OIC in 1974, Pakistan recognized Bangladesh 
and successfully gained the released of 90,000 prisoners of 
war including the 195 war criminals. Through Pakistan's 
recognition, Bangladesh got an opportunity to expand 
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cooperation with Pakistan, but still there were no 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
Because of the lack of diplomatic tie there was no 
trade link between the two countries and economic relations 
remained virtually nil. 
Although national interest implies that there is no 
eternal friend and no eternal enemy, national interest is 
the prime concern, in the international relation, Mujib's 
foreign policy was directed by the principles of national 
liberation war which generated hatred against Pakistan for 
its genocide and destruction in Bangladesh during the 
struggle. Of course Mujib's foreign policy was consistent 
with the principles of the national liberation war but it 
was incompatible with the national interest. Consequently, 
Bangladesh-Pakistan relations remained totally stagnant with 
mistrust, misunderstanding and enmity to each other. 
Following the August coup of 1975, the new leader Ziaur 
Rahman's new direction of foreign policy decision led 
Bangladesh to move towards rapprochement with Pakistan. 
After the fall of the Mujib regime and with the end of the 
entente cordial that existed between Mujib-Gandhi and 
Brezhnev, Pakistan was the first country that renewed its 
recognition of Bangladesh and urged upon the Islamic and 
Third World countries to recognize Bangladesh. Pakistan's 
new approach was reciprocated by Bangladesh and both 
countries established diplomatic relations. However Ziaur 
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Rahman's constitutional measures of deleting secularism and 
farewell to socialism at the domestic level and 
constitutional commitment to maintain fraternal relations 
with the Muslim world at the international level, were 
highly appreciated by Pakistan and prompted close 
cooperation and friendship between the two countries. During 
the Mujib regime, hostilities froze the relationship between 
the two countries, the ice started melting under the Zia 
regime. As a matter of fact, Ziaur Rahman accomplished 
quite a good number of achievements in bilateral relations. 
Both countries held identical views in regional and 
international forums and Pakistan emerged as a trusted 
friend of Bangladesh. Bangladesh raised its voice with 
Pakistan against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and 
supported Pakistan's readmission into the Commonwealth. 
While Pakistan strongly endorsed Bangladesh's position in 
the UN General Assembly against India regarding the Ganges 
water dispute. Apart from this, regarding bilateral 
problems though Bangladesh-Pakistan cordiality could not 
solve the distributions of the assets and liability issues, 
it settled partially the repatriation of the stranded 
Pakistanis issue what was a major success of Zia's policy 
towards Pakistan. Actually Bangladesh and Pakistan worked in 
the spirit of partnership during the Zia regime which served 
Bangladesh's national interest, better than the Mujib 
regime. 
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Again at the economic level, Bangladesh-Pakistan 
established economic relations with the advent of Ziaur 
Rahman. In order to promote economic cooperation the two 
countries signed a number of agreements and the landmark 
among those agreements was the setting up of a joint 
economic commission. The joint economic commission indeed 
augmented the volume of trade and commerce between Dhaka and 
Islamabad and Pakistan became the biggest buyer of 
Bangladesh's jute and tea. Another important aspect of 
Bangladesh's economic relations with Pakistan was that the 
balance of trade was always favorable to Bangladesh. 
Finally, it has been discerned that at the economic level, 
Bangladesh-Pakistan relations improved significantly during 
the Zia regime and Bangladesh's national interest was 
protected through Bangladesh's favorable balance of trade. 
Bangladesh and the USA 
Following its emergence as an independent state 
Bangladesh's relation with the United States was clouded 
with mistrust and misunderstanding for two reasons: First of 
all, the United States pursued a "tilt" policy towards 
Pakistan during the liberation war of Bangladesh,because 
Pakistan was the former ally of the USA, the partner of the 
US sponsored defense treaties, i.e. SEATO and CENTO and 
finally Pakistan played the role of the conduit between the 
US and China for Nixon-Kissinger's rapprochement process. 
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Secondly, in the post-liberation period, the Mujib 
administration adopted a socialist development strategy at 
the domestic level and at first adopted and later rejected a 
multi party system, and instead introduced one party 
authoritarian system following the Soviet system. It also 
externally aligned with India, the Soviet Union and other 
countries of the socialist camp, which were opposed to the 
capitalist development strategy, western democracy and US 
foreign policy. Specifically Mujib's policy against the US 
role in Vietnam war and Bangladesh's trade relations with 
Cuba, branded Mujib as an anti-American international 
lobbyist. Subsequently the US statesman and policy makers 
were skeptical about Mujib's national and international 
policies. 
Although during the economic crisis of 1973/74, Mujib 
administration was trying to revise its policy according to 
the prescription of the world bank and the IMF, the Mujib 
government could not regain credibility among the U.S. and 
the Western donors. Moreover the failure of the Mujib 
administration to utilize the huge amount of foreign aid in 
the nation building activities during 1972/74 further eroded 
Mujib's credence among the donors. The west, particularly 
the US administrators and policy makers expressed 
considerable frustration with the Bangladesh government and 
regarded Bangladesh as a low priority area. So, it has been 
discerned that in the wake of the birth of Bangladesh, in 
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order to meet the growing economic necessity, Bangladesh's 
national interest demanded warm relations with the United 
States and increasing US aid as India and the Soviet Union 
failed to provide Bangladesh with adequate economic 
assistance. But Mujib followed the principles of the 
national liberation war and pursued a pro-Indian, pro-Soviet 
and pro-socialist foreign policy, which was not suited with 
the national interest of Bangladesh. 
However, following the August coup of 1975 and the 
emergence of Ziaur Rahman as the new head of the government, 
Bangladesh's relation with the USA flourished significantly 
because of Zia's shifting from Mujib's domestic and 
international policies. At the domestic level Zia introduced 
free market economic policy instead of Mujib's socialist 
development strategy. Internationally Zia followed an 
"outward looking" foreign policy, aimed at promoting 
Bangladesh's relations with the west, particularly with the 
USA. 
In international forums both Bangladesh and the USA 
pursued an identical policy, unlike the Mujib regime. 
Bangladesh's role against the Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan, highly impressed the United States. Moreover as 
a member of the Security Council Bangladesh played a very 
constructive role during the US hostage crisis in Iran. In 
return the United States came forward with its economic 
assistance for implementing the second five year plan of 
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Bangladesh. Finally by the 1980s the USA emerged as the 
largest donor of Bangladesh and partner in 133 different 
accords. Moreover the US policy makers were very confident 
in Zia's foreign policy and regarded the US-Bangladesh 
relations as excellent. Finally, it has been understood that 
the US-Bangladesh friendship reached from the nadir to its 
peak during the Zia regime and served the national interest 
of Bangladesh better than the Mujib regime. 
Bangladesh and the Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union was the only super power which 
actively supported the Bangladesh liberation war. After the 
birth of Bangladesh, Mujib government subscribed to the 
socialist development strategy at the domestic level and 
allied with the Indo-Soviet nexus at the international 
level. Of course Mujib's pro-Soviet policy at the domestic 
and international levels better suited the principles of the 
national liberation war. But it failed to meet the national 
interest of Bangladesh in the post liberation period. 
Bangladesh under Mujib subscribed the Soviet model of 
socialism and one party authoritarian system, at the 
national level. Mujib also supported the Soviet policy in 
Vietnam and Cuba against the US policy at the international 
level. But the Soviet Union failed to meet up with the 
economic needs of Bangladesh in the post-liberation period. 
It was expected that the Soviet Union will emerge as the 
main patron of Bangladesh in the economic field, but the 
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rising expectation soon translated into a heightened 
frustration, only when the Soviet Union proved totally 
unreliable. Moreover, the wide gap between the Soviet aid 
commitment and disbursement further eroded the Soviet 
credibility among the people of Bangladesh. Immediately in 
the post liberation period, the Soviet Union obviously 
wanted Bangladesh to be in the anti-imperialist bloc in 
order to withstand the Sino-US détente in South Asia. But 
the Soviet Union failed to keep Bangladesh within its orbit 
completely, because the Soviet declined in providing 
adequate economic aid to Bangladesh in order to avert famine 
and help re-model the war ravaged economy which ultimately 
contributed to the fall of the Mujib regime. 
However after the demise of the Mujib regime and the 
rise of Ziaur Rahman, the Soviet Union observed the 
development in Bangladesh as an embarrassment. Ziaur Rahman 
sharply shifted from the Indo-Soviet orbit overnight. He 
changed Mujib's policies of socialism and secularism and 
introduced the principle of free market economy instead of 
socialism while "trust and faith in Almighty Allah" replaced 
secularism. Again, at the international level, Zia adopted 
pro-US pro-Chinese and pro-Islamic foreign policy and got 
out of the Indo-Soviet orbit. Zia's rapid transformation 
from the Indo-Soviet orbit was marked by serious 
disappointment, which manifested in the poor Bangladesh- 
Soviet relations during the whole period of Zia. The Soviet 
404 
Union placed special reservation in their attitude towards 
the Zia regime at the political level the Soviet economic 
aid program was also slowed down considerably from its 
initial high level of activity during the Zia regime. Again 
Dhaka's denunciation and active role in the UN against the 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan created a new impediment. 
This contributed to Bangladesh's relations with the Soviet 
Union sinking to a new low. Although Zia's policy 
antagonized the Soviet Union at both the political and 
economic levels, its rapprochement with the USA, China and 
the Muslim world encountered the Soviet threat, and 
preserved the national interest. 
Bangladesh and China 
The frozen Bangladesh-China relations during the Mujib 
regime (1971-1975) became mutually warming with the 
beginning of the Zia regime. As a matter of fact, despite 
Chinese historical commitment of support to the national 
liberation struggle against repression, foreign domination 
and occupation, it is amazing to note that during the 
national liberation war of Bangladesh, it played a very 
negative role against the freedom struggle and directly 
supported economic and military assistance to the military 
dictator of Pakistan. Actually China's reservation about the 
liberation struggle of Bangladesh was determined by its 
global perceptions viz: hostility towards the Soviet Union, 
adversarial relations with India and strong ties with 
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Pakistan, which enabled the Sino-US rapprochement in 1971. 
In fact because of its "tilt" policy towards Pakistan, 
Beijing fully supported Islamabad during the 1971 crisis 
which tarnished its revolutionary image in Bangladesh. Apart 
from its global perception, from the Maoist revolutionary 
point of view, the liberation war of Bangladesh was that it 
was a criminal act of Indian expansionism backed by the 
Soviet social imperialism, the two forces which consistently 
supported the Bangladesh struggle in 1971. So, the Chinese 
officially regarded the Bangladesh liberation war as a 
counter revolutionary movement to aggrandize the narrow 
class interest, with the help of reactionary and revisionist 
external power. According to the Chinese standard it was 
not a genuine guerrilla war fought by peasants and workers. 
It was a separatist movement launched not by the masses but 
by a handful of persons who wanted to sabotage the unity of 
Pakistan. 
So following the dawn of independence, mistrust, 
misunderstanding and misperception obstructed the 
Bangladesh-China relations. China did not even recognize 
Bangladesh during the Mujib regime, because of its pro- 
Indian and pro-Soviet foreign policy, which was opposed to 
China's global policy. Moreover, China considered the Mujib 
regime as a government backed by the Indian hegemonism and 
the Soviet social imperialism. Although Bangladesh's 
national interest demanded the normalization of relations 
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with China and gaining Chinese economic and technical 
assistance for the rebuilding of the war damaged economy, 
the Mujib administration successfully failed to re-dress the 
Chinese grievances and was unable to pursue an independent 
foreign policy outside the Indo-Soviet orbit, which was 
anticipated by China. 
On the other hand after the fall of the Mujib regime, 
China recognized Bangladesh and established diplomatic 
relations. Actually China saw Mujib's overthrow as a 
disgraceful matter for both India and the Soviet Union. 
Since then the Bangladesh-China rapport have been growing 
warmer, because of the new ruler's reluctance to subscribe 
the Indo-Soviet models at the domestic level and his rapid 
shifting from the Indo-Soviet orbit at the international 
level and alliance with China, the USA and the Muslim world. 
In the economic field, Bangladesh-China relations increased 
also substantially during the Zia regime which were 
virtually nil during the Mujib era. The economic relations 
were formalized through a series of agreements for bilateral 
economic cooperation including the long-term trade agreement 
(LTTA). Moreover China responded to Bangladesh's economic 
development by providing aid on easier conditions unlike 
many western countries. Actually President Zia stressed on 
the national interest of Bangladesh, which demanded close 
cooperation with any great power like China in the wake of 
Indo-Soviet hostility and the termination of Indo-Soviet 
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economic aid to Bangladesh. Zia's realistic policy overnight 
shifted from the Indo-Soviet orbit and directed Bangladesh's 
foreign policy closer to China which suited with the 
national interest of both Bangladesh and China. 
In the final analysis it is unveiled that Bangladesh's 
national interest and Chinese national interest intersected 
each other and reached at an equilibrium point, following 
the collapse of the Mujib regime and the rise of the Zia 
regime. Since then the Bangladesh-China relationship has 
been progressively improving and by the 1980s it reached its 
peak from its nadir. 
Bangladesh and the Muslim World 
Bangladesh's relations with the Muslim world were bleak 
and frustrating during the Mujib regime, partly because of 
the Muslim worlds support towards Pakistan during the 
liberation war and their deliberate "tilt" towards Pakistan 
but mainly because of Mujib's domestic policies of 
secularism and socialism—the forbidden ideologies of Muslim 
states and Mujib's international alliance with the Hindu 
India and the Socialist Russia. Of course, there were valid 
reasons for supporting the Pakistan against the Bangladesh 
liberation struggle. Their first consideration was the 
solidarity of the Muslim countries. Albeit 85 percent of the 
Muslim population were fighting for the Bangladesh struggle, 
the active support of the Soviet Union and India towards the 
Bangladesh movement provided the Muslim world with the grand 
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design of the Indo-Soviet allies to dismember the largest 
Muslim country—Pakistan. Secondly, Israeli moral support to 
the Bangladesh movement and its early recognition of 
Bangladesh created widespread misperception and skepticism 
among the Muslim world about the Bangladesh struggle. 
Thirdly, during the Bangladesh struggle of 1971, the Muslim 
world did not get a clear picture about what was going on in 
the East Pakistan. The East Pakistan crisis was presented 
to the Muslim world from the West Pakistani viewpoint. In 
fact, Pakistani rulers gave very distorted impressions about 
the political development in East Pakistan and most of the 
Muslim countries were confused about the happenings in East 
Pakistan. They were either not clear about the underlying 
reasons or the undercurrents of the Bangladesh movement. 
Fourthly, Indo-Bangladesh joint action against Pakistan 
with the material support of the Soviet Union was observed 
by the Muslim world, as a Soviet bid to fish in troubled 
water and materialize its "collective security plan." In 
fact the Soviet active involvement in the Pakistan crisis in 
1971 concerned the security of many Muslim states especially 
who had close borders with the Soviet Union. The Muslim 
world as a whole was worried about the expansion of the 
Soviet influence from Pakistan to Afghanistan, Iran and 
other oil rich Persian Gulf and Middle Eastern countries, 
which would inevitably pose a threat to the interest of the 
Muslim states, and break down the existing status-quo in 
409 
West Asia and the Middle East. Finally, Pakistan's relations 
with the Muslim world were very prominent and its position 
was very important as the largest and most active member of 
the Muslim world. So, they did not want the dismemberment 
of the largest member of the Ummah and opposed the 
Bangladesh movement. 
However, following the emergence of Bangladesh, the 
Mu jib regime tried to get the Muslim world's political as 
well as economic support for the re-modeling of the national 
economy, but it was mainly busy in getting the recognition 
of the Muslim world. Although it received recognition of all 
but Saudi Arabia, it failed to receive significant economic 
support from them which was crucial for the very survival of 
the country. Of course the national interest of Bangladesh, 
at this point, demanded its alliance with the Muslim world 
and their economic cooperation, but this could not be 
accomplished by the Mujib regime. Because Mujib's domestic 
and foreign policy was based on the principles of the 
national liberation war (secularism and socialism) which was 
opposed to ruling ideology of the Muslim world. So the 
Muslim world remained hostile to the Mujib regime, 
especially hostile to the secular character of the 
constitution, hostile to the commitment of socialism and 
hostile to the alignment of the state with the Soviet Union, 
socialist world and India. 
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But, during the post-Mujib regime a thaw began because 
of Zia's response to the national interest instead of 
stressing the principles of the national liberation 
movement. Scanning Bangladesh's national interest Zia 
brought a structural change both in the domestic and foreign 
policy of Bangladesh. By amending the constitution Zia 
deleted secularism from the constitution and gave Islamic 
character to it by inserting Bismillah-hir-Rahman-ir-Rahim 
in the preamble of the constitution and declared absolute 
trust and faith in Almighty Allah (God) . While the free 
market economic system was introduced instead of a socialist 
development strategy. Again at the international level, Zia 
overnight shifted from the Indo-Soviet orbit and aligned 
with the Muslim world. In order to ensure special relations 
with the Muslim world, Zia introduced a constitutional 
provision, which declared that the state shall endeavor to 
consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations 
among the Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity. 
Zia's policy of closer relations with the Muslim world was 
reciprocated unequivocally by the Muslim world, and 
Bangladesh became a leading member of the OIC and the Muslim 
world, which was formalized by securing its membership in 
the Alqud's committee, Alqud-Summit Committee, OIC Peace 
Committee, permanent committee of the Islamic Solidarity 
fund, and the appointment of the assistant secretary general 
of the OIC from Bangladesh. Similarly at the economic level, 
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because of weak political relations during the Mujib regime, 
economic relations were also very meager. But Zia's 
political alliance with the Muslim world and its commitment 
towards the Muslim countries both at the domestic and 
international levels, significantly improved Bangladesh's 
economic relations with the Muslim world. 
Apart from bilateral economic relations with the Muslim 
countries, IDB and OPEC the two multilateral institutions of 
the Muslim world came forward to assist the development 
projects in Bangladesh. During the Mujib regime, the Muslim 
world did not provide any food, project or commodity aid 
except some donations. During the Zia regime, the situation 
reversed dramatically, and the Muslim world provided 
significant aid to Bangladesh in addition to a large number 
of overseas employment opportunities in the Arab world. 
Moreover bilateral trading between Bangladesh and the Muslim 
world improved substantially during the Zia regime. 
At last, it is clearly apparent that Mujib's foreign 
policy continued to be dictated by the principles of the 
national liberation war, not by the theory of the national 
interest and, thereby it took the pro-Indian and pro-Soviet 
stances which was very much against the USA, the west, China 
and the Muslim world, and ultimately could not serve the 
economic interest of the country, since India and the Soviet 
Union proved totally ineffective in meeting the gargantuan 
needs of Bangladesh. While Zia's foreign policy was directed 
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towards the national interest of Bangladesh and distracted 
from the unproductive values of the national liberation war, 
which was widely appreciated by the USA, China, and the 
Muslim world. 
Appendix A shows a comparison between the Mujib and Zia 
regimes. 
APPENDIX 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE MUJIB AND ZIA REGIMES 
Munlh Regime 
i. Guiding Principle 
Principles of the national 
liberation war viz: nation¬ 





i. Guiding Principle 
Theory of National Interest: 
no eternal friend, no eternal 
enemy, national interest is 
supreme viz: self preservation, 
economic advancement, safe¬ 
guarding national power, 
upholding national ideology, 
values and national prestige. 
ii. Foreign Policy 
Transformation from the Indo- 
Soviet orbit to the US-China 
and Muslim world triangle. 
BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS 
Political level 
(1) Indian assistance to set 
up the new government 
after liberation. 
(2) Signing of a 25 years long 
treaty of peace, friend¬ 
ship and cooperation. 
(3) Indian dominance over 
Bangladesh. 
Economic Level 
(1) Indian significant amount 
of aid to Bangladesh for 
the reconstruction of the 
war-ravaged economy. 
(2) Indian technical assistance 
for repairing the roads, 
bridges and communication 
networks. 
(3) Rampant smuggling of Indian 
goods to Bangladeshi market 
and the ruination of Bangla¬ 
desh's local industries and 
inflation in Bangladesh. 
(4) Balance of trade was favor¬ 
able to India. 
(5) National interest was under¬ 
mined. 
Eolitical. level 
(1) Dispute over the apportion¬ 
ment of the Ganges water. 
(2) Zia's internationalization of 
the Farakkah issue against 
India and a five year long 
agreement with India for the 
apportionment of the Ganges 
water. 
(3) Overall attitude of India was 
hostile and unfriendly. 
Economic Level 
(1) India reduced bilateral 
economic aid to Bangladesh 
and it was very insignifi¬ 
cant during the Zia regime. 
(2) Zia's policy enabled to 
control smuggling from 
Bangladesh to India, 
substantially. 
Although balance of trade 
was still negative, Bangla¬ 
desh's export to India also 
increased significantly. 
(4) Bangladesh's national inter¬ 





(1) Repatriation of the prisoners 
of war from Bangladesh to 
Pakistan. 
(2) Repatriation of the stranded 
Bengalis from Pakistan to 
Bangladesh. 
(3) Pakistan's recognition of 
Bangladesh. 
(4) No diplomatic relations 
between Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. 
(5) Repatriation of the stranded 
Biharis remained unsettled. 
(6) Internationally Bangladesh's 
alignment with anti-Pakistani 
camp and totally different 
foreign policy from Pakistan. 
Economic Level 
(1) Distribution of the assets 
and liabilities remained 
unsettled. 
(2) Because of the lack of 
diplomatic relations 
economic cooperation was 
stranded. 
(3) Bangladesh's national 
interest was not protected. 
Political Level 
(1) Pakistan was the first country 
that recognized the new regime 
after the fall of the Mujib 
regime. 
(2) Set up of diplomatic relations. 
(3) Repatriation of the stranded 
Pakistani issue was partially 
resolved. 
(4) Pakistan's support to Bangla¬ 
desh for the apportionment of 
the Ganges water in the UN, 
NAM and OIC. 
(5) Bangladesh supported the admis¬ 
sion of Pakistan into the 
commonwealth. 
(6) Internationally identical 
policy with Pakistan. 
Economic Level 
(1) Joint Economic Commission was 
established. 
(2) Trade relations improved. 
(3) Balance of trade was favorable 
to Bangladesh. 
(4) Distribution of assets and 
liabilities still remained 
unsettled. 




(1) US recognition was delayed 
because the US was concerned 
about China and Pakistan's 
reaction. The presence of 
Indian troops in Bangladesh 
was also seen by the USA 
as an imitation of 
sovereignty. 
(2) Mujib government's socialist 
domestic policy and interna¬ 
tional alignment with the 
Soviet Union and the socialist 
world seriously disappointed 
the US policy makers. 
(3) Mujib's anti-American policy 
towards Vietnam, hindered the 
Bangladesh-US relations. 
Political Leva! 
(1) Zia's total commitment towards 
the capitalist path of develop¬ 
ment . 
(2) Zia's rapid shifting from the 
Indo-Soviet orbit and alignment 
with the US-China and the 
Muslim world helped build con¬ 
fidence among the US leaders. 
(3) Zia's identical policy with the 
USA about Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan made Bangladesh a 
trusted friend of the USA. 
(4) Zia's supportive policy towards 
the release of the US hostages 
in Iran was highly applauded 
by the USA. 
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BANGLADESH-USA RELATIONS (continued) 
(4) Mujib's installation of one- 
party rule finally eroded the 
bonds of friendship with the 
USA. 
Economic Level 
(1) Mujib's socialist development 
strategy made Bangladesh an 
unfriendly country to the 
US administration. 
(2) Mujib administration's misuse 
of foreign aid disappointed 
the US policy makers. 
(3) The US administration branded 
the Mujib government as an 
international basket case. 
(4) Mujib administration's trade 
relations with Cuba created 
mistrust and misunderstanding 
among the US policy makers. 
(5) Because of the weak political 
relations, there was a wide gap 
between the commitment and dis¬ 
bursement of the US aid to 
Bangladesh. 
(6) Bangladesh's national interest 
was seriously hampered. 
Economic Level 
(1) Zia's free market economic 
policy impressed the US 
policy makers. 
(3) US-emerged as the largest donor 
and partner in 133 different 
accords by 1980s. 
(4) Apart from bilateral assistance 
US-sponsored multi-lateral 
institutions like IMF, IBRD, 
IDA, and ADB announced major 
credits for Bangladesh. 
(5) Bangladesh's foreign aid 
management was appreciated 
by the western donors. 
(6) Bangladesh's aid inflow from 
the USA increased. 
(7) Bangladesh's national interest 
was augmented significantly. 
BANGLADESH-SOVIET UNION RELATIONS 
Political Level 
(1) The Soviet military and diplo¬ 
matic efforts greatly facili¬ 
tated the emergence of Bangla¬ 
desh. 
(2) Mujib government's socialist 
development strategy created a 
new Soviet satellite in 
Bangladesh. 
(3) Mujib government's identical 
policy with the Soviet Union 
against the US invasion in 
Vietnam and against US policy 
towards Cuba made Bangladesh 
close ally of the USSR. 
(4) Mujib subscribed the Soviet 
one-party authoritarian system. 
Political Level 
(1) Zia's overnight shifting from 
the Indo-Soviet orbit and the 
new alignment of Bangladesh 
with the USA, China and the 
Muslim world—the opposite camp 
of the socialist world. 
(2) Bangladesh's active role and 
and sponsorship of a resolution 
in the UN GA and the NAM 
against the Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan. 
(3) Bangladesh's role against Viet¬ 
namese aggression in Kampuchea 
also clouded the Bangladesh- 
Soviet relations. 
(4) Bangladesh openly charged the 
Soviet Union for opening a 
Soviet consulate at the port 
city of Chittagong without 
prior permission of the Bangla¬ 
desh government. 
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BANGLADESH-SOVIET UNION RELATIONS (continued) 
Economic Level 
(1) The Soviet Union provided sig¬ 
nificant but insufficient 
amount of aid to Bangladesh 
which could not meet the 
increasing necessity of 
Bangladesh. 
(2) The Soviet slavage operation 
in the Bangladesh ports of 
Chittagong and Khulua. 
(3) The Soviet Union provided 
barter trading facilities to 
Bangladesh. 
(4) Balance of trade was always in 
favor of the USSR. 
(5) Bangladesh's national interest 
was not ensured, because the 
Soviet Union was unwilling to 
provide necessary aid to Bang¬ 
ladesh to meet the immediate 
necessity of the post-indepen¬ 
dent Bangladesh. 
Economic Level 
(1) Zia's free market economic 
policy went against Soviet 
Socialist policy. 
(2) Bangladesh-Soviet trade turn¬ 
over which increased 
rapidly during Mujib's period 
began to fall down sharply 
during the Zia regime. 
(3) There was a large gap between 
the Soviet aid commitment and 
disbursements. 
(4) The Soviet Union only continued 
financing the old projects, 
committed during the Mujib 
regime. 
(5) Although the Soviet aid to 
Bangladesh was virtually 
stopped yet Bangladesh received 
huge amounts of aid from the 
US-China and the Muslim world, 
which was greater than the 
Soviet amount and thus Bangla¬ 
desh's national interest was 
served. 
BANGLADESH AND CHINA RELATIONS 
Polical Level 
(1) Because of its "tilt" towards 
Pakistan Beijing fully sup¬ 
ported Islamabad which tar¬ 
nished its revolutionary image 
in Bangladesh. 
(2) China refused to recognize 
Bangladesh during the Mujib 
regime because of his pro- 
Indian and pro-Soviet policy. 
(3) China branded Mujib administra¬ 
tion as a puppet government of 
the Indian hegemonism and the 
Soviet social imperialism. 
(4) China vetoed against admission 
of Bangladesh into the UNO in 
1974. 
Political Level 
(1) China recognzed Bangladesh and 
established diplomatic rela¬ 
tions with Bangladesh. 
(2) Zia's shifting from the Indo- 
Soviet orbit and alignment 
with the West and China was 
applauded by the Maoists. 
(3) Bangladesh under Zia regime 
showed the common perception 
with China in its anti-Indian 
and anti-Soviet attitude. 
(4) Bangladesh's relation with 
China forestalled Bangladesh's 
undue dependence on India. 
(5) China supported Bangladesh's 
Farrakah issue against India. 
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BANGLADESH AND CHINA RELATIONS 
Economic Level 
(1) The economic relation was nil 
during the Sheikh Mujib's 
period. 
(2) Although Bangladesh's national 
interest demanded the normali¬ 
zation of relations with China 
and required Chinese economic 
and technical assistance for 
the reconstruction of Bangla¬ 
desh's war-torn economy yet 
Mujib administration failed to 
address the Chinese grievances. 
(continued) 
Economic Level 
(1) Since the emergence of Ziaur 
Rahman, Bangladesh-China rela¬ 
tions had been growing steadily. 
(2) Economic and technical coopera¬ 
tion agreement and a trade and 
payment agreement (TPA) were 
signed in Peking in 1977. 
(3) Economic and tecnical coopera¬ 
tion stipulated an interest- 
free Chinese loan of $58.3 
million payable for ten years. 
(4) A five-year long term trade 
agreement (LTTA) was signed in 
Dhaka in 1980. 
(5) China provided better trade 
facility to Bangladesh. 
(6) China provided Bangladesh most 
favored nation's treatment in 
trade relations. 
(7) Chinese military aid to Bangla¬ 
desh was another major area of 
cooperation Beijing came for¬ 
ward as Dhaka's major arms sup¬ 
plier after the Soviet Union 
scrapped all military assist¬ 
ance to Bangladesh following 
the collapse of the Mujib 
regime. 
(8) Bangladesh's alignment with 
China forestalled Indo-Soviet 
threat and Chinese economic and 
technical assistance helped 
rebuild the national economy 
and thus the national interest 
of Bangladesh was achieved. 
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BANGLADESH AND THE MUSLIM WORLD RELATIONS 
Political Level 
(1) The birth of Bangladesh was 
considered by the Muslim world 
as a device of the Indo-Soviet 
axis power to dismember 
Pakistan. 
(2) Mujib's secular state principle 
and socialist development 
strategy was against the basic 
principles of Islam and the 
Muslim world. 
(3) Although most of the Muslim 
countries recognized Bangladesh 
during the Mujib regime, it 
is true that they had simply 
recognized the existence of 
Bangladesh but they did not 
involve in any economic activ¬ 
ities or did not show any 
interest about Bangladesh. 
(4) Although many Muslim countries 
recognized Bangladesh, yet the 
oil rich Saudi Arabia did not 
recognize during Mujib regime. 
(5) Bangladesh got admission in to 
the OIC in 1974. 
(6) Mujib's ban order on Islamic 
politics seriously disappointed 
the Muslim world. 
Economie Level 
(1) No bilateral aid (food, pro¬ 
ject or commodity aid to 
Bangladesh), except a few 
donations. 
(2) Although Bangladesh was the 
member of the OIC, because of 
its stranded political rela¬ 
tions, economic relations 
became stagnant. 
(3) Because of its poor political 
relations with the Muslim 
world, OPEC and IDB did not 
provide significant amount of 
aid and assistance to Bangla¬ 
desh. 
Political Level 
(1) Zia's shifting from the Indo- 
Soviet orbit, and alignment 
with the Muslim world and the 
West impressed the Muslim 
world. 
(2) Abolition of secularism and 
and socialism and insertion of 
of trust and faith in Almighty 
Allah in the constitution and 
Zia's constitutional pledge for 
maintaining fraternal relations 
with the Muslim world made 
Bangladesh a close friend of 
the Muslim world. 
(3) Bangladesh became a leading 
member of the OIC and the Mus¬ 
lim world. It became a member 
of the 15 member Alquds com¬ 
mittee, 3 member Alquods Summit 
Committee, 9 member OIC Peace 
Committee, and 15 member Com¬ 
mittee of the Islamic solid¬ 
arity fund. 
(4) Zia pursued an identical policy 
with the Muslim world regarding 
Palestine issue and the 
Middle East peace process. 
(5) The Muslim world extended its 
support towards Bangladesh 
against Indian hegemonism. 
It supported Bangladesh 
desh against India regarding 
Farrakkah issue. 
Economic Level 
(1) Zia's free market economic 
policy was appreciated 
by the Muslim world 
especially in the Arab world. 
(2) The Arab world became a major 
donor of Bangladesh during the 
Zia regime. 
(3) OPEC and IDB two multilateral 
institutions of the Muslim 




BANGLADESH AND THE MUSLIM WORLD RELATIONS (continued) 
(4) National interest demanded 
petro dollars from the Middle 
Eastern countries and trade 
and commerce with other Muslim 
countries, but Mujib's policies 
of socialism and secularism 
at the domestic level and 
alignment with the Indo-Soviet 
axis at the international level 
hindered the Muslim world 
from cooperation with 
Bangladesh. 
(4  Middle Ea3t became a potential 
labor market for Bangladesh's 
skilled and unskilled manpower. 
(5) Bangladesh's export increased 
significantly. 
(6) angladesh's national interest 
was served both politically and 
economically. At the political 
level, Zia's relations with the 
Muslim world worked as counter 
balance against India and the 
Soviet Union. At the economic 
level, the aid from the Middle 
East, the OIC, the OPEC and the 
IDB greatly regulated Bangla¬ 
desh's economic development and 
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